|   | Continuing Violations Observed:Site Code: 077 809 5036 County: Jackson)ebris Pile
 ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCYOpen Dump Inspection ChecklistSECTION DESCRIPTION VIOLILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ACT REQUIREMENTS6. 21(d)CONDUCTANY WASTE-STORAGE, WASTE-TREATMENT, OR WASTE- DISPOSALWASTE INTO THE STATE AT/TO SITES NOT MEETING REQUIREMENTS OF ACTANY OF THE FOLLOWING OCCURRENCES AT THE DUMP SITE:(1) Litter13. 809.302(a)
OTHER REQUIREMENTS14.APPARENT VIOLATION OF:(LI)PCB;(0)CIRCUIT COURT
DIGITAL INSPECTION PHOTOSNo PhotoViolations Observed:
 ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ACT REQUIREMENTSOTHER REQUIREMENTS
DIGITAL INSPECTION PHOTOS0778095036-12052003-010778095036-12052003-02
DIGITAL INSPECTION PHOTOS0778095036-12052003-030778095036-12052003-04
AFFIDAVITContinuing Violations Observed:
OPENDUMPINSPECTIONPage 3077 812 5013Carbondale / Egon KamarasyMarch 11, 2004
 SECTION DESCRIPTION VIOLILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ACT REQUIREMENTS1. 9(a) CAUSE, THREATEN OR ALLOW AIR POLLUTION IN ILLINOIS2. 9(c) CAUSE OR ALLOW OPEN BURNINGOPERATION:7. 21(e)DISPOSE, TREAT, STORE, OR ABANDON ANY WASTE, OR TRANSPORT ANYWASTE INTO THE STATE ATITO SITES NOT MEETING REQUIREMENTS OF ACTANY OF THE FOLLOWING OCCURRENCES AT THE DUMP SITE:10. 812.1 01(a)SUBTITLE GFAILURE TO SUBMIT AN APPLICATION FOR A PERMIT TO DEVELOP ANDOPERATE A LANDFILL 
 Photo File Name:
Digital Inspection Photo SheetPhoto File Name:Photo File Name:
Digital Inspection Photo SheetPhoto File Name:Photo File Name:Continuing Violations Observed:
ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCYOpen Dump Inspection ChecklistSECTION DESCRIPTIONVIOLILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ACT REQUIREMENTS2. 9(c) CAUSE OR ALLOW OPEN BURNING6. 21(d)CONDUCT ANY WASTE-STORAGE, WASTE-TREATMENT, OR WASTE- DISPOSALOPERATION:7. 21(e)DISPOSE, TREAT, STORE, OR ABANDON ANY WASTE, OR TRANSPORT ANYWASTE INTO THE STATE ATITO SITES NOT MEETING REQUIREMENTS OF ACTANY OF THE FOLLOWING OCCURRENCES AT THE DUMP SITE:10. 812.101 (a)FAILURE TO SUBMIT AN APPLICATION FOR A PERMIT TO DEVELOP ANDOPERATE A LANDFILL13. 809.302(a)
OTHER REQUIREMENTSDigital Inspection Photo SheetDigital Inspection Photo SheetDigital Inspection Photo SheetADMINISTRATIVE CITATIONthat this is lawfuLEXHIBITL05/03/o4 184285784.80CORRECTIVE ACTIONS REQUIREDATTACHMENT AEXHIBIT
 MEMORANDUM SUPPORTING AMENDED PETITION TOCONTEST ADMINISTRATIVE CITATIONMemorandum Supporting Amended Petition to Contest Administrative Citation~HERESPONDENT DID NOT CAUSE OR ALLOW OPENhazard, a public nuisance, or a fire hazard.
111111 111111 11111 11111 11111 1111 1111
 | 
JACKSON COUNTY
 HEALTH
 DEPARTMENT
AFFIDAVIT
 REC~v~
CLERK’S OF~~E
IN THE MATTER OF:
 2Ot~4
Pt
 ri
 STATEOFlLUNO~S
0778095036
IJackson
 County
 ri
 1
 101
 ~
 t~Il
 IA\
 II
 Pollution Contro’
Boarc~
Makanda
 I
 Egon
 Kamarasy
 -•
 L.
COMPLiANCE FILE
 HJ
 Ii
Respondent.
Affiant, Don Terry, being first duly sworn, voluntarily deposes and states as follows:
1.
 Affiant is a fieldinspector employed by Jackson County Health Department and
has been so employed at all times pertinent hereto.
2.
 On March
25,
2004, betweenthe hours of2:32 pm and
2:35
pm,
 Affiant
conducted an inspection ofthe open dump site known as MakandslEgon
Kamarasy, Jackson County, Illinois.
3.
 Affiant inspected said open dump site by an inspection from a location adjacent to
the site.
4.
 As a result ofthe activities referred to in Paragraphs 2 and 3 above, Affiant
completed the Inspection Report form attachedhereto and made a part hereof,
which, to the best of Affiant’s knowledge and belief; is an accurate representation
 ofAffiant’s observations and factual conclusions with respect to said Egon
Kamarasy, Makanda, Illinois, open dump site.
Don Terry
 ti
Solid Waste Inspector
Subscribed and Sworn To before me
this
 c~Z’7
day of
 ~
 ,
 2004.
(~c~1W~k~
 t~ifl
ACY~H~NG1
MY COMMISSION
 EXP~RE~
 03/04/2006
_,w~
 w~w
 ~
-
 ~L~-
 A
NARRATIVE
INSFECTIONREPORTDOCUMENT
OFENDUMP SITE
Date
ofInspection:
 March
25,
2004
 Inspector:
 Don Terry
Site Code:
 077 809
 5036
 County:
 Jackson
Site Name:
 Makanda / Egon Kamarasy
 Time:
 2:32pm
—
 2:35 pm
Location:
 Eastern end of
Starvation
 Acres Rd
 Owner ofProperty:
 Egon Kamarasy
Approximate Volume of Waste at site:
 110
 cu/yds
 GPS:
 N 37°40.580
 W 089°15.105
GENERAL REMARKS
During the above date and time, I conducted an inspection ofthis site as a follow-up ofone done on
December
5,
2003.
According to the Jackson County Assessor’s Office, the site is owned by Egon Kamarasy of474
Egret LakeRd, Carbondaie, 1L 62901.
 .The weather conditions at thetime ofthe inspection were:
partly cloudy, windy and a temperature ofabout 72°F.
I did
 not enter the property and conducted this follow-up inspection from thegate.
From the gate I observed a debris pile in
 approximatelythe
 same location as I had observed on
December
 5,
2003
 (Photo #1, see sketch).
 It appeared larger than when I observed it on my last
inspection,
 indicating more material has been open
 dumped at this location since December
5,
 2003.
The approximate volume ofthis debris pile is
 110 cu/yds (Photo #1, see
 sketch).
 It appeared to
consist ofconstruction / demolition debris consolidated from off site and included: dimensional
lumber, dark paneling, metal siding
 and other materials not readily identifiable from my location.
My inspection ended at approximately 2:35 pm.
Continuing Violations Observed:
Item
 #5(21)(a):
 Cause or allow open dumping,
 Item #S(21)(p)(1
 and 7): Cause
 or allow the
open dumping ofany waste in
 a mannerwhich results in any of the following occurrences at
the dump
~it~
 (1)
1itt~r;
(7) Deposition of
 general eonstruetion
 or demolition debris; or
clean construction or demolition debris:
 During the inspection open dumping on the site was
observed causing litter and the deposition
 of
general or clean construction or demolition debris.
Item
 #6(21)(d)(1):
 Conduct any waste-storage, waste-treatment, or waste-disposal operation:
Without a
 permit;
 Item #6(21)(dI(2):
 Conduct any waste-storage, waste-treatment,
 or
waste-disposal operation: In violation ofany regulations or standards adopted by the Board:
Due to the volume
 and typeofwaste observed, the mannerin which it was placed and the location,
it
 can
 be
 assumed that
 the
 waste was
 not generated on site
 and was transported
 onto
 thd
 site for the
purpose of
disposal.
 Duringthe
 inspection violations
 of
regulations and standards
 were observed.
 There
 is no record
 that
 Mr. Kamarasy
was issued
 a
 pemiit by the Agency to
 conduct a waste-
storage,
 waste-treatment,
 or
 waste-disposal
 operation.
Item #7(21)(e):
 Dispose, treat, store, or abandon any waste, or transport any waste into the
State at/to sites not meeting requirements oftheAct: Violations of
this
 section ofthe Act were
observed during the
 inspection.
Item #10(812.100(a): Failure to submit an application for a permit to develop
 and
 operate a
landfill;
 Item #15(807.201): Failure to obtain a Developmental Permit to operate a solid
waste management site;
 Item #15(807.202): Failure to
 obtain
 an Operational Permit to
operate a solid waste management site:
 There is no record that Mr.
 Kamarasy
 has submitted
 or
received a permit to develop or operate a landfill or to develop or operate a solid waste
management site.
vrc1v
 uui~ir
iiv~r&t.iiuiv
SITE SKETCH
 I
Date Of Inspection:
 March
25,
20204
 Inspector:
 Don Terry
Site Code:
 077 809 5036
 County: Jackson
Site Name:
 Makanda/ Egon
 Kamarasy
 Time:
 2:32 pm 2:35 pm
Not
 Drawn to Scale
All locations are approximate
0
 indicates approx. location &
 direction
 ofphotos
 fN
/
/1
/
/
I.
-————j
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
)ebris Pile
0
Starvation Acres Rd
/
/
/
/
/~
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
Fence
 /1
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL
 PROTECTION AGENCY
Open
 Dump Inspection Checklist
LPc#:
Makanda
 I
 Egon Kamarasy
County:
 Jackson
Location/Site Name:
Date:
 0312512004
 Time:
 From
 2:32
 pm
Inspector(s):
 Don Terry
No. of Photos Taken:
 #
 1
Interviewed:
 no one at site
SECTION
 DESCRIPTION
 VIOL
ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ACT REQUIREMENTS
1.
 9(a)
 CAUSE, THREATEN OR ALLOW
 AIR
 POLLUTION IN ILLINOIS
 El
2.
 9(c)
 CAUSE OR ALLOW OPEN BURNING
 El
3.
 12(a)
 CAUSE, THREATEN OR ALLOW WATER POLLUTION IN ILLINOIS
 El
4.
 12(d)
 CREATE A WATER POLLUTION
 HAZARD
 El
5.
 21(a)
 CAUSE OR ALLOW OPEN DUMPING
6.
 21(d)
CONDUCTANY WASTE-STORAGE, WASTE-TREATMENT, OR WASTE- DISPOSAL
OPERATION:
(1)
 WIthout a Permit
(2)
 In Violation of Any Regulations or Standards Adopted by the Board
7.
 21(e)
DISPOSE, TREAT,
STORE, OR ABANDON ANY WASTE, OR TRANSPORT ANY
WASTE INTO THE STATE AT/TO SITES NOT MEETING REQUIREMENTS OF ACT
8.
 21(p)
CAUSE OR ALLOW THE OPEN DUMPING OF ANY WASTE IN A MANNER WHICH RESULTS IN
ANY OF THE
 FOLLOWING OCCURRENCES AT THE
 DUMP SITE:
(1)
 Litter
(2)
 Scavenging
 El
 (3)
 Open
 Burning
 El
(4)
 DeposItion_of Waste
 in_Standing_or_Flowing_Waters
 El
(5)
 Proliferation
 of Disease Vectors
 El
(6)
 Standing or Flowing Liquid Discharge from the Dump Site
 El
ts
077
 809 5036
 Region:
 7
 -
 Marion
To
 2:35 pm
 Previous Inspection Date:
 12/05/2003
Weather:
 72°F
--
 partly cloudy with
 moderate winds
Est. Amt. of Waste:
 110
 yds3
 Samples Taken:
 Yes #
Complaint #:
 2004-002
Responsible Party
Mailing Address(es)
and Phone
Number(s):
Egon
Kamarasy
474 Egret Lake Rd
Carbondale,
 IL
 62901
__No~
Revised 06/18/2001
 (Open Dump
-
 1)
LPC#
 0778095036
Inspection Date:
 03/25/2004
(7)
Deposition of General Construction or Demolition Debris;
 or Clean Construction or
Demolition Debris
9.
 55(a)
 NO PERSON SHALL:
(1)
 Cause or Allow Open Dumping of Any Used or Waste Tire
 E~l
(2)
 Cause
or
Allow Open Burning of Any Used or Waste Tire
 L:I
35 ILLINOIS
 ADMINISTRATIVE CODE REQUIREMENTS
SUBTITLE 0
10.
 812.101(a)
FAILURE
 TO SUBMIT AN APPLICATION FOR APERMIT TO DEVELOP AND
OPERATE A LANDFILL
11.
 722.111
 HAZARDOUS WASTE DETERMINATION
 El
12.
 808.1 21
 SPECIAL WASTE DETERMINATION
 El
13.
 809.302(a)
ACCEPTANCE
 OF
 SPECIAL WASTE
 FROM AWASTE
 TRANSPORTER WITHOUT A
WASTE HAULING PERMIT, UNIFORM WASTE PROGRAM REGISTRATION AND
PERMIT AND/OR MANIFEST
El
OTHER REQUIREMENTS
14.
APPARENT VIOLATION OF:
(LI)
PCB;
(0)
CIRCUIT COURT
CASE NUMBER:
 ORDER ENTERED ON:
El
15.
 OTHER:
 807.201
 Developmental Permit & 807.202
 Operational
 Permit
El
El
El
El
.~.
El
Signature of Inspe9’àr(s)
Informational Notes
1.
 illinoisJ
 Environmental Protection Act 415 ILCS
 514.
2.
 Illinois Pollution
 Control Board: 35
 III. Adm.
 Code, Subtitle C.
3.
 Statutory and regulatory references herein are provided for convenience only and should
 not be construed as legal
conclusions
 ofthe Agency or as limiting the Agency’s statutory or regulatory powers.
 Requirements of some statutes
and regulations cited
 are in summary format.
 Full text of requirements can be found
 in references listed in 1.
 and 2.
above.
4.
 The provisions of su•bsectio.n (p) of Section
 21 of the Illinois
 Environmental
 Protection Actshall be enforceable either
by administrative citation under Section 31.1
 of the Actor by complaint under Section
 31
 of the Act.
5.
 This inspection was conducted in accordance with Sections 4(c) and 4(d) of the Illinois
 Environmental
 Protection Act:
415
 ILCS
 5/4(c) and
 (d).
6.
 Items marked with an
“NE”
were not evaluated at the time of this inspection.
Revised 06/18/2001
 (Open Dump -2)
DIGITAL INSPECTION PHOTOS
Date: March
 25,
2004
 J
Site
#:
 077 809 5036
 County:
 JACKSON
Time: 2:32 pm
 Site Name:
 Makanda/ Egon
Kainarasy
Photograph taken by:
DonTerry
COMMENTS:
 Pictures taken toward:
East
PHOTO
FILE
NAME:
0778095036-03252004-01
No Photo
Date:
Time:
Photograph taken by:
COMMENTS:
 Pictures takentoward:
PHOTO
 FILE NAME:
NARRATIVE
INSPECTION REPORT DOCUMENT
OPEN DUMPSITE
~
Date ofInspection:
 December
5,
2003
 Inspector:
 Don
Terry
-~ —
 —
 -
 -
 ~7~7
 C~
 (se,
 ~‘
IV)
 .~
 I~’
.~
 4-....
 T.-....1.-.......,
~iLe
 ‘..oue;
 ~ii
 /
oui
 .~i.3u
 ~uu11Ly.
Site Name:
 Makanda / Egon Kamarasy
 Time:
 9:10 am
—
 9:15
 am
Location:
 Eastern end of Starvation Acres Rd
 Owner ofProperty:
 Egon
 Kamarasy
Approximate Volume of Waste at site:
 100 cu/yds
 GPS:
 N
370
 40.580
 W 089°15.105
GENERAL REMARKS
During the above date
and
time, I conducted an inspection ofthe site listed above.
 This inspection
was made as a follow up to a report made to
this
office by Jackson County Health Department staff.
According to the Jackson County Assessor’s Office, the
 site is owned by Egon Kamarasy of474
Egret Lake Rd,
 Carbondale, IL 62901.
 I was accompanied on this inspection by Matt Charles a
Sanitarian at the Jackson County Health Department.
 The weather conditions at the time ofthe
inspection were: cloudy, with rain/snow drizzle and a temperature of about 35°F.
I drove east on Starvation Acres Road.
 I observed a section of dark wood paneling lying on the
north side ofthe road
 about 100
 feetwest ofthe gate we were approaching.
 The road ended at this
gate which opened into a pasture containing a lake (Photo #4, see sketch) and several horses.
 A
sign with “Welcome to Bittersweet Farm,
 457-6167” was posted at the gate along with a “No
Trespassing”
 sign (Photo #1, see
 sketch).
 After checking the phone book, I found that the phone
number 457-6167 is listed to the name Egon Kamarasy at 474 Egret Lake Rd, Makanda, IL 62958.
I did not enter the property and conducted my inspection from the gate.
From the gate I observed a large debris pile approximately 100 cu/yds in volume
 (Photos
 #2
 and
#3,
 see
 sketch).
 It appeared to
 consist of construction / demolition debris consolidated from off
site and included:
 dimensional
 lumber, dark paneling, metal
 siding and other materials not readily
identifiable from my location.
My inspection ended at approximately 9:15
 am.
Page 2
077
809
 5036
Makanda / Egon Kamarasy
December 5, 2003
Violations Observed:
Item #5(21)(a):
 Cause or allow open dumping;
 Item #S(2l)(p)(1 and 7~:
 Cause or allow the
open dumping ofany waste in
 a mannerwhich results in any of the following occurrences at
the dump site: (1) Litter;
 (7)
 Deposition ofgeneral construction or demolition debris; or
clean construction or demolition debris:
 During the inspection open dumping on the site was
observed causing litter and the
 deposition of general or clean construction or demolition debris.
Item #6(21)(d)(1’):
 Conduct any waste-storage, waste-treatment, or waste-disposal operation:
Without a permit;
 Item #6(21’)(d)(2):
 Conduct any waste-storage, waste-treatment, or
waste-disposal operation: In
 violation of any regulations orstandards adopted by the Board:
Due to the volume and type ofwaste observed, the manner in which it was placed and the location,
it can be assumed that the waste was not generated on site and was transported onto the
 site for the
purpose ofdisposal.
 During the
 inspection violations ofregulations and standards were observed.
There is no record that Mr. Kamarasy was issued a permit by the Agency to conduct a waste-
storage, waste-treatment, or waste-disposal operation.
Item
 #7(21)(e): Dispose,
 treat, store, or abandon any waste, or transport any waste into the
State
 at/to
 sites
 not
 meeting
 requirements ofthe Act:
 Violations ofthis section ofthe Act were
observed during the inspection.
Item #10(812.101)(a): Failure to submit an application for
 a permit
 to develop and operate
 a
landfill;
 Item #15(807.201): Failure to
 obtain
 a
 Developmental Permit to operate
 a
 solid
waste management site;
 Item
 #15(807.202):
 Failure to obtain an Operational Permit to
operate a solid waste management site:
 There is no
 record that Mr. Kamarasy has submitted or
received a permit to
 develop or operate a landfill or to develop or operate a solid waste
management site.
 -
ILLINOIS
 ENVIRONMENTAL
 PROTECTION AGENCY
Open
 Dump Inspection Checklist
County:
 Jackson
 -
 LPC#:
 077 809 5036
Location/Site Name:
 Makanda
I
Egon Kamarasy
Date:
 12/05/2003
 Time:
 From
 9:10am
Inspector(s):
 Don
Terry
No. of Photos Taken:
 #
 4
Interviewed:
 no one
 at the site
Responsible
 Party
Mailing Add ress(es)
and Phone
Number(s):
To
 9:15
 am
 Previous Inspection
 Date:
Weather:
 rainy/snow, cloudy
-
31°F
Est.
 Amt. of Waste:
 100
 yds3
 Samples Taken:
 Yes #
Complaint #:
 2004-002
Region:
 7
 -
 Marion
No~
Egon Kamarasy
474 Egret Lake
 Rd
Carbondale
 IL
 62901
SECTION
 DESCRIPTION
 VIOL
ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ACT REQUIREMENTS
1.
 9(a)
 CAUSE, THREATEN OR ALLOW AIR POLLUTION
 IN
 ILLINOIS
 El
2.
 9(c)
 CAUSE
 OR ALLOW OPEN
 BURNING
 LI
3.
 12(a)
 CAUSE, THREATEN OR ALLOW WATER POLLUTION IN ILLINOIS
 El
4.
 12(d)
 CREATE
AWATER POLLUTION HAZARD
 El
5.
 21(a)
 CAUSE
 OR ALLOW OPEN DUMPING
6.
 21(d)
CONDUCT ANY
WASTE-STORAGE,
WASTE-TREATMENT, OR WASTE- DISPOSAL
OPERATION:
(1)
 Without a Permit
(2)
 In Violation
 of Any Regulations or Standards Adopted by the
 Board
7.
 21(e)
DISPOSE, TREAT, STORE, OR ABANDON ANY WASTE, OR TRANSPORT ANY
WASTE INTO THE
 STATE
 AT/TO SITES
 NOT
MEETING
 REQUIREMENTS OF ACT
8.
 21(p)
CAUSE
 OR ALLOW THE
 OPEN DUMPING OF ANY WASTE
 IN A MANNER WHICH
 RESULTS
IN
 ANY OF
 THE
 FOLLOWING
 OCCURRENCES AT THE DUMP SITE:
(1)
 Litter
(2)
 Scavenging
 El
(3)
 Open
 Burning
 El
(4)
 Deposition of Waste
 in Standing or Flowing Waters
 El
(5)
 Proliferation of Disease Vectors
 -
 El
(6)
 Standing
 or Flowing
 Liquid
 Discharge from the Dump
 Site
 El
Revised 06/18/2001
 (Open Dump
-
 1)
LPC#
 0778095036
Inspection Date:
12/05/03
(7)
Deposition of General Construction or Demolition Debris; or Clean Construction or
Demolition Debris
9.
 55(a)
 NO
 PERSON SHALL:
 -
-
 (1)
 Cause or Allow Open Dumping
 of Any Used or Waste Tire
 El
-
 (2)
 Cause or Allow Open
 Burning of Any Used or Waste Tire
 El
35
 ILLINOIS ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
 REQUIREMENTS
SUBTITLE G
10.
 812.101(a)
FAILURE
 TO
 SUBMIT AN
 APPLICATION
 FOR A
 PERMIT TO
 DEVELOP AND
OPERATE A LANDFILL
11.
 722.111
 HAZARDOUS WASTE
 DETERMINATION
 El
12.
 808.121
 SPECIAL WASTE
 DETERMINATION
 El
13.
 809.302(a)
ACCEPTANCE
 OF SPECIAL
 WASTE
 FROM A WASTE
 TRANSPORTER WITHOUT A
WASTE
 HAULING
 PERMIT,
 UNIFORM WASTE
 PROGRAM REGISTRATION
 AND
PERMIT
 AND/OR MANIFEST
El
OTHER REQUIREMENTS
14.
APPARENT VIOLATION OF:
(El)
PCB;
 (LI)
CIRCUIT COURT
CASE
 NUMBER:
 ORDER
 ENTERED
 ON:
El
15.
 OTHER:
 807.201,
 807.202
El
El
El
El
nspector(s)
Informational Notes
1.
 Illinois
 Environmental Protection Act: 415 ILCS
 5/4.
2.
 Illinois Pollution Control
 Board: 35
 Ill.
 Adm. Code, Subtitle
 G.
3.
 Statutory
 and regulatory references herein are provided for convenience only and should
 not
 be
 construed
 as legal
conclusions
 of the Agency or as limiting the Agencys
 statutory or regulatory powers.
 Requirements of some statutes
and
 regulations cited
 are in summary format.
 Full text of requirements can be found
 in references listed
 in
 1.
 and
 2.
above.
4.
 The provisions of subsection (p) of Section
 21
 of the Illinois
 Environmental
 Protection Act shall
 be enforceable either
by administrative citation under Section 31.1
 of the Act or by complaint under Section
 31
 of the Act.
5.
 This inspection was conducted
 in accordance with Sections 4(c) and 4(d) of the Illinois
 Environmental Protection Act:
415 ILCS
 5/4(c)
 and
 (d).
6.
 Items marked with
 an “NE” were not evaluated at the time of this
 inspection.
El
Revised 06/18/2001
 (Open Dump
-
 2)
DIGITAL INSPECTION PHOTOS
Date:
 December
5,
 2003
 f
Site
 #: 077 809
 5036
 County:
 JACKSON
Time:
 9:12
am
 Site Name:
 Makanda/
Egon Kamarasy
Photograph
takenby:
Don Terry
COMMENTS: Pictures taken toward:
East
PHOTO
FILE
NAME:
0778095036-12052003-01
Date: December
5,
 2003
Time:
 9:13am
Photograph
takenby:
Don
 Terry
COMMENTS:
Pictures taken toward:
East
PHOTO
 FILE NAME:
0778095036-12052003-02
DIGITAL INSPECTION PHOTOS
Date:
December
5,
2003
 Site
 #: 077
 809 5036
 County:
 JACKSON
Time: 9:14 am
 Site Name:
 Makanda / Egon Kamarasy
 -
Photograph
 takenby:
Don Terry
COMMENTS:
 Pictures takentoward:
East
PHOTO
 FILE
NAME:
0778095036-12052003-03
Date:
December
5, 2003
Time:
 9:14am
Photograph
taken
by:
Don
 Terry
COMMENTS:
Pictures
takentoward:
Southeast
PHOTO
 FILE NAME:
0778095036-12052003-04
JACKSON COUNTY
HEALTH
 DEPARTMENT
IN TilE
 MATTER
 OF:
077 812
 5013/
 Jackson County
Carbondale
I
 Egon
Kamarasy
COMPLIANCE FILE
Respondent.
AFFIDAVIT
Affiant, Don Terry,
 being first duly sworn,
 voluntarilydeposes and states as follows:
1.
 Affiant is a field inspector employed by Jackson County Health Department and
has been so employed at all times pertinent hereto.
 .
 -
2.
 On March 25,2004, between the hours of2:25 pm and 2:30 pm, Affiant
conducted an inspection ofthe
 open dump site known as Carbondale / Egon
Kamarasy, Jackson County, Illinois.
3.
 Affiant
inspected said
open dump site by an on-site inspection.
4.
 As a result ofthe activities referred to in Paragraphs
 2 and 3 above, Affiant
completed the Inspection Report form attached hereto and made a part hereof,
which, to the best ofAffiant’s knowledge and belief,
 is an accurate representation
ofAffiant’s observations and factual conclusions with respect to said Egon
Kamarasy, Carbondale, Illinois, open dump site.
Don Terry
Solid Waste Inspector
Subscribed and Sworn To
 before me
this
 ~
 day of1v”C\i~
I
 ‘OFFICIALSEAL’
___~J~-,___
 -~--,~-,,---
 -. -
TRACY
L.
 HARTUNG
NOTARY PUBUC, STATE OF ILUNOIS
MYOM~US~ONEXP~ESO~!2OO6
 —
j
A
2004
NARRATIVE
 INSPECTIONREPORTDOCUMENT
OPENDUMP SITE
 .
-
Date ofInspection:
 March
 25,
 2004
 Inspector:
 Don
Terry
Site
 Code:
 077 812 5013
 County:
 Jackson
Site
 Name:
 Carbondale / Egon Kamarasy
 Time:
 2:25 pm
—
 2:30 pm
Location:
 786 Green Ridge Rd
 Owner of
Property:
 Egon Kamarasy
Volume of
Waste
 at
 site:
 10 cu / yds
 -
 GPS:
 N 37°40.869
 W 089°16.646
GENERAL REMARKS
 I
During the stated date and time, I conducted an inspection ofthe site listed above.
 This inspection
was made as a follow up to
 an inspection made ofthis site on March 11, 2004.
 Weather~onditions
at the time ofthe inspection were: cloudy, windy with the temperature about
72°F.
According to the Jackson County Assessor’s Office, the site is owned by Egon Kamarasy of474
Egret LakeRd, Carbondale, IL.
Upon arrival at the site I observed a pile ofdebris in the same general location as on my inspection
visit ofMarch
 11, 2004 (Photos
 #1
—
 #5,
 See sketch).
 The
 debris pile appeared to have been
reduced in volume by open burning.
Within this pile I observed
 landscape waste,
 dimensional lumber, and what appeared to be metal
frames from furniture.
 I also observed metal fence posts, the remains of what appeared to be a
window air
conditioner, sections oflaminate counter tops, metal
 cans and other materialsnot
 easily
identifiable (Photos #1
—
 #5,
 See
 sketch).
 Most of
this
material was charred from burning.
My inspection ended at approximately 2:30 pm.
Page 2
077 812
 5013
Carbondale
I
Egon Kamarasy
March 25, 2004
Continuing Violations Observed:
Item #1(9)(a): Cause, threaten or allow airpollution in
 Illinois;
 Item #2(9)(c):
 Cause or
allow open burning;
 Item #8(2fl(p)(3): Cause or allow the open dumping ofany waste in a
 manner which results in any ofthe following occurrences at the dump site:
 (3) Open
Burning:
 During the inspection,
 evidence ofthe open burning
 of
waste was observed.
