1. the ultimate draft we’e relatively minor ones in accordance with
ILLINOIS
POLLUTION
CONTROL
BOARD
December
9,
1970
Inre
)
)
)
#R70—7
)
Air Pollution Episode Revisions)
Opinion
of
the Board
(by Mr. Currie)
“Episode”
is
a
commonly
accepted’
euphemism
for
an
extraordinary
buildup
of
air
pollutants as a result of stagnant weather.
When there
is little wind and little vertical mixing1 often because of the
presence of a layer of warm air above the cool, emissions that cause
relatively little harm under normal weather conditions can become
extremely dangerous.
Such instances have been thoroughly documented
over the past forty years; among them are the 1948 tragedy in Donora,
Pennsylvania, and the 1952 London disaster that is said to have claimed
11000 lives.
Illinois has had episodes that serve as grim reminders that
disaster could strike at any tIme.
The well—publicized episode of
November 1969 in Chicago is one example.
It would be folly to ignore these warning sIgns and to rely for
protection solely on the gradual process of reducing emissions on a
regular basis.
Moreover, it may be far less costly, after reducing
regular emissions to a level far below those now encountered in our
large metropolitan areas, to avoid remaining pollution peaks due to
abnormal weather conditions by invoking extraordinary
episode
controls
than to insist on controlling for the worst day every day.
Consequently,
the former Air Pollution Control Board in June 1968 adopted regulations
for episode control, which because of an unfavorable Attorney General
opinion as to the legality of imposing mandatory controls relied
exclusively upon voluntary cooperation.
This defect was remedied by
statute
in
1969,
and the old Board adopted mandatory episode control
regulations
February
25,
1970.
The Environmental Protection Act, effecflve July 1, 1970 abolished
the old Board
and
created
in
its
stead
this
Board,
with
rule-making
and adjudicative powera, and the Environmental Protection Agency, whose
functIons are administrative and prosecutorial. In response to a Board
Inquiry as to the adequacy of the existing episode regulations, the
EPA on September
5
submitted to the Board a proposed revision of those
regulations.
The Board
held
three
public
hearings
on
this
proposal,
in Chicago, East St.
Louis, and Edwardsville.
At the third hearing
1
—101
on October
28,
I presented an alternative draft of the revisions,
together
with an explanatory statement.
On November
9,
on the basis
of testimony
in the record,
the Board published
a proposed final draft of the
revisions.
In accordance with our procedural rules, notice
of
the
proposed final draft was sent to our en~iremailing list of some
1500
persons,
and copies
of the draft itself were made available
to all
persons who appeared at the hearings and to anyone eise.requesting
them.
Additional
comments were received until November
20, and
the proposed
final draft, with minor revisions, was adopted
by
the Board November
24,
to become effective upon filing with the Secretary of State as required
by statute.
The regulations
as they stood before the present revisions consisted
essentially of two types
of provisions:
specifications of
the meteoro-
logical conditions
and pollutant concentrations upon which various alert
stages would be declared, and requirements of actions
to be taken uDon
the declaration of an alert.
To assure that the required actions
were
adequately planned and executed,
the requlations orovided for
the
submission of individual plans by persons operating emission sources,
detailing,
in accordance with objectives
laid down in the regulations,
exactly what action would be taken
to
control
each source during an
alert.
The submission of individual plans
was
to be triggered
by
a
request from the enforcement agency.
In addition to changing references to various agencies
and the
like
to conform to the Environmental Protection Act,
and in addition
to
a rearrangement of sections, the EPA’s original proposal for amending
the episode regulations embraced
a number of imoortant changes, which
are discussed below.
Our authority to adopt these
and. other episode
amendments derives from sections
10(a),
(b),
(e),
27,
and
49(c)
of
the
Environmental Protection Act, which give
the Board power to amend
regulations of the
old Air Board,
to adopt air quality standards,
emission standards,
and other regulations
to combat air pollution, with
special authorization
(~l0(e)) for “alert and abatement standards
relative to air—pollution episodes or emergencies constituting
an acute
danger to health or to the environment.”
1.
Alert Values.
First,
in order to bring Illinois’ alert levels
into accord with federal recommendations
to avoid “substantial endanger-
ment”
to health,
the EPA proposed to lower the sulfur dioxide yellow-
alert value from 0.35 ppm to 0.30;
to add sulfur-dioxide values for
red alerts and emergencies
(0.35
and O.40cpm);
and to reduce the
CON-SO2
product emergency value
from 3.0 to
2.4.
