ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
November
14,
1972
BEARDSTOWN SANITARY DISTRICT
v.
)
#72—232
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
CITY OF BEARDSTOWN
V.
)
#72—264
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
)
Opinion
&
Order
of
the Board
(by
Mr.
Currie)
rfhe Beardstown Sanitary District operates
a sewage
treatment plant giving primary treatment
and some degree
of
chlorination1
to
the domestic wastes
of some 7,000 persons
in and near Beardstown,
The City of Beardstown owns
a
separate treatment facility consisting
of lagoons providing
a certain degree of treatment
to oxygen-demanding wastes
of about 40,000 population equivalents
from the Oscar Mayer
slaughterhouse at Beardstown.
Although
the District~s
petition does not state the regulations
from which
a variance
~s sought,
both petitioners appear to seek variances until
June,
1974 from the effluent standards of Rule
404(a)
(PCB
Regs.,
Ch.
3, Rule 404(a)), which requires BOD to be reduced
1.
The Agency~s uncontradicted evidence is that present
chlorination
is ineffective;
feeding equipment is less
than
that
required,
there
is
no
contact
chamber
to
as-
sure
adequate
retention
to
kill
bacteria,
and
the
fecal
coliforms
in
the
effluent
are
“about
the
same”
as
those
in
raw
sewage
(R.
267,
269;
EPA
Ex,
9)
,
The
District
said only
that it
was chlorinating and believed it
was
meeting
the standards
(R.
185)
.
It offered no supporting
test data.
The District has contracted
to
provide
dis-
infection
for the
City
too
(P.
61,
173)
.
Neither
petitioner
asks relief
from
the disinfection require-
ments,
and
the
Agency has
not filed
a complaint.
There
is
therefore nothing
for
us
to do about bacteria in
the
present case, however
inadequate
the present treatment.
—2—
to
30 mg/i
and
suspended solids
to
37 mg/i by July
1,
1972,
or such earlier date as may have been specified
in prior
regulations.
The District appears
to request
a similar
extension
of
the July
1,
1972 date of Rule
602
for control
of
treatment plant bypasses.
We deny both petitions
for
reasons given below.
The hope of both petitioners
is to combine their efforts
and
to dispose
of
the effluents
from both facilities
on
land
for
the irrigation
of crops,
obviating
the need
for
additional treatment
and terminating dry-weather discharges
to
the Illinois River
(P.
175)
A preliminary study
(City Ex.
10)
convinces
the petitioners’
engineers
that
the land—disposal
idea
is wortn pursuing
(P.
55)
.
An expert from the Illinois State Geological
Survey,
however,
pointed out the extremely permeable nature
of the
soil at
the proposed disposal
site, noting that
much of the wastewater applied to
the ground would reach the
water table without much diminution
in mineral content
“in essentially
the same condition
as when it was sprayed
on
the land”
(P.
100).
An expert from
the Illinois State
Water Survey said he believed nearby wells would be affected
(R.
113)
.
The City’s consultant
acknowledged that his
study
so
far did not disclose relevant information with res-
pect to
lateral migration
of water from the site and that
further study was needed before
the safety of
the project
could
be assured
(P.
81—82)
We cannot help feeling
some reservations about
a
scheme for dumping inadequately treated sewage and slaughter-
house wastes2onto
the ground with no protection against
seepage of contaminants
into either ground or surface
waters.
We note
in contrast
the careful precautions
for
control
of leachate from solid waste disposal
sites required
in EPA
v.
Carlson,
#71—243,
5 PCB
(Sept.
26,
1972)
proposed by
the operators
in Elgin Jaycees
v.
Tn-County
Landfill,
Inc.,
~7l-59,
which is now pending before us,
and proposed by
the Agency and Institute
in the pending
revised landfill regulations,
#R
72-5.
Cf.
also SEMCO,
Inc.
v.
EPA,
#72-364,
now pending before us,
as to precautions
2.
The preliminary report notes that ordinarily
secondary
treatment is desirable before
land disposal of
effluent;
says
that one
of the City’s
lagoons will be taken to
provide some treatment beyond primary to
the District
effluent;
that the City’s effluent will
thus receive
less treatment than presently;
that
there will be no
disinfection;
and that expected effluent BOD and suspend-
ed solids
levels will be
130 and
80 mg/i,
respectively——
hardly
the
equivalent
of
secondary
treatment
as
defined
in
SWB-8.