Item #5(21)(a):
 Cause
 or allow open dumping;
 Item #8(21)(p)(1&7): Cause or allow the
open dumping ofany waste in
 a mannerwhich results in any ofthe following occurrences at
the dump
 site: (1) Litter and (7) Deposition ofgeneral construction or demolition debris; or
clean construction or demolition debris:
 During the inspection, the open dumping ofwaste
resulting in litter and the deposition ofgeneral construction or demolition debris was observed.
Item
 #6(21)(d)(1):
 Conduct any
 waste-storage,
 waste-treatment, or waste-disposal
 operation:
Without a permit;
 Item
 #6(21)(d)(2):
 Conduct any waste-storage, waste-treatment, or
waste-disposal operation: In violation ofany regulations or standards adopted by the Board:
There is no record ofthe property owner having received a permit from the Agency to conduct a
waste-storage, waste-treatment or waste-disposal operation.
 Also, during the inspection, violations
ofstandards
 and regulations were observed.
Item #7(21)(e): Dispose, treat, store, or abandon any waste, or
 transport
 any
 waste
 into
 the
State at/to sites not meeting requirements ofthe Act:
 Due
 the location ofthe
 site and the type
and amount
 of
debris observed, it would be reasonable to assume that the waste was transported to
the site from another location for thepurpose
 ofdisposal.
Item #9(55)(a)(1):
 No person shall: Cause or allow open dumping ofany used or waste tire;
Item #10(812.lOfl(a): Failure to submit an application for a permit to develop and operate a
landfill:
 During the inspection, the open dumping ofwaste tires on the site was observed.
OPENDUMPINSPECTION
SITE SKETCH
~—
 ~
Date Of Inspection:
 March
 25,
 2004
 •
 Inspector: Don
 Terry
Site Code:
 077 812 5013
 County: Jackson
Site Name:
 Carbondale / Egon Kainarasy
 Time:
 2:25
 pm
—
 2:30 pm
Not Drawn to Scale
All
 Locations Are Approximate
0
 Indicates
 Approximate
 Location & Direction ofPhotos
Debris
I
Euni
Pile
fN
:~
-
I-
4
Green
Ridqe
 Rd
NARRATIVE
INSPECTIONREPORTDOCUMENT
OPENDUMP SITE
~
Date of Inspection:
 March
 11,
 2004
 Inspector:
 Don Terry
Site
 Code:
 077 812 5013
 County:
 Jackson
Site Name:
 Carbondale / Egon Kamarasy
 Time:
 11:05 am
—
 11:15
am
Location:
 786 Green Ridge Rd
 Owner ofProperty:
 Egon Kamarasy
Volume ofWaste at site:
 16
 Cu!
yds
 GPS:
 N 37°40.869
 W
 089°16.646
GENERAL
REMARKS
During the stated date and time, I conducted an inspection ofthe site listed above.
 This inspection
was made as a follow up to a complaint made to this office by a member ofthe Jackson County
Health Department staff.
 Weather conditions at the time ofthe inspection were: sunny, windy with
the temperature about 40°F.
According to the Jackson County Assessor’s Office, the site is owned by Egon Kamarasy of474
 Egret Lake Rd, Carbondale, IL
Upon arrival at the site I observed a large pile ofdebris
 (Photos #1, #2, #3
 & #5,
 See
 sketch).
Within this pile I observed landscape waste, two
 couches, two
 mattresses, pallets, plastic items,
charred wire and
 other materials not readily identifiable.
 To the north ofthe debris pile I observed
three waste tires that had been open dumped (Photos #2 &
 #5,
 See sketch).
I also observed
 in and around the debris pile, evidence ofprevious burning,
 including:
 charred
dimensional lumber, wall board, metal, mattress springs and earth.
 I also observed ash at the
bottom ofthe pile (Photos #4,
 #5 & #6, See sketch)
I observed an individual to my east, approximately 30 yards away who appeared to be clearing
brush.
 I approached this individual and asked himhis name.
 He identified himself as James Taylor.
I asked ifhe was the owner ofthe property on which the
 debris pile was located.
 He told me no,
the owner was Egon Kamarasy for whom he worked.
(7/
Page 2
077
 812 5013
Carbondale / Egon Kamarasy
March 11,
 2004
I
 asked him if he knew anything about the debris pile.
 He said yes and explained that he was told by
 Mr. Kamarasy to add brush to the pile and then burn it.
 I explained that the burning ofdebris
including the tires lying to the side ofthe pile was not permissible in Illinois.
I stated to Mr. Taylor that he was not to burn the pile and that if he did he
 could be held responsible
for open burning and open dumping under Illinois law and that those violations carry civil penalties
beginning at $1500 per offence.
Before leaving I gave Mr. Taylor my business card and asked him to have Mr. Kamarasy call
 me to
discuss this situation.
My inspection ended at approximately 11:15
 am.
Violations Observed:
Item #1(9)(a): Cause,
 threaten or allow air pollution in
 Illinois;
 Item #2(9)(c):
 Cause or
allow open burning;
 Item #8(2l)(p)(3): Cause or allow the open dumping ofany waste in
 a
manner which results in any of the following occurrences at the dump site:
 (3) Open
Burning:
 During the inspection,
 evidence ofthe open burning ofwaste was observed.
Item #5(21)(a):
 Cause or allow open dumping;
 Item #8(21)(n)(1&7): Cause or allow
 the
open dumping of any waste in a manner which results in any of the following occurrences at
the dump site:
 (1) Litter and
 (7)
 Deposition ofgeneral construction or demolition debris;
 or
clean construction or
 demolition debris:
 During
 the inspection,
 the open dumping ofwaste
resulting in litter and the deposition ofgeneral construction or demolition debris was observed.
Item #6(21)(d)(1):
 Conduct any waste-storage, waste-treatment, or waste-disposal operation:
Without a permit;
 Item #6(21)(d)(2):
 Conduct any waste-storage, waste-treatment, or
waste-disposal operation: In
 violation of any regulations
 or standards adopted by the Board:
There is no record ofthe property owner having received a permit from the Agency to conduct a
waste-storage, waste-treatment or waste-disposal operation.
 Also, during the inspection, violations
ofstandards and regulations were observed.
Page 3
077
 812 5013
Carbondale / Egon Kamarasy
March
 11, 2004
Item #7(21)(e): Dispose, treat, store,
 or abandon any waste, or transport any waste into the
State at/to sites not meeting requirements of the Act:
 Due
 the location ofthe site and the type
and amount ofdebris
 observed, it would be reasonable to
 assume that the waste was transported to
the site from another location for the purpose of disposal.
Item #9(55)(a)(1):
 No person shall: Cause or allow open dumping ofany used or waste tire;
Item #10(812.101)(a): Failure to submit an application for a permit to develop and operate a
landfill:
 During the inspection, the open dumping ofwaste tires on the sitewas
 observed.
ILLINOIS
 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
Open Dump
 Inspection
 Checklist
County:
 Jackson
 077
 8125013
Location/Site
 Name:
Date:
 03/11/2004
 Time:
 From
 11:05
 am
 To
 11:15
 am
 Previous Inspection
 Date:
 06/24/2002
Inspector(s):
 Don Terry
 Weather:
 40°F—sunny
 and windy
No.
 of Photos Taken:
 #
 6
 Est. Amt. of Waste:
 16
 yds3
 Samples Taken:
 Yes #
 No
 ~
Interviewed:
 James.Taylor
 Complaint #:
 2004-057
SECTION
 DESCRIPTION
 VIOL
ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ACT REQUIREMENTS
1.
 9(a)
 CAUSE, THREATEN OR ALLOW AIR POLLUTION
 IN ILLINOIS
2.
 9(c)
 CAUSE OR ALLOW OPEN BURNING
3.
 12(a)
 CAUSE, THREATEN OR ALLOW WATER
 POLLUTION IN
 ILLINOIS
 LI
4.
 12(d)
 CREATE AWATER POLLUTION HAZARD
 LI
5.
 21 (a)
 CAUSE OR ALLOW OPEN DUMPING
6.
 21(d)
CONDUCT ANY WASTE-STORAGE, WASTE-TREATMENT, OR WASTE- DISPOSAL
OPERATION:
(1)
 Without a Permit
(2)
 In Violation ofAny Regulations or Standards Adopted by the Board
 Z
7.
 21(e)
DISPOSE, TREAT, STORE, OR ABANDON ANY WASTE, OR TRANSPORT ANY
WASTE INTO THE STATE ATITO SITES NOT MEETING REQUIREMENTS OF ACT
8.
 21(p)
CAUSE OR ALLOW THE
 OPEN DUMPING OF ANY WASTE IN A MANNER WHICH RESULTS IN
ANY OF THE FOLLOWING OCCURRENCES AT THE DUMP SITE:
(1)
 Litter
~________
 (2)
 Scavenging
 LI
(3)
 Open Burning
(4)
 Deposition
 of Waste in Standing or Flowing Waters
 U
(5)
 Proliferation of Disease Vectors
 E
(6)
 Standing or Flowing Liquid Discharge from the Dump Site
 LI
LPC#:
Carbondale
 I
 Egon Kamarasy
Region:
 7
-
 Marion
Responsible Party
Mailing Address(es)
and
 Phone
Number(s):
Egon Kamarasy
474 Egret Lake
 Rd
Carbondale,
 IL
 62901
Revised 06/18/2001
 (Open Dump
-
 1)
LPC#
 0778125013
 Inspection
 Date:
 03/11/2004
(7)
Deposition of General Construction or Demolition Debris; or Clean Construction or
Demolition Debris
9.
 55(a)
 NO PERSON SHALL:
 .
(1)
 Cause orAllow Open Dumping
 of Any Used or Waste Tire
-
 —
 —
 —
 (2)
 Cause or Allow Open~Burn~p
 ~
 .L
35 ILLINOIS ADMINISTRATIVE CODE REQUIREMENTS
-
LI
 —
10.
 812.1 01(a)
SUBTITLE
 G
FAILURE TO SUBMIT AN APPLICATION FOR A PERMIT TO DEVELOP AND
OPERATE A LANDFILL
11.
 722.111
 HAZARDOUS WASTE DETERMINATION
 LI
12.
 808.121
 SPECIAL WASTE DETERMINATION
 UI
ACCEPTANCE OF SPECIAL WASTE FROM AWASTE TRANSPORTER WITHOUT A
WASTE HAULING PERMIT,
 UNIFORM WASTE PROGRAM REGISTRATION AND
 LI
13.1809.302(a)IPERMITAND/ORMANIFEST
 ~
 ~
.~....
 ...
 ..
 OTHER REQUIREMENTS
 .
 __
 .~
Informational Notes
APPARENT VIOLATION OF:
(LI)
PCB;
(LI)
CIRCUIT COURT
CASE NUMBER:
 ORDER ENTERED ON:
Signature~9f
 Inspector(s)
1.
 lIlinoisJ
 Environmental
 Protection Act: 415 ILCS 5/4.
2.
 Illinois Pollution
 Control Board: 35
 III.
 Adm. Code, Subtitle
 G.
3.
 Statutory and regulatory references herein are provided for convenience only and
 should not
 be construed
 as legal
conclusions
 of the Agency or as limiting the Agency’s statutory or regulatory powers.
 Requirements of some statutes
and regulations cited are in summary format.
 Full text of requirements can
 be found
 in references listed in
 1.
 and 2.
above.
4.
 The provisions of subsection
 (p) of Section
 21
 of the lltinoisj
 Environmental
 Protection Act shall be enforceable either
by administrative citation under Section 31.1
 of the Act or by complaint under Section 31
 of the Act.
5.
 This inspection was conducted in accordance with Sections 4(c) and 4(d) of the Illinois
 Environmental
 Protection Act:
415
 ILCS
 5/4(c)
 and (d).
6.
 Items marked with an “NE’ were not evaluated at the time of this
 inspection.
Revised 06/18/2001
 (Open Dump
-
 2)
Digital
 Inspection
 Photo Sheet
Date:
 March
 11, 2004
 Site #:
 077 812 5013
 County:
 Jackson
11:08 am
 -~
 Site
 Name:
 Carbondale
 I
 Egon Kamarasy
 Time:
Photo taken by:
Don
Terry
Comments
—
Photo taken towards:
Northwest
Photo File Name:
0778125013-03112004-01
)z
 ~
 J/
.,.
Date:
 March
 11, 2004
Time:
 11:08am
Photo taken by:
Don Terry
Comments
—
Photo taken towards:
Southwest
Photo File Name:
0778125013-03112004-02
P
Digital
 Inspection
 Photo
 Sheet
Date:
 March 11, 2004
 Site #:
 077 812 5013
 County:
 Jackson
Time:
 11:09am
 Site Name:
 Carbondale
 I
 Egon Kamarasy
F
 Photo taken by:
Don
Terry
Comments
—
Photo taken towards:
Southeast
Photo File Name:
0778125013-03112004-03
Date:
 March
 11, 2004
Time:
 11:09am
Photo taken by:
Don
Terry
Comments
—
Photo taken towards:
Southeast
Photo File Name:
0778125013-03112004-04
Digital
 Inspection
 Photo Sheet
Date:
 March
 11, 2004
 Site #:
 077812 5013
 County:
 Jackson
Time:
 11:10 am
 Site Name:
 Carbondale
 I
 Egon Kamarasy
Photo taken by:
Don Terry
Comments
—
Photo taken towards:
North
Photo File Name:
0778125013-03112004-05
Date:
 March 11,2004
Time:
 11:10am
Photo taken by:
Don Terry
Comments
—
Photo taken towards:
North
Photo File Name:
0778125013-03112004-06
 .
 (
NARRATIVE
INSPECTIONREPORTDOCUMENT
OPENDUMP SITE
~
 -
 ~.
 S
Date
of Inspection:
 March
 25,
 2004
 Inspector:
 Don Terry
Site Code:
 077 812 5013
 County:
 Jackson
Site Name:
 Carbondale / Egon Kamarasy
 Time:
 2:25
 pm
—
 2:30 pm
Location:
 786
 Green Ridge
 Rd
 Owner
 ofProperty:
 Egon Kamarasy
Volume ofWaste at
 site:
 10 cu / yds
 GPS:
 N 37°40.869
 W 089°16.646
GENERAL
 REMARKS
During the stated date and time, I conducted an inspection ofthe site listed above.
 This inspection
was made as a follow up to
 an inspection made ofthis site on March
 11, 2004.
 Weather conditions
at thetime of the inspection were: cloudy, windy with the temperature about 72°F.
According to the Jackson County Assessor’s Office, the site is owned by Egon Kamarasy of474
Egret Lake Rd,
 Carbondale, IL.
Upon arrival at the site I observed a pile ofdebris in the same general
 location as on my inspection
visit ofMarch
 11, 2004
 (Photos #1—
 #5,
 See sketch).
 The debris pile appeared to have been
reduced in volume by open burning.
Within this pile I observed landscape waste, dimensional lumber, and what appeared to be metal
frames from furniture.
 I also observed metal fence posts, the remains ofwhat appeared to be a
window air conditioner, sections oflaminate counter tops, metal
 cans and
 other materials not easily
identifiable
 (Photos #1
—
 #5, See sketch).
 Most ofthis material was charred from burning.
My inspection ended at approximately 2:30 pm.
Page 2
077 812 5013
Carbondale
 I
Egon
Kamarasy
March
 25,
 2004
Continuing Violations Observed:
Item #1(9)(a): Cause, threaten or allow
 air pollution in Iffinois;
 Item #2(9)(c): Cause or
allow open burning;
 Item #8(21)(p)(3): Cause or allow the open dumping of any waste in
 a
manner which results in any ofthe following occurrences at the dump site:
 (3) Open
Burning:
 During the inspection,
 evidence ofthe open burning ofwaste was observed.
Item #5(21)(a):
 Cause or allow open dumping;
 Item #8(21)(p)(I&7):
 Cause or allow the
open dumping of any waste in
 a mannerwhich results in
 any ofthe following occurrences at
the dump site:
 (1) Litter and
 (7)
 Deposition ofgeneral construction or demolition debris;
 or
clean construction or demolition debris:
 During the inspection, the open dumping ofwaste.
resulting
 in
 litter and the deposition ofgeneral construction or demolition debris was observed.
Item #6(21)(d)(1):
 Conduct any waste-storage, waste-treatment, or waste-disposal operation:
Without a permit;
 Item #6(21)(d)(2):
 Conduct any waste-storage, waste-treatment, or
waste-disposal operation: In violation ofany regulations or standards adopted by the Board:
There is no
 record ofthe property owner having received a permit from the Agency to conduct a
waste-storage, waste-treatment or waste-disposal operation.
 Also, during the inspection, violations
ofstandards and regulations were observed.
Item
 #7’21)(e~:
 Dispose,
 treat,
 store, or abandon any waste, or transport anywaste into the
State at/to sites not meeting requirements ofthe Act:
 Due the location ofthe site and the type
and
 amount ofdebris observed, it would be reasonable to
 assume that the waste was transported to
the site from another location for thepurpose ofdisposaL
Item #9155~a)(1):
No person shall:
 Cause
 or allow open dumping of any used or waste tire;
Item #10(812.101)(a): Failure to submit an application for a permit to develop and operate a
landfill:
 During the inspection, the open dumping ofwaste tires
 on the site
 was observed.
ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
Open Dump Inspection
 Checklist
County:
 Jackson
 LPC#:
 077 812
 5013
 Region:
 7
 -
 Marion
Location/Site Name:
 Carbondale
 I
 Egori Kamarasy
Date:
 03/25/2004
 Time:
 From
 2:25
 pm
 To
 2:30
 pm
 Previous Inspection Date:
 03/11/2004
Inspector(s):
 Don
 Terry
 Weather:
 72°F
 --
 partly
cloudywith moderate winds
No. of Photos Taken: #
 5
 Est. Amt. of Waste:
 10
 yds3 Samples Taken:
 Yes#
 No
 ~
Interviewed:
 no one at site
 Complaint #:
 2004-057
Egon Kamarasy
Responsible
 Party
 474 Egret Lake
 Rd
Mailing Address(es)
and Phone
 Carbondale,
 IL
 62901
Number(s):
SECTION
 DESCRIPTION
VIOL
ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ACT REQUIREMENTS
1.
 9(a)
 CAUSE, THREATEN OR ALLOW
 AIR
 POLLUTION IN ILLINOIS
2.
 9(c)
 CAUSE OR ALLOW OPEN BURNING
3.
 12(a)
 CAUSE, THREATEN OR ALLOW WATER POLLUTION IN
 ILLINOIS
 E
4.
 12(d)
 CREATE AWATER POLLUTION HAZARD
 0
5.
 21(a)
 CAUSE OR ALLOW OPEN DUMPING
 Z
6.
 21(d)
CONDUCT ANY WASTE-STORAGE, WASTE-TREATMENT, OR WASTE- DISPOSAL
OPERATION:
(1)
 Without a
 Permit
 Z
(2)
 In Violation of Any Regulations or Standards Adopted bythe Board
.
7.
 21(e)
DISPOSE, TREAT, STORE, OR ABANDON ANY WASTE, OR TRANSPORT ANY
WASTE INTO THE STATE ATITO SITES
 NOT MEETING REQUIREMENTS OF ACT
8.
 21(p)
CAUSE OR ALLOW THE OPEN DUMPING OF ANY WASTE IN A MANNER WHICH RESULTS
 IN
ANY OF THE FOLLOWING OCCURRENCES AT THE DUMP SITE:
(1)
 Litter
(2)
 Scavenging
 .
(3)
 Open Burning
(4)
 Deposition
 of Waste
 in Standing or Flowing Waters
 0
(5)
 Proliferation of Disease Vectors
 0
(6)
 Standing or Flowing Liquid Discharge from the Dump Site
 LI
Revised 06118/2001
 (Open Dump
-
 1)
LPC
 #
 077 809
 5036
Inspection
 Date:
 03/25/2004
(7)
Deposition of General Construction or Demolition Debris; or Clean Construction or
Demolition Debris
9.
 55(a)
 NO PERSON SHALL:
(1)
 Cause or Allow Open
 Dumping of Any Used or Waste Tire
 LI
(2)
 Cause or Allow Open Burning
 of Any Used or Waste
 Tire
 LI
35
ILLINOIS ADMINISTRATIVE CODE REQUIREMENTS
SUBTITLE G
10.
 812.101 (a)
FAILURE TO SUBMIT AN APPLICATION FOR A PERMIT TO DEVELOP AND
OPERATE A LANDFILL
11.
 722.111
 HAZARDOUS WASTE DETERMINATION
 LI
12.
 808.1 21
 SPECIAL WASTE DETERMINATION
 LI
13.
 809.302(a)
ACCEPTANCE OF SPECIAL WASTE FROM AWASTE TRANSPORTER WITHOUT A
WASTE HAULING PERMIT, UNIFORM WASTE PROGRAM REGISTRATION AND
PERMIT ANDIOR MANIFEST
LI
OTHER REQUIREMENTS
14.
APPARENTVIOLATIONOF:
(I)
 PCB;
(0)
CIRCUIT COURT
CASE NUMBER:
 ORDER ENTERED
 ON:
LI
15.
 OTHER:
LI
LI
:__
 LI
LI
LI
LI
I/i
 ~
~/4Vff
Signature of Inspeftor(s)
Informational Notes
1.
 Illinois
 Environmental
 Protection Act: 415
 ILCS
 5/4.
2.
 Illinois Pollution
 Control Board:
 35
 Ill.
 Adm. Code, Subtitle G.
3.
 Statutory and regulatory references herein are provided for convenience only and should
 not
 be
 construed
 as legal
conclusions
 of the Agency or as limiting the Agency’s statutory or regulatory powers.
 Requirements of some statutes
and regulations cited are in summary format.
 Full
text
of requirements
 can be found in references listed in
 1. and 2.
above.
4.
 The provisions of subsection (p) of Section
 21 of the Illinois
 Environmental
 Protection Act shall
 be enforceable either
by administrative citation under Section 31.1
 of the Act or by complaint under
 Section
 31
 of the Act.
5.
 This inspection was conducted in accordance with Sections 4(c) and 4(d) of the Illinois
 Environmental Protection Act:
415
 ILCS
 5/4(c)
 and
 (d).
6.
 Items marked with an “NE” were not evaluated at the time of this
 inspection.
Revised 06/18/200 1
 .
 (Open Dump
-
 2)
Digital
 Inspection
 Photo Sheet
Date:
 March 25, 2004
 Site #:
 0778125013
 County:
 Jackson
Time:
 2:26pm
Photo taken by:
Don Terry
Comments
—
Photo taken towards:
South
Photo File Name:
0778125013-03252004-01
Date:
 March 25,
 2004
Time:
 2:26 pm
Photo taken by:
Don Terry
Comments
 —
Photo taken towards:
Southeast
Site Name:
 Carbondale
 I
 EQon Kamarasy
Photo File
 Name:
0778125013-03252004-02
Digital
 Inspection
 Photo Sheet
Date:
 March 25, 2004
 Site #:
 0778125013
 County:
 Jackson
Time:
 2:27 pm
 Site Name:
 Carbondale
 I
 E~on
 Kamarasy
Photo taken by:
Don
Terry
Comments
—
Photo taken towards:
Southeast
Photo File
 Name:
0778125013-03252004-03
Date:
 March 25, 2004
Time:
 .
 2:27
 pm
Photo taken by:
Comments
—
Photo taken towards:
Northeast
Photo File Name:
0778125013-03252004-04
(7~~
Digital
 Inspection
 Photo Sheet
Date:
 March 25, 2004
 Site #:
 077812 5013
 County:
 Jackson
Time:
 2:27 pm
 Site Name:
 Carbondale
 I
 Egon Kamarasy
Photo taken by:
Don Terry
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Southeast
Photo File Name:
0778125013-03252004-05
Date:
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L
 BEFORE THE ILLINOIS
 POLLUTION CONTROL
~
 ~~C~VED
D’JM~1LJ
 CLERK’S OFFICE
COUNTY
 ~
 ~
r
 vs.
 No.
 2004-063
EGON
 KAMARASY,
)
 Respondent.
MEMORANDUM
 SUPPORTING
 PETITION
 TO
 CONTEST
ADMINISTRATIVE
 CITATION
I
INTRODUCTION
The County of Jackson (“County”) seeks
 to
 impose civil penalties for two
 (2) alleged
violations ofthe Act.
Mr. Kamarasy denies that his
 actions violated the
 Pollution Control
 Act.
 He
 further
denies that his actions gave rise to
 any “pollution”.
II
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On March
 25,
 2004,
 an inspector for the County, Don
 Terry,
 conducted an
 “on-site
inspection” of a
 site that
 he
 identified as
 the Makanda/Kamarasy
 site, located in
 Jackson
County, Illinois.
 The inspection lasted approximately three (3) minutes, from
 2:32
 p.m.
 until
2:35
 p.m.
 (See
 Jaëkson County Health Department Affidavit of Don
 Terry,
 dated March
 29,
2004,
 attached as Exhibit “A” to the Administrative Citation (“D. Terry Aff.”))
Mr. Terry’s Narrative Inspection Report (hereinafter “Report”),
 submitted in
 support
of the Administrative Citation filed by the County, states that the site investigation
 on
 March
 25,
2004
 was
 made “as
 a follow
 up to
 an
 inspection
 .
 .
 .
 done
 on
 December
 5,
 2003.”
 (See
Narrative Inspection Report Document Open Dump Site,
 attached to
 Affidavit of Don
 Terry,
dated March
 29,~2004,
 attached as Exhibit
 “A”
 to
 the
 Administrative
 Citation (“Narrative
Page
 1
Memorandum
 Supporting
 Petition
 to
 Contest
 Administrative
 Citation
Report”)
 Howe~er,the Report does not
 give
 any
 account of the December
 5
 investigation.
Nor does it
 say~whether
 that first
 inspection resulted in
 any
 action being taken against Mr.
Kamarasy, such as
 the issuance of a
 warning,
 which might have contained its
 own
 separate
terms for compliance.
Mr. Terry is
 careful to
 say in
 this Report “I
 did not
 enter the property and
 conducted
this follow-up inspection from the gate.”
 (Narrative Report)
 He then alleges,
 from that vantage
point,
 “I
 observed
 a debris
 pile in
 approximately
 the
 same
 location as
 I
 had
 observed
 on
December
 5,
 2003,” but
 the pile “appeared larger”
 indicating,
 in
 his
 words,
 “more
 material
has been open dumped at this location since December
 5,
 2003.” (Narrative Report)
The inspector estimated the size of the debris
 pile on
 March 25
 as being
 approximately
110 cubic yards~(NarrativeReport)
 Presumably, he also estimated the volume
 of the pile on
December 5, 2003
 But, he did not
 provide documentation from
 the December
 5
 inspection,
 to
show whether that previous estimate was smaller or larger.
Mr. Terry claims that thepile
 “appeared
 to
 consist of construction/demolition debris.”
(Narrative Report)
 More specifically, he said that the pile contained (1) “dimensional lumber”,
(2) “dark paneling”,
 (3) “metal siding”, and
 (4) “other materials not readily
 identifiable from
my location.” (N~rrative
 Report)
 He then concludes that this
 debris
 must have been
 generated
off-site and tran~p,orted
 to this location, given the size ofthe pile.
 (Id.)
To document these observations, Mr.
 Terry
 took
 one photograph, presumably from the
gate where he
 was
 standing.
 (See
 Open
 Dump
 Inspection Site
 Sketch, attached hereto
 as
Respondent’s Exhibit “R-2”,
 and attached to the Administrative Citation filed by the County in
this case.)
 This pjcture
 shows that Mr.
 Terry
 was
 standing at a very substantial
 distance
 from
the
 alleged “duttip”.
 From
 that
 distance,
 as
 the picture
 clearly shows,
 a
 pile
 of material
 is
visible on the sitç~but
 it is impossible to say what items were in thepile.
Mr. Terry’s Report states
 that, on the
 basis of his personal observation, he
 concluded
the following violations occurred: (1) causing or allowing the
 open
 dumping;
 (2)
 causing or
allowing
 the op~.ndumping
 of any
 waste
 in
 a manner that_results
 in
 (a)
 litter and
 (b)
 the
deposition
 of general construction or demolition debris or clean
 construction or
 demolition
debris,
 in violation of the
 Act;
 (3)
 conducting
 a
 waste-storage, waster
 treatment, or
 waste-
disposal operatidh without a proper permit; (4)
 conducting a waste-storage, waste-treatment, or
waste-disposal operation in violation of “any regulations or standards adopted by
 the
 Board;
(5)
 disposing,
 treating, storing or abandoning any
 waste or transporting
 any
 waste
 into
 the
States at or to sites not meeting therequirements ofthe Act; (6) failing
 to
 submit an
 application
for a permit to develop and operate a landfill; (7) failing to obtain a “Developmental Permit”
 to
operate a solid waste management site; and
 (8) failing
 to
 obtain
 an
 “Operational
 Permit”
 to
operate a solid waste management site
 (Narrative Report)
On March
 30,
 2004,
 the County filed an
 Administrative Citation with
 the
 Pollution
Control Board irithis cause.