These proposed new
values, expressed
as four-hour averages, have been correlated to
the
recommended 24—hour federal values by means of the standard Larsen
formula.
We have accepted this amendment.
I
—
102
According to Argonne National Laboratory, consultant to
the EPA
in this matter, we can expect perhaps
four or five yellow alerts this
year
in the Chicago area on the basis of the revised criteria.
(Sept.
28
hearing,
p.
18).
2.
Graduated Action.
Second,
the EPA proposed to create
a time
lag between the calling of
a yellow alert and the declaration of more
serious alert stages.
Under the existing regulations
a four—hour red—
alert reading,
given appropriate weather conditions, would
lead immediately
to the calling of
a red alert,
and
a four—hour emergency level to an
immediate
emergency, without the necessity for calling
a yellow alert
first.
The Agency asked us to provide that no red alert could be called
until
a yellow had been in effect
for four hours, and no emergency
until
a red had been in effect for
twelve.
Thus under the EPA proposal,
no
matter how quick
the buildup to emergency levels,
the most stringent
controls could not be applied until at least twenty hours had expired.
EPA was sharply questioned during
the hearings
as to the reasons
for building in additional delays before red alerts and emergencies
could b? called.
A portion
of the discussion
follows:
MR.
CURRIE:
Why is
it that the proposal will make it more
difficult
for us
to call alerts by buildina in additional delays
before the episode can be triggered?
MR.
STALLINGS
(of EPA):
.
.
.
This is back to the concept
of graduated action rather than a
jump, and
I think
this was
a
difference
that was brought out in our study with Argonne and
their consulting with
us, that the most practical episode
is
one
which takes
a graduated tyPe of action rather than jumping
from,
say, watch
into Red or watch
into emergency.
CHAIRMAN CURRIE:
But what about the people during that
interim?
If,
for example, you have an 502 concentration of
.40
parts per million or you have
a product of
2.4 indicating that
the emergency value
is reached,
and
that happens at the very
beginning
of an episode and continues for four hours, why should
you not immediately go to the most stringent control that you can
put into effect
.
.
.
.
?
.
.
.
I am worried about what, happens
in the first
20 hours
.
MR.
STALLINGS:
As
I understand the actuality of the situation
not only
is graduated action the most reliable in terms of what
happens, but actually the pollutant concentrations would
take
place
in
a graduated steo—wise
fashion.
.
.
MR.
ROBERTS
(of Argonne):
I think that Mr.
Stallings made
it reasonably
clear that we
feel that to jump into episode control
directly
after,
say,
a four—hour period involves
a substantfal,
in fact we
feel an impossibly difficult operational task,
and
1
103
considering
the accuracy of forecasting HAPPAS and local HAPPAS
as well
as
local forecasts, we feel that this
is
a very inappropriate
way to go about
a rational solution to an episode.
I further point out that the real episode oroblem
is
a problem
that runs for 24 hours and longer,
and consequently we
feel, and
especially
the longer term episodes,
the schedule
that we have
laid out will actually be effective.
CHAIRMAN
CURRIE:
I
recognize
that
we
are interested in long-
term
episodes,
but
I
don’t
see
that
that
requires
us
to
wait
until
we
have
already
had
a
long-term
episode
before we
do anything about
it.
.
MR.
ROBERTS:
Well,
the feeling
is, you see,
that
the Yellow
Alert controls
and especially
the Red Alert controls which are
executed after 12 hours are likely to be very effective
in reducing
these levels
ithout the extreme emergency measures
.
.
CHAIRMAN CURRIE:
That is an important ooint.
You have
a
sufficient degree of confidence in the Yellow and
Red prescribed
actions
that you feel
that it is not necessary
to
go farther?
MR.
ROBERTS:
Yes.
MR.
CURRIE:
Even
if,
for example, you had a four-hour average
product of
2.4?
That is the situation
I am worried
about.
MR.
ROBERTS:
You must understand,
also,
that as John
Stallings
pointed out,
the arrival of an eoisode
is
a rather gradual event
.
MR.
ROSSIN
(of Argonne):
.
.
.
I think the situation you de-
scribe,
a very high level pollution
at
a localized area,
can be
dealt with under
the guidelines
very effectively without putting
yourself
in the position of suddenly forcing you to
go into an
emergency stage which involves an awful lot of actions that take
an awful
lot of preparation.