See
City
Ex.
10,
pp.
iii,
15-16.
There
is
no
ade-
quate evidence
to assure us against bacterial
or viral con-
tamination
of groundwater,
or nitrate pollution.
6
—
230
—3—
necessary
in land disposal
of sewage sludge.
We note
also that
the cost
of pumping
the District’s sewage
to the
site for land disposal without
further treatment approximates
the cost of secondary treatment
(P.
225)
and that
the June
1974 compliance date is anything
but
firm
(P.
57—58,
63-64)
We think
a great deal more proof must
be offered before
we or
the Agency
can give approval
to any such proposal.
With respect
to stormwater,
it appears that
the pro-
posed land disposal
scheme will not solve the problem
(R.
228)
.
Indeed the District makes no concrete proposal
for stormwater control.
The District complains
that
the
Environmental
Protection Agency has interpreted Rule
602,
which the Agency concedes
is substantially
the same
as prior
regulations,
to require primary treatment and chlorination
of all stormwater
flows
in all cases,
contrary to
its earlier
interpretation
that only ten times
the dry-weather
flow
need be
so treated
(R.
212-13).
The District thinks this
requirement would impose
an unreasonable burden upon it but
does not ask us
to rule the Agency’s
interpretation wrong3
3.
The Agency’s rigid interpretation
is totally incon-
sistent with the language and intention of
the rule,
which deliberately
leaves the Agency
a good deal of
discretion as to
the degree of treatment required, be-
yond primary treatment and disinfection
of
ten times
the dry-weather
flow,
to maintain adequate water quality
without unreasonable cost in light of varying local
situations.
The blanket requirement imposed by EPA is
precisely what we rejected
in adopting
the regulation,
as
a reading
of the opinion accompanying
the regulations
will
readily
show.
In
the
Matter
of
Effluent
Criteria,
#R
70-8,
3 PCB 755,
773—75
(March
7,
1972).
The Agency
should consider on its merits
the
adequacy of the
proposed stormwater treatment
facility to determine
its effect upon water quality
in recognition
of
the
fact
that
the regu~.ationcontemplates
there will be
cases
in which the cost of capturing
and
treating the
highest flows may not be justified.
6
—
231
—4—
or to give it permission to construct a less costly facility.4
Instead
the
District asks a year’s time in which, if the
Agency
is correct, the “design may be revised or the
storm water facility eliminated from the plans and specifi-
cations for the secondary treatment facility.”
(Amended
Petition,
p.
2).
How the later course would cure the
stormwater problem is not clear.
We
find
a total absence
of coninitnent to an adequate program of stormwater control.5
4.
The District’s cost figures for giving complete storm-
water
treatment
are
a
red
herring.
The
District
tells
us it
may
cost
a
million
dollars
or
more
(R.
221),
over three times the cost of the secondary plant,
to
build
primary
treatment
facilities
for
the
entire
50-mgd
storm
flow.
There
is
no
proof
that
this
is
a
sensible
way
to
approach
the
problem,
much
less
the
only
or
the
least
expensive
way.
We
have
elsewhere
noted
the
practice
of
constructing
retention
ponds
to
capture large storm flows that can later be fed through
treatment facilities of comparatively modest size.
See In the Matter of Effluent Criteria, tR 70—8,
3 PCB 755, 773 (March 7, 1972); League of Women Voters
v. North Shore Sanitary District, 470—7,
1 PCB 369,
379
(March 31,
1971).
There was no proof here
that
this method could not be followed, only the cryptic
suggestion that the idea had not been pursued because
of the “prevailing winds”
(R.
250—51).
The practicability
and
cost of such facilities is a proper issue for
the
Agency to consider in assessing the quantity of
stormwater
for
which
treatment
must
be
provided
in
a
particular
case
under
Rule
602.
5.
A final issue requires clarification
in
this
connection.
There was repeated reference in the record to differ-
ent
stormwater standards that must be met
now
and
in
1975
(E.g.,
R. 157—58).
This is
a misconception.
The
standard for
both
1972
and
1975 compliance is phrased
in identical larquage, to be applied by the Agency
according to the facts.
The different dates reflect the
decision to allow more time for correction of over-
flows elsewhere in the sewer system than for bypasses
at the treatment plant itself, because of more challeng-
ing
logistic
problems
detailed
in
the
rule-making
record.
See In the Matter of Effluent Criteria, #R 70-8
3 PCB 755, 773—75 (March
7, 1972).