The Admmistrative Citation states a legal conclusion in
 its
 so-called “Facts”
 section,
namely
 that
 “tflie
 facility
 is
 an
 open
 dump,
 operating
 without
 an
 Illinois
 Environmental
Protection Agency Operating Permit.”
 This
 is improper because the complaint fails to
 allege
any of the underlying facts necessary
 to
 support
 the legal
 conclusions that this
 was
 either
 a
“facility” or an ‘~pendump” in the sense regulated by the Pollution Control Act.
In partic~ilar,
 proving
 that the pile in
 question was
 an
 “open
 dump”
 is
 part
 of the
County’s
 primafacie
 case for both ofthe charges against Mr. Kamarasy.
 Therefore,
 it cannot
be “fact,” until tl~isBoard says it is.
 Nor can it be simply be asserted
 as
 a conclusory opinion
by the County’s~inspector.The County must
 prove
 the elements of its
 primafacie
 case,
 not
merely recite them
Furthernläre, it is
 a
 fact
 that neither the Citation, nor any
 other charging instrument
from
 the
 CounW~accusesMr.
 Kamarasy of operating
 a
 commercial
 dump
 site
 “facility”
without a 1icense~ Therefore,
 one
 must presume that even the
 County does not
 believe this
accusation by Mr. Terry was a “fact”.
The citatioli document charges that (1) “the
 Respondent has caused or allowed litter at
the facility in vi~51ationof 415
 ILCS
 §
S/2l(p)(l)”;
 and (2) “the
 Respondent has caused or
u
 allowed
 the
 deposition
 of
 general
 construction
 or
 demolition,
 or
 clean
 construction
 or
demolition debri~~
 in
 violation of 415 ILCS
 §
S/2l(p)(7).”
These charges are improperly stated for the same reason as described above.
 The plain
language of the Pollution Control Act requires a showing that the site in question was an “open
dump”, in the precise sense that “open dump”
 is
 defined in
 the
 Act, before
 showing
 that it
“caused or allowed litter,” or that it “caused or allowed the deposition of general
 construction
or demolition, or~cleanconstruction or demolition debris.”
The respEndentfiled a Petition
 to
 Contest Administrative
 Citation.
 In
 it, he
 denies
 that
P
 his conduct viola~d
 the Act as alleged.
Mr. Kamarasy will testify, first of all, that the pile in question was placed on
 his
 own
property.
 He w~U
 explain that the pile contained the broken
 down parts
 and
 pieces of
 some
mobile homes that were abandoned by others on property that he owns.
 He will further explain
how this pile cathe to be located on the property in question, as set out below.
Mr. Kamarasy owns and operates a mobile home park.
 It
 is a
 common
 problem that
mobile home oWners sometimes
 abandon their mobile homes
 at the mobile
 home park
 when
they move.
 The~iwner/operatorofthe property is
 then left with the problem of disposing
 of
these unwanted structures.
Mr.
 Kan~arasywill testify
 and
 documentary evidence
 will
 show
 that
 the
 Illinois
Department of Public Health (“IDPH”), as a result of its
 standard inspections
 conducted of
Mr. Kamarasy’&hiobile
 home park,
 ordered him
 to
 remove
 certain
 abandoned and
 broken
mobile homes from the mobile home park.
 According to
 the IDPH,
 Mr.
 Kamarasy was
 not
permitted to
 leave the abandoned homes at the mobile home park until he
 managed
 to
 sell or
recycle the usable parts from the homes.
 (See
 Respondent’s Exhibit “R- 1”, a copy of which
 is
attached hereto.)~
Mr. Kamarasy attempted to comply with the IDPH directive.
 He had some
 open space
on land he owned,~:called
 “BittersweetFarm”,
 which is
 located in Makanda Township,
 about a
halfmile from his~own
 homestead and farm located in Pomona Township.
r
L
 Mr. Kama~asy
 will
 testify
 that he relocated the abandoned mobile home structures
 and
L
materials in question to
 the Bittersweet Farm site.
 From there, workers
 continued
 the work of
dismantling the Structures, separating the recyclable from the non-recyclable materials, in order
~
 to sell whatever naterials from the mobile homes were reusable and dispose ofthe rest.
Mr. Karnarasy will further testify
 that,
 at the
 time, he thought,
 and
 had every reason to
believe that his
 actions were legal and not in
 violation of either the
 Litter Control Act or the
Pollution Control Act.
 There was
 nothing
 unlawful,
 he
 believed,
 about moving the
 materials
from one ofhis
 properties
 in
 the area to
 another.
 And, the act of depositing
 the debris
 on the
L
 Bittersweet Farm
 site did
 not
 introduce
 pollutants
 into
 the
 environment.
 Nor
 was
 Mr.
Kamarasy operating a commercial waste dump
 facility on Bittersweet Farm, or allowing
 others
to
 dump there
Next,
 Mt~.i
 Kamarasy will testify
 that the debris
 pile
 was
 located approximately five
L
 hundred (500) feet from the gate where Mr.
 Terry says
 he
 was
 standing when he
 took his
 one
and only
 photograph on March
 25,
 2004.
 From that
 distance,
 Mr.
 Terry could not
 possibly
have identified the specific items
 in the debris pile,
 such as dark paneling
 and
 metal
 siding,
 that
he
 reported
 to
 mive
 personally observed on
 his
 March
 25,
 2004
 inspection.
 Nor
 does
 the
photograph tak~n
 by Mr. Terry make it possible
 to
 identify,
 with
 the naked eye,
 any
 such
L
 specific items.
L
 Mr. Kaniàrasy can only
 guess
 that
 what Mr.
 Terry
 did was simply
 assume that
 all
 the
items that he idetitified during his previous inspection of December
 5,
 2003,
 were still
 there.
Underlying that a~sumption
 is the further conclusory assumption that
 Mr. Kamarasy had done
nothing to
 address the problems that Mr. Terry had previously identified on December
 5.
The County will present no evidence that Mr. Te~ made a
 direct
 observation of the
L
 items he purported
 to
 have observed
 on
 March
 25,
 2004.
 And, the
 County
 can
 present
 no
evidence
 to
 supJ~ort
 its
 conclusory assumption that Mr.
 Kamarasy failed
 to
 do
 anything
 to
alleviate the problem that Mr.
 Terry had previously identified on December
 5,
 2003.
To the cbntrary, Mr. Kamarasy will testify that all of the
 metal parts
 from
 the
 mobile
homes (including all the metal-siding) had
 been removed from
 the debris
 pile
 and
 taken for
recycling by the~time
 Mr. Terry returned for his follow-up inspection on March 25, 2004.
 As
 a
result, Mr. Terry’s Report was demonstrably inaccurate in identifying metal siding at the
 site,
and should be considered suspect with respect to all other specific items
 that Mr. Terry claimed
to have identified.
 In addition,
 Mr. Kamarasy denies having made further deposits of material
on this site, afterhe was warned, in a letter, dated January 9,
 2004,
 that the debris pile
 might be
unlawful.
 During that time, thepile clearly was diminished in size, not increased.
 In December
2003, Mr. Kamarasy contracted with McMurphy Excavation to remove the debris
 and
 transport
it to a landfill.
 The evidence will show that
 all of the materials were removed from the
 site and
properly dispos~dof by May 2004.
 (See
 Respondent’s
 Exhibit “R-3”,
 a
 copy of
 which is
attachedhereto.~~
Mr. Kan~arasyhas no
 personal
 knowledge upon
 which
 to
 deny
 that
 Mr.
 Terry
 did
inspect the site ~n December 5,
 2003.
 Mr.
 Terry did not contact Mr. Kamarasy.
 He did not
request permission from Mr. Kamarasy to enter the property to
 make an inspection.
 No prior
notice was given ~to
 Mr. Kamarasy concerning the inspection.
 And, Mr.
 Terry did not give Mr.
Kamarasy a citatiOn, or even an official warning, at that time.
However,
 in
 January
 2004,
 Mr. Kamarasy
 received a
 letter, dated
 January
 9,
 2004,
signed
 by
 Bart~’Hagston,Coordinator
 Solid
 Waste
 Program,
 Jackson
 County
 Health
Department. (Se~Respondent’s
 Exhibit “R-4”, a copy of which is attached hereto.)
 That letter
stated that
 “a representative
 of
 the
 Jackson County
 Health Department”
 “completed”
 an
investigation on tecember 5, 2003 and believed that he found several violations of theAct.
 The
violations a11eged~’werestated as
 follows:
 (1) causing
 or allowing
 the open
 dumping of any
waste because
 ‘~evidence
 of
 waste
 was
 observed
 open
 dumped
 at
 this
 site
 during
 the
inspection”;
 (2). conducting
 a
 waste-storage, waste-treatment,
 or waste-disposal operation
without a permit granted by
 the IEPA because “no
 permits have been issued
 for
 this
 waste
management
 facility”;
 (3)
 conducting
 a
 waste-storage, waste-treatment, or
 waste-disposal
operation in violation ofregulations or standards
 adopted under the Act because “no
 permits
have been issued
 for this
 waste-management facility”;
 (4)
 disposing,
 treating, storing
 or
abandoning any ~iaste, or transport any
 waste into this
 State for disposal,
 treatment,
 storage or
abandonment,
 except
 at
 a site
 or facility
 that meets the requirements of
 the
 Act
 and
 the
regulations and standards thereunder because “violations
 of Board regulations
 as well as the
Act were observed at the time ofthe inspection”;
 (5) causing or allowing the open dumping of
any waste in a manner that results
 in
 (a)
 litter and
 (b)
 deposition of general
 construction or
demolition
 debris or clean construction or demolition
 debris;
 (6) developing
 and/or operating a
landfill
 without~receivinga
 Developmental
 Permit
 from
 the
 IEPA
 “for
 a
 solid
 waste
management siteLát this
 location”;
 and
 (7) causing or allowing the use or operation of a solid
waste managemeht
 site for which a Developmental Permit
 is
 required without an
 Operating
Permit issued by’~the
 IEPA.
This letter, contained “an explanation ofthe activities that the Illinois
 EPA
 and
 JCHD
believe may reso1~vethe specified violations, including an estimate ofa reasonable time period to
complete the necessary activities” and
 stated that “resolution of the violations
 may require the
involvement of ~Pprosecutorialauthority for
 purposes
 that
 may
 include,
 among others,
 the
imposition of statutory penalties”.
The lette~tthen
 stated that a written response must be
 submitted
 to
 the County
 Health
Department within 45 days ofMr. Kamarasy’s receipt of the letter; the written response “must
address each violation specified.
 .
 .
 and include for each an explanation ofthe activities that
 wifi
be implemented~indthe time schedule for the completion
 of that activity”;
 and,
 the
 written
response “will
 cbnstitute a
 proposed Compliance Commitment Agreement
 (“CCA”),
 which
the County Hea1th~Department
 will review and
 either accept or reject
 within
 30 days
 of receipt.
No time period fOrcompletion of any remediation activities was given.
The letter~nded
 by saying that failing to respond timely in
 writing
 would be
 considered
a
 “waiver of
 the! opportunity
 to
 respond and
 to meet”
 and
 the
 County
 Health Department
“may proceed with a referral to the prosecutorial authority”.
 Mr.
 Kamarasy was urged to
 call
Mr. Terry with any questions regarding this matter.
In respon~e
 to this Notice ofViolation, Mr. Kamarasy did call Mr.
 Terry on January
 15,
and the two ofthem discussed the corrective actions that the County Health Department wanted
done.
 (See
 Respondent’s
 Exhibit “R-5”,
 a copy of which is
 attached hereto.)
 Mr. Kamarasy
will testify that he told Mr. Terry that (a)
 he
 (Mr.
 Kamarasy)
 was working on
 removing the
materials comprising the pile; (b) he had already arranged for a contractor to
 remove
 it;
 and
 (c)
he
 believed he could accomplish this
 objective by February
 13,
 2004
 Mr
 Kamarasy
 will
further testify that he understood that Mr. Terry
 agreed to this proposal, and that Mr.
 Kamarasy
believed Mr
 Terry was acting with the authonty ofthe County at this time
By
 February
 13,
 all
 of the metal from
 the
 site had
 been removed for
 recycling by
Michael Mays, P~rchie
 Mays, Lucas
 Parrott,
 and Danny Morefield, individuals
 retained by Mr
Kamarasy
 to
 dismantle
 the
 mobile home
 structures
 and
 recycle the
 recyclable
 matenals
Unfortunately,
 the weather
 did not
 cooperate with removing the rest of
 the
 debris.
 Mr.
McMurphy had to
 wait for a “hard freeze” to
 make it possible to
 get his heavy equipment into
the field in order to load the non-reusable materials into a truck for transportation to
 the county
landfill.
 The weather wasjust not cold enough and the ground was too wet and muddy for such
equipment to accomplish the job
 Mr
 McMurphy’s
 testimony
 is
 expected to corroborate
 that
he was unable, ot~
 believed that he
 was unable,
 to
 complete the job
 due to
 the conditions
 of the
weather and the ground upon which his heavy equipment would have to traverse in order to
 load
and haul away th~
 materials from the site.
When th~ground
 finally
 dried enough,
 Mr.
 Kamarasy had
 the
 rest of the
 debris
removed to the Jackson County landfill.
 However, this occurred after March
 25,
 2004
 and
 was
too late to prevent him from receiving the Citation in this case
On March~25,2004, Mr. Terry conducted his three-minute inspection from the gate
 500
feet from the pile
 of matenals and
 on March
 29,
 2004 the Administrative Citation was filed m
this
 case.
 No
 a.ttcmpt
 was made by
 the
 County
 to
 contact Mr.
 Kamarasy
 following their
r
communications occurring in January to determine why more of the
 pile had not been removed
L
or for any
 otherreason.
 Mr. Terry did not call or write Mr.
 Kamarasy or make any
 inquiry
 to
determine why the matter had not been resolved to
 his
 satisfaction
 by March
 25,
 some
 six (6)
r
 weeks after he believed Mr
 Kamarasy had promised to complete the disposal
Mr.
 Kamarasy
 contends
 that
 both
 he
 and
 the
 County
 were
 bound
 to
 honor
 this
r
 agreement, that he intended
 to
 honor
it,
and
 that he
 made all reasonable
 efforts
 to
 comply
 with
its terms.
 However, he was prevented from fully complying due to circumstances outside of his
reasonable control.
I
 In addition, Mr
 Kamarasy contends
 that
 the
 debris
 pile
 he
 created, while perhaps
unsightly,
 was not
 an
 “open dump”,
 as that
 term is
 defined
 in
 the
 Pollution
 Control
 Act,
III
 because the nature of the debris and the manner and
 location in
 which
it
 was deposited did not
cause the debris to enter into the
 environment, nor make
it
 likely
 that polluting materials would
be emitted or discharged, or otherwise disseminated from the site
r
 For similar reasons, Mr. Kamarasy contends that his debris pile
 did
 not constitute
 litter,
as that term is defined in the Litter Control Act
 In fact, a plain reading ofthe Litter Control
 Act
r
 shows
 that Mr
 Kamarasy acted lawfully in depositing this material on his own land
Mr. Kam~rasyfinally contends that it was a violation of his due
 process rights
 and
 a
L
 violation of the Separation of Powers principle for him to be
 charged with two
 violations for
what amounts to~one
 (allegedly) wrongful act of moving the abandoned mobile home
 structures
to a site on Bittersweet Farm to be dismantled, recycled and disposed offrom there.
The County makes no
 attempt
 to show that there was any litter, apart from5the broken
down parts
 of these mobile home
 structures at the Makanda/Kamarasy
 site.
 Therefore,
 the
prosecution is eff~ctively
 charging Mr. Kamarasy
 twice for the
 same
 demolition debris,
 simply
by the deceit of renaming the mobile
 home parts
 “demolition
 debris”,
 after first naming them
“litter”.
Finally,
 ~Mr.Kamarasy
 will
 argue
 that
 the
 Pollution
 Control
 Act
 should
 not
 be
interpreted so a~tooutlaw
 an
 act that
 the Litter Control Act expressly
 permits,
 namely,
 the
~
 .~.*
 ~
 ::
 :~
 ~
 ~.
 .
 .~
P ..,.M~th
 ~
 P~titiô~P
 tóPCoñtest
 Adinin1~t~àti
ciLatid~
:
dumping ofa pik, ofnon-polluting
 and non-littering debris on
 one’s
 own property, some
 to be
recycled
 and th~restdisposed
 of.
 To hold
 otherwise would render one or
 the
 other
 Acts
unconstitutiona1~~ince,
 taken together, the two statutes would then tell Illinois citizens that the
same act of creating a debris
 pile on one’s own land in such a way that
it
does not spread or
emit or discharge onto otherland is both lawful and unlawful at the sametime.
III
ISSUES PRESENTED
The Administrative Citation and the Petition to Contest Administrative Citation present
the following iss~s:
A.
 Shbuld the inspector’s
 Narrative Report, based upon his
 March
 25
 inspection of
the Makanda/K~iarasysite, be
 disregarded because the
 inspector could
 not
 possibly
 have
observed what he~said
 he observed from the location where he claimed to have-observed it?
B.
 DidPthe
 County
 improperly state charges
 against
 Mr.
 Kamarasy
 and
 fail
 to
acknowledge thátias part ofits
 primafacie
 case, it must prove Mr.
 Kamarasy created
 an “open
dump”, according to the legal definition of that term?
C.
 DidMr. Kamarasy cause or allow “open dumping”
 at the Makanda/Kamarasy
site?
D.
 If ‘~cpendumping”
 occurred
 at the
 site,
 did
 the
 “open
 dumping”
 result
 in
“litter”?
E.
 If ‘~pendumping” occurred at the
 site,
 did
 the “open
 dumping”
 result in
 the
deposition
 of general construction or demolition debris or clean
 construction or
 demolition
debris?
F.
 Was the County bound to respect the agreement negotiated between the parties in
January,
 2004?
 liP so, was Mr. Kamarasy’s
 failure to
 comply
 with that agreement the result of
circumstances
 that were beyond
 his
 control?
G.
 Did:-the County and
 its
 inspector abuse their discretion
 and exceed
 the intent
 and
scope ofthe administrative citation process by broadening the definition of “litter”
 beyond the
legislature’s intent,
 and by filing
 two
 charges
 against Mr.
 Kamarasy
 for the
 single
 act of
creating a pile
 of materials by
 depositing
 on
 his
 own property the broken
 down parts
 from
certain mobile homes
 that others
 had
 abandoned on
 his own property?
 If so,
 did
 this create a
separation ofpo~ers
 problem under the Illinois Constitution?
H.
 Is the law, as applied to Mr. Kamarasy,
 unconstitutionally vague, in
 failing to
 give
Mr. Kamarasy reasonable notice of what
 constitutes
 creating an open
 dump on
 one’s
 own
property, and what constitutes littering on one’s own property?
IV
THE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT THE INSPECTOR DID NOT OBSERVE,
ANI5 COULD NOT HAVE OBSERVED,
 ON MARCH 25, 2004, THE
SPECIFIC ITEMS THAT HE CLAIMS TO HAVE OBSERVED IN THE
NARRATIVE REPORT, THEREFORE,THIS PART OF THE REPORT
SHOULD BE DISREGARDED AS MERE SPECULATION BY THE
INSPECTOR, LACKING IN ANY FOUNDATION
When a i~itness
 such as Mr. Terry attempts to testify about the “facts”
 of a case,
 he is
required to testify only
 about
 those
 facts of which he has personal knowledge.
 Moreover, the
legislature explicitly prescribed, when creating the Administrative Citation process, that
 an
enforcement agent, such as Mr. Terry, must base his
 testimony
 upon
 his
 direct
 observations.
See
 415 ILCS
 §
5/31.1(b)
 It follows that speculative evidence should not be admitted.
By
 Mr. Terry’s
 own
 admission,
 he
 inspected
 Mr.
 Kamarasy’s
 pile
 of material,
 on
March 25, 2004 ~r
 the sum total ofthree minutes.
 This inspection was performed as a follow-
up to a Decemb~5,
 2003 inspection.
 Mr.
 Terry
 admits,
 however, that
 all
 he did was
 stand on
the side ofthe road by the gate to Mr. Kamarasy’ s property
 and
 take a photograph of the
 pile.
He did not enter-onto the property to make a serious investigation of the pile
 or determine what
was in it.
The evide~ice
 further shows
 that Mr
 Terry took
 only
 one photograph of the
 site
 on
March 25
 That picture is completely unsatisfactory in that
it
does not show
 any of the
 specific
items
 Mr. Terry;âlleges
 to
 have
 seen
 in
 the
 pile
 —
 namely,
 “dimensional
 lumber”,
 “dark
paneling”,
 and ‘~metalsiding”.
 About
 the
 only
 thing the photograph shows
 clearly is
 that
there was a pile
 of materials and it was located at a
 great distance
 from
 the place
 where Mr.
Terry stopped toponduct his investigation.
That le~’VesMr.
 Terry’s
 personal
 testimony
 as
 the only
 evidence
 the
 County
 can
produce to supp~rtits claim that the
 items
 claimed actually were
 contained in
 the
 pile,
 as
 of
March 25, 2004- --But the questionremains “what
 is
 the foundation for Mr. Terry’s
 testimony
concerning these -items”.
 If the camera did
 not
 “see”
 the individual items
 Mr.
 Terry
 alleges,
when and how did Mr. Terry see them?
It is an undisputed fact that Mr.
 Terry was
 standing very far away from the pile when he
took the photograph on March 25, 2004.
 Mr. Kamarasy is
 expected to testify
 that the
 distance
from the gate to the location ofthe pile was
 approximately 500 feet.
 How could Mr. Terry have
observed
 dimensional lumber at this distance,
 or “dark paneling”, or “metal
 siding”?
 The
answer is that he could not have.
It
 is
 alsø~undisputedthat Mr. Terry only
 took
 a total of three minutes to
 make his
inspection, and much of that time was presumably spent taking
 out his
 camera, lining
 up
 the
photograph, andsetting the proper angles on the lens.
 He did not have
 time to
 study
 the debris
pile, or scan clos~iy
 for signs of lumber or paneling or siding.
 His Report shows that
 no tests
or samples of any~materialswere taken.
One might
 speculate that Mr.
 Terry entered
 these
 items
 on
 his
 report
 on
 March
 25,
based on his
 recOllection of having observed them on December
 5,
 2003.
 Even so, Mr.
 Terry
simply had no way ofknowing for sure that the items he
 saw
 on
 December
 5
 were
 still
 present
on March 25.
As a result, Mr. Terry’s testimony
 is either untruthful, if he claims to have
 seen
 these
items
 on March25, or it is inadmissible if he claims to have only seen them on December
 6.
The violation thai- Mr. Kamarasy is charged with
 is
 dated March
 25,
 2004,
 not
 December
 6,
2003,
 and
 the legal requirement
 is
 that
 Mr.
 Terry can
 only
 testify
 about what
 he
 directly
observed regarding the alleged violation.
Even
 without the requirement set
 forth
 in
 the
 Administrative
 Citation process,
 the
general rules of evidence make Mr. Terry’s evidence
 so unreliable that his reference to the
existence ofthe specific items
—
 —
 the metal siding, dark
 panelmg,
 and dimensional lumber
—
 —
should
 be excisqd from his report and stricken from this record.
 Mr. Terry merely
 assumed
that those items were there.
 And, given the fact that Mr. Terry already knew Mr. Kamarasy
 was
trying to clean the place up, Mr. Terry’s assumption was unreasonable.
IfMr. Terry wanted to
 testify
 about what was
 in
 the
 pile, he
 should have taken a close
up look to see what was there.
 He did not.
 And his speculation now about what
 was there then
cannot support a reasonable,
 sustainable finding that Mr. Kamarasy’s actions violated the Act.
It follows that the County should only be allowed to
 present evidence that the
 pile
 of
materials from
 the’- abandoned mobile home structures still existed as ofMarch 25, 2004, a point
that Mr
 Kamaras,y does not dispute
 The County should not be permitted to
 testify
 about what
was in the pile.
 pAnd then, it follows that the County cannot make
 aprimafacie
 case that
 the
pile violated the ~Po11ution
 Control
 Act.
 As
 a matter of
 law, the
 mere existence of a
 pile of
materials is not enough.
V
IT IS I~ART
 OF THE
 STATE’S
 PRIMA FACIE
 CASE TO PROVE THAT
MR. K~MARASYCAUSED
 OR ALLOWED
 “OPEN DUMPING”, AS
THAT TERM IS DEFINED
 IN THE POLLUTION CONTROL ACT:
 BUT
MR. KAMARASY DID NOT CAUSE OR ALLOW “OPEN DUMPING”
AT THE MAKANDA/KAMARASY SITh
In order
 U5
 seek enforcement by Administrative
 Citation for violations
 of Section 21(p),
the Agency, or local governing body, must first establish that the respondent caused or allowed
open dumping
 Se~e
 Montgomerv County
 Illinois
 v
 Clifford Crispens
 Jacqueline R
 Cnspens
and Line Pilot Bungee, Inc., AC 95-43.
 Section 21(a) ofthe Act sets forth a general prohibition
against open duthping as follows:
 “No person shall cause or allow the open
 dumping of any
waste.” 415 ILCS
 §
5/21(a)
Section 3~385ofthe Act defines “refuse”
 as “waste”.
 415
 ILCS
 §
 5/3.385.
 The Act
then defines “wa’ste” to mean “any garbage, sludge from a waste treatment
 plant,
 water supply
treatment plant,
-
 or air
 pollution
 control
 facility or
 other discarded material”.
 415
 ILCS
 §
5/3.535.
 -
Section ~‘300of the Act defines “open dumping” as
tl~
 consolidation of refuse from one or more sources at a
 disposal
si~è
that
 does not
 fulfill
 the
 requirements of
 a
 sanitary
 landfill.
(Emphasis added.)
415 ILCS
 §
5/3.395.
 Thus,
 in
 order to prove that Mr. Kamarasy
 committed “open
 dumping”,
the County must show that he created a “disposal site” on his land.
It cannot be true, however,
 that any time a
 landowner places any
 household
 item
 (for
example, a broken chair) on his
 land, or piles up
 some
 branches and
 leaves, that he
 or she has
thereby created t “disposal site” under the statute.
 Such
 an
 interpretation would render the
Pollution Contro1~Actso broad as to be arbitrary and unenforceable.
 See
 Alternate Fuels.
 Inc.
 v.
Director of the illinois Environmental
 Protection Ag~cy,2004 WL 2359398
 (Ill.
 Sup.
 Ct.
2004)
It would mean for example that every homeowner who has everplaced a broken
 chair in
his backyard, or-th~old
 piece of plywood has thereby created a “disposal
 site”
 under the
 law,
and would be
 subject (in the case of the plywood) to charges of both littering
 and
 depositing
demolition debrisiin violation ofthe Pollution
 Control Act.
 Hopefully,
 this
 Board would
 agree
that that is not the~type
 ofproblem that the Pollution Control Act was meant to address.
Of course,
 Mr. Kamarasy recognizes
 that
 his
 pile of materials was
 not
 equivalent
 in
scale
 to merely p~tting
 out a couple ofbroken pieces ofplywood on one’s land.
 However, size
or scale is not a r~1evant
 consideration when it comes to determining which piles of materials
 do
or do not constitute “disposal sites” under the
 Pollution
 Control
 Act
 As will be discussed m
detail below, th~relevant
 distinction between a mere “pile of material” and a “disposal site”
has to
 do
 with
 the likelihood that
 the “pile of material” will
 cause “pollution.”
 Roughly
speaking, as willi be discussed in
 more detail below,
 a disposal
 site
 is
 a place
 where
 material is
disposed of in suCh a way that it is
 likely
 to
 cause pollution.
 So, it
 is
 not the existence of the
pile ofmaterial that is offensive to the Pollution Control Act; it is
 the scattering of that
 material,
or constituents thereof, freely into the environment, which the law seeks to prevent.
In the case at bar, Mr. Kamarasy admits that he
 organized
 and
 consolidated the
 parts
and material froñ~i-
 some mobile homes
 that had been abandoned on his
 property, moving them
to a single locatio~nat the Bittersweet Farm site at the direction of the IDPH
 But none of these
parts
 or materials threatened to
 scatter
 freely into the
 environment
 Mr
 Kamarasy
 merely
intended to harvest or recycle the usable parts before disposing ofthe rest.
 In so
 doing,
 he may
have created a ness;
 however,
 he
 did not create a
 disposal
 site, according
 to
 the
 Pollution
Control Act.
 ‘~
Admitte4ly, the Act does not provide a single definition for the term “disposal site”, but
the words
 “disposal” and
 “site”
 are
 defined separately.
 The definition of the term “site”
 is
self-explanatory~ee
 415 ILCS
 §5/3.460
 However, the term “disposal”
 is
 specific enough
 as
to
 shed light on
 s’~’hichdebris piles can be labeled “disposal sites” and which cannot.
Accordin~
 to theAct:
“Disposal”
 means
 the
 discharge,
 deposit,
 injection,
 dumping,
spilling, leaking or placing of any waste or hazardous waste
 into or
or~
 any
 land
 or
 water
 or
 into
 any
 well
 so
 that
 such
 waste
 or
hazardous
 waste
 or
 any
 constituent
 thereof
 may
 enter
 the
environment
 orbe emitted into the air or discharged into any
 waters,
 -
 including ground waters.
