ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
July 22, 2004
THE VILLAGE OF LOMBARD,
Complainant,
v.
BILL’S AUTO CENTER, BILL’S
STANDARD SERVICE and WILLIAM
KOVAR,
Respondents.
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PCB 04-213
(Citizens Enforcement – Cost Recovery)
ORDER OF THE BOARD (by N.J. Melas):
Today’s order accepts the complainant’s cost recovery complaint for hearing. On June 1,
2004, The Village of Lombard, Illinois (the Village) filed a complaint against Bill’s Auto Center,
Bill’s Standard Service, and Mr. William Kovar (respondents).
See
415 ILCS 5/31(d) (2002); 35
Ill. Adm. Code 103.204. Mr. Kovar owns and manages Bill’s Auto Center and Bill’s Standard
Service.
In its five-count complaint, the Village seeks recovery of $98,000 in costs incurred as a
result of respondents violating the following sections of the Environmental Protection Act (Act):
(1) Section 21(a) by causing or allowing open dumping of petroleum; (2) Section 21(d)(2) by
unlawfully storing and disposing of petroleum products in violation of Board regulations; (3)
Section 21(e) by unlawfully storing and disposing of petroleum products in violation of the Act;
(4) Section 12(a) by causing water pollution in count IV; (5) and Section 12(d) by creating a
water pollution hazard. 415 ILCS 5/12(a), (d), 21(a), (d)(2), and (e) (2002). The Village further
alleges that respondents violated these provisions by contaminating Village property while
removing and remediating petroleum contamination from leaking underground storage tanks at
the respondents’ facility. The complaint concerns respondents’ former gas station located at 330
South Main Street, Lombard, DuPage County.
Section 31(d) of the Act allows any person to file a complaint with the Board. 415 ILCS
5/31(d) (2002). Section 31(d) further provides that “[u]nless the Board determines that such
complaint is duplicitous or frivolous, it shall schedule a hearing.”
Id.
;
see also
35 Ill. Adm. Code
103.212(a). A complaint is duplicitous if it is “identical or substantially similar to one brought
before the Board or another forum.” 35 Ill. Adm. Code 101.202. A complaint is frivolous if it
requests “relief that the Board does not have the authority to grant” or “fails to state a cause of
action upon which the Board can grant relief.”
Id.
Within 30 days after being served with a
complaint, a respondent may file a motion alleging that the complaint is duplicitous or frivolous.
35 Ill. Adm. Code 103.212(b). Respondents have filed no motion.
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The Board, on its own motion, dismisses count II of the Village’s complaint as frivolous.
Count II of the Village’s complaint alleges a violation of Section 21(d)(2) of the Act, which
prohibits a person from conducting a waste storage operation or waste disposal in violation of
any regulation or standard adopted by the Board pursuant to the Act. 415 ILCS 5/21(d)(2)
(2002). The Board finds no alleged violation of any Board regulation or standard in the
Village’s complaint. Accordingly, the Board finds count II frivolous because it fails to state a
cause of action upon which the Board can grant relief. The Board notes that the Village may
move the Board for leave to file an amended complaint by following the procedures set forth in
Sections 103.204 and 103.206 of the Board’s procedural rules. 35 Ill. Adm. Code 103.204,
103.206.
The Board accepts the remainder of the Village’s complaint for hearing.
See
415 ILCS
5/31(d) (2002); 35 Ill. Adm. Code 103.212(a). A respondent’s failure to file an answer to a
complaint within 60 days after receiving the complaint may have severe consequences.
Generally, if respondents fail within that timeframe to file an answer specifically denying, or
asserting insufficient knowledge to form a belief of, a material allegation in the complaint, the
Board will consider respondents to have admitted the allegation. 35 Ill. Adm. Code 103.204(d).
The Board directs the hearing officer to proceed expeditiously to hearing. Among the
hearing officer’s responsibilities is the “duty . . . to ensure development of a clear, complete, and
concise record for timely transmission to the Board.” 35 Ill. Adm. Code 101.610. A complete
record in an enforcement case thoroughly addresses, among other things, the appropriate remedy,
if any, for the alleged violations, including any civil penalty.
If a complainant proves an alleged violation, the Board considers the factors set forth in
Sections 33(c) and 42(h) of the Act to fashion an appropriate remedy for the violation.
See
415
ILCS 5/33(c), 42(h) (2002). Specifically, the Board considers the Section 33(c) factors in
determining, first, what to order the respondent to do to correct an on-going violation, if any,
and, second, whether to order the respondent to pay a civil penalty. The factors provided in
Section 33(c) bear on the reasonableness of the circumstances surrounding the violation, such as
the character and degree of any resulting interference with protecting public health, the technical
practicability and economic reasonableness of compliance, and whether the respondent has
subsequently eliminated the violation.
With Public Act 93-575, effective January 1, 2004, the General Assembly changed the
Act’s civil penalty provisions, amending Section 42(h) and adding a new subsection (i) to
Section 42. Section 42(h)(3) now states that any economic benefit to respondent from delayed
compliance is to be determined by the “lowest cost alternative for achieving compliance.” The
amended Section 42(h) also requires the Board to ensure that the penalty is “at least as great as
the economic benefits, if any, accrued by the respondent as a result of the violation, unless the
Board finds that imposition of such penalty would result in an arbitrary of unreasonable financial
hardship.”
Under these amendments, the Board may also order a penalty lower than a respondent’s
economic benefit from delayed compliance if the respondent agrees to perform a “supplemental
environmental project”
(SEP). A SEP is defined in Section 42(h)(7) as an “environmentally
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beneficial project” that a respondent “agrees to undertake in settlement of an enforcement action
. . . but which the respondent is not otherwise legally required to perform.” SEPs are also added
as a new Section 42(h) factor (Section 42(h)(7)), as is whether a respondent has “voluntary self-
disclosed . . . the non-compliance to the [Illinois Environmental Protection] Agency” (Section
42(h)(6)). A new Section 42(i) lists nine criteria for establishing voluntary self-disclosure of
non-compliance. A respondent establishing these criteria is entitled to a “reduction in the portion
of the penalty that is not based on the economic benefit of non-compliance.”
Accordingly, the Board further directs the hearing officer to advise the parties that in
summary judgment motions and responses, at hearing, and in briefs, each party should consider:
(1) proposing a remedy for a violation, if any (including whether to impose a civil penalty), and
supporting its position with facts and arguments that address any or all of the Section 33(c)
factors; and (2) proposing a civil penalty, if any (including a specific total dollar amount and the
portion of that amount attributable to the respondent’s economic benefit, if any, from delayed
compliance), and supporting its position with facts and arguments that address any or all of the
Section 42(h) factors. The Board also directs the hearing officer to advise the parties to address
these issues in any stipulation and proposed settlement that may be filed with the Board.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
I, Dorothy M. Gunn, Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control Board, certify that the Board
adopted the above order on July 22, 2004, by a vote of 5-0.
Dorothy M. Gunn, Clerk
Illinois Pollution Control Board