6—
232
—5—
Thus we find, with respect to both petitioners,
that
the proposed plan for compliance with the standards is
inadequate to justify present approval,
Normally an
adequate program is requisite to the grant of a variance.
See Chicago—Dubuque Foundry Co. v.
EPA, #71-130,
2 PCB 65
(June 28,
1971)
;
York Center v.
EPA,
#72-7,
3 PCB 485
(Jan.
17,
1972)
;
Metropolitan Sanitary District v.
EPA,
#71-183,
3 PCB 57
(Nov.
11,
1971)
.
The question remains
whether we should grant additional time in which to make
further study of the proposal without fear of money
penalties.
Cf.
International Harvester Co.
v.
EPA,
#72—321,
5 PCB
(October 24,
1972)
A v.~rianceis a shield against the possibility of
penalties for failure to comply with the law or regulations.
We cannot grant
a complete shield if
the failure to comply
was inexcusable, for to do so would make every violation its
own justification and completely frustrate enforcement.
See,e.g.,
Decatur Sanitary District v.
EPA,
#71-37,
1
PCB 359
(March 22, 1971);
Commonwealth Edison Co. v.
EPA,
#71-150,
5 PCB
(August
8,
1972).
We must inquire as
to the diligence of
the District and of the City in attempting
to comply with the standards here sought to be waived.
The City attempts to argue that there were no standards
it was required to meet until the adoption of Rule 404(a)
in March,
1972,
so that it simply had no adequate time
in which to construct the necessary facilities by
the
July 1972 deadline.
This would be
a persuasive argument
if the premises underlying
it were sound, see International
Harvester Co.
v. EPA, cited above,
and cases there cited,
but they are not.
Rule
1.08 of Rules and Regulations
SWB—8,
(City Ex.
11)
adopted
by
the Sanitary Water Board
March
5,
1968 and effective April
1,
1968,
provided as
follows:
10.
Treatment Requirements and Effluent Criteria.
.
a.
All municipal
or
industrial
facilities
for treatment
of deoxygenating waste
shall provide at least
secondary biological treatment,
or advanced waste
treatment to reduce the ~ganic
pollution
load of the treatment works effluent at the
final treatment structure
in accordance with effluent
guidelines
in paragraph
11.
.
-
11.
Guidelines Regarding Range of Treatment
a.
Secondary treatment resulting in effluents ranging
from
20
to
40
mg/l
five-day
BOD
and
25
to
45
mg/l
suspended solids
is acceptable on the Illinois
River.
.
.
6
—
233
—6—
b.
Permissive
Treatment
and
Effluent
Requirements
Based on Average Strength Municipal Wastes
BOD or ODI
Effluent
Effluent
Stream
Type
Reduction
BOD, ODI
Suspended
.
.
.Dilution
Treatment
Percent
mg/i
Solids mg/i
Requirements
Secondary
85
30
35
.
.
.
Illinois
I
River
The
City,
acknowledging
the
“coincidence”
CR.
75)
that
the
effluent numbers of the new Rule 404(a) are virtually
identical
to
those
of
the
1968
regulation,
suggests
that
the earlier regulation was merely a “guideline”
in contrast
to
the
present
“standard”
(R.
32-33).
This
difference
is
pure
semantics.
The
City
would
have
us
believe
that
the
Sanitary
Water
Board,
in
carefully
prescribing
a
figure
for
effluents
to
the
Illinois
River,
intended
that
it
could be
freely
ignored.
This
incredible
interpretation
is
squarely
refuted
by
the
language
of
the
regulation,
quoted
above:
“All.
.
.
facilities.
.
.
shall
provide.
.
.
treatment.
in accordance with effluent guidelines in paragraph ii.”
No
more
explicit
language
for
creating
a
legally
enforceable
obligation
can
be
imagined.
The
1968
regulation
imposed
effluent BOD and suspended solids requirements of not over
40
and
45
mg/i,
respectively,
with
“average
stren~jth”
municipal
wastes required to meet
30 and 35 and others to be determined
by
the
Agency
within
the
range
stated
in
paragraph
ha.
It is undisputed that the City’s facilities never con-
formed
with these
limits.
They were designed to produce an
effluent BOD of 75 mg/i
(R.
35)
;
in May 1971 the effluent
averaged
80,5
mg/i
BOD
and
68.5
mg/i
suspended
solids;
in
May
1972
the
averages
were
27
and
88
mg/i
respectively
(See petition).