.
.
.
I certainly don’t anticipate,
for example,
that an effective program for vehicle control would
suddenly turn on like
a faucet after four hours.
I certainly
anticipate
that at the Red Alert level
the wheels would start to
get the law enforcement officials and the oublic warned that the
situation is going to arise.
.
.
.
In the City of Chicago especi-
ally where you have extensive commuter traffic, you have
a very
practical situation, you can’t stop traffic during the middle of
the day and
lock everybody
in the city.
I think we can believe
that at the emergency level,
a 24-hour minimum time
for emergency,
1-104
that
this is
a practical interval within which to organize
and effectively
set up
a vehicle control program
.
.
(Sept.
24 hearing, pp.
26,
97
—
103).
The same approach was taken by the National Air Pollution
Control Administration in
a Regional Air Quality Management Work-
shop held in December 1969
(pp.
6-7)
Because the first step
is only
a forecast,
this allows
source reduction actions
to be taken in three increments.
Each control
step, or course,
should be designed with the
intent of preventing the next level concentration from being
reached.
The four-stage sequence provides protection
to
the public,
and also provides
for an orderly reduction of
emissions from certain source categories.
Its purpose
is
to
avoid overkill
or unnecessarily severe source abatement.
.
Thus the reasons given
for requiring the lapse of eight
hours before Red Alert and of twenty before emergency
are several:
the unlikelihood that severe conditions will build up suddenly;
the probability that yellow alert actions will be sufficient
to
reduce initial high concentrations without more drastic action
the fact that the SO2
and particulate values
of most significance
for health are
likely
to be longer than four-hour exposures;
the
fact
that some control actions
may require
a substantial
lead
time;
and the desirability of avoiding action that
is
more restrictive,
and therefore more costly,
than
is reasonably necessary
to avoid
health hazards.
We
cannot,
on the basis
of present knowledge,
be certain that
we
have set the early levels tight enough,
or required drastic enough
action,
to avert worse levels
a few hours
later.
But
we
can only
rely on the expert judgment of those closest to
the actual operation
of an episode control strategy until we have accumulated some
experience in the enforcement of our own regulations,
and until
we have the benefit of
a more sophisticated assessment based on
mathematical modeling as
to the effectiveness
of various reduction
strategies under episode conditions.
We therefore think
it best
to accept the advice of Argonne, which has considerable experience
in designing episode strategies
for actual field apolication,
and
of the Agency, whose
task it will be
to enforce the regulations
we
adopt,
and to amend the regulations
to provide that
Red Alerts
and Emergencies can only be called after
four and sixteen hours,
resoectively, of earlier alert stages.
3.
Other Proposed Changes in Alert Criteria. Third, the
Agency asked us
to reorganize the sections providing for require-
ments
for calling alerts
to make separate provision according
as
a
frornal High Air Pollution Potential Advisory is or
is
not
in effect.
In our view
this double-column format with
two
entire sets of requirements
is overly complicated,
and without
significantly altering the substance of the EPA orooosal
we
have
adopted
a more simplified version that is easier to understand and,
I
—
105
we hope,
easier to administer.
In response
to our simolification of its proposal,
EPA
has asked us
to simplify the criteria further by eliminating
the two—hour difference between the
time
a yellow alert may
be called when
a HAPPA is
in effect and the time
the same alert
may be called under other circumstances.
The difference
arises
because in either case yellow alert may be called only after
four hours of
a Watch, and because in the absence
of
a HAPPA a
Watch can be called only after two hours
of high concentrations.
EPA proposes to cure
this discrepancy by linking the calling of
a yellow alert
to the adverse weather forecast rather than to
the calling of
a watch and allowing
a watch
to be called on the
basis
of either an adverse local forecast or of two—hour
reading.
One difficulty with
this suqgestion
is that it would
require
a Watch
to be called on
the basis
of an adverse forecast
in an area with no siqnificant emissions.
While this difficulty
could be avoided by redrafting,
the gain does not seem worth the
trouble at this
late
date.
The Agency’s proposal would have required that the pollution
levels during
the last hour preceding the alert or emergency,
exceed
the requisite value,
in addition
to the average of
the preceding
several
hours.
This suggestion would permit
a single abnormally
low value due to transient conditions
in
the middle of an episode
to postpone
the whole program.