415
 ILCS
 §
5/3.185.
 Presumably, then, a “disposal site” under
 the Act would be one where
such “disposal”‘takes place.
For purpdses of analysis, there are two main parts
 to
 the
 above
 definition.
 First, the
definition requires a
 showing
 that Mr.
 Kamarasy “placed
 .
 .
 .
 waste
 .
 .
 .
 on
 his
 land.”
Second it requires
 that Mr. Kamarasy placed waste of such a kind and
 in
 such a manner “so
that such waste.
 .
 .
 or any constituent thereofmay
 enter the environment
 or
 be
 emitted
 into the
air
 or discharged’
 nto
 any
 waters, including ground waters.” (Emphasis added.)
Because the County bears
 the burden of proving
 that Mr.
 Kamarasy committed the act
of “open
 dumping”
 and because
 this
 requires
 a
 showing
 that
 the
 respondent created
 a
“disposal site”, itis clearly
 the County’s
 burden to
 prove that the
 site in
 question was truly a
“disposal
 site”*-’
As just noted, that would ordinarily require two showings
 (1) placing waste on the land,
and (2) doing thi~~
 in such a way that the
 waste would be
 likely to
 “enter
 the environment”,
 or
be “emitted” into the air or “discharged”
 into the
 water.
 But,
 since Mr. Kamarasy concedes
the first point, the County’s burden is to show only that
 the
 waste,
 was somehow placed on
 the
land in such a way that it, or some
 constituent thereof was entering into the environment or
emitting into the~airor discharging into the waters.
Certainly, no evidence will
 be presented ofemitting or discharging
 Therefore,
it
 would
appear
that the Gounty will have to prove “entering into the environment”.
The County will present no evidence that the pile
 of material at the site
 in question was
likely to cause pollution in the sense just described
 Perhaps
 the County
 means
 to
 argue,
 m
effect, that everyPtime a personplaces waste on his orher land, then he or she automatically, as
 a
matter oflogical consequence,
 causes that waste to enter into the environment.
 But if that
 is
 the
correct interpretation
 of the phrase
 “enter
 the environment”, namely
 that
 anything
 found
outside of a building is necessarily
 in the environment, so that every debris pile
 is
 a disposal
site, then the entire phrase
 “so that such waste.
 .
 .
 or any
 constituent thereof may enter the
environment orb~
 emitted into the air or discharged into any
 waters,
 including
 ground waters”
would become d~mpletely
 superfluous.
 If the prohibited act was merely placing the waste on
the land, why did’ the legislature botherto say that it was only prohibited if it was done in
 such a
way as to cause the materials to enter into the environment?
It is a standard principle ofstatutory construction that each clause
 in
 a statute
 should be
presumed to have~some
 meaning. Alternate Fuels.
 Inc.
 v.
 Director of the Illinois
 Environmental
Protection
 Agency,
 supra,
 2004
 WL 2359398
 Therefore,
 it
 must
 be
 presumed
 that
 the
legislature meant-the concepts of “entering into the environment”, as well as “emitting”
 and
“discharging”, t~place
 some limitation
 on
 the
 notion of placing
 waste
 on
 the
 land.
 A
landowner, like Mr. Kamarasy, does not create a disposal site every time
 he places waste on his
land.
Li
 So how d~iesone know which acts create a disposal site, and which do not?
 What
 is the
distinction that the legislature
 intended to
 make?
 It
 seems
 clear
 that
 by
 using
 the
 words
“entering into
the
environment”, “emitting”, and “discharging” the legislature meant to
 imply
a certain lack of~Qntrolorpotential
 lack of control by the person who placed
 the waste on the
land.
 To be a disposal site, it must be shown either that (1) the waste in its
 entirety (for example
unprotected paper trash), or else
 (2)
 some constituent of the
 waste (for example oil or paint in
open cans)
 did enter or is likely to enter (freely) into the
 environment, or be
 emitted into the air
or be discharged/ihto the waters.
 This is a
 Pollution
 Control
 Act.
 It is pollution
 that
 is
 being
regulated, not mere messiness on the part of a landowner
Now, it thMr. Kamarasy’s position, as discussed above, that the County
 in general
 and
Mr.
 Terry in particular failed to provide any credible or substantial evidence
 showing the nature
or type ofitems
 i-n the pile of materials on March 25, 2004.
 Without such evidence,
 the County
cannot possibly -~reet
 its burden ofproving that such materials were
 deposited “so
 that such
waste..
 .
 or any~constituent
 thereof may enterthe environment or be
 emitted
 into the air or
discharged into ahy waters, including ground waters”.
Even iftj~~
 Board were to allow the County
 to
 use Mr. Terry’s
 specific
 list of items
 as
evidence, that wOuld hardly help to prove
 this
 was a disposal
 site.
 Does
 anyone
 seriously
believethat metái~siding,dark paneling,
 and
 dimensional lumber are likely
 to
 scatter,
 like paper
trash, freely intouPthe environment, or to
 leak into the ground water or emit
 vapors into
 the
 air?
And, how did M~-
 Terry determine that this scattering or leaking or emitting was going
 on,
 if he
only inspected
th~
 pile visually for three minutes from a distance of500 feet?
ThereforC~
 and for all of the reasons cited
 above,
 the County
 cannot and
 wifi not prove
that Mr. Kamaras~’smaterial pile at BittersweetFarm, as observed on
 March 25,
 2004,
 was
 an
“open dump”.
 Since
 such a finding is
 the necessary predicate to
 both of the charges
 against
Mr. Kamarasy, l~Othcharges should be
 dismissed.
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VI
n
 ~-MR.
 KAMARASY DID NOT CAUSE OR ALLOW OPEN
j
 DUMPING THAT RESULTED IN “LITTER” AS
 THAT TERM IS
‘~-•P
 USED IN THE POLLUTION CONTROL ACT
Even if the Board
 should find that Mr. Kamarasy did commit “open dumping,” each of
the two charges against Mr. Kamarasy still require a further showing.
Count
 (19 states that the respondent caused or allowed open
 dumping that resulted in
r
 “litter” in violatiOn of
§
2l(p)(l)
 of the Act.
 But,
 Mr. Kamarasy does not believe that his
 act
of placing
 a pile~
 of materials on his
 land, consisting of
 materials from
 abandoned mobile
homes, in a locatiOn that was a substantial distance
 from both the road and
 any neighbors,
 and
in a mannerthat-~posed
 no threat that the items
 might migrate towards someone else’s
 property,
can reasonably
 characterized as “littering”
Of cours~I,
 Mr. Kamarasy
 is
 well aware that
 the
 term
 “litter”
 has
 been
 interpreted
expansively in ~rior
cases
before the Pollution Control Board.
 See e.g.
 Illinois
 Environmental
Protection Agency v.
 Springer,
 supra,
 AC 02-7
at p.
 6
 But,
 again, if the legislature had merely
intended that every landowner who everplaced waste on his
 land in such a way as to
 constitute
“open dumping~’
 was
 also
 and
 automatically guilty
 of littering,
 then the legislature would not
have
 added the ~ua1ifying phrase
 “that resulted in
 litter.”
 See
 e.g.
 Alternate Fuels.
 Inc.
 v.
Director of the Illinois
 Environmental Protection
 Agency,
 supra,
 2004 WL 2359398
 It would
havejust defined~thecrime as “open dumping”.
By addingthe phrase “that resulted in litter”, the legislature made it clear that it believes
that
 not all discâ~ded
 items left at a “disposal site” are litter.
 So
 the question remains what
constitutes “litt&-~ng”under the
 Pollution
 Control Act, and what does
 not.
 Unfortunately,
 the
Act does not
 sa~:?This
 failure
 to define littering would have the
 potential to
 pose
 serious
enforcement problems of constitutional dimension: how can a homeowner, even one
 who has
studied the statute in
 elaborate detail, possibly
 know if he
 is
 performing the kind of “open
dumping” that
 results
 in litter, if the
 Act does not define “litter”?
 See e.g.
 People
 v.
 Einoder,
209 Il1.2d 443. 450.
 283
 I11.Dec.
 551.
 808
 N.E.2d 517
 (2004)
U
 The Pollution Control Board has attempted to
 answer this
 problem in
 previous
 cases,
responding
 to
 charges
 that
 the term
 “litter”
 in
 the
 statute
 is
 too
 vague
 by
 adopting
 the
definition oflitter from the Litter Control Act
 See e g
 St
 Clair County v
 Louis
 Mund, AC 90-
n
 64.
 This approach by the Board is both logical and reasonable.
 It has the virtue of relying on
 a
legal notion of “litter” that was created by
 the legislature precisely for the purpose of going
beyond the simplistic notion that litter is just “messy
 stuff left outside,” and identifying
 with
r
 some precision which messy stuffleft outside shall be treated by
 the law as “litter”
 and
 which
shall not, so that littering can be either prevented orpunished.
By adopting the meaning of “litter” as it is
 used in the Litter Control
 Act, the Board
has put homeowners like Mr. Kamarasy
 on
 notice
 that unlawful “littering”
 in
 the
 Pollution
Control Act
 mea*s exactly the same thing
 as unlawful “littering” in the Litter Control Act.
The Littei
 Control Act provides.
“Litter”
 means
 any
 discarded,
 used or unconsumed substance
 or
waste.
 “Litter”
 may include,
 but
 is
 not
 limited
 to,
 any
 garbage,
ti~ash,
 debris, rubbish, grass clippings
 or other lawn or garden
 waste,
newspaper, magazines,
 glass, metal, plastic or
 paper
 containers or
otherpackaging
 construction material,
 abandoned vehicle.
 .
 .
 motor
vehicleparts, furniture, oil, carcass ofa dead animal, any nauseous
 or
offensive matter of any kind, any object likely to injure
 any
 person
or create a traffic hazard, potentially
 infectious
 medical waste
 as
defined in
 Section
 3.360
 of the
 Environmental Protection
 Act, or
anything
 else of an unsightly or unsanitary nature, which has been
discarded,
 abandoned or otherwise disposed of improperly.
415 ILCS
 §1051-3
But this paragraph, though properly taken from the Litter Control Act, does not give a
complete definition oflitter.
 Indeed, it is
 transparently incomplete, if one reads
 it carefully.
 It
consists of two sentences.
The first sentence
 is
 obviously definitional
 in syntax.
 “Litter means any
 discarded,
used or unconsiti~ied
 substance
 or waste.”
 But
 this
 sentence,
 taken
 alone, suffers
 from the
same vagueness-lproblem as discussed above.
 In fact, based solely on
 this
 sentence
 the
 trash
that
 one
 puts
 inside
 one’s garbage
 can and
 takes
 to
 the
 curb
 is
 “litter,”
 since
 it
 certainly
consists
 of “discarded, used or consumed
 substance or waste.”
 Likewise, a
 small
 pile
 of
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 leaves in one’s own back yard would be litter, and subject to
 whatever enforcement measures
the Litter ContrOpAct
 provides.
 Certainly, that is not what the legislature intended.
b
 For one
 thing, the second sentence is there for a reason.
 It appears to
 be
 intended to
give some help
in
understanding “litter”, by providing a list (though not complete) of concrete
examples.
 But the key word in the second
 sentence
 is
 “may”.
 For example according
 to
 this
so-called definition, “grass clippings or other lawn or garden waste”, may
 be
 considered litter
under the Litter-Control Act.
 Or, they may
 not.
 One
 simply does
 not
 know, without
 more
guidance from tl~ë
 statute.
Mr
 Kamarasy
 does
 not
 say
 this
 to
 be
 tricky,
 or try
 to
 win
 this
 case
 on
 a
 mere
technicality.
 The
 question raised here
 is
 one
 about
 fundamental fairness.
 This
 so-called
definition, cited frequently by the Board, completely fails to
 answer the basic question posed
above: what
 kin~i-
 of dumping
 on one’s own property is
 the kind
 that results
 in
 littering,
 and
what kind does not?
 Without that
 answer, how can a landowner ever know
 what is prohibited
and what is not?’
For example, if this
 one
 paragraph were
 the
 entire
 definition of
 litter,
 even such
 a
common practice as mulching one’s grass
 clippings back into
 one’s
 lawn would
 be
 fraught
with unknown and unknowable danger
 The inspector might cite
it
 as
 a violation
 Or
 he
 might
not.
 And, the onI~y
 way for a homeowner to
 know in
 advance would be to read the inspector’s
mind.
 Thereforê~
 in effect, the interpretation ofthe Litter Control Act that Jackson
 County is
asking this Board to
 adopt for use in the Pollution
 Control Act
 would grant the inspector sole
and absolute pow~r
 to decide what is litterand what is not.
Perhaps-‘~41r.Terry
 believes
 that he
 can enforce the Pollution
 Control Act merely by
insisting that he knows litter when he
 sees
 it, but if
 so, this
 would
 lead to a blatant violation of
the Separation of~~owers
 Clause of the Illinois Constitution.
 See e.g.
 People
 v.
 Izzo,
 195
 Il.2d
109,
 115-6, 253~Ill.Dec.
 425,
 745 N.E.2d 548
 (2001)
 It is up to
 the legislature to
 give
 clear
guidelines abou~~’
 hat litter is
 and what it is not; the inspector, and even the Pollution Control
Board, should have only a very limited discretion in this matter
Ofcourse~P
 the legislature knew this when it wrote the Litter Control Act.
 It did not
 give
broad discretion to inspectors to define litter
 Instead,
 in
 plain language,
 the
 legislature gave
fairly detailed guidelines about what is litter and what is not.
 In the legislature’s own words:
t~his Act is, therefore, necessary
 to
 provide for
 uniform prohibition
throughout the
 State
 of any
 and all littering
 on
 public
 or
 private
property so as to protect the health,
 safety and welfare of the people
of
this State.
415 ILCS §105/2 (Legislative Findings and Determinations) (Emphasis added.)
Therefore, it was the legislature’s intent that the notion of unlawful littering should be
“uniform”
 in the State of Illinois,
 and
 that one has
 to
 examine the
 entire
 statute
 to
 ascertain
what “any and all littering” means.
 Merely reading one paragraph from
 the statute
 will not
suffice.
Itfollow;that the criterion for
 whether a landowner has
 committed
 open dumping
 that
resulted in litter
 in violation of the Pollution
 Control Act is
 to
 determine
 whether or not
 the
landowner comn~ittedopen dumping
 thatresulted in litter
 in violation ofthe Litter Control Act.
In other~~ords,
 to
 prove
 that
 Mr. Kamarasy’s
 alleged “open dumping”
 resulted
 in
“litter”, the County must prove that his actions constituted a violation of the Litter Control Act.
But, the County cannot do so, because Mr.
 Kamarasy did not violate the Litter Control Act.
The Litter Control Act contains four sections that describe prohibited
 acts.
 See
 415
ILCS
§~
 105/4 tl~pugh105/7
 Two of these are not relevant to this hearing
 in
 that they refer to
dumping from a
 otor vehicle orabandoning a motor vehicle.
 See
 415 ILCS
 §
 105/5
 (dumping
from
 motor vehicle)
 and 415
 ILCS
 §
 105/7
 (abandonment of
 motor
 vehicle)
 That leaves
Section 4 (dumping and the deposit oflitter) and Section 6 (accumulation of litter)
Section -4~~f
 the Litter Control Act provides in relevant part, as follows:
No person shall dump, deposit,...
 or
 discard.
 .
 .
 litter.
 .
 .
 unless
*
 *
 *
 *
(c)
 the person is the owner or tenant in
 lawful possession
 of the
property
 .
 .
 .
 and
 does
 not
 create
 a
 public
 health
 or
 safety
hazard,
 a public nuisance, or a fire hazard.
r
(Emphasis added)
L
 Section
 -6-of the Litter Control Act
 addresses accumulation of litter.
 It
 provides
 in
relevant part, as follows:
T
 No person shall allow
 litter to
 accumulate upon
 real
 property, of
-
 which theperson charged is
 the owner or tenant
 in
 control, in
 such
a
 manner
 as
 to
 constitute
 a
 public
 nuisance
 or
 in
 such
 a
r
 manner that the litter may be
 blown
 or
 otherwise
 carried
 by
I
 -
 the natural elements on to the real property of another person.
r
 There is
 no evidence to
 support
 a claim that Mr. Kamarasy’s
 so-called “open
 dump”
I
 -
 created a public health or safety hazard, a public nuisance, or a fire hazard.
 There
 is
 also
 no
evidence that he ~depositeditems in the
 so-called “open
 dump”
 in
 a manner as to
 constitute a
-
 public
 nuisance Or such that items may be blown or otherwise carried by the natural elements
on to the real prO~ertyof another person.
Therefore~
 Mr. Kamarasy should not be
 found in violation of the Act
 on
 the charge of
L
 open dumping that resulted in litter, because he did not cause or allow litter in violation of either
p
 the Pollution Control Act or theLitter Control Act.
L
THE RESPONDENT DID NOT
 CAUSE
 OR ALLOW OPEN DUMPING
-
 ‘-THAT RESULTED
 IN THE DEPOSITION OF GENERAL
CONSTRUCTION OR DEMOLITION OR CLEAN CONSTRUCTION
 OR
DEMOLITION DEBRIS IN VIOLATION OF THE ACT
Count (2) against Mr
 Kamarasy
 (if it
had
 been properly stated in
 the Citation)
 charges
L
 him
 with open
 dumping that
 “caused or allowed the deposition
 of general
 construction or
demolition
 orclean construction or demolition debris in violation of415 ILCS
 §
5/21 (p)(7).”
As already explained, Mr.
 Kamarasy concedes that the pile of materials that Mr.
 Terry
observed
 on
 Match
 25,
 2004,
 at Mr.
 Kamarasy’s
 Bittersweet Farm
 property
 contained the
remaining parts from
 several abandoned mobile home
 structures, after Mr
 Kamarasy
 had
disposed ofcertain recyclable and reusable parts.
 Mr. Kamarasy denies,
 however, that the
 pile
was an “open dump”
 and he denies, as ofMarch 25, 2004, that the pile contained the particular
items
 that Mr. Terry claims
 to have
 seen.
 In particular, Mr. Kamarasy denies that the pile
contained
 dimenaional lumber, or metal siding.
Mr. Kamarasy does not know whether the materials that remained in
 the pile
 on March
25,
 formally met- either of the
 definitions of “general
 construction or demolition
 debris”
 or
“clean construction or demolition debris”, since he does
 not
 know if
 his
 actions constituted
“demolishing”
 the
 abandoned mobile
 homes,
 or
 whether the
 materials therefrom
 should
technically be described as “debris.”
 See
 415
 ILCS
 §
5/3.160(a)
 and
 415
 ILCS
 §
 5/3.160(b).
Thatis a matter fOrthe Board to decide.
But, regardiess ofthe Board’s decision on this point, and even assuming further
 that the
Board
 decides
 ~ifr. Kamarasy did
 create an
 “open
 dump” in
 the
 sense
 intended
 by
 the
Pollution Control Act, the Board still must dismiss
 this
 “depositing
 demolition debris”
 charge
essentially forth~
 same reason as the Board must dismiss the littering charge.
As
 discu~s~ed
 above, the littering
 charge must be dismissed because the
 Litter
 Control
Act
 expressly ~lgrants
 a
 landowner
 the
 right
 to
 deposit
 on his
 own
 land
 the
 kind
 of
“stuff”(which dOes
 not spread freely onto
 other people’s
 land)
 that Mr. Kamarasy deposited
at Bittersweet Fath, in the manner that he deposited it (so that it did not cause a public
 nuisance,
or health, safety,Pand fire hazards).
Now, theCounty simply wants
 to
 rename
 the same materials
—
 the alleged dimensional
lumber, metal
 siding, and dark paneling
—
 as “demolition debris” rather than “litter”.
 But,
 Mr.
Kamarasy contends that merely changing the names of those
 items
 cannot transform the reality
of whetherMr. Kamarasy’s action in depositing them was lawful or unlawful.
Mr.
 Kan~iarasy’scontention on
 this
 point
 is
 two-fold.
 First,
 he
 cannot rightfully
 be
convicted
 of
 both
 charges
—
 littering
 and
 depositing
 demolition material.
 Second,
 if this
 Board
agrees that he was not guilty of littering
 because the Litter Control Act expressly
 permits
 his
action in
 depositing material
 from
 abandoned mobile homes
 on his
 own property,
 then
 the
Board
 must alsoPfind
 that Mr. Kamarasy was not guilty
 of unlawfully depositing demolition
debris for depositing these same items on the same land.
o
 In addressing the first of these two arguments, Mr. Kamarasy wants to be very clear not
to
 overstate
 it. ‘While
 fundamental fairness
 dictates that
 a
 person not
 be
 convicted
 (and
punished) twice~for
 the exact same act, even if the act is
 given two
 separate
 names by
 the
prosecution, Mt~’
 Kamarasy does recognize that in
 some instances,
 the prosecution may
 be
unsure how to
 characterize certain items,
 whether as “litter”
 or as “demolition
 debris”
 under
the Pollution
 Control Act.
 In that event, it
 might make sense for the
 prosecution to
 bring
forward both charges and let the Board sort it out.
 But this
 Board
 should
 still only
 convict on
one count.
Mr. Kam’arasy further recognizes that
 in some cases, a person could run an
 open
 dump
site in which both~
 litter, such as paper trash,
 and
 demolition debris,
 such as broken
 concrete or
bricks, are preselit.
 In that case, the State, in principle,
 could
 charge the person separately
 with
“littering” and
 “~depositingdemolition debris.”
But that i~
 not true ofthe case at bar.
 Neither the inspector nor the County has
 accused
Mr. Kamarasy
 C-f depositing
 different kinds
 of “stuff’
 in
 his
 pile.
 There
 is
 only
 one kind,
namely
 the parts~from
 the abandoned mobile homes
 that
 others left upon
 Mr.
 Kamarasy’s
mobile home park.
 The County may
 call this
 “litter”.
 Or it may call this “demolition
 debris”.
But it cannot convict Mr. Kamarasy of two counts, littering and depositing demolition
 debris,
on the basis ofa single act ofdepositing a single type ofmaterial.
In effect, iJackson County
 is
 asking this
 Board
 to
 impose two
 separate
 fines
 on
 Mr.
Kamarasy for th~
 exact same action involving
 the exact same materials.
 This
 Board
 should
decline to do so.
In makinig
 the second argument
--
 that this Board cannot simultaneously hold that the
items deposited ate lawful, whencalled litter, but unlawful, when called demolition debris
--
 Mr.
Kamarasy also wishes to be
 careful
 not to
 overstate his
 argument.
 Of course, it is
 possible to
be acquitted und~r
 one law because it does not apply, and then be convicted under
 a
 separate
law that does apply to the same act.
L
 But the
 difference in the case at bar is
 that the
 stuff at Bittersweet Farm is
 the kind of
L
stuffthat the Litter Control Act was
 intended
 to regulate.
 The County
 already
 conceded that
 it
believes this is so, when
it
chargedMr
 Kamarasy with pollution by
 littering
 for depositing
 this
stuff on his property.
Of coursç~when one
 checks the Litter Control
 Act, it is
 not
 absolutely
 clear on
 this
r
 point.
 As already. noted, the LitterControl Act provides a long list of examples of items
 that are
r
 regulated under the Act.
 The list does not
 include
 “material
 from
 abandoned mobile homes.”
-
 But
the legislature was
 careful
 to
 say that this
 is
 not the complete or defmitive list.
 Items
 like
the items on the list should also be regulated.
Materials from abandoned mobile homes
 are the types of items
 that might be unlawful
litter, if disposed:of in a
 manner that violates
 the Litter Control
 Act.
 The list also
 specifies
furniture, and presumably the broken down pieces of furniture, as items that may be unlawful
L
 litter, if disposedofin violation ofthe Litter Control Act.
 Mr.
 Kamarasy believes that any
 dark
L
 paneling or pieces of wood found at his
 site, and
 coming from the broken mobile homes
 that
others
 abandone;c~-:inhis mobile home
 park,
 are of
 a type that
 could be
 compared
 to
 broken
L
 down pieces of ftu
 iture.
 Mr. Kamarasy believes
 the same can be
 said of any pieces of wood
found at the site.
 They likely came from items
 that were furniture inside
 the mobile
 homes.
P
 Mr. Kamarasy f
 i~ther
 believes that any metal
 siding found at the site, -too,
 would be
 the type of
stuff the LitterControl Act was meant to
 address.
In other Words, the materials from the abandoned mobile homes
 are a subset of the stuff
-
 that is potentiallytonsidered to be litter and addressed under the Litter Control
 Act.
 That being
so, sections
 4
 and 6
 of the
 Litter Control Act
 expressly
 say
 to
 a
 landowner,
 such as
 Mr.
Kamarasy, that h~’
 is lawfully entitled to deposit those things
 on his
 own land, so
 long
 as those
things do not fotm a public
 nuisance, migrate to
 the neighbor’s
 property, or create
 a
 health,
safety, orfire hazaid.
Now, theprosecution wants to
 argue that, nevertheless,
 it
 is
 unlawful to
 deposit
 these
materials on
 one’s own land, provided that
 one
 calls
 them
 “demolition
 debris”
 instead of
“litter”.
 This is like believing that eating too much sugar-is unhealthy, but if the label
 on the
box calls it sucrose instead, one can eat as much as one wants.
The prosecutor in this case, in effect, is asserting that the legislature has written two laws
on the subject.
 Under one
 law,
 a landowner is
 expressly
 entitled to
 deposit materials from
abandoned mobile homes on his own land (so long as certain
 conditions
 are
 met);
 under
 the
other, it
 is
 always
 unlawful
 to
 do
 so
 (at
 least without obtaining
 a
 permit).
 The
 two
 laws
therefore contradict each otherand cannot both represent the nature ofthe law in this State.
Furthermore, and not coincidentally, the Pollution Control
 Act happens
 to
 have adopted
the definition of~~~tter
 from the Litter Control Act.
 In effect, that means that every landowner
had
 a right to e4iect that any action of depositing
 stuff on
 his or her own land that
 is
 lawful
under the Litter Control Act would also be lawful under the Pollution Control Act.
By
 contrast, the prosecutor wants this
 Board to
 declare that
 Mr. Kamarasy’s
 act
 of
depositing materials from mobile homes that others
 abandoned in
 his
 mobile home park on his
own land is both expressly unlawful under the littering section ofthe Pollution Control Act,
 and
also expressly unlawful under the depositing demolition debris section of the
 Pollution
 Control
Act.
 This positiOn is contradictory and should be adopted by the Board.
This
 Board
 should
 rule
 that the prosecution’s
 theory
 of
 the
 case
 is
 untenable,
 and
dismiss Count (2) of the charges against Mr. Kamarasy.
VIII
IN JANUARY 2004,
 THE PARTIES REACHED AN AGREEMENT
BY WHICH MR. KAMARASY PROMISED TO DISPOSE OF THE
MATERIALS ON
 THE
 STARVATION ACRES SITE BY
FEBRUARY 13, 2004, MR.
 KAMARASY
 ATFEMPTED TO HONOR
THE AGREEMENT, BUT WAS UNABLE TO DO
 SO DUE TO
PROBLEMS OUTSIDE
 HIS CONTROL, AND HE HAS SINCE
-
 -
 COMPLETELY
 CLEANED UP THE
 SITE
The Adthnistration Citation procedure
 in
 the Pollution Control Act provides a defense
in the case ofunavoidable circumstances.
If
the Board finds that the person appealing the citation
 has
 shown
that the violation resulted from
 uncontrollable
 circumstances, the
n
 BOard shall adopt a final order which
 makes
 no
 finding of violation
and which imposes no penalty.
 -
~
 415
 ILCS
 §
5/3f1(D)(2)
Mr.
 Kamarasy will present evidence that, after receiving the January
 9,
 2004
 letter from
Mr.
 Hagston ab’out his
 pile
 at the Bittersweet Farm
 site, he
 came
 to
 an
 agreement with
 Mr.
Terry about cleaning
 up the site.
 The agreement was reached
 in
 January.
 It
 called for Mr.
Kamarasy to cle~n
 up the site by February
 13, 2004.
At
 the time
 he
 entered
 into the
 agreement, Mr. Kamarasy
 already
 had
 called Mr.
McMurphy to
 haul away the non-recyclable materials and fully believed
 that he
 could meet the
February
 13 target date
 And, he will present evidence to
 this Board that he did proceed with
due diligence
 to iattempt to comply.
 He
 succeeded
 in
 arranging
 to
 have
 all
 the
 recyclable
materials, including themetal
 siding, taken to Karco Metals forrecycling; and,
 as mentioned,
 he
already had arranged with Mr. McMurphy to pick up the remaining materials and
 take them to
a landfill.
 1-
Unfortuñ~te1y,Mr. Kamarasy did
 not
 account
 for
 the
 weather.
 Mr.
 McMurphy
intended to takethis heavy equipment onto the property to pick up the remaining material,
 but
the ground was too wet and muddy.
 Mr. McMurphy proposed to
 wait for a solid freeze, but
such a freeze didnot occur prior to March 25.
