ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD

March 25,

1993

C.OA.L.

 (CITIZENS OPPOSED TO

)

ADDITIONAL

LANDFILLS),

)

Petitioner,

)

 PCB 92—131

(Landfill Siting Review)

LAIDLAW WASTE SYSTEMS,

 INC.,

)

and

THE

PERRY

COUNTY

BOARD

)

COMMISSIONERS,

)

Respondents.

ORDER OF THE BOARD

 (by J.

 C. Marlin):

This matter is before the Board on C.O.A.L.’s March

1,

1993

motion for reconsideration

 (35 Iii. Adm. Code 101.300)

 of the

Board’s January

21,

 1993 decision affirming the Perry County

Board of Commissioner’s (County)

 granting of siting approval to

Laidlaw waste Systems,

 Inc.

 (Laidlaw).

 On March 12,

 1993,

Laidlaw filed its response.

C.O.A.L. raises several arguments in support of

reconsideration all relating to the Board’s conclusion that the

County had jurisdiction over Laidlaw’s application.

 First,

C.O.A.L. contends that the Board erred in finding that Laidlaw

was not required to serve Matilda Poiter with notice under

Section 39.2(b) of the Environmental Protection Act

 (Act).

 (415

 ILCS 5/39.2(b)

 (1992).)

 The Board found that there was no

evidence introduced indicating that Poiter’s name appeared on the

authentic tax records and, hence,

 C.O.A.L. failed to establish

the that the jurisdictional notice requirement of Section 39.2(b)

of the Act applied to Poiter.

 (PCB 92-131 at 6—7.)

 C.O.A.L. now

asserts that Poiter,

 “as an owner of property within the subject

area

...

 was entitled as a matter of law to notice of the

proposed siting application,

 irrespective of whether the property

interest appeared in

...

 the ‘authentic tax records’ for Perry

County.”

 According to C.O.A.L., the Board erred in not

addressing a distinction between owners of property within the

boundaries of the subject property

 and those owning property

within 250 feet of the lot line of the subject property.

 (415

ILCS 5/39.2(b)

 (1992).)

 C.O.A.L. argues that owners within the

boundaries of the subject property are entitled to notice

regardless of whether their names appear on the authentic tax

records.

The Board notes that CO.A.L.’s interpretation of Section

39.2(b) that owners of property within the boundaries of the

subject property must receive notice regardless of whether their

2

names appear on authentic tax records

 is raised for the first

 time in its motion for reconsideration.

 A review of C.O.A.L.’s

post-hearing brief shows that the jurisdictional arguments raised

were based upon the contention that,

 as an owner of property

within 250 feet of the 1~tline of the subject property, Poiter

should have received notice of the application.

 (C.O.A.L’s Brief

at

1,

3.)

 The Board finds that C.O.A.L. may not raise such an

issue for the first time on reconsideration.

 While C.O.A.L.

continues to assert that jurisdictional issues may be raised at

any time, the Board again notes that C.O.A.L. had the opportunity

to address its jurisdictional challenges at the Board’s October

27,

 1992 hearing.

 C.O.A.L. does not contend that,

 for the first

time at this stage in the proceeding,

 it has discovered a

jurisdictional defect and new evidence in support that defect.

Rather, C.O.A.L.

 attempts to raise a new statutory construction

argument in support of a previously raised jurisdictional

challenge.

 For this reason alone,

 the Board denies

reconsideration of its finding that laidlaw was not required to

give notice to Poiter pursuant to Section 39.2(b)

 of the Act.

In spite of the above conclusion that C.O.A.L. has waived

this argument, the Board will address the merits of C.O.A.L.’s

statutory construction argument.

 Section 39.2(b) provides that

an applicant must serve notice “on owners of all property within

 the subject area not solely owned by the applicant,

 and on the

owners of all property within 250 feet in each direction of the

lot line of the subject property, said owners being such persons

or entities which appear from the authentic tax records of the

County in which the facility is to be located.”

 (415 ILCS

5/39.2(b)

 (1992).)

 Contrary to C.O.A.l.’s assertion,

 Section

39.2(b) makes no distinction between owners of property within

the subject area and owners within 250 feet for purposes of

identifying who must receive notice.

 Section 39.2(b) defines

“owners” as those persons or entities which appear on the

county’s authentic tax records regardless of whether they own

property within the subject area or within 250 feet of the lot

line of the area.

 Because the record fails to establish that

Poiter’s name appeared on the “authentic tax records”, the Board

affirms its ruling that no jurisdictional defect is presented by

Laidlaw’s failure to give Poiter notice.

The Board has considered the remaining arguments raised by

C.O.AL.

 in support of its contention that Poiter was entitled to

notice.

 The Board finds that C.O.A.L.’s argument regarding which

party had the burden of proof to establish jurisdiction was

adequately addressed by the Board in reaching is determination

that Poiter was not entitled to notice under Section 39.2(b) of

the Act.

 (PCB 92-131 at 4-7.)

 Having reached this conclusion,

 and finding that C.O.A.L. has waived its new statutory

construction argument, the Board declines C.O.A.L.’s request for

a rehearing on the issue of whether Poiter was entitled to

notice.

 L~O-Q2O6

Lastly,

 C.O.A.L. contends that the Board should reconsider

its finding that William Walker was not entitled to notice under

Section 39.2(b)

 of the Act as an owner of property within 250

feet of the lot line of the subject property.

 The Board finds no

support in C.O.A.L.’s motion for reconsideration for altering its

determination that there was no evidence presented establishing

that Walker owned property within 250 feet of the lot line of the

subject property.

Upon granting reconsideration,

 the Board has reviewed the

briefs and its opinion and order of January 21,

 1993 and declines

to reconsider its determination finding that the County had

jurisdiction and affirming the County’s grant of siting approval

to Laidlaw.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Section 41 of the Environmental Protection Act

 (415 ILCS

5/41

 (1992)) provides for the appeal of final Board orders within

35 days.

 The Rules

 of the Supreme Court of Illinois establish

filing requirements.

 (But see also,

 35 Ill. Adm.

 Code 101.246,

Motions for Reconsideration,

 and Casteneda v. Illinois Human

 Rights Commission

 (1989),

 132 Ill.

 2d 304,

 547 N.E.2d 437; Strube

v.IPCB,

No.

 3—92—0468, slip op. at 4—5

 (March 15,

 1993)

I, Dorothy M. Gunn,

 Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control

Board, hereby certify that the above order was adopted on the

5~day of

~7’)-~

~

 1993 by a vote of

______

~

Dorothy M.

~II~ic~I,

Clerk’

Illinois Pq9(ution Control Board

ieO-0207