ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
    February
    7,
    1980
    ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
    Cornolainant,
    v.
    ?CB 78-28
    DARREL
    SLAGER,
    d/b/a
    RAPID
    LIQUID
    WASTE AND RUBBISH
    REMOVAL,
    )
    Respondent,
    MS.
    ANNE
    K.
    MARKEY,
    ASSISTANT
    ATTORNEY
    GENERAL,
    APPEARED
    ON BEHALF
    OF
    THE
    COMPLAINANT.
    MESSRS.
    WILLIAM
    C.
    LATHAM
    AND
    JOHN
    L.
    PARKER,
    JOHN
    L.
    PARKER
    &
    ASSOCIATES,
    LTD.,
    APPEARED
    ON
    BEHALF
    OF
    THE
    :RESPONDENT.
    OPINION AND ORDER OF THE BOARD
    (by Dr.
    Satchell)
    This matter comes before the Board upon
    a complaint filed
    on February
    2,
    1978 by the Environmental Protection Agency
    (Agency)
    An amended complaint was filed on March
    10,
    1978,
    substituting
    Darrel Slager, d/b/a/ Rapid Liquid Waste and Rubbish Removal
    as
    Respondent.
    The amended complaint alleges Respondent has disposed
    of refuse at a solid waste disposal site which fails to meet the
    requirements
    of the Environmental Protection Act
    (Act)
    arid, regu-
    lations thereunder in violation of Section 21(f)
    of the Act.
    Hearings were held on May
    1,
    1978, May 24,
    1978, September 21,
    1978 and November
    1,
    1978,
    Respondent
    is alleged to have dumped liquid wastes at the
    Paxton Landfill located between 116th Street
    and. 120th Street
    and.
    Oglesby Avenue on the far south side of the City of Chicago.
    Paxton Landfill did have a valid operating permit issued by the
    Agency
    CR,
    311,
    312).
    The original site
    (Paxton No.
    1)
    was
    corn--
    pleted in early 1976
    (R,
    312),
    However, operations proceeded into
    an
    adjacent land
    area that had not been included in the original
    permit nor was the site included in any new permit
    (R,
    312).
    The
    new site
    (Paxton No,
    2)
    did receive
    an operating permit in the
    fall of 1978, after the time period
    covered. in the amended com-
    plaint
    (R,
    310)
    Respondent’s trucks were seen disposing of liquid wastes at
    the Paxton No.
    2 site on several occasions;
    these include February
    28, 1977, March
    1,
    1977,
    October 14, 1977 and February
    9,
    1978
    :37—28 1

    —2—
    (R.
    29,
    46,
    58,
    65),
    On these dates observations
    of
    violations
    of
    the regulations were made,
    Refuse was not being deposited at
    the toe of the fill but was being spread
    and. compacted~downhill
    (R.
    31,
    60).
    This
    is not in accordance with Rule 303 of Chapter
    7:
    Solid Waste Regulations
    (Chapter 7).
    Operational roads were
    in unsatisfactory condition,
    a violation of Rule 314 of Chapter
    7
    (R.
    33).
    Liquid wastes and sludges were being disposed of at
    the site
    CR.
    33).
    Liquid wastes are only allowed to be disposed.
    of if authorized by permit.
    As Paxton No.
    2 had no permit, there
    could be no authorization;
    a violation of Rule 310 of Chapter
    7.
    On February 9,
    1978 there was inadequate daily cover over a portion
    of the fill and there was in fact virtually no cover——a violation
    of Rule 305 of Chapter 7
    (R,
    64),
    The fact that the Paxton site was operating in violation of
    the Act and the regulations was made known
    to Respondent
    in a
    letter from the Agency dated July 17, 1977
    (Comp. Ex,
    12),
    Respondent attempted to make a defense
    at the hearing on the
    basis that “liquid”
    is not defined by the regulations or the Act
    and consequently Agency employees would be incapable of deter-
    mining what a “liquid” waste would be.
    It is accepted practice
    that words that are not defined in an act or a regulation are given
    their plain
    and
    ordinary meaning,
    Webster’s New Twentieth Century
    Dictionary,
    Unabridged. 1976 Edition defines liquid as
    “a substance
    that, unlike a solid,
    flows readily, but unlike a gas, does not
    tend to expand indefinitely.”
    The Board finds that there is
    sufficient evidence in the Agency observations and exhibits to
    determine that Respondent was disposing of liquid wastes.
    The Board finds that there is sufficient evidence to determine
    that Respondent did dispose of refuse at a site which failed to meet
    the requirements of the Act and of regulations thereunder.
    Before
    determining what penalty should be assessed the Board must consider
    the factors enumerated in Section 33(c)
    of the Act.
    The character
    and degree of injury cannot be definitely ascertained.
    Liquid
    waste, because of its form,
    can spread faster than solid waste.
    As
    the components are unknown it is impossible to determine the hazard,
    This
    is precisely why special authorization is required to dispose
    of liquid wastes and hazardous wastes.
    If the components are known
    in advance, mixing of wastes with unfortunate results can be avoided.
    Certainly there
    is social and economic value
    to
    being able to dis-
    pose
    of
    unwanted
    wastes and by—products but these are diminished
    when
    there
    is a lack of planning for the disposal of the wastes.
    The
    site
    ultimately did get an Agency permit;
    however, whether or
    not these particular liquids should have been deposited there was
    not determined at hearing.
    Respondent was barred from presenting
    evidence of financial condition at the hearing because of Respond-
    ent’s refusal to comply with the Hearing Officer’s discovery order.
    37—282

    —3—
    The Agency did supply the Respondent with the names of properly
    licensed landfills in the area in
    the
    Agency’s letter of July
    13,
    1977
    (Comp. Ex.
    12),
    Technically and economically it appears
    compliance was feasible,
    Considering all of
    these factors, Respondents continued
    disposal of liquid wastes at this site after notice of the
    site’s
    violations
    is
    a blatant violation of the Act,
    Liquid wastes,
    because
    of their nature, are a particularly great and unknown hazard
    to future generations.
    The Board finds that a penalty of $1000
    will be assessed to aid the enforcement of the Act.
    This Opinion constitutes the Board’s findings of fact and
    conclusions of law in this matter.
    ORDER
    It is the Order of the Pollution Control Board that:
    1.
    Respondent, Darrel Slaqer, d/b/a Rapid Liquid Waste
    and Rubbish Removal is found to have violated Section
    21(f)
    of the Environmental Protection Act.
    2.
    Respondent shall, by certified check or money order
    payable to the State of Illinois, pay a civil penalty
    of $1000 whIch
    is to be sent to:
    Environmental Protection Agency
    Fiscal Services Division
    2200 Churchill Road
    Springfield,
    Illinois 62706
    Mr. Werner abstains.
    I, Christan L. Moffett,
    Clerk of the Illinois Pollution
    Control Board, he~ebycerify
    the above Opinion and Order were
    adopted on the
    fl~
    day of
    1980 by a vote of
    3_O
    Illinois Polluti
    Board
    37—283

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