 Therefore,
 Mr. Kamarasy was forced to
 wait
until the ground dried up later in the spring before having the remainder of the material taken to
the landfill for disposal.
In Il1inois~Environmental
 Protection Agency
 v.
 Marshall Pekarsky, AC 0 1-37 (Feb.
 27,
2002), the Pollution Control Board
 held that snow
 was a sufficient excuse for not meeting the
terms of a compliance
 agreement.
 Rain
 and mud
 are just
 as paralyzing in
 circumstances
 such
as this.
 Therefore,
 this
 Board
 should hold
 that Mr. Kamarasy
 was unable to comply with the
agreement with M:r. Terry due to circumstances (weather) that were beyond his controL
Of course~the County may argue that this is not a case of uncontrollable
 circumstances
because Mr. Kamarasy had control when he created thepile.
 But this is not the proper standard
for the defense-as defined by
 the
 statute.
 See
 Illinois
 Environmental Protection
 Agency
 v.
Marshall Pekarsky,
 supra.
 Most
 violations of the Act involve
 some willful or negligent action
on the part of the alleged wrongdoer at some point
 in the chain of circumstances that led to
 the
violation.
 Ifone willful or negligent act in the chain of circumstances
 is
 sufficient to
 negate the
statutory defense ofuncontrollable circumstances, then the defense itself couldnever be used.
Again, under the principle that the legislature does not introduce language,
 and
 certainly
not whole defenses, that are superfluous, one must
 presume that the words “resulted
 from”
 in
the phrase
 “the violation resulted from
 uncontrollable
 circumstances”
 does
 not
 subsume
everything in the chain of events that led to the violation, but
 only
 refers
 to
 those
 events
 that
triggered the final act ofissuing
 a citation.
With that~jnmind, this Board should
 note that,
 in
 January
 2004,
 the County
 agreed that
it
would not proceed with prosecutonal action
if
Mr
 Kamarasy complied with the agreement
 It
is an uncontested-and uncontestable fact that
 no administrative citation would have beenfiled ~
Mr. Kamarasy had
 complied with
 the agreement to
 remove the material
 to
 the landfill by the
promised target date.
 But Mr. Kamarasy was diligent in
 trying to comply
 with the agreement,
and the only reason he did not fully succeed in complying is
 due
 to
 circumstances that were
truly beyond his control.
 Had the County’s
 inspector undertaken any
 effort to
 inquire of Mr.
Kamarasy why some of the material had not beenremoved by February
 13, 2004,
 it would have
learned about the -contractor’s inability to complete the job
 due to
 adverse weather conditions
and could have i~ade
 a determination
 whether to extend the target date to allow completion of
the job, or take sOme other action.
For thesei~reasons
 alone, and in
 accordance with the Marshall Pekarsky case, the charges
in this case should be dismissed.
IX
IT IS
 UNFAIR,
 AND A VIOLATION OF MR.
KAMARASY’S CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED DUE
 PROCESS RIGHTS, TO ACCUSE HIM
 OF IMPROPERLY
CREATING AN OPEN DUMP SITE,
 LITTERING, AND/OR
DUMPING DEMOLITION DEBRIS AT A SITE WHERE HE
 IS
—
 EXPRESSLY ENTITLED TO DEPOSIT THOSE SAME
MATERIALS
 UNDER THE LITTER CONTROL ACT
The same act by
 a
 landowner cannot be
 declared by
 the State to
 be
 both
 lawful
 and
unlawful.
 Yet,-äs discussed above
 in
 Section
 VII, the
 County
 is
 seeking
 to
 convict
 Mr.
Kamarasy oftwo counts of pollution in
 this
 case, for an
 act that
 is
 expressly
 permitted by the
Litter Control Act.
The irony of this is
 clear.
 The Pollution Control Board
 has adopted
 the definition of
“litter”
 as
 it
 is ~described in
 the Litter Control
 Act.
 That should
 mean that lawfulness
 and
unlawfulness with respect to the matters covered by both Acts should be
 the
 same.
 Yet, Mr.
Terry and the Jackson County prosecutor are asking this Board to hold, in effect, that it is
 much
easierto
 convictalandowner
 ofpollution
 (under the Pollution Control Act)
 by littering
 than it is
to convict the landowner simply oflittering (under the Litter Control Act).
But the problem goes deeper than irony.
 It raises serious Constitutional concerns.
A basic tenet of due process is
 that
 a
 citizen must
 be
 able to
 reasonably
 ascertain
whether an act that he is contemplating is lawful or not.
 See e.g.
 Granite City
 Div.
 Of Nat.
 Steel
Co. v. Illinois Pollution Control
 Board,
 155
 Ill.2d
 149,
 163,
 184
 Ill.Dec.
 402,
 613
 N.E.2d 719
(1993)
 Where the State has two laws, one of which tells the citizen unequivocally that the act
 is
lawful, while the~ther tells the citizen, in effect, that the actis not lawful, it must be
 true that one
or both of those
laws is unconstitutional.
 Id.
 Otherwise,
 there would be
 no possible
 way for a
citizen to make the necessary determination about what is lawful conduct and what is not.
A landowner who wants
 to
 know
 whether depositing
 materials from
 abandoned mobile
homes on his property is
 perse
 unlawful as littering has every reason to expect that reading the
Litter Control Act-will provide guidance.
 And it does.
 The LitterControl
 Act specifically
 states
that this is lawfuL
Now, the County wants to argue that,
 while this
 may be lawful under the Litter Control
Act, it is not lawful under the Pollution Control Act, and Mr. Kamarasy can still be charged with
unlawful “littering”
 under the Pollution
 Control Act.
 In other words, the County
 is
 trying to
tell landowners that an act that is lawful as littering under the Litter Control
 Act may
 still be
unlawful for creating an open dump that results in littering
 under the Pollution Control
 Act.
How
 could a landowner,
 such
 as
 Mr.
 Kamarasy, reasonably
 be
 expected to
 ascertain this
twisted
 logic?
 The
 answer
 is
 that
 he could not!
 And therefore,
 the
 charge
 against
 Mr.
Kamarasy for open dumping that resulted in
 litter should
 be
 dismissed
 by
 this
 Board
 as an
unconstitutional charge.
Although-it is not quite as obvious,
 the
 same problem applies
 to
 the charge against Mr.
Kamarasy for open dumping that resulted in
 depositing
 demolition
 debris
 (meaning material
from the abandoned mobile homes)
 on
 his
 land.
 Given that the Litter Control Act instructs
landowners in plain language that they are permitted to deposit such material on their land, as
long as they do -~iot
 thereby create
 a
 public nuisance, or a
 health,
 safety, or fire hazard, how
could Mr. Kamaràsy have reasonably anticipated that doing
 so
 would
 violate the
 Pollution
Control Act?
 Thd answeris that he could not.
 And, therefore, the charge against Mr. Kamarasy
for open dumping that resulted in depositing demolition
 debris
 should
 also
 be
 dismissed by
this Board as an unconstitutional charge.
Every citizen of the United States
 and the State of Illinois must be
 able
 to
 reasonably
ascertain what is~awfuland what is not.
 Otherwise law enforcement becomes simply a random
and uninte1ligible~
 act.
 For the State
 to have
 two laws, one of which told Mr. Kamarasy his
 act
was lawful,
 and~
 One of which
 supposedly
 tells him that his
 act was
 unlawful
 is
 untenable.
Therefore, all charges against Mr
 Kamarasy in AC 04-63 should be dismissed
X
IT WOULD BE UNFAIR, AND A VIOLATION OF MR. KAMARASY’S
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED DUE PROCESS RIGHTS, IF THIS
BOARD
 INTERPRETED THE LEGAL MEANING OF “DISPOSAL
SITE”, “OPEN DUMP” AND/OR “LITTER” IN SUCH
 A WAY AS
 TO
IGNORE
 OR RENDER
 DE MINIMUS
 THE NOTIONS OF SCATTERING
FREELY OR EMITTING INTO THE ENVIRONMENT AND OF
CAUSING SOME HARM TO OTHERS, WHICH THE LEGISLATURE
INTENDED TO BE INCORPORATED INTO THE MEANING OF
“POLLUTION”; AND SINCE THE COUNTY HAS NOT EVEN
ATTEMPTED TO PROVE THAT SUCH HARM ACTUALLY OCCURRED
ATTHE MAKANDAIKAMARASY SITE, IT HAS FAILED TO MAKE A
PRIMA FAC~IE
 CASE OF POLLUTION AGAINST MR. KAMARASY
The problems inherent in the County’s interpretation of the Pollution Control
 Act,
 as
evidencedby the manner in which the prosecutor has
 stated and presented its
 case
 against Mr.
Kamarasy, have already been discussed extensively in this
 memorandum.
 When the legislature
wished to defin~-~an
 open dump,
 it did not describe it merely as a location where a landowner
places some ofhis
 orher
 waste.
 The legislature said
 that,
 to
 be an
 open dump, the debris
 pile
must
 also
 be
 placed
 in
 such a
 way
 that
 either
 the
 debris
 itself
 is
 free
 to
 enter
 into
 the
environment, o~
 else
 constituents
 of the
 debris
 may
 be
 emitted
 or
 discharged
 into
 the
environment.
 04e must assume that the legislature used this language for a reason,
 namely
 to
distinguish the r~-~re
 serious crime of “pollution”
 from the lesser notions of litter or of mere
“messiness”.
 One
 must also
 assume
 that by using
 the word “may”
 the legislature meant to
require the County to prove a significant likelihood, not simply an
 infinitesimal
 possibility of
entering
 into the environment. Otherwise
 an
 overzealous
 prosecutor can
 always
 claim
 the
existence ofa small possibility.
Similar1~with respect to “litter”,
 the legislature said
 that,
 if it occurs
 only
 on
 the
alleged offender’s
 own private property,
 and
 the
 accusation
 is
 unlawful
 “dumping,”
 the
allegedly offending stuff must be shown to “create a public health or safety hazard, a
 public
nuisance, or a firehazard.”
Or
 alter-mitively,
 where
 the
 accusation
 is
 that
 the
 stuff
 is
 being
 unlawfully
“accumulated”, it~mustbe
 shown that the stuff also
 constitutes
 a “public
 nuisance”
 or that it
“may be blown or otherwise carried by
 the natural
 elements on
 to
 the real property of another
person.”
These additional criteria in
 the Pollution
 Control
 Act and the Litter Control
 Act are not
identical but the~I
 are consistent in requiring that the County prove something
 more than merely
that the respondent placed some waste on
 his
 land.
 The
 something
 more,
 particularly in
 the
case of the Pollution Control Act, is that some form of pollution was actually occurring.
 But
common sense, as well as the language of the two statutes, shows that pollution
 (by
 littering)
requires
 a showiiig of some actual harm either to neighbors or the public in general.
Where w~s
 this
 irreducible element of harm
 in
 the case at bar7
 The County has
 never
made, much less given Mr. Kamarasy the opportunity to
 defend against any, such allegation.
Mr. Terry did not discuss this element ofharm in his Report.
 He did not
 claim to
 have
observed a fire hazard, or other safety hazard.
 He did not
 claim to see
 materials being “blown
or otherwise carried by the natural elements on to the real property of another person.”
 See e.g.
County of Sangàrnmon v. Everett Daily, AC —1-16,
 17, at p.
 10
 Nor
 did
 he
 claim to
 see
 any of
the materials at the site emitting or discharging into the environment.
How could he have?
 By his own admission, he only observed the pile for three minutes
from a distance of500 feet?
 And. most ofthat time was spent taking
 a photograph,
 which does
not show any significant scattering ofthe pile ofmaterials at this site.
The only possible argument that the County
 can make here is
 to
 exaggerate the
 law,
since it lacks th~
 facts.
 The County may try to convince this Board
 that merely setting
 waste
out on the land
 iS
a sufficient recitation of fact to
 imply
 that entering
 into the environment has
occurred.
 But it-has already been explained
 above, in
 Section V, that if this
 were true, it would
 -
CT
o-~
~
 ~
 Ut ~
render the entire clause,”so
~.
 .
t~
 supeffluous’,
 a
result to be
 avoided.
 ‘~
Entering into the environment is not a mere trivial point in
 the
 County’s
 case against
Mr. Kamarasy. ~:itis an
 essential point, which
 the County
 must
 prove.
 But
 the County has
presented and ca~
 present no facts to support this claim.
n
 Therefore, if this
 Board upholds
 the County’s
 argument in
 this
 case, it will in
 effect
write the requirement to
 show
 that pollution
 was
 actually occurring completely
 out
 of
 the
Pollution
 ContrOl
 Act.
 This
 will
 not
 encourage respect
 for
 and
 compliance
 with
 the
r
environmental la~s of the State.
Such an approach to the law would have the virtue of making it much easier in the
 future
for the County to prove its case against any
 landowner who
 creates
 a pile of material on
 his
 or
her own land.
 T-he County
 would no
 longer need
 to
 demonstrate any
 pollution in
 order
 to
convict for “pollution”
 under the Pollution Control Act.
 But,
 as the respondent discussed in
Section
 IX
 (imiediately)
 above,
 that
 would
 also
 render
 the
 Pollution
 Control
 Act
unconstitutionally vague, at least as applied to Mr. Kamarasy’s case.
To avoid~thisresult, this
 Board
 must interpret the Pollution
 Control
 Act in such a way
that it is constitutional.
 That is, the Board must hold the County to its responsibility to prove,
 in
addition
 to
 the tbther elements
 of its
 prima facie
 case, that
 some
 form
 of
 pollution
 was
emanating from Mr. Kamarasy’s pile of materials
 at the Makanda/Kamarasy site.
Since the’ County has not even attempted to
 make such a
 prima facie
 showing,
 this
Board’s decisioii~
 should be easy.
 The charges against Mr. Kamarasy must be
 dismissed for
failure to
 state
 akrimafacie
 case.
XI
~
 IT WOULD BE
 UNFAIR, AND A VIOLATION OF THE
PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS, IF THIS BOARD WERE
TO~PERMITTHE INSPECTOR AND JACKSON COUNTY TO
SIMPLY USE THE “I KNOW IT WHEN I SEE IT” DEFINITION OF
Pt~LLUTION
 (BY LITTERING)
 UNDER THE POLLUTION
CONTROLACT OR LITTERING UNDER THE LITTER CONTROL
ACT~ATHER
 THAN CAREFULLY APPLYING THE GUIDELINES
SET FORTH BY THE LEGISLATURE IN THE TWO LAWS
If this Board holds
 as unlawful acts that are explicitly lawful under
 the Litter Control
Act (forexampleplacing waste on
 one’s
 own property in
 such -a way that
 it is
 not likely
 to be
carried onto
 a neighbor’s property by the natural elements) or which
 are explicitly lawful under
the Pollution Control Act (for example burning landscape, household,
 and agricultural
 waste on
-
 ~
 P,-P
 -
 pPag~-3~::--P~p
 ~
 -
 ~
 -~p~
 p-
o
 one’s own property), then this Board would
 be,
 in effect,
 making new legislation about what is
and what is not
 unlawful pollution.
 That would be
 a
 violation of
 the Separation of Powers
principle of the Illinois Constitution.
 Making law is not a proper administrative function.
 This
Board is only authorized to enforce the law.
By the same token, if this Board permits
 an inspector to exercise
 unbridled discretion
about what is lit~rand what is pollution, under the guise of “I
 know it when I
 see
 it,”
 that
would
 be
 a
 violation of the
 Separation of Powers
 principle.
 The
 inspector
 is
 no
 more
authorized than the Board to make new law about what is and is not pollution.
Nor
 is
 this
 some
 minor matter in
 which
 the exercise
 of discretion
 is
 proper
 and
necessary.
 If littering
 is
 the crime in question, it cannot be left to
 the executive branch
 of
government, whether that means a county health department inspector or this Board, to
 decide
arbitrarily and on its
 own what constitutes unlawful litter and what does not
 There must be
clear guidelines from the legislature, and those guidelines must be
 followed, or the enforcement
itself is unconstitutional.
Of course~the legislature did
 give
 guidelines, if the two
 statutes
 are
 analyzed with care,
as has been discussed throughout this memorandum.
 But
 Jackson County
 seems
 to
 believe
that such careis
 not required, and it can make up its own guidelines.
 Any
 time it sees a pile
 of
material on a person’s land, the County claims that it can simply decide arbitrarily, or merely on
the basis ofits
 inspector’s conclusory opinion, that the pile constitutes unlawful pollution.
If that is~allthat
 this
 Administration Citation process
 requires, then
 the
 inspector
becomes both th~1awmaker
 and the enforcer ofthe law, in violation of the Separation of Powers
clause ofthe Il1ii~dis
 Constitution.
Therefore~in
 order to
 preserve
 the constitutionality
 of
 the
 Administration
 Citation
process, this Board must hold Jackson County to its
 irreducible duty
 to
 prove concrete
 facts,
and
 not
 simply
 ~tate mere conclusory
 opinions,
 that
 some form
 of
 pollution
 was
 actually
occurring at the-~Makanda/Kamarasysite, in violation of the specific terms
 of
 the
 Pollution
Control Act.
-
 XII
-
 IT WOULD ALSO BE UNFAIR, AND SIMILARLY A
VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS, IF
THIS BOARD WERE TO PERMIT THE INSPECTOR AND JACKSON
COUNTY TO PILE ON MULTIPLE CHARGES FOR WHAT
AMOUNTED TO A SINGLE ACT OF DEPOSITING ABANDONED
-
 MOBILE HOMES AT THE STARVATION ACRE SITE
The legislature
 designed the
 Administration Citation process
 in
 order
 to
 expedite
enforcement andstreamline the adjudication process for violations ofthe Pollution
 Control Act.
Naturally, this streamlining creates the risk of giving too much power to the executive branch,
and
 thereby
 abandoning the
 checks
 and
 balances
 upon
 which
 our
 constitutional
 system
depends.
The
 legislature was well
 aware of this
 concern when it created
 the
 Administrative
Citation proceduie
 That is why the legislature made a substantial effort to
 limit the discretion
of the
 executiv&branch,
 in
 applying
 this
 procedure.
 The
 more
 control
 exercised
 by
 the
legislative branch through
 strict crafting of the law, the less discretion would remain
 in
 the
hands of the exec-titive branch.
Perhaps i-he most important element of the legislature’s plan to limit discretion was
 to
strictly limit the4ines that this Board can assess for violations of the statute.
 A landowner is to
be assessed $1500 for a violation ofthe Act,
 no more and no less.
 The Board is
 not entitled
 to
look at mitigating- circumstances, such as the size ofthe debris pile, the length of time that it had
been present on-~theland, or the intention
 of the
 landowner, unless
 the violation itself was
somehow due to--uncontrollable circumstances.
 Similarly
 the Board is
 not
 allowed to consider
exacerbating circumstances such
 as
 deliberate
 polluting,
 the
 extent of
 the
 pollution, or
 the
belligerence ofthe landowner.
Yet, Mr.~Terry
 and JacksonCounty
 have managed
 to
 undermine this
 most fundamental
pillar of the Administration Citation process by
 finding a
 sneaky
 way
 to
 bring
 two
 charges
against Mr. Kamarasy for the same act.
Page
 35
Memorañdñm
 Su~pôrtiñg-Petition ~to~~PContest
 Administrative~
 -Citatioñ-.
Mr. Kamarasy admits that he deposited some material from abandoned mobile
 homes
on his
 own land,: only after the IDPH ordered it removed from the mobile
 home park.
 As
discussed above~the
 prosecutor may label this material “litter”, and charge Mr.
 Kamarasy
 with
unlawful littering under the Pollution
 Control Act.
 Or, the prosecutor may
 label
 these parts
“demolition
 debris”
 and charge for
 the
 unlawful
 depositing
 of
 demolition
 debris.
 The
prosecutor can even charge for both and
 let the Board decide which one
 is
 most
 likely
 to
 be
applicable.
 —
But, in tl~efinal analysis, this
 Board
 cannot sustain
 both
 charges
 where,
 as
 here,
 the
prosecution did ~pt even attempt
 to allege any different underlying facts for the two charges.
They are simply -the same charge, with a different name.
Under th~-
 Administrative Citation process, a single
 violation can only
 be given a single
fine of $1500.
 If this
 Board
 upholds
 more,
 its
 ruling
 will
 violate the Separation of Powers
principle, and will have the effect of rendering the Pollution Control Act unconstitutional,
 at
least as applied ~
 Mr. Kamarasy.
The only?alternative is for the Board to limit its considerations in this
 proceeding to
 one
charge only, and:not two.
 It follows that, the maximum charge against Mr. Kamarasy in
 this
proceeding shouiid be $1500,
 not $3000, if his conduct in this case is found to violate the Act.
What the~
 County
 is proposing
 amounts to
 trying to use the
 law punitively, to
 fine Mr.
Kamarasy twice~vhere
 the legislature only authorized one
 fine.
 In that sense, both Mr. Terry
and the prosecuthr ofJackson
 County, as members of the executive branch,
 are attempting to
overrule the legi~lature
 and create new law of their own.
 In their view, the fine for creating
 an
open dump
 that~--resultedin the deposition
 of abandoned mobile
 home
 materials should
 be
$3000, not
 $1500.
But
 the
 l~gislaturedid
 not
 write
 such
 a
 provision
 into the
 Pollution
 Control
 Act.
Therefore, this ~oardshould insist that,
 even if it finds
 Mr.
 Kamarasy
 guilty,
 the fine must be
limited to $1500.~Otherwise,theAct as applied to Mr. Kamarasy would be unconstitutional, in
violation ofthe Separation ofPowers clause ofthe Illinois Constitution.
r
XIII
CONCLUSION
Li
 The inspector investigated the pile at Starvation Acres on March
 25,
 2004
 for a total of
r
 three minutes.
 He did
 so by
 standing
 at
 a
 gate on
 the
 side
 of the
 road
 at
 a
 distance of
approximately
500
feet and taking a single photograph ofthe pile.
The inspector could not
 possibly
 have observed
 what was
 in
 the pile with
 any
 detail
from
 the
 distance
 he
 was
 observing,
 in
 the
 time
 described.
 The Act
 requires
 that
 an
administrative citationbe based onthe direct observation of the inspector. 415 ILCS
 §
5/31.1(b)
Nor does the photograph itself reveal what was in
 the pile. Therefore, the only
 specific point,
which the County can prove
 about this pile,
 is
 that it contained materials from
 abandoned
mobile homes.
Mr. Karnarasy
 concedes that
 the
 pile contained
 materials from
 abandoned
 mobile
homes and adds-that, by March 25, 2004,
 the recyclable parts,
 such
 as
 the
 metal
 siding,
 had
beenremoved frOm the pile
 and
 taken to
 a metal recycling center,
 leaving
 only
 those parts
 that
could not readily-be reused or recycled,
 and of which he intended to
 dispose,
 and
 did
 dispose,
as soon as
 the weather
 permitted.
Mr. Kamarasy affirmatively notes that he had
 an
 agreement with Mr. Terry
 to clean up
the site, and thathewasproceeding with due diligence to abide by that agreement. He
 arranged
for and did have all therecyclable material removed from the site,
 and
 he has provided concrete
evidence ofthat fact.
 He also arranged for a contractor to dispose of the remaining items.
 But,
the weather made~it
 impossible to carry out
 this part of his
 agreement in the time allotted.
 Mr.
Kamarasy believ~s
 that even if the pile
 was
 unlawful, the bad
 weather was
 an
 uncontrollable
circumstance prOvided for by the law as a legitimate defense.
Furthermore, Mr. Kamarasy contends
 his
 pile
 was not unlawful because it
 did
 not
constitute
 a
 “disposal site” or an
 “open dump”
 as those terms
 are defined in
 the
 Pollution
Control
 Act.
 N~r
 has the County even attempted to
 present evidence that
 the materials were
scattering freely
 iii-
 theenvironment in someway, or wereemitting ordischarging,
 as
 is
 required
to meet the defiI4-~ionsofboth open dump and littering.
 If the County
 had
 attempted to present
some evidence of- this kind,
 the
 evidence
 would have been inadmissible
 anyway, because the
County’s
 evidence must be based on
 the direct observations of Mr. Terry, and Mr. Terry did
not and could not have observed
 any such thing during his three-minute inspection on March
25.
Mr. Karnarasy notes that the stuff in the pile, being materials from
 abandoned mobile
homes, is
 stuff that is explicitly
 regulated by
 the Litter Control
 Act.
 The Litter Control Act
makes it lawful t. deposit such stuffonto one’s
 own land,
 provided that
 stuff is
 not carried
 by
the natural e1em~tsonto the property of another, and does not cause a public
 nuisance, or
 a
health, safety, orthe hazard.
 The County
 has made no
 allegations, nor presented any
 evidence
that Mr. Kamara~y’
 s pile was doing any of these unlawful things.
 Therefore, it was a
 lawful
pile, and this action against Mr. Kamarasy amounts to unjustified
 and
 unjustifiable harassment
by Jackson County.
Mr. Kamarasy is not
 sure whether materials from abandoned mobile homes constitute
construction or demolition
 debris
 as intended by
 the Pollution
 Control Act.
 But if so,
 that
would simply mean that materials from abandonedmobile homes are at the intersection of stuff
regulated by
 bOth
 the ban
 against pollution by
 littering
 and
 the ban
 against
 pollution
 by
depositing demoljtion debris as set forth in the Pollution Control Act.
Itwould constitute an abuse of discretion to charge Mr. Kamarasy with two separate
violations
 for one
 allegedly wrongful act,
 simply because the same
 stuff, the
 materials from
abandoned mol~i1ehomes, can be characterized in two separate ways under the Act.
 The
essential “crime~
 ~whichMr. Kamarasy committed, if any,
 was to set materials from abandoned
mobile homes
 on his land at
 Starvation
 Acres.
 If it
 is
 a
 violation of the
 Act,
 it
 is
 only
 one
violation, not two, and should only be fined in the amount of $1500, not $3000.
The only-way for this Board to
 convict Mr.
 Kamarasy on
 either of the counts herein is
to
 interpret
 the~—iegalterms “open
 dump”
 and
 “litter’
 so
 expansively
 and
 arbitrarily
 as
 to
violate Mr. Kamarasy’s due process right to be able to reasonably anticipate what is
 illegal
 and
what is not.
 Such an
 interpretation necessarily would be
 so
 broad
 that it
 gives
 the
 executive
branch ofgoverri~i-ent
 too
 much
 discretion
 regarding both
 the decision about
 what is
 litter and
about
 how
 large. a
 penalty
 should
 be
 imposed
 in
 this
 case
 and
 this
 would
 violate
 the
Constitutional principle of Separation ofPowers.
The respondent did not violate the Act as alleged in
 the Administrative
 Citation and, for
all of the foregoing reasons, the Administrative Citation shouldbe dismissed.
Dated
 this
 I
 ~
 day ofNovember, 2004.
EGON KAMARASY, Respondent
By________
-
 G~r~ory
 jA~ATQach,
 IARDC # 2893061
Attorneyforrespondent
LAW OFFICES,
OF
GREGORY A. VEACH
3200 Fishback Road,
 P. 0.
 Box
 1206
Carbondale IL 62903-1206
Telephone:
 (618) 549-3132
Telecopier:
 (618) 549-0956
e-mail
 : gveach@gregveachiaw.com
Attorney forrespondent
m
0~
-1-
-~
~\
 illinois
 Department
of
~ PUBLIC
?\
HEALTH
 ~-
 -
 -.F
-
 -:
 --
‘U’,
2-309
 West
 Main
 Sraet
 Marion,
 riols
 ~29:j9.1
 187
 www
 hit~,
stale
-
Novem
 her
 19,
 2003
JACKSON
 COUNTY
-
 Makanda
Raccoon Valley Mobile Home
 ~rk!1.D,ffOl59-0
 t4O~-t)
Arututal Licensure
 Inspection
EgonKamarasy
 C~RTIFWt)
!V!A!L
474
 Egret Lake Road
 7002
 2410
 C002
 7S61
 1940
Carbondale, IL 62901
Dear
Mr
 Kam
arasy:
~onald 0. Clark,
 a repre~er.tative
 of this Depm~ment,
 conducted ar annual licensure irspectior~
 i:f
 Raccoon Valley
Mobile Home
Park
on
Nc-vernber 12,
 2003~
Thepurpose
 of this
 inspection was to d~errnine
 compliance with
 the
Mobile
 Home
 Park Act
and Manufactured
 Home Community Code.
The inspectionrevealed that your
 manufactured home cc~mmunityi~
 n~tbeing opeiate4 andmaintained in
accordance with theMobile
 Home Park Act and Manuf~cr~red
 Home
 Cormnunity
 Code.
 The following actions ore
requiied to correct the vioations
 that were kuid
 to exist:
Section 8o0.~5Ofc)The elec~ic~l
 box
 behind the Ionic at si~c2~
 is not covered and locked.
Provide a coverand lock the bo~to prevent acdd~atalcontact.
 Correct by
 November26, 2003.
2.
 ~ect1on 860.300(ai Assure that community
 resident5properly
 stoic alt
 rehire
at
all
 times.
 The
followingwere observed in your community:
 Jitter
 arcuxidthe dumpster across from site 5~
 and at
site
35B~
 an
old
mahress at site 34; the commode, eec. at site 8A:
 the
bathtub, commode,
etc. at site
12; the
debris and robbk
at site 46; the undeq inn tn~ai site 47A.