The Agency’s
fear
lest
an alert
be called when air quality
is
imProving
is taken care
of by the
requirement
that the forecast
is
for continued adverse weather
conditions.
The Agency asked
us
to continue the authorization
for an
alert in
the Director’s discretion on the basis of
a subjective
assessment of weather alone.
We do not
agree;
despite the
desirability
of flexibility, we
are persuaded that we must provide
as much certainty
as we reasonably
can
for the protection of persons
who will be asked to make substantial sacrifices to reduce emissions.
We cannot afford
the possibility that
an alert may be called on
the basis of an administrator’s whim.
For the same reason,
and
also because,
as Argonne suggests,
the prooosal
is contrary to
the principle of gradual alert stages discussed above, we reject
the
EPA suggestion, made at oublic hearing,
to authorize red
alerts or emergencies hsed
on
a subjective fear that yellow alert
actions will be insufficient
to avoid higher concentrations.
4.
Area Affected by Alerts.
Fourth,
the Agency asks that
we make clear that Yellow and Red Alerts may be called
for only
a portion of
a metropolitan area or air quality control region
when
the episode
is
a
local
one.
This principle was implicit in
the existing regulations
and was made clear in
the hearings before
1-106
the old Air
Board.
We agree with the EPA that it should be made
explicit.
We have gone beyond
the EPA suggestion by extending
this reasoning
to Emergencies as well,
since
there is no reason
to close down sources that do not contribute
to the episode
condition regardless of
its severity.
This principle is
a
necessary corollary to the position,
clearly stated in the
existing and the amended regulations,
that an alert or emergency
may be called on the basis of readings at
a single station.
In
the absence of this latter provision, persons subjected
to un-
healthy air would receive no relief unless the
air was bad else-
where
as well,
and such
a situation would plainly be intolerable.
We
have
also
specified,
as
requested
by
an
industry
communication,
that
the
Agency
not
only
may
but
must
limit
its
alert
or
emergency
declaration
to
the
area
in
which
the
problem
is
located.
This
means
that
when
an
alert
is
called
those
sources
will
be
required
to
take
action
under
existing
or
predicted
weather
conditions
affect
air
quality
in
the
area
in
which
high
pollutant
values
are
observed.
Such sources,
of course,
may
he
outside
the
area
of
high
ambient
concentrations.
We
have
also
attemoted
to
be
more
specific
than
was
the
Agency
in
defining
the
factors
that
should
influence
the
delineation of the affected areas.
It
is
implicit
in
the
provision
for
alerts
limited
to
problem
areas
and
in
the
concept
of
a
step-by—step
alert
strategy
that
the
contaminant
concentrations
required
to
trigger
later
alert
stages
must
occur
at
stations
within
the
area
of
a
prior
alert.
5.
Watch
Stage
Preparatory
Only.
The
Agency
asks,
and
we
have
agreed,
that
we
make
the
initial Watch stage merely prepara-
tory, omitting the one mandatory action provision applicable to
that stage
in the existing regulations.
Since that provision
related
to open burning, which
is generally prohibited at all
times,
the omission should have no significant impact on
the
effectiveness of the program.
The general question of the advi-
sability of requiring action at the Watch stage was raised
at
the hearings:
MR.
CURRIE:
I have some reluctance
to accent the notion that the
watch stage should be only
a preparatory stage.
.
.
.
Based on
a
prediction of adverse meterological
conditions and the known
rates of emission in the Chicago
area,
I think we can anticipate
we may very well be
in serious trouble from the calling of the
watch
alone.
.
MR. MC MAHON:
(of EPA)
Well,
definitely one of the aspects to
the change
is something to the effect of fearing crying wolf
too
often,
and we really feel that the enforcement mechanism can
and should have
a period of time
to be geared uo,
and we
feel
that the levels set fo~the watch procedures are sufficiently
low that
this is
a period of time within which maximum safety
to the public will allow
the air pollution agencies
to gear
up their machinery.
(September
24 hearing,
pp.
31-33).
This position was taken with
the concurrence of Argonne,
and
is
in accord with Chapter
3 of
the detailed Air Pollution
Incident Control Operations Manual prepared by Argonne.
1
—
107
In
short
we
accept
the
nosition
of
those
closest
to
the
oo-
eration of
an episode strategy
that the inexactness of weather
forecasting
and the
lead
time required
for effective control
actions justify the omission of mandatory
control actions during
the preliminary Watch stage.
6.
Public Notice.
