ILLINOIS
    POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
    October
    14,
    1971
    ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
    v.
    )
    PCB 71—109
    )
    WILLIAMSON COUNTY HOUSING AUTHORITY
    Frederick
    C.
    Hopper for the Environmental Protection Agency
    James Bleyer for the Williamson County Housing Authority
    Douglas Ingold for the Colp Residents Improvement Association
    Opinion and Order of the Board
    (by Samuel
    R. Aldrich):
    The Williamson County Housing Authority
    (“Housing Authority”)
    owns
    and operates a public housing project located in Colp,
    Illinois.
    On May
    13,
    1971, the Environmental Protection Agency
    (“Agency”)
    filed
    a complaint against the Housing Authority alleging violations of one
    or more of
    the following:
    Section
    10 and 11 of the Sanitary Water
    Board Act,
    Section 12 (a),l2
    (b),
    12
    (c), and
    12
    (d)
    of the
    Environmental Protection Act.
    On May
    24,
    1971,
    a petition to intervene
    was submitted by the Coip Residents Improvement Association
    (“CRIA”),
    a nonprofit corporation composed of residents
    of the Colp housing
    project.
    The CRIA entered
    a complaint against the Housing Authority
    alleging the
    same violations of water pollution regulations as those
    complained of by the Agency.
    In addition,
    a violation of Section
    9(a)
    of the Environmental Protection Act
    (“Act”) was alleged.
    The evidence
    substantiates
    several
    of the charges and we will order
    that
    a money pen-
    alty be paid.
    We will also require Respondent to take steps to ensure
    that no further violations occur.
    Before considering the merits of the
    case,
    it
    is necessary to consider
    a number
    of issues raised at the hearing by counsel for the Respondent.
    First,
    the Housing Authority denies that the Agency has complied with
    the rules for the issuing of
    a complaint.
    The basis for this alle-
    gation
    is apparently that a number of informal contacts occurred
    between the Agency and Respondent
    in which the likelihood of
    legal
    action was discussed,
    However,
    a written notice, together with
    a
    formal complaint, were served upon Respondent
    as reouired by Section
    31(a)
    of the Act.
    We find that the Agency has fully complied with
    the rules.
    Respondent
    further alleges that the Act is unconstitutional
    and violates
    the due process clause of the United States Constitution and the
    Constitution of the State of Illinois.
    We find these allegations to be
    deficient in that Respondent
    fails to specify how it is denied due
    process by the Act.
    The issues of constitutionality and due process
    have been dealt with elsewhere
    (EPA v.
    Granite City
    Steel (~o., PCB 7O~34,
    March
    17,
    1971).
    There we noted that “.~the statute does
    not a~olv in
    any case
    in which
    its application would be unconstitutional.
    ~pond-~
    ent’s argument
    is wholly without merit.
    2
    619

    Respondent next denies that the Attorney General of the State of Illinois
    is the proper party to bring action against it.
    Here Respondent
    is
    simply mistaken.
    The complaint was
    in fact filed not by
    the Attorney
    General but by
    the Agency,
    in accordance with Section 31(a)
    of the Act.
    We hold, however,
    that it is entirely legal and proper for the Attorney
    General
    to bring action or
    to intervene
    if he chooses.
    We note
    further Rule
    303
    (b)
    of the Board’s Procedural Rules which states that
    “Misnomer of
    a party is not
    a ground
    for dismissal, but the name of any
    party may be corrected
    at any time.”
    Thus, even
    if the complainant had
    been misnamed we would not dismiss the complaint.
    The Housing Authority further alleges that the Attorney General of the
    State of Illinois
    acts both as
    a
    judge and jury
    in the instant case and
    demands that the Attorney General be disqualified from the proceedings.
    Such statements reveal
    a serious misunderstanding of the situation.
    Section 33
    (a)
    of
    the Act provides that the final determination in
    enforcement cases is
    to be made by the Pollution Control Board.
    The
    Office of the Attorney General provides legal assistance
    to the Agency
    in presenting enforcement cases before the Board.
    We reject Respondent’s
    demand that the Attorney Generalbe disqualified.
    Respondent next denies that the Southern Illinois Legal Aid Society,
    Inc.,
    which provided attorney feed
    for the CRIA,
    has any standing to appear
    in the proceedings and says that the Society
    is federally funded and
    in effect receives
    funds similar to those received by the Agency.
    The Housing Authority further states that it is being tried by
    a
    “conspiracy of governmental agencies.”
    Section
    310(a)
    of
    the Board’s
    Procedural Rules allows the Hearing Officer to permit any person to
    intervene in an enforcement proceeding either when
    the applicant might
    be adversely affected by
    the Board’s final order or when
    the applicant’s
    claim and the enforcement proceeding have
    a question of
    law or
    fact in
    common.
    Clearly,
    both conditions are met
    in the instant case.
    Section
    32
    of the Act permits any party to an enforcement hearing to be repre~
    sented by counsel and places no restriction on
    the source of
    funds by
    whichcounsel
    is remunerated.
    Moreover,
    the Agency does not receive
    direct financial support from the federal government
    as Respondent
    alleges.
    The Agency merely disperses federal funds to other parties
    for the purpose of pollution control.
    The allegation of
    a “conspiracy”
    is completely unfounded,
    Finally, Respondent demands
    a trial by
    jury,
    contending that since
    the
    Agency in its complaint requests
    a money penalty,
    a
    jury trial is
    guaranteed by
    the Constitution of the State of Illinois an~by
    the
    United States Constitution.
    This argument was refuted in an earlier
    case
    (~
    ~
    PCB
    70—38, May
    3,
    1971).
    There
    we held with extensive citation of federal and state authorities that
    the imposition of money penalties does not constitute
    a criminal
    sanction necessitating
    a
    jury trial.
    2
    620