 Correct by Noveiatber 10, 2003.
3.
 -
 ~
 Remove
 the plastic bags- ifrefuse which we-re noted on tbe
grour-id
 at
sites
13,
25,
 46, and
51.
 Sealed plastic
bass may
 be used
to ;upplernent
 the required containerson
 the
day
 of
 garbage collection only.
 At
all
other tunes. h4gsofgarbagej~jbe
stored in
 rust
resistant, watertight and fly-proof containers
with
 the lids closed.
 C:orrcct ~ithln 48 hours.
4.
 Section
 ~6O.304)(1a16)
 An
 apparent
burn pus was observed
at
sitc
 27.
 iMMEDIATELYcease
burning
of
refuse
and
 properly dispose oLall ashes,
metals,
 etc.
5.
 Section ~60.3lOf~)Remove
the household iten’,~
such
as
the rimmed
tire at
 site 2; the
 air
conditioner
at
site
 14; thed~’er
 at
 the
2~the
wi:;dows, etc. at site 3JA
 the washer
at
site
35B:
rimmed tire
 at
 site 36,
 aIr conditioner,
old desk
 er-c.
 -a
site
5l~
 rimmed tires at
 sac 58;
 and
the aIr
conditioner, etc. at site 59A that were ~tore-d
 o-.itjc
its,
 Househ’i!d furniture and appliances, eiito
parts
inc1ud~ng
 tires
aid
 batteries,
 bailding materials- abandoned
 equipmenl, and ~,imi1ar
 items
shall not be
 stored in ;h~
 community
 except in ~ied~or garages ~
 ~h
 doors.
tn~povlng
 pufrff~
fte~lTh.,
U#~
 eunniwivily ~Ia~
printei o; re~cyc/ed
 pdp&!
EXHIBIT
L
JACKSON
 COUNTY
-
 Makanda
Raccoon Valley Mobile Home ParkJT.L).~i59.0I4O5-0
Page 2
t
 ~J5.
 ~~*Ion86O.310~
Remove
or repair th~
 mani~factured
 homes
 at sites 9.
 5)A, and
 59
 which
have
 the
 appearance of being abandoned.
 The homes are
 potentially hazardous
to children and
other
 community
 residents due to available access through
 broken windows
 and/or unsecured doors.
 T
 The home at site
 59
 is a REPEAT v~oiation.Rema~
 and ~pr~
 dis
 oso of the rubble
 ibm
 I
 -
 homes being dismantled at sites 12~nd
 31. ~irect
 ov
 ~
 tLI.
7.
 Section
 860.310(d)
 Remove all apparently
 abandoned or unu~eri
 ‘.ehicles.
 All
 automobiles,
trailer3.
~ndsimilar
 vehicles
 s~b,eca
to
 licensursby
 the Secretaiy of State
 sitali
have
current
licenses diaplayed.
 Remove or license
 the
following
vehicles
 by
 December
 12,
 2003:
 theyello~~
Pontiac statioa wagon
at
 site
 30;
the
 whiteVolkswagen van
at site 59:
 and the
 red
 Ford
 Prohe at
Site
59A.
8
 Section ~6U.~0(a~ Remove the tires
located c,utdoors a’
 site-s
 t2,
 13, 14,
 36, and
4~A.Correct
by November 26,
2003.
Section
~6G.~6Qth~
Remove the motorized recreationai
 vehicle fror~
 site 7.
 Motorized
recreational
 vehicles shall not be located in a manufactured home
ocmrnvsoiy
as a residence.
Correct by
 December
 12, 2003.
The above actions to elinunate
the
violations ofthe Act and Code shall be
carried
out by the date(s) specil~ed,
Enclosed are copies of the
inspection
repo~
 and a ~otification
of
Coirection
 of’ Code
Violatiora;.
 Please
complete
the
 Explanation of Corrections section
 on the
notification
 form, sign
 and date
the
 form,
and
returr.
 it
to this
office by
December
 12, ~003.
Upon receipt
of the signed not~ficationform,
we
will s~hedute
a reinspection.
 ~jj~
reinspection~c~iirms
 correction
~fj~e
 ~
 we will
recommend
 that your hcerse he renewed for next
ycar.
 Your current
 Manufactured
Home
Community
 License uxpires on
 April
30,
 2004.
 Theannual
 License renewal
form
will be
 sent to you prior to that
date
from
 our Springfield Central
 Office.
Ifyou ha’~e
 any questions regarding the Mobile Home Park Act and Manufactured Home
Community
Code, please
contact Ronald 0. Clark at
 The Marion Regional
Cities,
 telephone 6I8i993-~0l0,
Sinc,erely,
Walter
 G.
 Ward
Acting
 Regional Soparvisor
ROC’by
cc:
 Div. of Env. Health.
MRO
-
 MHC
m
0~
-1-
N)
OPENDUMP INSPECTION
SITE SKETCH
Date Of Inspection:
 March
 25,
 20204
 Inspector:
 Don Terry
Site Code:
 077 809
 5036
 County:
 Jackson
Site Name:
 Makan
da / Egon
 Kamarasy
 Time:
 2:32 pm
 2:35
 pm
Not Drawn to Scale
All locations
 are
 approximate
0
 indicates approx. location& direction ofphotos
 IN
Starvation
 Acres Rd
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
Fence
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/1
/
/
_____.1
It
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
m
0~
-h
(J)
CWI OF
ILLINOIS
 .
 1540 LANDFILL RD
 DESOTO,
 IL 62924
INVOICE
 DATE
 INVOICE
 NO.
 ACCOUNT
 NO.
 FOR
 BILLING
 INQUIRIES.
 CALL
 SERVICE ADDRESS
L05/03/o4
 184285
PAGE NO.
 1
EGON KAMARASY
END OF STARVATION ACRE RD
CARBONDALE
 IL
 62901
DATE
 DESCRIPTION
 OTY.
 RATE
 TOTAL
WORK
 ORDER*:
 178644
4/05/04
 30 YD DELIVERY
WORK ORDER*:
 179038
4/09/04
 30 YD PULL & RETURN-FLAT
WORK ORDER*:
 179285
4/12/04
 30 YD PULL & RETURN-FLAT
WORK ORDER*:
 179632
4/14/04
 30 YD PULL & RETURN-FLAT
4/14/04
 TONNAGE OVER 6 TONS
WORK ORDER*:
 179884
4/15/04
 TONNAGE OVER 6 TONS
4/16/04
 30 YD PULL $ REMOVE-FIAT
Net
 10 days
ACCOUNT STATUS
 TOTAL THIS
INVOICE
PLEASE
 PAY
THIS AMOUNT
784.80
10 22454 3
 f
 (800)
 631-1156
FOR
 PERIOD:
r
r
1.00
6.16
16.50
45.00
355.00
355.00
355.00
4.80
315.00
355.00
30.000
30. 000
CURRENT
 31
 -
60
 DAYS
 61
 -
90
 DAYS
 OVER
 90
 DAYS
I
 .
 ~,
 I
 I
 I
 I
 1.7Rtii
 Rfl
m
Jackson
 County
 Health
 Department
Promoting Health,
 Preventing Illness,
 and Protecting our Environment
618/684-3143, ext.
 128
CERTIFIED MAIL
January
9,
2004
 RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED
Egon
 Kamarasy
474
 Egret Lake
 Rd
Carbondale
 IL
 62901
RE:
 Violation Notice, L-2004-JC119
 ~-—-~
 r
 ~.
 ~
 .——
077
 809
 5036
--
 Jackson County
Makanda
 / Egon Kamarasy
Compliance File
Dear Mr. Kamarasy:
This
 constitutes a Violation Notice pursuant to Section
 31 (a)( 1) ofthe Illinois
 Environmental
Protection Act, (“the Act”) 415 ILCS
 5/31 (a)( 1), and is
 based upon an inspection completed on
 December
 5,
 2003
 by a representative ofthe Jackson County Health Department (“JCHD”).
 The
open dumpi~~g
 site is located in
 Makanda Township, Section 06, on
 a road known as Starvation
Acres.
The Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (“Illinois
 EPA”) and JCHD hereby provide notice
ofviolations ofenvironmental statutes, regulations, or permits as set forth in Attachment A to
this letter. Attachment A includes an explanation ofthe activities that the Illinois EPA and JCHD
believe may resolve the specified violations, including an estimate ofa reasonable time period to
complete the necessary activities.
 Due to
 the nature and seriousness ofthe violations cited,
please be advised that resolution ofthe violations may require the involvement ofa prosecutorial
authority for purposes that may include, among others, the imposition of statutory penalties.
A written response, which may include a request for a meeting with representative ofJCHD must
be submitted via certified mail to the JCHD within 45
 days ofreceipt ofthis letter.
 The response
must address each violation specified in Attachment A and include for each an explanation ofthe
activities that will be implemented and the time schedule for the completion of that activity.
 The
written response will constitute a proposed Compliance Commitment Agreement (“CCA”)
pursuant to Section
 31 ofthe Act.
 The JCHD will review the proposed CCA and will accept or
reject it within 30 days of receipt.
P.O.
 Box 307
 +
 Murphysboro, IL 62966-0307
 +
 Phone (618) 684-3143
 +
 Fax (618) 684-6023
www.jchdonline.org
 +
 Printed on
 Recycled Paper
r~
Ifa timely written response to this Violation
 Notice is not provided, it shall be considered to be a
waiver ofthe opportunity to respond and to meet and the Illinois EPA and JCHD may proceed
j
 with a referral to the prosecutorial authority.
-~
 Written communication should be
 directed to:
-
 Jackson County Health Department
r
 Attn:
 Don
Terry
Solid
 Waste Management Division
POBox 307
Murphysboro,
 IL
 62966-0307
All
 communications must include reference to
 this
 VIOLATION NOTICE NUMBER,
L-2004-JC119.
Questions regarding this matter should be directed to Don Terry at 684-3143, ext.
 128.
Sincerely,
Bart
Hagston,
 oordinator
Solid
 Waste Program
Lj
BH/th
enclosure
Certified Return Receipt No. 7003 2260 0005 0889 6105
L
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS REQUIRED
IMMEDIATELY cease all open dumping
 and/or open burning.
 You shall not dispose ofany
waste by open burning.
 The following corrective actions
 must be completed by February
 13,
2004.
A.
 Remove all general refuse from this site and properly transport to a permitted landfill or
transfer station.
B.
 Scrap metal not disposed at a permitted landfill or transfer station
 may be taken to a scrap
metal facility or recycling center.
Retain and submit to the Jackson County
 Health Department’s Solid
 Waste Management
Section copies of receipts that document the proper disposal or recycling of the wastes by
February 27, 2004.
L-2004-JC 119
ATTACHMENT A
Pursuant
 to Section 21(a) ofthe Act, no person shall cause or allow the open dumping of
any
 waste.
A violation ofSection 21(a) ofthe Illinois
 Environmental Protection Act (415 ILCS
5/21(a))
 is alleged for the following reason: Evidence ofwaste was
 observed open
dumped
 at this site during the inspection.
2.A.
 Pursuant to Section 21(d)(1) ofthe Act, in relevant part, no person shall conduct any
waste-storage,
 waste-treatment, or waste-disposal operation
 without a permit granted by
the Agency or in violation of any conditions imposed by such permit, including periodic
reports and full access to adequate records
 and the inspection of facilities, as may be
necessary to assure compliance
 with this Act and with regulations and standards
 adopted
thereunder.
A violation ofSection 21(d)(l) ofthe
 Illinois
 Environmental Protection Act
 (415
 ILCS
5/21(d)(1))
 is
 alleged for the following reason: No permits have been issued forthis waste
management facility.
2. B.
 Pursuant to
 Section 21(d)(2) ofthe Act, no person shall conduct any waste-storage,
waste-treatment, or waste-disposal operation in violation ofany regulations or standards
adopted by the Board under this Act.
A violation ofSection
 21 (d)(2) ofthe Illinois
 Environmental Protection Act (415 ILCS
21 (d)(2)) is alleged for the following reason:
 No permits
 have been issued
 forthis
 waste
management facility.
3.
 Pursuant to Section 2 1(e) ofthe Act, no person shall dispose, treat, store
 or abandon any
waste, or transport any waste into this State for disposal, treatment, storage or
abandonment, except at a site or facility which meets the requirements ofthe Act and
 of
regulations and standards thereunder.
A violation of Section 21(e) ofthe
 Illinois
 Environmental
 Protection Act (415 ILCS
5/21(e)) is
 alleged for the following reason: Violations of Board regulations as well as the
Act were observed at the time of the inspection.
4.
 Pursuant to Section 21(p) ofthe Illinois
 Environmental Protection Act (415 ILCS
 5/21
(p)), no person shall, in violation ofsubdivision (a) ofthis Section
 21,
 cause or allow
the open dumping ofany waste in a manner which results in:
1.
 litter;
2.
 deposition ofgeneral construction or demolition debris as defined in
 Section
3.160(a) ofthis Act; or clean construction or demolition debris as defined
 in
Section 3.160(b) ofthis Act.
The prohibitions specified in the subsection (p) shall be enforceable by the Agency either
by administrative citation under Section
 31.1
 ofthis Act or as otherwise provided by this
Act.
 The specific prohibitions in this subsection do not limit the power ofthe
 Board to
establish regulations or standards
 applicable to
 open dumping.
A violation of Section 21(p) ofthe Illinois
 Environmental Protection Act (415 ILCS
5/21(p))
 is alleged for the following reason: Items land 2
 above were not complied with.
5.
 Pursuant to Section 812.101(a),
 all persons, except those specifically exempted by
Section
 2 1(d) ofthe Environmental Protection Act (Act) (Ill. Rev.
 Stat.
 1991, ch.
 111
 1/2,
par.
 102 1(d))
 415
 ILCS
 5/21
 (d)
 shall submit to
 the Agency an application for a permit
to develop and operate a landfill.
 The application must contain the information required
by this Subpart
 and by
 Section 39(a) ofthe
 Act, except as otherwise provided in
 35
 Ill.
Adm. Code 817.
A violation of
35
 Ill.
 Adm. Code 8 12.101
 (a) is
 alleged for the following reason: No
Developmental Permit has been issued for a solid waste management site at this location.
6.
 Other: Pursuant to 35
 Iii.
 Adm. Code
 Section 807.201
 Development Permits: No person
shall cause or allow the development of
any
 new solid waste management site or cause or
allow the modification ofan existing solid waste management site without a
Development Permit issued by the
 Agency.
 Also Section 807.202 Operating Permits: No
L
 person shall cause or allow the use or operation of any solid waste
 management site for
which a Development Permit is required under section 807.201
 without an Operating
Permit
 issued by the agency, except for such testing operation as
 may be authorized by
L
 the Development Permit.
You
 are
 in apparent violation of
35
 Ill.
 Adm.
 Code Section 807.201
 and Section 807.202:
No Developmental Permits or Operating Permits have been
 issued for a solid waste
management site at this location.
m
:3-
0~
-4-
Ci
Jackson
 County
 Health
 Department
Promoting Health,
 Preventing
Illness,
 and Protecting our Environment
January
 16,
 2004
 Certified Mail
Return
 Receipt Requested
Mr.
 Egon
 Kamarasy
474 Egret Lake Rd.
i’~~
 ~
 /
Carbondale, IL 62901
 /
 ~‘
 u.-.
 .
Dear Mr.
 Kamarasy:
This letter is to act as a confirmation and summary of our phone conversation
 of January 15,
2004.
 ——
You called
 our
 office in reference to the
 Violation
 Notice L-2004—JCI 19 that was sent to you
regarding the open
 dumping of demolition debris on
 property owned
 by you.
 This property is
on Starvation Acres Rd and is listed in the Jackson County Assessor’s Office under
Parcel # 19-06-400-008.
During our phone
 conversation, you admitted that the debris was on
 the site and had originated
from the demolition of mobile homes you were being
 required to remove by
 the I. 0.
 P.
 H.
 You
explained
 that debris was taken to the above listed
 site-so that recyclable and non-recyclable
materials could be separated.
 You also stated that you wanted
 to work with
 us and the date
given to you
 in the violation noticeletter
 to properly clean
 up the
 open dump
 site (February
 13,
2004)
was more than
 sufficient to be able to accomplish the task.
 —.--
I
 explained that the process
 of taking
 demolition debris from one site to another for the
 purpose
of salvaging was not permissible under Illinois law and that the demolition would have
 to take
place where the
 mobile
 home had been place.
 I
 also explained that this process should take
place as
 quickly as
 possible; any materials that were going to be
 used or
 recycled should be
covered
 until moved,
 and all waste would have to be properly disposed of at theJwj~IJ.I also
 asked that you provide
 us copies of all landfill and recycling tickets relating to the d1~posalof
the debris
 from the Starvation Acres open
 dump site.
I______
P.O.
 Box 307
 +
 Murphysboro, IL 62966-0307
 +
 Phone (618) 684-3143
 +
 Fax
 (618)
 684-6023
www.jchdonline.org
 +
 Printed
 on
 Recycled Paper
EXHIBIT
LR~
Finally,
 I asked that you contact me when the site was clean so
 I could come do a compliance
U
 inspection.
 You stated that you would do this and also would be happy to accompany me on
the
 inspection
 of the site.
L
 appreciate
 all of your efforts to correct this matter.
 If you have any questions,
 please do
 not
hesitate to contact me at 618-684-3143,
 Ext. 128.
Sincerely,
Don Terry
r
 Solid Waste
 Inspector
Jackson County
 Health Department
cc: file
n
Certified Return
 Receipt # 70032260000508895993
BEFORE THE ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL
ARD
COUNTY
vs.
 )
 AC
 No.
 2004-064
EGON
 KAMARASY,
)
Respondent.
MEMORANDUM
 SUPPORTING
 AMENDED
 PETITION
 TO
CONTEST
 ADMINISTRATIVE
 CITATION
I
INTRODUCTION
The County ofJackson (“County”) seeks to impose civil penalties for three (3)
 alleged
violations ofthe Act.
The respondent denies that his actions violated the Act.
II
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On March25, 2004,
 an
 inspector for the County of Jackson, Don Teny, conducted
 an
“on-site inspectjpn” of a
 site known as Carbondale/Kamarasy, located in Jackson
 County,
Illinois.
 The inspection lasted five
 (5)
 minutes, from 2:25 p.m.
 until
 2:30
 p.m.
 (See
 Jackson
County Health Department Affidavit of Don Terry, dated March 29,
 2004,
 attached as Exhibit
“A” to
 the Admii~istrative
 Citation (“D. Terry Aff.”))
Mr. Terr~
 s Narrative Inspection Report (hereinafter “Report”), submitted in
 support
of the Administrative Citation filed by the County of Jackson, states that the site investigation
on March 25, 2004 was made “as a follow up to an inspection of this
 site
 done
 on March
 11,
2004.” (D. Terry Aff.)
 However, the Report does not give
 any
 account or explanation for the
alleged March
 UI
 “inspection”.
 Nor does not it say whether that
 inspection resulted in
 any
action being take~
 againstMr. Kamarasy, such as the issuance ofa warning, prior to March
 25.
The Report doesnot even say whether Mr. Terry discussed the March 11,
 2004
 inspection with
Mr. Kamarasy prior to March 25.
The Report does state that,
 on March
 25,
 Mr. Terry “observed a pile of debris
 in the
same general location as on
 his
 inspection
 visit of March
 11, 2004”,
 but
 that
 “the
 debris
pile appeared to, have been reduced in
 volume by open burning”
 (D.
 Terry Aff.)
 Mr.
 Terry
thenestimated the volume ofthe debris to
 be ten
 (10)
 cubic yards.
 (Id.)
 Again, Mr.
 Terry did
not state that he had warned Mr. Kamarasy that he would have to remove the material by March
25 or any other date.
 (See
 Administrative
 Citation)
 Mr.
 Terry
 also
 did
 not give any
 indication
that
 he told
 Mr.
 Kamarasy
 that
 it would
 be
 unlawful
 to reduce the
 pile
 by
 burning
 the
flammable material, and that Mr. Kamarasy
 should take those materials, including yard waste, to
a public dump rather than burning them.
 (Id.)
Moreover; Mr. Terry
 did not
 state by
 what
 authority
 he
 conducted
 either
 of these
investigations: fi1~st,the one on
 March
 11,
 2004
 for which
 six
 photographs,
 but
 no
 narrative
report or otherdocumentation, have beenprovided; and, second, the one on March 25 that led
 to
theAdministrative Citation filed in this cause on or about March 30, 2004.
 Mr.
 Terry does not
say, for example~.whether
 he was able to
 observe the alleged dump site from the side of a public
road, or whetherhe entered onto Mr. Kamarasy’s
 private property
 with the express purpose of
looking for a dump
 site, or whether he had simply entered onto Mr.
 Kamarasy’s
 property
 at
random and stumbled upon this dump site.
 Nor does Mr.
 Terry say whetherhe believed he had
permission from~iVIr.Kamarasy
 to inspect his home and farm for debris
 piles
 or whether he
believed he had some special statutory license for entering
 onto
 Mr.
 Kamarasy’s
 homestead
without first obtaining a search warrant.
In any event, Mr. Terry claims
 he
 observed
 the following materials within the
 debris’
pile:
 (1) “landsc~tpe
 waste”,
 (2) “dimensional lumber”,
 (3) “what appeared to be
 metal
 frames
from furniture”,(4) “metal fence posts”, (5) “the remains of what appeared to
 be a window
air conditioner”;~(6)“sections
 of
 laminate counter tops”,
 (7)
 metal cans,
 and
 (8)
 “other
materials not easily identifiable”.
 He observed that most of the
 material “was
 charred from
burning”.
 (D. Terry Aff.)
To document these observations, Mr. Terry took five
 (5)
 close-up photographs of this
site on March 25~2004. Mr. Terry also took six (6) photographs on March
 11.
 2004.
 The five
(5)
 photographs taken on March 25 might be said
 to
 show
 two
 (2) pieces of charred and half-
burnt wood that~before they
 were
 burned,
 could
 have been characterized as
 “dimensional
lumber.”
 But, none ofthe pictures show a window air conditioner.
Mr.
 Terry’s Report then states on the basis of his
 observations, the following violations
occurred:
 (1) causing or allowing the open dumping of any waste in
 a manner that results
 in
open burning ofwaste
 in violation of the Act; (2) causing or allowing
 open
 dumping of
 any
waste that results in litter and
 the deposition
 of general
 construction or demolition
 debris or
clean
 constructipn or demolition
 debris; (3)
 conducting
 a
 waste-storage
 or
 waste-disposal
operation withoüta proper permit; (4) disposing, treating, storing or abandoning any
 waste or
transporting any.~waste
 to the site from another site for the purpose of disposal; and
 (5) causing
or allowing openumping
 ofany used or waste tire. (D. Terry Aff.)
Photographs
 taken by Mr. Terry on
 March
 11,
 2004 show
 two
 (2)
 or three (3)
 used
tires.
 None is in.~the
 burn pile, but instead lie off to
 the
 side.
 Photographs
 taken by Mr.
 Terry
on March
 25,
 2004 do not show any tires. (D. Terry Aff.)
 Mr. Kamarasy properly disposed of
used tires from his property and has a receipt for the disposal
 from
 Davis Tire Center.
 (See
Respondent’s Exhibit “R- 1”, a copy ofwhich is attached hereto.)
On March 30, 2004, Jackson County filed an Administrative
 Citation with
 the Pollution
Control Board ii~iwhich
 the following violations
 are
 alleged: (1) that the respondent caused or
allowed open dumping that resulted in
 “litter”
 at the
 site in
 violation of
 §
21(p)(1) of the
 Act;
(2) that the respondent caused or allowed open dumping that resulted in “open
 burning”
 at the
site in violation ~f
 §
2l(p)(3) of the Act; and (3) that the respondent caused
 or allowed open
dumping at the ~ite that resulted in “the deposition of general
 construction or demolition;
 or
clean construction or demolition debris”
 in
 violation of
§
 21(p)(7) of the Act.
 (Administrative
Citation, p. 2)
The respc’ndent filed an Amended Petition to
 Contest Administrative Citation, denying
that his conduct violated the Act as alleged
 (See
 Amended Petition to
 Contest Administrative
Citation (“Am.
 Pet.”))
Mr. Kamarasy will testify, first of
 all, that the pile of material
 at the
 site in
 question
rested entirely on his
 homestead, where
 he maintains
 his
 personal residence and a
 working
farm.
 The pile
 is
 located between four (4) pastures on
 his farm.
 It cannot be
 seen
 from
 the
road.
 In order to observe the pile, one would have to
 enter onto Mr. Kamarasy’s property,
 walk
up a hill to a gatedpasture, open the gate, and proceed for about another 500
 feet.
 Not only
 is
the pile not visible from the public road, it would also not be visible from the
 gateway
 that
 is
 on
Mr.
 Kamarasy’
 property.
 Mr.
 Terry
 could only
 have discovered the pile
 by
 making
 a
determined effort to search
 Mr. Kamarasy’s property for possible violations.
 Mr.
 Kamarasy
did not give Mr. ~Terrypermissionto enter his premises for any purpose.
Next,
 M~:
Kamarasy will testify
 that the
 pile
 of
 material
 about which
 Mr.
 Terry
complains
 consisted primarily of landscape waste,
 with
 a small
 amount of household
 waste
(being some used furniture), generated through ordinary residential and household use of the
premises in question, together with
 a
 small
 amount
 of
 agricultural
 waste
 generated by
 his
farming operation~that were conducted on thepremises.
 Mr. Kamarasy will further testify
 that
there
 were metal~fenceposts in the pile.
 He was using the fire to burn the poison ivy off the
fence posts.
 Butthere
 was no
 window air conditioner in the pile,
 and Mr. Kamarasy
 did
 not
attempt to burn ~ñy such thing.
 His explanation is that he had an old Coleman
 water heater that
he used to preveni freezing of drinking water in a water trough for the livestock that was
 located
at about sixty (60) feet from the pile.
Mr. Kamarasy will testify that none ofthe materials he burned at this site
 were “general
construction or demolition”
 material or “demolition debris”
 Furthermore,
 according
 to
 the
I
 Page4
I
 Memorand~nnSupporting
 Amended
 Petition
 to
 Contest
 Administrative
 Citation
n
o
 meaning of the tçrm
 “litter” as set forth in the Litter Control Act,
(see
discussion below), none
1
 of
it was “litter.”
Li
 Nor was Mr
 Kamarasy
 attempting to create a waste disposal site
 As
 he
 will testify, he
merely collected~thesematerials in one place, for the purpose ofburning them.
Finally, Mr. Kamarasy will point out that the Pollution
 Control
 Act makes
 an
 exception
forburning landsç ape, household, andlor agricultural waste, provided that
 waste
 is
 generated by
p
 farming operations conducted on
 the premises.
 Therefore, even if the waste in question could
be characterized ~islitter or construction material,
 Mr. Kamarasy’s
 act in
 burning this
 material
would not be
 a s~atutory
 violation,
 whence, a
priori,
 it
could not be unlawful to collect the
material in one p1~ce
 in preparation forburning.
With tha~inmind, Mr. Kamarasy does not know
 why he
 is
 being prosecuted in
 this
o
 matter.
 He had nb way ofknowing that he was violating any law by burning his
 household and
farming waste in~rural area, even if he had read all the statutes
 in question and consulted with
 a
lawyer in advanc’&
 Furthermore, despite the implication in
 Mr. Terry’s
 Report
 that this
 was a
follow-up inspection, Mr. Kamarasy was not
 given notice or warning of a possible
 violation,
together with a reasonable time period in which to clean up the site.
III
ISSUES
PRESENTED
The Adnijnistrative
 Citation
 and
 the
 Amended Petition
 to
 Contest
 Administrative
Citation present
the
following issues:
A.
 Did~theState violate Mr. Kamarasy’s Fourth
 Amendment right to
 privacy, by
•
 entering
 onto hi~
 land for the purpose
 of inspecting for
 illegal debris
 piles
 without either
obtaining Mr. Kamarasy’s permission first, or obtaining a search warrant?
B.
 Did~r.Kamarasy cause or allow open dumping
 on
 his homestead,
 the so-called
Carbondale/Kamarasy site?
C.
 If open dumping occurred at the site, did the open dumping result in litter?
D.
 If open dumping occurred at the site,
 did
 the open dumping result in
 burning
 at
the
 site?
 And,
 if
 so,
 was
 that
 open
 burning
 permitted by
 IEPA
 regulations
 and
 other
environmental laws~
E.
 If
 open
 dumping
 occurred
 at
 the
 site,
 did
 the
 open
 dumping
 result
 in
 the
deposition of general construction or demolition debris
 or clean
 construction or
 demolition
debris?
F.
 Given that IEPA regulations
 and
 other environmental laws expressly
 permit the
kind of burning ~allegedlycommitted
 by
 Mr.
 Kamarasy,
 how
 can it be
 unlawful
 for
 Mr.
Kamarasy to first gather in one place the materials he intended to burn?
G.
 Did~Mr.
