ILLINOIS
POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
February
20,
1985
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,
)
Complainant,
v.
)
PCB 83—83
JOSLYN MFG.
& SUPPLY CO.,
an
)
Illinois
corporation, and
)
BERMAN ZELDENRUST,
)
)
Respondents.
CONCURRING STATEMENT
(by 3.
D.
Dumelle):
The
majority of the Board
has examined the
Environmental
Protection Act.
They have
bootstrapped a legal
requirement
to
publish an opinion containing
~factsand reasons~
via the
Administrative Procedure Act
into an assumed
requirement
for
admission of violations.
Admitted
,
the Environmental
Protection
Act is silent on
settlement prc ~dures (see majority
order, p.
3),
One must then
look at legis
~ive intent.
The court~have long held that ~t~e
legislative
declaration
of the purpose of the (Environmental
Protection
Act
(par.
1002)
indicates that the principal rea~onfor
authorizing
the
imposition of civil penalties
(par.
1042)
was
to.
provide
a
method
~
a+d the enforcement of th.~
Act ai~d~
that th~
punftive
considerations were secondary~ (C
fMonm2tithv. Pollution
Control Board
(1974)
57 Ill.
2d 482,
490,
313
N.E.
2d 161,
166).
I
find no reason to conclude that
compliance
with
the Act
cannot be
encouraged through
settlements
which do
not allow for
the finding of violation.
A large
penalty absent.
such a finding
clearly would be a greater deterrent
than a sma1~.
penalty in
conjunction with such a finding,
Thus,
the Board’s
~principal
reason~for imposing a penalty is
better met.
The Environmental PrQtection
Act has as one
of its goals the
establishment of
~~1alized
technical tribunal to
adjudicate
environmental
dir
~
~~olving
its own ru~~and
th~
~
That
tribunal
is thi~~1L~~i
Control
Board.
Implicit in establishing that
tribunal
is the
power
to
accept
(not ~order~) settlements
freely arrived at by
the
parties.
And if a party chooses
to make a contribution or pay a
penalty to
an Illinois fund,
why should the Board not accept ~t
it if it
appears reasonable?
After the
Board order
has been
issued
accepting the stipulation,
the penalty or
contribution
payment
is really not ~‘ordered,~ The word “
~r~’mere~
the Board’s official acceptance consistent ~th
tie at ‘u~at~
~,
The A~torneyGene
~.
of Illinois has brought this case on
behalf of
the IEPA.
His office
is also the lawyer for the
Pollution Control Board,
Obviously,
his staff saw no legal
impediment to approval by the Board of the stipulation here
presented and now rejected by the majority.
Further
nothing prevents the Attorney General from entering
into a
ontract with any person against whom he has brought an
enforcement action agTeeing to
dismiss
the proceeding upon a
contribution
to the En”trcnmental Trust Fund,
If the
~torney
Gener4.
were to
a~esuch a course,
the same ~settlement
could
be reauhed but neither the Board nor
the public would hs~
~
opportunity to look into that agreement
ifl
a public fo~un,
Alternatively,
as the majority acknowledg~,
~
same settlement
offered here could be accompliuhed before the court system.
In
either case,
the Boai~dloses ~he opportunity to oversee the
settlement process.
If the Board
is
to fully operate as the state’s specia1~ec1
technical tribunal in environmental matters,
it must have the
power
to accept all types of reasonable stipulations.
My feeling
is that
it has always had that power.
The propo
~condit~onmaking payments contingent upon a
Circuit Court
tion renders the stipulation unacceptable.
~
final o der of
he Boar~1should be final.
Also,
it appears
possible that
ne same paFties are pursuing the same action in
two forums simultaneously which should not be allowed
to occur,
The stipulation shouTh be rejected for these reasons only~ T~ius,
I concut in the ~ejed’tion~S~utnot for the main reason stated by
the majority
the
issue cf the need to find violations.
I, Dorothy N
cu~, Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Con~rol
Board, hereby cer
:
t the above Concurring Statement was
submitted on the
~
~
of
_____
~thyM.G~n~rk
Illinois Pollution Control Board