    We now consider the merits of the case.
    It
    is appropriate first to
    describe the events which culminated
    in the present situation.
    Construction of the housing project began in 1968
    (R.
    144).
    The orig-
    inal request to the State called for
    a three-stage oxidation disposal
    system.
    This was dropped when
    the Village of Colp, which was not then
    served by sanitary sewers, assured the Housing Authority that
    a
    municipal sewage disposal system would be completed by the time
    the
    housing project was finished
    (R.
    144).
    The Housing Authority intended
    to connect the housing project to the municipal system at that time
    (R.
    125).
    Because of financial difficulties encountered by the
    Village,
    the municipal system was not completed when anticipated.
    As
    a result,
    the Housing Authority applied
    to the Sanitary Water Board
    for a permit to install
    the three-stage Oxidation pond with effluent
    chlorination facilities.
    A permit was granted in February of 1969
    (EPA Ex.
    1).
    Only the first stage was ever installed
    (R.
    147).
    In
    place of the original three-stage lagoon system, Respondent installed
    an extra—large single holding lagoon believed adequate for two years
    and committed part of the money thus saved
    to assist the village in
    expediting the municipal
    system.
    In February of 1970
    the Sanitary
    Water Board ordered the Ho~isingAuthority
    to complete
    its treatment
    facilities according to permit specifications.
    The project was
    to be
    completed by May 15,
    1970
    (EPA Ex,
    5).
    The three-stage system was
    :iot
    completed by that date, however.
    In May of
    1971 the Environmental
    Protection Agency filed
    a complaint against the Housing Authority.
    At
    this point the Housing Authority decided to close the facility and in
    fact issued eviction notices
    to the tenants
    (R.
    156).
    The notices
    were later rescinded,
    however,
    after the Housing Authority was informed
    by
    the Agency that no additional penalty would be sought if the
    facility were
    to remain open
    (R.
    157,
    167).
    At the time’of the
    hearing on June
    29, 1971, wastes from the housing project were still
    being treated in
    a single lagoon.
    The municipal system had still not
    been completed, although construction was begun in May of this year
    (EPA Ex,
    4).
    It was anticipated that the system would be completed
    and in operation within
    90 days,
    that
    is, by September
    29,
    1971
    (R.
    117).
    There can be no doubt that the Housing Authority has violated the
    terms of the permit granted it by the Sanitary Water Board.
    It is
    indeed unfortunate that the Village was delayed in completing its
    treatment facilities,
    Connection of the housing project to the munic-
    ipal system will provide the best long-term solution to the project’s
    waste problems.
    Nonetheless,
    the Housing Authority’s procrastination
    over the past
    two years cannot be excused,
    We are aware that the
    Housing Authority relied upon a false
    hope
    that it could attach
    to the
    municipal system before
    a problem arose but we
    feel that it was
    the
    responsibility of the Housing Authority to complete and use
    its
    own facilities until such time as
    the municipal system became operational.
    Respondent was in violation of Section
    12
    (b)
    and 12(c)
    of the Act.
    2
    ~ 621