 Terry
 and Jackson County abuse their discretion
 and
 exceed
 the
 intent
and scope ofthe administrative citation process by broadening the definition of “litter”
 beyond
the legislature’s intent,
 and
 by
 filing
 multiple
 charges against Mr
 Kamarasy for the single
 act
of burning a relatively small amount of landscape, household,
 and
 agriculture waste
 from his
farm and, therefore, violate the separation ofpowers under the Illinois
 Constitution?
H.
 Is the law, as applied to Mr. Kamarasy,
 unconstitutionally
 vague, in
 failing to
 give
him reasonable notice of what constitutes
 creating an open dump on
 one’s own property, and
what constitutes ~1
 jttering on one’s own property?
I.
 Were the enforcement actions taken against Mr. Kamarasy with respect to this
 site
so overzealous
 as to be
 arbitrary
 and
 capricious
 and
 in
 violation of
 his
 constitutional
 due
process rights?
 ~
Iv
THE~COUNTY
 VIOLATED THE FOURTH AMENDMENT BY ITS
WARRANTLESS
ENTRY ONTO PRIVATE PROPERTY TO
SEARCH
FOR
ILLEGAL
ACTIVITY
Section 4(d) of the Act grants the IEPA “in
 accordance with
 constitutional limitations,
authority to ~hterat all reasonable times upon any private or public property for the purpose
of
 .
 .
 .
 inspeciing
 to
 ascertain possible
 violations of the
 Act or
 of
 permits
 or
 terms
 or
conditions thereof.
 .
 .
 “.
 415
 ILCS
 §
 5/4(d)(1)
This provision has been heldto authorize the IEPA to
 go
 before a court and
 request an
administrative inspection warrant in order
 to
 carry
 out
 its
 duties
 under
 the
 Act,
 where
 the
violations
 are not in open
 or plain view and require entry
 and
 a
 “search”
 to
 venfy
 See
 e
g
Tippin
 v.
 Rockciale Sash &
 Trim Co..
 Inc.,
 196
 Ill.App.3d
 333, 336-7,
 143
 Ill.Dec. 22,
 553
N.E.2d 729
 (3d Dist.
 1990);
 People
 v.
 Van
 Tran
 Electric
 Corp.,
 152
 Ill.App.3d
 175,
 105
Ill.Dec.
 173,
 5O~
N.E.2d
 1179
 (5th
 Dist.
 1987);
 Miller
 v.
 Pollution
 Control
 Board,
 276
Ill.App.3d
 160/204
 Ill.Dec.
 774,
 642 N.E.2d 475
 (4th
 Dist.
 1994)
 reh.
 den.;
 Village of
Bridgeview v.
 Slominski, 74 Ill.App.3d
 1, 29 I1l.Dec. 944, 392 N.E.2d 641
 (1st
Dist.
 1979)
Clearly, there was a search in this case.
 The inspector, Mr.
 Terry,
 could not observe the
debris pile on Mr. Kamarasy’s
 farm from the public
 road or from neighboring property.
 He
had to leave the public
 road,
 traverse more than 200
 feet across Mr.
 Kamarasy’s
 property
 to
 a
gate, open the gate, and
 then proceed another 300
 feet before reaching the debns pile
 that
 is
alleged to
 constitute a violation of the Act
 in
 this
 case
 He
 did
 this
 on
 two
 (2)
 separate
occasions, according to
 his
 Affidavit:
 the first
 time
 on
 March
 11,
 2004;
 the second
 time
 on
March
 25,
 2004.~
Following his entry and search on March
 11, 2004, he did not contact Mr.
 Kamarasy
about the existe~1ceof the debris pile
 or its
 disposition;
 nor,
 did
 he
 seek
 an
 administrative
warrant to returfl~tothe site for any further inspections.
Instead, h~
 returned to
 the site a second time,
 without notice to
 Mr.
 Kamarasy,
 entered
again
 Mr.
 Kam~arasy’sprivate
 property,
 without
 warrant
 or
 consent
 or
 any
 exigent
circumstance, and took additional photographs
 TheAdministrative Citation then was filed only
days after Mr. T~rr~’s
 second, unannounced,
 warrantless entry onto
 Mr.
 Kamarasy’s
 property
and the search undertaken by the taking of the second photographs showing the debris pile.
Under these circumstances,
it
is
 clear that
 the County violated Mr
 Kamarasy ‘s Fourth
Amendment right
 to be
 secure in
 his
 property from unreasonable
 searches
 and
 seizures.
Consequently, the~
 evidence obtained from
 the warrantless searches should
 not
 be
 allowed
 to
Memorandum
 Supporting
 Amended
 Petition
 to
 Contest
 Administrative
 Citation
support a finding~that
 Mr. Kamarasy violated the Act by assembling and burning the material in
thepile.
V
~HERESPONDENT DID NOT CAUSE OR ALLOW OPEN
‘DUMPING AT THE CARBONDALE/KAMARASY SITE
In order to seek enforcement by Administrative
 Citation for violations of Section 21(p),
the Agency, or kcal governingbody, must establish that the respondent caused or allowed open
dumping.
 See
 Montgomery County, Illinois
 v.
 Clifford Crispens.
 Jacqueline
 R.
 Crispens
 and
Line Pilot Bungèe. Inc.,
 AC 95-43.
 Section
 2 1(a) of the Act
 sets
 forth
 a
 general prohibition
against open
 dur~pingas follows:
 “No person shall cause or allow the open
 dumping of any
waste.”. 415 ILCS
 §
5/21(a)
Section 3:385 of the Act defines “refuse”
 as “waste”.
 415
 ILCS
 §
 5/3.385.
 The Act
then defines “wa~te”
 to mean “any garbage, sludge from
 a waste treatment plant,
 water supply
treatment plant,
 dr air pollution
 control facility or
 other discarded material”.
 415
 ILCS
 §
5/3.535.
None
 of the “stuff’
 in
 the pile
 on
 the site in
 question was “garbage,
 sludge
 from
 a
waste treatment i~:iant,water supply treatment plant, or airpollution
 control facility.”
 Therefore,
the State
 must mean
 to
 incorporate
 all
 the
 items
 in
 question
 under
 the
 catch-all phrase
“discarded material.”
 While that term can be stretched to mean most
 anything, it is
 hard
 to
believe that the Illinois legislature intended the Pollution Control Board to
 consider vegetative
matter, such as free branches, set out in a pile
 to
 burn, as the kind of “discarded
 material” that
creates
 an “opeE~dump”.
See
 Alternate Fuels,
 Inc.
 v.
 Director of the Illinois
 Environmental
Protection Agency, 2004 WL 2359398 (Ill. Sup. Ct. 2004)
Section
 3.300 ofthe Act defines “open dumping” as
the~
 consolidation of refuse from one or more sources at a
 disposal
 site
 that
 does not fulfill
 the
 requirements
 of
 a
 sanitary
 landfill.
(Ei~nphasis
 added.)
415 ILCS
 §
5/3.300.
 Thus,
 in order to prove
 that Mr.
 Kamarasy
 committed “open
 dumping”,
H
 the County must’first show that he created a “disposal site” on his
 land.
L
 It canno~betrue,
 however,
 that
 any
 time
 a
 homeowner
 and/or
 farmer
 places
 any
n
 household item (for example, a broken piece of furniture) outside his
 or her home
 or on
 his
 or
her farm, or piles’up some branches and leaves outside his
 or her house, that he
 or she thereby
has created a
 “disposal
 site”
 under
 the
 statute
 Such
 an
 interpretation would
 render
 the
Pollution ContrOFAct so broad as to be arbitrary and unenforceable.
 See
 Alternate Fuels,
 Inc.
 v.
•
 Director ofthe Illinois Environmental Protection Agency,
 supra,
 2004 WL 2359398
It would mean, for example, that every homeowner who ever burned a pile of leaves or
branches
 in
 the
 backyard
 thereby
 created
 a
 “disposal
 site”.
 Consequently,
 any
 such
homeownerwould be guilty of open dumping, which would then make him or her strictly
 liable
for at least two
 counts of “littering”
 and
 “burning”,
 and a fine
 of
 at least $3000
 under the
Pollution Control~iAct. Hopefully,
 this Board would agree that that
 is
 not the type of problem
that the Pollution Control Act was meant to
 address
The
 case
 at
 bar
 is
 not
 really
 all
 that
 different.
 The
 respondent
 organized
 and
consolidated sothe old household items that he no longer wanted, some
 landscape
 waste,
 and
some waste froth this farming operations, and placed them at a
 site
 on
 the
 farm, far
 from
 the
road.
 He then p~ceeded
 to burn the material in the pile.
Of course,
 Mr. Kamarasy concedes that the items in question were “waste”.
 In fact,
almost all ofit
Wà~
vegetative waste, as the County’s inspector’s photographs plainly show.
 He
further concedesthat he attempted to destroy this
 waste by
 burning it.
 However, he denies
 the
rest ofthe allegations contained in the Administrative Citation.
In the first place, the words “allowed or caused
 open
 dumping”
 sound
 so
 grandiose
that they make Mr. Kamarasy seem
 like some kind of willful
 and repeat
 offender.
 He
 is
 not.
This
 was not a repeat offense.
 Mr.
 Kamarasy
 was not “allowing”
 others to
 dump
 their waste
items on his land~
r
In fact, by Mr. Terry’s own admission, the total amount of waste at this
 site was only
about ten (10) cubic yards
 (D
 Terry Aff)
 Yet, in Mr
 Terry’s
 Report,
 he
 manages to
 accuse
Mr. Kamarasy
cf~
 “conducting a
 waste-storage or waste-disposal operation
 without a
 proper
r
 permit.”
 Common sense says that an inspector, acting in good faith, could not accuse a person
of conducting
 a waste-disposal operation
 without a license on the basis of discovering a mere
L
 ten (10) cubic yards ofhousehold, agricultural and landscape
 waste
 in
 a pile
 on
 his
 or her own
r
 farm property!
It is true, and Mr.
 Kamarasy understands, that the commercial dump
 site charge was
later dropped by~ieJackson County prosecutor
—
 presumably because it was
 too preposterous
to be believed
—
iut the fact that Mr.
 Terry could
 have made such an
 allegation
 after observing
this site suggests his prejudice or animus againstMr
 Kamarasy
To set thørecord straight, Mr. Kamarasy merely set out some landscape waste
 on
 his
L
 farmland, together with some household and agriculture waste, for the purpose of disposing of
fl
 the waste by burning it.
 At the time, Mr. Kamarasy had no way ofknowing,
 or even suspecting,
I
that this act ofburning one’s own refuse, in
 such a rural setting, was illegal.
In the second place, the Mr. Kamarasy had no intention ofcreating a “disposal site” on
his
 land.
 Of course,
 the respondent understands
 that
 his
 lack of intent
 is
 not,
 by
 itself,
 a
sufficient defens:&
 Mr.
 Kamarasy duly
 acknowledges that the charges
 in
 section 21(p) of the
Act were meant
to
be enforced strictly and
 with little discretion on
 the part of the inspectors or
the IEPA and its designated agents, such as Jackson County
 See e
 g
 IEPA
 v
 Spnnger, Illinois
Pollution Contro1~Board
 Case No. AC 02-7
 However, if one reads
 the definitions as
 set forth
in the Act,
 it appears that
 Mr.
 Kamarasy
 cannot be
 said
 to
 have unintentionally created
 a
“disposal site” either.
While there is no
 single
 definition for the term “disposal
 site”, the words “disposal”
and
 “site”
 are
 defined separately in
 the
 Act.
 The
 definition of
 the
 term “site”
 is
 self-
explanatory.
 See;415
 ILCS
 §5/3.460
 However, the term “disposal” is
 specific enough
 as
 to
shed light on
 whj’ch debris piles can be labeled “disposal sites” and which cannot.
Accordiiig to the Act.
“bisposal”
 means
 the
 discharge,
 deposit,
 injection,
 dumping,
spilling, leaking or placing of any waste or hazardous waste into or
on
 any
 land
 or
 water
 or
 into
 any
 well
 so
 that
 such
 waste
 or
hazardous
 waste
 or
 any
 constituent
 thereof
 may
 enter
 the
environment or be emitted into the air or discharged into any
 waters,
including ground waters.
415
 ILCS
 §
5/3485
 Presumably, then, a “disposal site” under
 the Act would be
 one
 where
such “disposal” .~akes
 place.
This
 definition
 of “disposal”
 involves
 two
 parts.
 First,
 the
 definition
 requires
 a
showing
 that
M~.
Kamarasy “placed
 .
 .
 .
 waste
 .
 .
 .
 on
 his
 land.”
 Second
 it requires
showing that M~
 .Kamarasy placed waste of such
 a kind and in
 such a manner “so
 that
 such
waste
 .
 .
 .
 or any constituent thereof may
 enter the environment
 or
 be
 emitted
 into the
 air
 or
discharged
 into ~ny waters, including ground waters.” (Emphasis added.)
Because the County bears the burden ofproving that
 a respondent committed the act of
“open
 dumping’~jandbecause open dumping requires a showing that the respondent created a
“disposal
 site”, itiis clearly the County’s
 burden to
 prove
 that the site in question was
 truly a
“disposal site”.
 As just noted, that would ordinarily require two showings
—
 (1) placing
 waste
on the
 land;
 and
 (2)
 doing
 this
 in
 such a
 way that the
 waste
 would be
 likely to
 “enter
 the
environment”, dr be
 “emitted” or “discharged” into the environment.
 Since the
 respondent
concedes the
first
point, the County’s burden in the case at bar is
 to
 show that the
 waste,
 which
Mr. Kamarasy had burned incompletely, was
 somehow placed on the land in
 such a way that
 it,
or any
 constituent thereof,
 was entering
 into the environment or emitting
 into
 the
 air
 or
discharging into the waters.
Certainly~
 no evidence has been or wifi be presented of emitting or discharging, unless
the County seeks~io
 claim that the burning itself
 is
 per se
 unlawful, which it is
 not.
 As
 wifi be
discussed in
 detail below, the burning
 was lawful in this
 setting and,
 in
 any
 event, the charge
under consideration is
 whether the respondent caused or allowed “open dumping” at the site in
n
o
 question, not whether there was open
 burning.
 Therefore,
 the County
 must
 prove
 “entering
into the environment”.
Of course, the County might argue
 that every
 time a person places waste
 on his
 or her
land, then he or she has
 automatically, as a matter of logical consequence,
 causes
 that waste
 to
enter into the environment.
 But
 if
 that
 is
 the correct interpretation of the phrase
 “enter
 the
environment”, namely that anything found outside ofa building or enclosure necessarily
 enters
or is emitted into, the environment, so that there is nothing which needs to be proved, then the
whole phrase “spthat such waste.
 .
 .
 or any
 constituent thereof may enter the environment or
be
 emitted into l~heair
 or
 discharged into
 any
 waters,
 including
 ground
 waters”
 becomes
completely superfluous.
 Merely placing waste
 on
 the
 land, without more, would automatically
imply that one had caused it to enter into the environment.
It is
 a standard principle of statutory construction that each clause
 in
 a statute should be
presumed to have~
 some meaning
 Alternate Fuels
 Inc
 v
 Director of the Illinois
 Environmental
Protection
 Agency,
 supra,
 2004
 WL 2359398
 Therefore,
 it
 must
 be
 presumed
 that
 the
legislature meant
 the concepts of “entering into the environment”, as well as “emitting”
 and
“discharging”,
 to place
 some
 limitation on
 the
 notion of
 placing
 waste
 on
 the
 land.
 A
homeowner, likeMr.
 Kamarasy, does not create a disposal site every time he places waste on
•
 his land.
So how dOes one know which acts create a disposal site, and which do not?
 What
 is the
distinction that the legislature intended to
 make?
 It
 seems
 clear
 that
 by
 using
 the words
“entering into thetenvironment”, “emitting”, and “discharging” the legislature meant to
 imply
a certain lack of controlor potential lack of control by the person who placed the waste
 on
 the
land.
 To be a disposal site,
 the County
 must
 show
 either the waste in its
 entirety (for example
unprotected papertrash), or else some constituent of the waste (for example oil or paint in
 open
cans) did enter orhas the potential to enter (freely) into the
 environment, or be
 emitted into
 the
air or be discharged into the waters.
 This is a
 Pollution Control Act.
 It
 is
 pollution
 that
 is
being regulated, not mere messiness on thepart ofa landowner.
But, the specific items
 observed at this
 site, and
 listed in
 the fact section above,
 are not
items likely to blbw, scatter,
 or spread
 freely, escape, leech, or be emitted into the environment.
Nor are they itenis likely to emit or discharge.
 A fence post,
 for example, lying
 on the ground,
is not going to scatter into the environment, nor is it going to
 emit or discharge anything into the
environment.
 Neither is the metal frame from some piece of furniturethat burned incompletely.
It is not even possible for Mr. Terry to claim that these items
 were
 abandoned on
 the
land or forgottenby Mr. Kamarasy.
 By Mr.
 Terry’s own admission, Mr.
 Kamarasy must have
conducted a burning of some of the
 materials at some time between March
 11
 and
 March
 25,
2004,
 when the citation was issued.
 Therefore, Mr. Kamarasy had not forgotten or ignored this
pile ofmaterial.
 ‘He was trying to get rid ofit!
It fo1lows~that
 the County has failed to prove an essential element of its
 charge
—
 that
Mr. Kamarasy c~mmitted
 the act of “open
 dumping”
 at the site in
 question.
 For
 that reason
alone, the charge of causing or allowing
 “open dumping”
 against Mr. Kamarasy in this case
should be dismissed.
VI
THE R~SPONDENTDID NOT CAUSE OR ALLOW OPEN DUMPING
THAT RESULTED IN “LITTER” AS
 THAT TERM IS USED IN THE ACT
Even if this Board
 should find that Mr. Kamarasy did commit “open dumping,”
 this
would not in itself be an actionable offense under the Act.
 Each of the three specific charges
against Mr. Kaffiarasy requires further showings.
The County’s
 first claim is that Mr. Kamarasy caused or allowed open
 dumping that
resulted in “litter”
 in
 violation of
 §
2l(p)(l) of the
 Act.
 But,
 Mr. Kamarasy does not believe
that his act ofburning some stuffat a site on
 his
 own
 homestead, in
 a location
 not
 visible from
the public road,~àndin a
 manner that
 did
 not
 cause
 a
 public
 nuisance, can reasonably be
characterized as c~using
 litter.
Mr. Kanj4rasy is well aware that the term “litter” has been interpreted expansively
 in
prior cases
 before the
 Pollution
 Control
 Board.
 See
 e.g.
 Illinois
 Environmental
 Protection
Page
 13
~‘Meniorand~ciin
 : Supporting~AmendedPetition
 to
 contest
 :iAdministrativé ::Citation
Agency v. Springer,
 supra,
 AC 02-7 at p.
 6
 But, again, if the legislature had
 intended that every
homeowner whoever placed waste on his land in such a way as to
 constitute “open
 dumping,”
was also and automatically guilty of littering, then the legislature
 would not
 have bothered to
add the qualifying phrase “that
 resulted in litter.”
 See e.g.
 Alternate Fuels,
 Inc.
 v.
 Director of
the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency,
 supra,
 2004
 WL
 2359398
 It
 would
 have just
defined the crime
 as
 “open dumping”.
 By
 adding the
 phrase
 “that resulted in litter”
 the
legislature madeit clear that it believes that not all items left at a “disposal site” constitute litter.
So the question remains, what constitutes
 “littering” under the Pollution
 Control
 Act,
and what does not’~Unfortunately, the Act does not say
 The failure
 to
 define littering poses a
serious enforcement problem ofconstitutional dimension: how can a homeowner, even
 one who
has studied the statute in elaborate detail,
 possibly
 know if an
 act constitutes
 “open
 dumping”
that results in “litter”,
 given that the Act does not
 define “litter”?
 See e.g.
 People
 v.
 Einoder,
209
 Il1.2d 443, 450, 283
 Ill.Dec. 551,
 808 N.E.2d 517 (2004)
The
 Pollution
 Control Board
 attempted
 to
 answer this problem
 in
 previous
 cases,
responding
 to
 qharges
 that
 the
 term “litter”
 in
 the
 statute
 is
 too
 vague
 by
 adopting
 the
definition oflitterfrom the Litter Control Act.
 See e.g.
 St. Clair County
 v.
 Louis
 Mund, AC
 90-
64.
 This approaeh by the Board is both logical and reasonable.
 It has the virtue of relying on
 a
legal notion of ‘~1itter”that was created by
 the legislature precisely for the purpose of going
beyond the simplistic notion that litter is just “messy stuff left outside,” and identifying with
some precision which messy stuff left outside shall be treated by
 the law as “litter”
 and
 which
shall not, so that littering can be either prevented or punished.
By adopting the meaning of“litter” as it is used in the Litter Control Act, the Board put
homeowners, like Mr. Kamarasy,
 on notice that unlawful “littering” in
 the Pollution Control
Act
 means exactly the same thing
 as unlawful “littering” in the Litter Control Act.
The Litter Control Act starts out by providing as follows:
“J~itter”means
 any
 discarded, used or unconsumed
 substance
 or
waste.
 “Litter”
 may include,
 but
 is
 not
 limited to,
 any
 garbage,
trash, debris, rubbish, grass clippings
 or other lawn or garden
 waste,
~~paper
 magazines, glass, metal, plastic or paper
 containers or
otherpackaging construction
 material,
 abandoned vehicle.
 .
 .
 motor
v~ëhicle
 parts, furniture, oil, carcass ofa dead animal, any
 nauseous or
J
 offensive matter of any kind, any
 object likely to
 injure any
 person
ôi
 create a traffic
 hazard, potentially
 infectious
 medical waste
 as
defined in
 Section
 3.360
 of the
 Environmental
 Protection
 Act, or
ahything
 else of an unsightly or unsanitary nature, which
 has
 been
I.
 discarded, abandoned or otherwise disposed ofimproperly.
415 ILCS
 §
 105)3
But this paragraph, though properly taken from the Litter Control Act, does not
 give a
complete definition of “litter”, in the sense oftelling a homeowner what is
 unlawful.
 Indeed, it
is transparently incomplete, if one reads it carefully.
 It consists of two sentences.
The first sentence
 is
 obviously
 definitional in
 syntax
 “Litter means any
 discarded,
used
 or unconsu~edsubstance
 or
 waste.”
 But
 this
 sentence,
 taken alone, suffers
 from
 the
same
 vagueness.ii~roblem
 as discussed above.
 In fact, based solely on this
 sentence
 the
 trash
that one puts insj~.e
 a garbage can and takes to the curb is
 “litter,”
 since it certainly consists
 of
“discarded,
 used or consumed substance or waste.”
 Likewise,
 a small pile
 of leaves in one’s
own back yard
 ~~uld probably be “litter”,
 and
 subject to
 whatever enforcement measures
 the
Litter Control Act provides.
 Certainly, that
 is not what the legislature intended,
For one
 thing, the second sentence
 is there for a reason.
 It appears to
 be
 intended
 to
give some help in understanding “litter”, by providing a list (though
 not complete) of concrete
examples
 But the key word in the second
 sentence is
 “may”
 For
 example, according
 to
 this
so-called definition, “grass clippings or other lawn
 or garden waste”, may be considered litter
under the Litter G;bntrol Act.
 Or,
 they may not.
 One simply does not know, without
 reading
the entire statute~to
 get more guidance.
The respondent does
 not
 say
 this
 to
 be
 tricky,
 or try
 to
 win
 this
 case
 on
 a
 mere
technicality.
 Th~question raised here
 is
 one
 about
 fundamental fairness.
 This
 so-called
definition, cited frequently by the Board, completely fails to
 answer the basic
 question posed
above: what kind)of dumping
 on
 one’s own property
 is
 the kind that results
 in
 litter,
 and
 what
U
 kind is not?
 Without that answer, how can a homeowner everknow what is prohibited and
 what
is not~
For example,
if
this one
 paragraph were
 the
 entire
 definition of
 litter, even
 such
 a
common practice as mulching one’s grass
 clippings
 back into one’s
 lawn
 would
 be
 fraught
with unknown and unknowable danger.
 The Inspector might cite it as a violation.
 Or
 he
 might
not.
 And, the oril~’
 way for a homeowner to
 know in advance
 would be
 to
 read the Inspector’s
mind.
 Therefore, in effect, the interpretation of the Litter Control Act that Jackson County
 is
asking this Board to adopt for use in the case at bar would grant the Inspector sole
 and absolute
power to decide ~hat
 is litter and what is not.
Perhaps Mr. Terry
 believes
 that he
 can enforce the Pollution
 Control Act
 merely by
insisting that he knows litter when he
 sees
 it,
but
if
so,
 this
 would lead to
 a blatant violation of
the Separation of~PowersClause of the Illinois
 Constitution because the inspector would then
have the authority
 to determine if and
 when individuals
 should be
 prosecuted for “littering”.
See e.g.
 People v~Izzo,
 195
 Il.2d
 109,
 115-6, 253
 Ill.Dec. 425, 745 N.E.2d 548
 (2001)
 It is
 up
to the legislature
to
give clear guidelines
 about what litter is and what it is not; the inspector, and
even the
 Pollution
 Control
 Board,
 should
 have
 only
 a
 very
 limited
 discretion
 in
 this
determination.
Ofcours~’
 the legislature knew this when it wrote the Litter Control Act.
 It
 did not give
broad discretionito inspectors to define litter.
 Instead, in
 plain language,
 the legislature gave
fairly detailed guidelines about what is litter and what is not.
 In the legislature’s own words:
tj’his
 Act is, therefore,
 necessary
 to provide for
uniform prohibition
throughout the State
 of any
 and
 all littering
 on
 public
 or
 private
prbperty so as to protect the health,
 safety
 and
 welfare of the people
of this State.
415
 ILCS
 §
l05/~
 (Legislative Findings and Determinations) (emphasis added).
Therefor~
 it was the legislature’s intent that the notion ofunlawful littering should be
“uniform” in the~
 State of Illinois,
 and that one
 has to
 examine the entire
 statute to
 know
 what
“any
 and all
 littering” means.
 Merely reading one paragraph from the statute will not suffice.
fl
o
 It follows that the criterion for whether a landowner has
 committed open
 dumping
 that
p
 resulted in litterin
 violation of the Pollution
 Control Act
 is
 to
 determine whether or not
 the
landowner comnutted open dumping
 that resulted in litter
 in violation ofthe Litter Control Act
n
In other words,
 to prove
 that Mr.
 Kamarasy’s
 alleged “open dumping”
 resulted
 in
“litter”, the State iwill have to prove
 that Mr.
 Kamarasy’s
 actions constituted
 a violation of the
Litter Control Act.
 But, the County cannot do so, because Mr.
 Kamarasy did
 not violate the
r
 Litter Control Act.
The Litter Control Act contains four sections that describe prohibited
 acts.
 See
 415
P
 ILCS
§~
 105/4 thiough
 105/7
 Two ofthese are not relevant to this
 hearing in
 that they refer to
li
dumping from a motor vehicle or abandoning a motorvehicle.
 See
 415 ILCS
 §
 105/5
 (dumping
from
 motor vehiCle)
 and 415
 ILCS
 §
 105/7
 (abandonment of motor
 vehicle)
 That leaves
o
 Section 4 (dumprng and the deposit oflitter) and Section
 6
 (accumulation of litter)
L
 Section
4
ofthe Litter Control Act provides in relevant part, as follows:
No person shall dump, deposit,...
 or
 discard..
 .
 litter.
 .
 .
 unless
•
 (a)
 the person
 is the owner or tenant in
 lawful possession
 of the
•
 property
 .
 .
 .
 and
 does
 not
 create
 a
 public
 health
 or
 safety
hazard,
 a
 public nuisance, or a
 fire hazard.
(Emphasis added)
Section 6 of the Litter Control Act addresses
 accumulation of litter.
 It
 provides
 in
relevant part, as føllows:
No persoti shall allow litter to
 accumulate upon
 real property,
 of
which the person charged is
 the owner or tenant in
 control, in
 such
a
 manner
 as
 to
 constitute
 a
 public
 nuisance
 or
 in
 such
 a
manner that the litter may be blown or
 otherwise
 carried
 by
the natural
 elements on to the real property of another person.
There
 is
 no
 evidence to
 support
 a
 claim that Mr. Kamarasy’s
 so-called “open
 dump”
created a
 public health or safety hazard, a public nuisance, or a fire hazard.
 There
 is
 also
 no
evidence that he deposited items
 in the
 so-called “open
 dump”
 in
 a manner
 as to
 constitute
 a
~
 ~
 ~
 ~
~Memo~d~’~i
 S~pó~tiiig
Amènde&~etfli~n~t~Contest
 A~thiiistrathe~
 CitatiOi~
o
 public nuisance or such that items may be blown or otherwise carried by the natural elements
on to the real property ofanother person.
Therefore, Mr. Kamarasy should not be
 found in violation of the
 Act on
 the charge of
open dumping that resulted in litter, because he did not cause or allow litter in violation of either
the Pollution Control Act or theLitter Control Act.
p
•
 VH
THE RESPONDENT DID NOT CAUSE OR ALLOW OPEN
DUMPING AT HIS HOMESTEAD THAT RESULTED IN OPEN
P.
 BURNING IN VIOLATION OF THE ACT
IEPA
 regrilations exempt several activities from the general prohibition against open
burning under the Act.