If
the
effluent
had
consistently
met
the
SWB-8
maximum
standard
of
40
and
45,
the
City
might
have
a
legitimate position;6 there
is no contention that it did.
The
effluent
has
been
in
continuous
violation
of
SWB—8
ever
since
the adoption of that reguaition in 1968,
and based
upon the City’s own design for the plant the City should
have been aware of the violation even
if
it did not sample
the effluent.
The resemblance between the old and new standards
was
no mere coincidence;
the
new
standard
was
set
to
indi-
cate what the old had long since required.
6.
Even
on this assumption the
Agency
letter
of October,
1970,
specifically
imposing
the
30—35
limit
(City
Ex.
2)
gave
the City ample
time to
meet
the
standard
as
the
Agency had determined
it should he
aoplied,.
6
—
234
—7—
The City’s next excuse
is
that
it
was
lulled
into
complacency by the fact that
the
Sanitary
Water
Board,
in
listing the steps that must he taken by individual discharg-
ers
in order
to comply with SWB-8, expressly provided that
no additional treatment was required for this facility
(SWB—8,
p.
15,
under
the name Oscar Mayer)
.
How
the Sanitary
Water
Board
could have believed this
to he
true is
beyond
us,
since the lagoons were
admittedly
not
designed
-to
allow compliance with the regulation.
We do not know on
what information that Board acted in purporting
-to
give
the
City a free pass.
To the extent it had adequate information,
the SWB as enforcement agency seems to
have
made a deter-
mination squarely contrary to
its own regulations.
Whether
a discharger
is entitled
to
ignore
the
plain meaning of
the
law and follow
the
erroneous advice of the prosecutor seems
to us highly doubtful,
Even giving the City the benefit of the doubt, since
this bad advice was incorporated into
the
implementation
plan of
the
regulation,
the City has not justified its
entire
delay~
In October
1970
the Environmental Protection
Agency informed the City that
it
was required to provide
additional treatment to meet
a standard
of
30 and
35
mg/I
of BOD and suspended solids
(City Ex.
2)
,
which
in fact was
the
basic
requirement
of
EWE-B
as
well
as
a
slightly
tighter
version
of
the
present
Rule
404(a).7
This
letter
made
it no longer appropriate,
if it ever had been,
for the
City
to
rely
on the
SWB’s earlier erroneous interpretation
of SWB-8
as not requiring further treatment.
The letter
required
that
plans
and
specifications
for
meeting
the
BOD
and
solids
requirements
be
submitted
in
January
1971
and that contracts be awarded by July
1971.
The City next relies upon
a letter from
the Aqency
in December
1970
(City Ex.
4)
that
it reads
to suggest
that
the
City
should
after
all
do
nothing
until
the
Pollution Control Board had completed its reexamination
7.
The
fact
that
the
letteFreferred
in
passing
to
Regulations
SWB-l4,
which
applied
to
intrastate
streams
not
covered
by
other
regulations
(See
P.
44)
,
as well as
to Techni-
cal Release 20-22, which set forth the Agency~sinter-
pretation of all the SWB regulations,
is not decisive.
The
letter adequately warned the City of its
obligations,
and
in case of
a. legitimate dispute over the applicable
standard
the City could have petitioned
this Board
for
relief, which it chose not to do.
6
—
235
—8—
of the
e
ffluent standards
(See R. l6~47).
We cannot so
read this rather mysterious document..U
Even if we could,
the argument is that the Agency gave
the
City a variance from
the old regulations until such time as new regulations
might be adopted.
This is something flatly beyond the Agency’s
power, for the statute makes it crystal clear
that
only
this Board may qrant varia)aces
(Environmental Protection
Act,
*
35).
No one in good faith was entitled to rely
upon
any
belief
that the Agency could waive the require-
ments of the regulations.
To take the examination of
whether existing regulations need strengthening as an
excuse to violate the law,as the City did,
is a cruel
joke indeed to which nothing in the statute or regulations
gives the least shred of support.
Thus, at least since Octcber 1970 it has been the
City’s duty to proceed posthaste with the construction of
facilities to meet the 30-35 standard.
In fact the City
has spent
two
entire years in simply going through the
preliminary stages of studying what to do about the pro-
blem.
There is no proof that the year and three quarters
between notification by the EPA and the July,
1972 com-
pliance date set by the new regulation was
too
short a
time to get the job done or that there is any adequate
justification for the need for
two
additional years.