    ine
    recorci
    inciicates that the single lagoon operated satisfactorily
    for about one year
    CR.
    101,
    150).
    A witness for the Agency testified
    that on October
    28,
    1969, he observed seepage of material from the
    lagoon in two places
    CR.
    44).
    On another occasion he observed that no
    overflow structure had been provided and that the contents of
    the
    lagoon were discharging to a ditch through
    a pipe
    CR.
    46).
    Laboratory
    analysis indicated that the discharge exceeded
    the limits for BOD
    and suspended solids specified by Rules and Regulations SWB—l4
    (EPA EX.
    3).
    On June
    28,
    1971,
    the same witness again observed seepage of material
    from the lagoon and what appeared
    to be septic domestic sewage present
    in a natural drainageway
    CR.
    48).
    He further testified that
    a failure
    of the dike surrounding the lagoon was
    a possibility if heavy surface
    runoff into the lagoon were
    to occur
    CR.
    49).
    Another witness for
    the Agency testified that the ditch into which material was seeping
    is connected to Hurricane Creek, which in turns joins the Big Muddy
    River
    CR.
    68).
    Julius Steinmarch, Executive Director of the Housing
    Authority, denied
    that any seepage could reach streams or waterways
    of the State
    (R.
    160).
    Nevertheless,
    the evidence indicates that a
    violation of SWB-l4 did occur and that
    a threat of water pollution
    did
    exist.
    We
    find Respondent has violated Section 12(a)
    of the Act.
    Testimony was presented that the lagoon has been unsatisfactory in
    other respects:
    a source of mosquitoes
    CR.
    92,
    104,
    106,
    114),
    and
    a danger to young children since it was fenced on three sides only
    (R.
    104,
    112).
    Gladys Berdette,
    President of
    the CRIA, testified
    that on several occasions sewage backed up from the lagoon into her
    home
    (R.
    92).
    However,
    Frank Caliper, who installed and has maintained
    the plumbing at the housing project,
    stated that
    this occurred
    because residents placed items
    in the sewer which should not have
    been put there
    CR.
    128).
    The most common complaint voiced at the hearing concerned odors
    emanating from the lagoon
    (R.
    92,
    103,
    104,
    108,
    114).
    Mr.
    Caliper,
    who is mayor of Colp,
    stated that conditions at the housing project
    with regard to odor were very similar to those which existed else-
    where in the Village
    CR.
    130).
    The
    fact that there are other sources
    of objectionable odors
    is no reason that the residents of the housing
    project should have
    to live with odors from the lagoon.
    Clearly,
    an
    intolerable situation has existed at the housing project,
    and there is
    reason to believe
    the lagoon has been in large measure responsible.
    We find Respondent has violated Section
    9(a)
    of the Act.
    For this
    and other violations previously mentioned we will assess
    a penalty
    of
    $500,
    We now consider what action can be taken
    to ensure that no further
    violations will occur.
    We agree with counsel for the Agency who
    expressed the view that continuance of the housing project is
    an
    important goal
    CR.
    9).
    Closure of the facility is certainly an
    unsatisfactory solution to
    the problem at hand.
    Lawrence Line, whose
    2
    622

    engineering firm was hired by
    the Village of Colp for its sewage
    treatment project,
    testified that the municipal system should be
    completed within 90 days,
    that
    is, by September
    29,
    1971
    CR.
    117).
    Accordingly,
    the question of further use of
    the existing lagoon by
    the Housing Authority is in all probability moot.
    By the date our
    order
    is entered the municipal system should be
    in operation and
    capable of receiving wastes from the housing project.
    We will order
    Respondent to verify that such
    is indeed the case.
    To ensure that
    the lagoon in question
    is no longer used we will order that its con-
    tents be transferred to the municipal treatment facilities
    and that
    it then be filled and graded back
    to the original contour.
    This opinion constitutes the Board’s findings
    of fact and conclusions
    of law.
    ORDER
    1.
    By November
    1,
    1971,
    the Williamson County Housing Authority
    shall submit to the Environmental Protection Agency and to
    the Pollution Control Board
    an affidavit indicating whether or not
    the human wastes from the Colp Housing Project are at that time
    being treated by the sewage treatment facilities of the Village
    of Colp.
    2.
    By December
    1,
    1971,
    the Williamson County Housing Authority
    shall cause the contents of
    its existing lagoon to be trans-
    ferred to the sewage treatment facilities
    of the Village of
    Colp,
    and shall further cause
    the lagoon to be filled and graded
    back to the original contour.
    3,
    The Williamson County Housing Authority shall, within
    35 days
    from the date of entry of this order,
    submit to the State of
    Illinois the sum,
    in penalty, of
    $500.
    I,
    Regina E.
    Ryan, Clerk of the Pollution Control Board, hereby
    certify that the Board adopted the above opinion and order this
    14
    day of October
    1971.
    ~
    2
    623

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