The Agency asks us
to eliminate
the require-
ment that the public and all sources subject to alert action require-
ments be notified that
a Watch is
in effect.
This request is not
easy to reconcile with the Agency’s insistence that the Watch stage
is
one at which people who must take action at later stages
are
expected to prepare themselves,
and indeed the Agency assured us
at the hearings
that it will notify those who really need to
know
.
We
are not persuaded
that there
is
any harm in requiring
the public to be told what
is going on;
a simple soot announcement
on radio
and television will
serve,
and there
is
no merit to the
notion that such
an announcement may unduly alarm the people.
The
people have
a right to know
that there
is
a danger of high pol-
lution values,
and if the announcement causes concern,
that
is
as
it should be.
The threat of an air oollution episode is
legitimate
cause for public concern.
We have more sympathy, however, with
the request that we delete the requirement
of individual notice
to
all sources required to submit Yellow Alert olans.
This
requirement imposes
a substantial administrative burden on the
understaffed EPA at the
time when it needs
all
its resources to
orepar~itself and others
for oossihle alert action.
The /\qency’s
request for some discretion to determine who really needs soecial
notification
is reasonable, esoecially since
those required to take
later action can he exoected
to listen
for
the mandatory public
announcement,
and we have rewritten the section accordinaly.
7.
Automotive Sources
and Carbon Monoxide Alerts.
The EPA
initially asked that we postoone mandatory control of automotive
traffic from the Yellow to
the Emergency
stacme.
The reason given
was
the practical difficulties of traffic control, esoecially once
a permit system is developed,
as contemolated
by the Act,
whereby
essential vehicles would he certified for travel during eoisodes
by
special
insignia
issued by the Secretary of State.
It was
thought more appropri ete to prescribe
a single level
for the
curtailment
of
all hut essential driving.
At the third hearing
the Agency revised its recommendation,
askincd us
to move mandatory
vehicle control forward
again
to the Red Alert
staae.
This
issue becomes entangled with
the more comolex one of
the relation between sulfur-and—oarticulate alerts on the
one hand,
and carbon monoxide alerts on the other.
The existing requlations,
and the EPA proposal,
build carbon monoxide criteria
into the same
provisions that govern SO2
and oerticulate
alerts.
But,
as became
increasingly evident from the testimony,
the oroblems
are quite
distinct,
and so are their solutions.
Even the existing rules
provide that if an a~Lert is called solely on the basis
of carbon
monoxide the only sources affected are those which produce
that
particular oollutant.
It seemed more amorooriate
to us,
and
the
Agency agrees,
to mae
an entirely seocrate orovision for
Co
alerts,
with
a single level
which selective
action
is taken against
significant CO sourcs~.
Our initial draft of this senarate provision
I
—
108
included a requirement that industrial CO sources file alert
action plans
and curtail emissions during CO alerts.
But we
are
oersuaded
by the testimony of the City of Chicago that the over-
whelming percentage of CO emissions are automotive,
and that the
limited
resources
of
the
control
agencies
should
not
be
squandered
in efforts
to control the small contributions
from stationary
sources imposing
a general ban on the burning of wastes.
The next problem was
to determine
the carbon monoxide level
at which mandatory
action against mobile sources was to begin.
Under the existing rules
that
level
(Yellow Alert) was 30 ppm
for four hours.
Under the final EPA proposal
it was
35 ppm
(Red
Alert)
for four hours.
At one point during the controversy,
I
published
an alternative draft setting
the level
at
20
~pm
for
four hours,
on the basis of testimony from the Clean Air Coordinating
Committee
that significant adverse health effects could occur at
exoosures
above that
level.
The Agency strenuously opposed the
20 ppm level,
stressing that the ourpose of episode control
is
not
to prevent all health effects but only to eliminate “imminent
and
substantial endangerment
to health?,
and pointing out that
the
20
npm
standard
would
require
“aoproximately
20
to
40
alerts
a
year
in
the
Chicago
region”.
Argonne
too
argues
that
20
ppm
is
too low
a level
for mandatory traffic controls.
We
cannot,
of course,
acceot the view that common occurrences,
no matter how dangerous,
never are appropriate
for episode control.
While episode measures
are themselves
too disruptive to be an
ideal solution
for frequent crises,
we could not in good conscience
acceot
a threat
to health because it haopened more than half
a
dozen times
a year.
But we
are convinced that the present carbon
monoxide situation, while giving no reason for complacency,
is
not
of that nature.