It
appears from the record that the City simply made up its
mind to go as slowly as possible.
We cannot forgive that
sort of delay.
The Sanitary District’s case is still less appealing.
According .to a 1971 EPA memorandum (EPA Ex.
8), Beardstown
is “the last major city south of Peoria on the Illinois
River usinq primary treatment.”
The District indicated
that the BOD in its effluent ranges from 70 to 120 mg/l
(average 90) and suspended solids 40 to 100
(R.
184).
Flows during storms, as a result of combined sewers, are
as much as 100 times the dry—weather flow
(R.
193).
At
such times raw waste is bypassed directly to the river in
large quantities
(See EPA Ex.
9 for a graphic description
of
the
bypass
problem).
8.
‘This letter acknowledges that the City must make further
engineering studies before submitting final plans and
that
certain
proposed
regulations
then
under
Board
consideration
as
to
nitrogen
and
phosphorus
would
affect
plans
for
plant
improvements, promises to notify the
City
as
to
any
revised
treatment
dates
once
the
Board
had
completed
its
rule-making
proceedings,
and
re-
affirms
the
necd
for
a
variance
in
the
event
the
existing requirements cannot be met.
No variance petition
was filed until the present one in 1972.
6— 236
—9—
The District makes
no claim
that SWB—8 did
not
recuire
it
to provide additional treatment,
for,
in addition to the pro-
visions quoted earlier in
this
opinion,
the
regulation
specifically lists
the
Beardstown
Sanitary District as re-
cuiring construction
of secondary treatment
and chlorination
facilities
to begin by January
1969
(SWB—8,
p.
9)
-
The
record indicates
that the District did not bother hiring
an
engineer
to
develop
a
program
for
secondary
treatment
until January,
1969
CR.
232)
,
the date when construction
was supposed
to begin.
A revised timetable was
sent by the
District
to
the Sanitary Water Board,
promising
that final
plans would be submitted
by August
1970
and that
the
secondary
plant would he
in operation,
presumably with
the necessary
bypass controls,
by September
1971
(EPA Ex.
4)
.
We
have
no proof that
the Board approved
this
extension,9 which would
have
amounted
to
a
variance.
The
District’s
consultant
ad-
mitted
he knew
no reason for the delay in getting started
on time
to meet
the original deadline
CR.
245)
;
the Dis-
trict itself offered only that it had not been aware
of the
requirements
until
1969
CR.
165,
170)
.
It was
of course
the District’s duty
to be aware
of
the requirements.
In fact
the District’s
own revised schedule,
whether
or
not approved,
was violated at
an early date.
The plans
the District
had promised
to file by August 1970 were not
even begun until
the next November
(P.
203)
.
The excuse
is
that alternative means of stormwater treatment were beinc
stu~ied (P.
219)
.
No
extra time
for such study had been
requested
or
granted.
In
late 1970 discussions began with
the City
as
to
the nossihility
of
a
joint approach
through
land
disposal
CR.
174)
-
Although
the
District
professed
not
to he
certain
that,
with
the
possibility of joint
treatment
under
discussion,
it
ought
to
file
the
plans
for
the secondary plant
CR.
240)
,
it did
so
in May 1971
(A.
203)
,
nearly
a year
late.
No extension or waiver
c)t
the
obligation
to
file
plans
had
been
requested
or
granted.
The clans were rejected
as
inadecuate,
for failure
to pro~-
vide
dual
aeration
tanks
and
backup
chlorination
equipment
(A.
205,
208-09)
,
both needed
to protect against pollution
in
the event
of
a malfunction.
Some corrections
in
the
clans were made although
the District continued
to object
to dual tanks
CR.
210)
,
hut ultimately
the District
simply
decided not
to pursue
the
secondary plant
CR.
214)
.
Land
disposal had not been approved,
but
it was
the answer.
To
extension
or
relief
from
the
secondary
timetable
had
9.
The
attorney
for
the
Agency
so
suggested
in
oral
argument
CR.