For
 exaffiple,
 open
 burning
 of “agricultural
 waste” is
 not
 a violation
 of
 the
 Act,
o
 provided the burning occurs on the premises
 on
 which such waste is
 generated, the area of the
burn is not a resfricted area, atmospheric conditions will dissipate readily the
 contaminants,
 no
visibility
 hazarcF~iscreated
 on roadways,
 railroad
 tracks
 or air
 fields,
 residential or
 other
populated areas are not closer than 1,000 feet, and
 it can be demonstrated that no
 economically
reasonable altei~ativemethod
 of disposal
 is
 available
 35
 Illinois
 Administrative Code
 §
237.120(a)
•
 “Agriculjiiral waste”
 is
 defined as
 “any
 refuse,
 except
 garbage and dead
 animals,
generated on a farm or ranch by crop and livestock production practices including such items as
bags, cartons, dry
 bedding, structural
 materials and
 crop
 residues
 but
 excluding
 landscape
wastes”. 35
 IllinOis Administrative Code
 §
237.10 1
Open burning of “domicile waste” is not a violation of the Act, provided the burning
occurs on the premises on which such waste is
 generated, the burn area is
 not a restricted
 area,
atmospheric conditions
 will dissipate readily
 the contaminants,
 and no
 visibility hazard
 is
created on road~áys,railroad tracks or airfields. 35 Illinois Administrative Code
§
237.120(a)
“Domicile waste” is
 defined as “any
 refuse generated
 on
 single-family domiciliary
property as a resiXlt of domiciliary activities”. 35 Illinois Administrative Code ~ 237.101
o
 Open burning of “landscape waste”
 is
 not
 a violation of the Act, provided the burning
occurs on the premises
 on which such waste is generated, atmospheric conditions
 wifi dissipate
readily the contaminants,
 and no
 visibility hazard is
 created on
 roadways, railroad tracks or air
fields”. 35
 Illinois Administrative Code
 §
 237.120(a)
“Landscape waste” is defined as “any
 vegetable or plant
 refuse, except garbage and
• •
 agricultural waste”, including trees, tree trimmings,
 branches, stumps,
 brush,
 weeds, leaves,
grass,
 shrubbery and yard trimmings.
 35
 Illinois Administrative Code
 §
 237.10 1
In the case
 at bar, Mr.
 Kamarasy
 consolidated items
 from his
 household,
 which
 is
located on the farm where the Carbondale/Kamarasy site is situated,
 and burned
 them.
 He also
consolidated items of landscape waste, such as branches, vines, leaves and brush,
 which
 were
generated on his~farm,
 and burned them.
 Also
 in
 the burn,
 were items
 of
 agricultural
 waste,
such as fence posts (formerly contaminated with
 poison
 ivy),
 boxes, cartons,
 structural items
and crop residue~
These activities by the respondent did
 not
 violate the Act’s
 ban
 on
 “open
 burning”.
Therefore,
 this claim should be dismissed.
VIII
THE RESPONDENT DID NOT CAUSE OR ALLOW OPEN DUMPING
ON
 HIS HOMESTEAD THAT RESULTED
 IN THE DEPOSITION OF
GENERAL CONSTRUCTION OR DEMOLITION OR CLEAN
CONSTRUCTION DEBRIS IN VIOLATION OF THE ACT
TheAct defines “general
 construction or demolition
 debris”.
 The term means “non-
hazardous, uncontaminated materials resulting from the construction,
 remodeling, repair, and
demolition ofutilities, structures, and roads, limited to
 the followmg
 bricks, concrete,
 and
 other
masonry materials; soil; rock; wood, including non-hazardous painted, treated,
 and coated wood
and
 wood
 products;
 wall
 coverings;
 plaster;
 drywall;
 plumbing
 fixtures;
 non-asbestos
insulation;
 roofing
 shingles
 and
 other roof
 coverings;
 reclaimed
 asphalt
 pavement; glass;
plastics that are not sealed in a manner that conceals waste,
 electrical wiring and
 components
fl
 •
D
 containing no hazardous substances; and piping or metals incidental to any of those materials”.
H
 415 ILCS
 §
5/3.460(a)
U
 The
 Act~defines“clean
 construction
 or
 demolition
 debris”.
 The
 term
 means
“uncontaminated~
 broken concrete without protruding
 metal bars, bricks, rock,
 stone, reclaimed
asphalt pavement, or soil generated from
 construction or demolition
 activities”.
 415
 ILCS
 §
5/3.160(b).
p
 Nothing,’in
 the
 debris
 pile
 discovered by
 Mr.
 Terry
 was
 construction
 material or
demolition debris.
 Mr. Kamarasy or his
 farm employees placed
 all of the
 materials contained
P
 in the debris pile7
 Mr. Kamarasy was not constructing a structure, nor was he
 demolishing one,
and
 so the “stuff~in his burn pile could not have been the waste
 generated by
 such an
 activity.
For
 the
 words
 l’t~onstruction”and
 “demolition”,
 which
 modify
 “debris”
 in
 this
 charge
against Mr.
 Karnarasy, to have any meaning, there must be at least some
 circumstantial evidence
that some construction and/or demolition of structures was taking
 place.
 The
 County
 has
presented and can present none.
The photpgraphs that Mr. Terry took do not show
 piles
 oflumber ofthe type that might
lead
 to
 a reasor~áb1einference
 that
 construction
 activity
 had
 taken
 place
 resulting
 in
 the
deposition
 of materials therefrom.
 Nor do they
 show debris from the demolition of a non-farm
structure.
 Rather, they appear to
 show
 a
 few
 pieces
 of
 debris
 from
 some
 old
 household
furniture and th&iike.
Even if the inspector did observe
 a few damaged pieces of “dimensional lumber”
 in the
debris pile,
 this
 ~nalysis is not
 changed.
 Obviously, no
 farm can be
 run without generating
some scrap pieces of wood.
 And it
 is
 simply not
 reasonable to
 say that if the inspector finds
one or two scrap pieces of wood, or even a couple of “2
 x
 4’s”
 in
 a debris pile, that he or she
can reasonably cOnclude that the debris
 pile
 consists
 of construction
 materials or
 demolition
materials.
 Otherwise, any time any homeowner puts a couple ofpieces ofscrap wood out in his
or her backyard, ~bra farmerputs
 a couple of scrap pieces of wood on the burn pile,
 he or she
will
 stand
 accuged of having committed
 open
 dumping that resulted
 in
 the
 deposition
 of
Mónornd~
 Supporting
 1Aniè~dødPetitioi
 ~
 ~
r
construction or demolition
 debris
 in
 violation of
 the
 Pollution
 Control Act.
 It
 should
 be
L
obvious that true construction and demolition activity would
 generate substantially
 more than
one or two pieces of wood that a homeowner might scrap or that a farmer might
 discard
 and
r
 seek to burn.
The respondent wishes to emphasize that the burden of proof lies
 with
 the County
 to
I
 show that the materials comprising the burn pile
 on the Carbondale/Kamarasy site constituted
“general construction or demolition
 debris” or “clean construction
 or
 demolition debris”.
The respondent contends that
 they did
 not,
 and
 the
 visual evidence,
 in
 the
 form
 of
 the
r
 photographs taken by Mr. Terry during his
 warrantless, unannounced entry and search of the
premises, seems i~atherclear on this point.
 However, it is
 not the respondent’s
 burden
 to
 make
out
 his
 defense~tbthis
 charge, until
 the
 State
 first
 shows
 that there was
 construction
 or
demolition debris in
 this burn pile.
L
 The State
 has made
 no
 showing of fact on this
 point,
 only
 Mr. Terry’s
 conclusory
L
 allegation.
 Consequently,
 no
 finding is
 warranted that the respondent allowed or caused open
dumping that
 resulted
 in
 the
 deposition
 of
 general
 construction
 or demolition
 or
 clean
construction or demolition debris on the Carbondale/Kamarasy site.
 Moreover,
 even if this
 Board
 should
 find
 as
 a
 matter of fact that Mr.
 Kamarasy
 did
E
 stack some “din~nsionallumber” in this
 debris pile and burn it,
 Mr.
 Kamarasy finds it hard
to
 believe that
 this
 Board
 would
 describe
 that
 act
 as
 depositing
 the
 lumber, rather than
attempting to burti it.
 And, as already discussed, even if
 it might be unlawful
 to
 abandon a pile
ofwood in a scrap heap, it is not unlawful to burn it in
 an unrestricted
 area, such as where Mr.
Kamarasy burned it.
Therefore, this Board should dismiss the charge of open dumping that resulted in
 the
•
 deposition ofgeneral construction
 or demolition
 or clean construction or demolition
 debris on
the Carbondale/Kamarasy site.
IX
IT~SUNFAIR, AND A VIOLATION OF MR. KAMARASY’S
j
 CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED DUE PROCESS RIGHTS, TO
ACCUSE HIM OF IMPROPERLY CREATING AN OPEN DUMP SITE,
LITTERING, OR DUMPING CONSTRUCTION DEBRIS AT A
 SITE
r
 WHERE HE IS LAWFULLY ENTITLED TO DEPOSIT THOSE SAME
1.
 MATERIALS FOR THE PURPOSE OF BURNING THEM
r
 By claiming that Mr.
 Kamarasy created an
 open dump,
 the County
 appears
 to
 suggest
that it was unlawful for Mr. Kamarasy to collect landscape, household, and agricultural
 waste
r
 and deposit it ma single site on his farm in preparation forburning it.
It
 was shown in
 Section
 VII of this
 Memorandum
 that
 IEPA regulations
 expressly
L
 permit the burning of such materials if they
 result from domiciliary
 waste,
 landscape waste, or
farm waste generated on
 the premises.
 Thus,
 unless
 the County
 can prove that this
 waste
 was
somehow generated by activities outside Mr
 Kamarasy’s house or farm, he was entitled by
 law
to burn the mater~iä1s.
But there is no way to burn the materials without first gathering them.
 So, if this
 Board
L
 were to
 uphold the County’s interpretation of the Pollution
 Control
 Act,
 it would be
 holding
r
 that the laws in the State ofIllinois contradict themselves.
 On the
 one hand,
 it is
 lawful to burn
materials in the maimer that Mr.
 Kamarasy
 did, but,
 on the other hand,
 it is
 unlawful
 to
 gather
•
 them for burningL
-~
 One ofthe.most basic notions ofdue process is that a citizen must be able to reasonably
L
 ascertain whethet’àn act that he is contemplating is
 lawful or not.
 See e.g.
 Granite City Div.
 Of
Nat.
 Steel Co. vjtTllinois Pollution
 Control Board,
 155
 I11.2d
 149,
 163,
 184
 Ill.Dec. 402,
 613
N.E.2d 719
 (199~)Where the State
 has two
 laws, one of which
 tells
 the citizen unequivocally
that the act is lawful, while the other tells the citizen,
 in
 effect,
 that the act is
 not lawful,
 it must
be
 true
 that
 onecor both of those
 laws
 is
 unconstitutional.
 Otherwise,
 there would
 be
 no
L
 possible way fo~acitizen to
 make the necessary determination
 about lawful versus
 unlawful
behavior.
Of course,
 the respondent does not say this by way of arguing that this Board should
find that the Pollution
 Control
 Act is
 unconstitutional
 on
 its
 face.
 Rather, the respondent says
this by way ofarguing that this Board must
 interpret the Pollution Control
 Act so as to
 keep it
within constitutional bounds
 That is,
 this
 Board must
 find
 that
 the Pollution
 Control
 Act
permits the gathering of “discarded”
 materials or “waste”
 in one place,
 even if that might be
described as creating an open dump site, so
 long
 as the
 materials consisted only of domiciliary
waste, landscape waste,
 and/or agricultural waste
 generated on the premises
 and
 the purpose of
gathering the materials was to burn them or otherwise dispose ofthem in a lawful manner.
Assumir~g
 that the above is the correct interpretation of the law, Mr. Kamarasy cannot
be found
 to
 have
 committed
 the violations
 described in
 the Administrative
 Citation.
 Mr.
Kamarasy’s onl~demonstrab1e
 intention was to burn the materials in question.
Mr
 Terry effectively conceded as much in
 his
 original
 Report
 According
 to
 that
Report, Mr. Terr~
 first observed the debris
 pile
 on
 March
 11,
 and
 it had not
 yet been burned.
Mr. Terry then observed the debris pile on March
 25,
 and he
 noted that it had been charred by
burning,
 and
 that the pile had
 been reduced in
 size since March
 11.
 The
 only
 reasonable
inference is
 that Mr. Kamarasy collected the
 materials at some
 time prior
 to
 March
 11
 for the
purpose ofburnig them at some time prior to March 25.
Becausethe
 collecting of the
 materials for burning in
 this
 case,
 and the burning of the
materials was really a single continuous
 act,
 the Board
 should
 find
 that
 the
 collecting of the
materials (1) waS not an act of open dumping; (2) was not an act oflittering;
 and
 (3) was not an
act of depositing construction or demolition debris
 in the sense intended by the legislature when
it passed the Pollution Control Act.
x
n
 IT WOULD BE UNFAIR, AND A VIOLATION OF
 DUE PROCESS,
IF THIS BOARD WERE TO INTERPRET THE LEGAL MEANING
OF
 “DISPOSAL SITE”,
 “OPEN DUMP” AND/OR
 “LITTER” IN
SUCH A WAY AS TO IGNORE OR RENDER
 DE MINIMUS
 THE
NOTIONS OF SCAYI’ERING FREELY INTO THE
ENVIRONMENT AND OF CAUSING SOME HARM TO OTHERS,
WHICH THE LEGISLATURE CLEARLY INTENDED TO BE
INCORPORATED INTO THE MEANING OF “POLLUTION”
The problems inherent in the County’s interpretation of the Pollution
 Control Act,
 as
evidenced by the manner in which the prosecution has stated and presented its
 case against Mr.
Kamarasy, have already been discussed extensively in this memorandum.
 When the legislature
wished to describe an open dump, it did not describe it merely
 as a location where
 a landowner
places some of his or her waste.
 Even if the placing of one or more
 items
 in
 a
 pile seems
unsightly, that does not make the pile an open dump, especially
if
the site is discrete and
 limited
The legislature said in plain language that,
 to be
 an
 open
 dump,
 a pile of material must
 also be
placed in such a way that
 either the material
 itself
 is
 free to
 enter into the environment, or else
constituents of
th~
 material may be emitted or discharged into the environment.
One
 must
 assume
 that
 the legislature used
 this
 language
 for a
 reason,
 namely
 to
distinguish the more serious
 crime
 of “pollution”
 from the relatively
 insignificant
 and
 not
unlawful case of;mere “messiness”.
 One must
 also
 assume that by
 using
 the word “may”
the
 legislature
 meant
 to
 require the
 State
 to
 prove
 a
 significant likelihood,
 not
 a
 remote
possibility,
 of euI~teringinto the environment.
 Otherwise,
 an overzealous prosecutor could
always claim the~existenceofan infinitesimal possibility.
Similarlyywith respect to “litter”, the legislature said, if it occurs
 only
 on
 the
 alleged
offender’s
 own private
 property, and
 the
 accusation is
 unlawful “dumping,”
 the
 allegedly
offending
 stuff must be shown to “create a public health or safety hazard, a public
 nuisance, or
a fire hazard,”
 Or alternatively, where the accusation
 is
 that
 the
 stuff is
 being unlawfully
“accumulated”,
 ~itmust
 be
 shown
 that
 the
 stuff is
 a
 “public
 nuisance”
 or that it “may
 be
blown or otherwise carried by the natural elements on to the real property of anotherperson.”
o
 Any homeowner whoreads these provisions would have
 to believe
 that it is
 lawful, say,
p
 to make a modest leafpile
 in his or her backyard, or to
 stack a few branches from a fallen tree,
or to
 set out a wood pile for aging first before burning it in a fireplace or wood stove.
 More
particularly, if Mr. Kamarasy had read the statutes with a fine-toothed comb, before creating his
burn site, he would have had no way of anticipating
 that an overzealous inspector might enter
p.
I
 onto his propert)y without a warrant, discover his pile of material, and then cite him,
 not just once
p
 but three times, for “polluting”, merely because the pile looked messy
 to
 the inspector and not
because it was actually scattering or threatening to be carried offby the natural elements onto
I
 someone else’s property.
That means it would be a violation of Mr. Kamarasy’s due process rights to convict him
of these charge~:A citizen of the United
 States
 and the
 State
 of
 Illinois
 must
 be
 able
 to
reasonably ascertain what is
 lawful and what is
 not.
 Otherwise
 law
 enforcement becomes
L
 simply a random~
 and unintelligible act.
Furthermdre, if Mr. Kamarasy had read the
 Litter Control Act
 carefully before
 creating
the pile,
 he woukthave rightfully determined not only that he was not violatingthat
 Act, but
 also
that he was exphcitly permitted by the Act to gather the materials that he did in the pile
 and burn
them.
 That brings us back to
 the same dilemma
 described above.
 The
 legislature
 cannot
reasonably declare to its citizens that it is lawful to place some
 debris in
 your backyard
 (if it
meets the requisite standards), but then in a separate law declare that it is
 unlawful, even if
 it
does meet those same standards.
Consequently, the Board must conclude either
 (a) that the
 Pollution
 Control
 Act
 as
applied to
 Mr. Kamarasy is unconstitutional; or (b) that
 the Pollution Control Act was
 never
intended to apply; and in fact does not apply,
 to items that
 one
 can lawfully dispose of in
 one’s
backyard according to the Litter Control Act.
 It was only meant to
 apply to such items
 as pose
a real threat to b~carriedonto
 the property of others
 by
 the
 natural
 elements.
 None
 of the
materials deposited by Mr. Kamarasy posed that threat.
r
IT WOULD BE UNFAIR, AND A VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF
j
 SEPAI~ATION
 OF POWERS, IF THIS BOARD WERE TO PERMIT THE
INSPECTOR AND JACKSON COUNTY SIMPLY
 TO USE THE “I
KNOWIT WHEN I SEE
 IT” DEFINITION OF LITTER RATHER THAN
T
 CAREFULLY APPLYING
THE
GUIDELINES SET FORTH IN THE
1.
 P
 LITTER CONTROL ACT
r
 If this B&ird holds that acts which are explicitly lawful under the Litter
 Control Act
 (for
-
 example placingwaste on one’s own property in such a way that it is not likely to
 be
 carried
I
 onto a neighbor~’propertyby the natural
 elements) or
 which are explicitly lawful under the
IEPA regulatiois accompanying the Pollution Control Act (for example burning
 landscape,
L
 household, and ~tgricultura1
 waste
 on
 one’s
 own property) violate the Pollution Control
 Act,
then this Board,~in
 effect,
 would be making new legislation about what
 is
 and
 what is
 not
pollution
 That would be
 a violation of the
 Separation of
 Powers
 principle of
 the
 Illinois
Constitution.
 Making
 law
 is
 not
 a
 proper
 administrative function.
 This
 Board
 is
 only
authorized to enfOrce the law.
T
L
 By the same token, if this Board permits an
 inspector to exercise unbridled discretion
r
 under the guise of “I can’t define litter, but I know it when I
 see it,”
 that would
 be
 a violation
ofthe Separatioiiof Powers principle.
 The inspector is
 no
 more authorized than the Board to
L
 make new law about what is and is not pollution.
Nor
 is
 this
 some
 minor matter in
 which
 the
 exercise of
 discretion
 is
 proper
 and
L
 necessary.
 If littering
 is
 the crime in question, it cannot be left to
 the executive branch of
p
 government, whether that means an Inspector or this Board,
 to decide arbitrarily and on its
 own
what constitutes
 “litter”.
 There
 must be
 clear
 guidelines
 from
 the legislature,
 and
 those
guidelines must be followed, or the enforcement itself is unconstitutional.
As stated previously in this
 memorandum, the legislature has set
 forth
 some
 guidelines
L
 for this
 case, th~Countyand
 its
 inspector have not
 followed
 them,
 and
 this
 Board
 should
implement those~guidelines
 by exonerating Mr. Kamarasy ofthe charges in this
 case.
XII
IT WOULD ALSO BE UNFAIR, AND SIMILARLY A VIOLATION
OF’ THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS, IF THIS
BO~DWERE TO PERMIT THE INSPECTOR AND JACKSON
COUNTY TO PILE ON MULTIPLE CHARGES FOR WHAT
REASONABLY SHOULD AMOUNT TO A SINGLE ACT OF
COLLECTING MATERIALS IN ONE SITE AND BURNING
THEM
The legislature only intended one fine for one
 violation of the
 Act.
 It
 surely
 did
 not
intend the legal trickery by
 which
 the prosecution has managed to
 subdivide that
 same act into
three aspects, eaCh ofwhich is alleged to constitute a separate violation.
By
 the *Osecution’s
 reasoning, if
 a
 homeowner were
 to
 take a
 collection of dead
branches and place them in a fire pit in his backyard, and
if
he were then to
 strip off a damaged
piece of plywoc~from an
 old door and
 throw it on the debris pile,
 and if he then burned
 the
pile, he could be Charged with not just one but
 three violations of the Pollution
 Control Act.
One count coulc~be
 for littering, one count could be for burning, and one count could be
 for
demolition
 debris
 as a result of having demolished the old
 door.
 Or, the prosecutor might
charge only for otie count.
 This decision
 would be purely discretionary.
In the case at bar, Mr.
 Terry
 and the Jackson County
 prosecutor used their apparently
unbridled
 discr~ionto
 file three complaints for what was really a single
 act of burning
 some
debris,
 the extent of which was
 to
 create
 only
 ten
 cubic
 yards
 of
 waste.
 The
 prosecution
exercised
 this
 discretion
 to
 pile
 on
 the
 charges, even though
 by
 its
 own
 admission,
 Mr.
Kamarasy created less than ten cubic yards ofwaste, whereas the typical case before
 this
 Board
involves hundreds
 of cubic yards
 of waste.
 That
 alone
 makes
 the
 charges
 against Mr.
Kamarasy in this action arbitrary
 and unreasonable, and an abuse ofdiscretion.
The essence of the legislature’s thinking in
 creating the Administrative
 Citation process
was
 to reduce th~
 discretion
 of the executive branch
 in enforcing the law.
 For
 example, by
imposition offixed penalties
—
 neither
 prosecutors
 nor this
 Board
 are allowed to
 say: this
 is
 a
$1500 litterpile, this is
 a $1000 pile, and this
 one only seems like a $500 one, either on account
of its size or the degree to which it presents problems to others.
 This lack of discretion
 is
 a
U
 significant part ~f legislature’s
 intent under
 the Act.
 Yet
 the prosecutor,
 in
 this
 case, has
managed to
 intrOduce a much larger degree of discretion in
 a back-door maimer.
 Whether it is
10
 cubic yardsor
 10,000,
 the
 fine
 for
 littering
 if
 the
 prosecution
 chooses
 to
 use
 the
Administrative
 Citation process
 must
 always
 be
 $1,500.
 Yet,
 in
 this case
 against
 Mr.
Kamarasy, the prosecution has figured out a way
 to
 charge Mr.
 Kamarasy with $4500
 in fines
for one tiny alleged dump site.
FurthermOre, and as previously discussed, before one can commit the alleged crime of
“open burning” under the Pollution Control Act, it is
 a logically
 necessary
 antecedent that
 one
first must have gathered the materials in
 a
 debris
 pile.
 For
 the prosecution to
 automatically
charge
 separate”fines,
 and
 in
 Mr.
 Kamarasy’s
 case
 two
 separate
 fines,
 for
 this
 logically
necessary antecedent step, before charging for the “burning” amounts
 to
 setting
 a minimum
fine of $3000 for all open burning cases.
 Alternatively, for the prosecution to
 decide
 at its
 own
discretion whethCr to charge a separate
 crime for the antecedent steps,
 violates the legislature’s
intent in creating~the
 Administrative
 Citation process, because the legislature intended the fines
to be enforced without discretion.
The pur~oseof eliminating discretion
 in the matter of fines
 was to avoid giving the
executive branch~
 too much power in
 these
 cases.
 If this
 Board
 were
 to
 decide to
 grant the
prosecutor discretion to
 charge Mr. Kamarasy
 with three separate
 counts for
 what
 was
 in
essence a single act of open burning,
 it would be
 endorsing
 a
 violation of the Separation of
Powers Clause of-the Illinois Constitution.
If the legislature had
 intended for the
 single
 act of burning
 some
 debris
 on
 one’s
property to carrya $3000 fine, it would have said so in the Act.
 It did not.
Therefore; thepiling on of multiple charges in this case, even if a violation of the Act is
found to have occurred when Mr.
 Kamarasy gathered
 the materials for the purpose of burning
them,
 should not~be
 countenanced and Mr. Kamarasy found liable for no
 more than one
 (1)
violation of the Act, if any is foundto have occurred.
XIII
CONCLUSION
The inspector discovered the pile at the site in question only by
 conducting
 an
 illegal
search ofMr. Kamarasy’s property.
 Therefore, all evidence of the existence of this pile
 should
be suppressed and disregarded.
The pile
 of material in
 question did
 not
 constitute a
 “disposal
 site”
 or an
 “open
dump”, as those terms are defined in the Pollution Control Act.
There was no general construction or demolition debris within the pile.
The pile itself would not be considered “litter”
 in violation of the Litter Control
 Act.
Therefore,
 it cannot be considered “litter”
 in violation ofthe Pollution Control Act.
It was an abuse of discretion to charge Mr.
 Kamarasy
 with three separate
 violations for
one allegedly wrongful act.
 The essential “crime”,
 which
 Mr.
 Kamarasy
 committed,
 if
 any,
was to create a burn site on his farm to
 dispose of household,
 landscape,
 and agricultural
 waste
generated on
 the farm by his
 farming activities.
 At most,
 he
 should have been
 issued
 one
citation for open burning.
But
 that~openburning
 charge
 must
 be
 dismissed
 because
 the
 IEPA
 regulations
expressly permitthis kind ofburning activity, provided certain conditions
 are met, which
 Mr.
Kamarasy obviously did meet.
The only ~wayfor this
 Board
 to
 convict Mr.
 Kamarasy
 on
 any
 of these three counts
would be to
 interpret the legal terms “open
 dump”
 and “litter’
 so
 expansively
 and
 arbitrarily
as to
 violate Mr.~Kamarasy’sdue process
 right to
 be
 able to
 reasonably anticipate what
 is
illegal and what isnot.
 In addition, the
 interpretation
 would have to
 be so broad as to
 give the
administrative branch ofthe government too much discretion regarding both
 the decision about
what is litter and the amount of penalties to be imposed for a particular act.
 This would be
 a
violation
 of the Constitutional principle of Separation ofPowers.
TherespOndent did not violatethe Act as alleged in the Administrative Citation.
Therefore, and for all of the foregoing reasons, the
 Administrative Citation should
 be
H
 dismissed.
Dated this 19th day ofNovember, 2004.
EG~JJ~MARASY,
 Respondent
By~~-~
-‘
 Gregory~~each,
 IARDC # 2893061
Attorney forrespondent
p
fl
I
I
LAW OFFICES
 OF GREGORY A. VEACH
 3200 Fishback Road
P. O.Box
 1206
Carbondale IL
 62903-1206
Telephone:
 (618) 549-3132
Telecopier:
 (618) 549-0956
e-mail: gveach@gregveachlaw.com
Attorney forrespondent
————.-.......-.....
 “
 ————————-——-——.——.——‘•
 ~
 —.l...1-....-....—-.—.-.....
m
Davis Auto Center
356 Cedar Creek
 Rd.
Makanda
 IL 62958
(618)549-3675
Thank you for your business.
page
 1
Repair Order #4582
Egon Kamarasy
 Day
 Phone
 : 618-457-6167
474 Egret Lake
 Rd.
Carbondale
 IL 62903
Vehicle
 :
 1986 BMW 325e 2693CC 2.7Liter L6
 Tag/State
 : RWCI94 /
 IL
VIN
 : WBAAB5404G9681384
 Color
 : White
Created
 : 06/02/04 5:22:00
 PM
 Odometer In
 :
 0
Qty
 Code/Tech”
 Reference
 Description
3
 -
 DISPOSAL FEE
 DISPOSAL OF
 OLD TIRE
Odometer Out:
 0
Condition
 Unit Price
$1.25
Price
$3.75
Labor
 $0.00
Parts
 $0.00
Sublet/Misc.
 $0.00
Shop Supplies
 $0.00
Charges
 $3.75
Sales Tax
 Tax
 @
 $0.00
 *
6.2500
Repair Total
$0.00
$3.75
I
 hereby authorize the repair work herein set forth to
 be done along with the
 necessary material and
agree that you are not responsible for loss or damage to vehicle or articles left in vehicle
 in case of fire,
theft or any other cause
 beyond
 your control.
 I
 hereby grant
 you and/or your employees permission
 to
operate the vehicle herein described
 on streets,
 highways or elsewhere for the purpose of testing and/or
Inspection.
 An express garagekeeper’s lien is hereby acknowledged on
 above vehicle to secure the
amount or repairs thereto. All Vehicles left over 48 hrs. after repairs are completed WILL INCUR A
$5.00
 PER
 DAY STORAGE FEE.
: Customer Signature
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