150)
6
—
237
been
so unsted
or cr~nLo1
,
bit
Lhc
istr
jet
‘lee
died
not
to
comi
L
fl(1
thr
r’~~ment
a
excuse
~or what
has
a1—
ready
00gm
ich~d
three veers
of
deja’;
C two an
the
as
sumetion
the revised
s checlu Ia
a
i
er~raved
i
n
t as
log
~onseruct
ion
of
seconder’.
md
storm~ater
‘~~fjr5~
‘‘Us
je
We
cannot
‘~ii
~ye
each
dcla’
-
We
therefore cannot
‘ir.~nt
cii
Leer
Lb
Fit’;
or
the
Dintrict
~
~m1~
1
:1
Cqainst
I :~
~r) L
itv
0)1
~J~
‘joe
‘need
~o 1 c’s
that have postponed
correction
of
their
exces:3i~’e ~ischargee.
The
further
question
is whether
to deny
Lb‘variances
out-
right,
or,
as we have done
in some
cases,
to qremst
a variance
upon
condition
of
the
payment
o~
e
money
oenal
Lv
far
east
delays,
avca:clinq
the necessity
for
thrfher
liticatian
and
giving
all
concerned
a clear indication
of
the
course that
should be
followed in
futore,
Scsi
CAl”
Carp.
v.
CPA,
i7l—
I,
1
PCB
481
(April
19,
197)
First
liational
S~~k
of Springfield
v.
EPA,
~72-3a1,
5
~CB
(October
li,
1972)
-
Lie
think
the
latter
course
is
erecluclod
here
lv
the’
absence
of any definitive aroqran we can
approve
as
pro-
viding
an
adequate
solution
to
the
rob
lema.
Until
it
is
clear
just
what
it
to
be
done
end
liaen,
we
think
it
in-
advisable
to grant even
a conditiaral variance.
The City
and
the District
should
pet
to
were
at
once
to
comciv
as
quickly
as
they
can
“i
Lb
all
opel Ic lii e regulations.
We do not understand why
the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency has
permitted matters
to reach
this
pass
without
filinq
a
complaint.
The
Sanitary
Distr
lit
has been in continuous violation o~ its deadlines
for years,
and nothing has been done.
The
City
was told what it had
to do
in 1970,
and
it has
done
nothing
mare
than
prepare
a
preliminary
report.
Inattention
to
such
flagrant
violations
can
only
encourage
violators
to
commit
further
delays.
The absence
of
a complaint
in
these cases
brinus
to
mind once again our observations
with
respect
to
municipal
sewace treatment problems
in adoptine
the
new
regulations
in March
of this year.
We noted at
the time
the state-
ment of Director Blaser of
the
EPA
that most communities
had
fallen behind
the
deadlines
set by
the Sanitary Water
Board
for
additional
treatment.
ifl
setting
new
dates
for
the submission
of programs
to achieve compliance
with
the
standards,
we stressed that
the pattern
of
slippage that had
characterized
the Sanitary
Water
Board
aeriod
“must not be
permitted
to
happen
again”
and
that
!Tsubstantial
money
penalties,
as well
as prohibition
of additional
connections,
are
a
distinct
possibility
for
communities
that do not
make diligent efforts
to meet
the
now
sleacllines.”
In
10.
The
Agency’s
new
Interpret
ition
of
the lonq-standinq
storm-
water control
rcmqui renent
was
made
known
t-o
the
District only
tn
July,
1972
(A.
212)
.
It
cannot excuse
the
fai lure
to
condo
with
the
law
as
previous
1’,’
construed
some
Lime
hetore.
6
—
238
the
yatter
of
Effluent
Cr:teria,
=R
70—3,
2
?CB
755,
773
I,
~
The
programs
for
concliance
;~ioh
many
of
the
ne’~:
nunicioal—waste
reoulations
~:ere
required
to
be
fileS
by
Seoterober
1,
1972,
and
those
for
certain
other
effluent
standards
by
July
1.
PCB Rees.
,
Cii.
3,
Rule 1002(b)
These interim dates
are
there
for
the oureose
of alo~:-
ing early enforcement action ~‘:hilethere
is still
some
aossibiiitv of brineina
about timely coomliance
‘:ith the
ultimate treatment
deadline.
Both
the July and
the
Secteriber dates have cassedr
and
no comolaints have
~.‘et
been filed
for failure
to
file
a compliance orocram.
We urge
the Agency to take such steps
as may be aoprooriate
to assure that
the regulations
are obeyed.
The
petitions
for variance
are hereby denied.
I, Christan Moffett, Clerk
of
the Pollution Control Joard,
certify that the
Board
adopted
the above Opinion
&
Order
this
14th day
of November,
1972, by
a vote of
~
6
—
239
I!