The significant determinant of the harmful
effects
of CO
is
the
level
of carboxyhemoglobin in blood, and
the
lowest
COBb
level
at
which
heart
patients——an
especially
vulnerable groun--have been found to experience
“physiologic stress”
is
5,
according to the federal criteria document on carbon monoxide
(o.
10-6).
Below that level there
are health effects,
to be sure;
2-2-1/2
COBb is said to cause “imoaired time interval discrimination”
(Ibid)
.
Such effects
are important and should not be overlooked
in designing routine air quality standards
to he achieved by
overall emission reductions, hut they
do
not
in
our view constitute
the
“imminent and substantial endangerment ot health” that is
the
basis
for the
federal recommendations
as
to episodes.
Enisode
control
is
too disruotive,
especially in the case of
automotive
emissions,
to
he
justified
as
frequently
as
would
be
required
by
a
20
mom
standard
in Chicago by
the desire
to avoid the kinds of health effects that are associated with
such
levels.
Five oercent COBb, according to NAPCA,
is
achieved
after
an eight-hour exoosure to 30opm of carbon monoxide.
To call
1-109
an
alert
after
four
hours
of
35
porn,
we
believe,
will
give
suf-
ficient assurance that
the
5
level will be avoided, esoecially
since high CO concentrations tend to be limited to areas of
high traffic density which can be avoided during a carbon monoxide
episode.
In light of the peculiar problems associated with carbon
monoxide episode control,
including the fact
that
the principal
sources are mobile,
that concentrations tend to vary according to
daily traffic peaks,
and that medical responses are determined
by
a
time—concentration
ratio
unlike
that
of
sulfur
or
particulate
pollution,
Argonne
has
proposed
that
we
consider
an
entirely
new
strategy
for controlling CO episodes,
in which we determine
whether
or
not
to
call
an
alert
on
the basis of
a predicted COHb
level calculated
in terms
of ambient concentrations, weather
conditions,
and the character of the neighborhood, which affects
the probable exposure time of persons
to elevated concentrations.
Identical
CO
levels,
for example, would be more serious
in
residential
areas
than along major traffic arteries,
since most
people
could
be
expected
to
remain
in
the
area
affected
for
longer
periods.
Moreover,
because of the substantial
lead time
required
to
impose
an
effective
traffic
ban
over
a
large
area
without
imposing
significant
hardships,
Argonne
proposes two
markedly different strategies
for reacting
to sudden CO episodes
caused
by
traffic
accidents
and
the
like
and
to incidents of
several
days’
duration
attributable
to lingering stagnation.
We
find
the
Argonne
proposal
for
CO
alerts
most intriguing
and highly promising, but Argonne agrees we cannot delay the
amendment of the existing regulations while the new strategy
is being perfected.
We shall continue to investigate
the
potential
of the proposed new strategy, and when more~objective
criteria for predicting COBb levels can be written into the
proposal we shall seriously consider adopting
it.
In the
meantime, however, we agree with
the Agency that mandatory traffic
controls after four hours at
35 ppm constitute
an acceptable
interim provision.
Argonne
suggests
that
since
we have separated the CO criteria
and strategies from those related
to SO2
and particulates,
we should
delete the requirement that traffic be curtailed
at the emergency
level
of
an
SO2-
particulate episode.
We disagree,
for two reasons.
First,
automobiles
are
a significant source of particulate
emissions which should not be overlooked in control of
a particulate
problem.
Second,
the buildup of high concentrations of sulfur
and particulates
under adverse weather conditions indicates that
other pollutants
are building up as well.
We do not yet have epi-
sode criteria for such automotive pollutants
as nitrogen oxides,
hydrocarbons,
lead, and photochemical oxidants.
Until we develop
them,
the presence of adverse weather and high levels of other
pollutants constitutes
the best danger signal we have that something
should be done
to reduce the output of these contaminants
as well.
1
—
110
The
present
regulations
at
the
chosen level impose
a flat
ban
on
driving
except “in emergencies with the approval
of local
or state police”.
The EPA
asks
us
to
change this to restrict
driving
to
“essential
uses
as designated by the Director”.
It
was
the
Agency’s
plan,
as
described
by
Mr.
McMahon,
that
“the
Director
will
promulgate
prior
to
any
episode
coming
into
effect
a
permanent
plan
or
a
plan
relating
both
to
motor
vehicles
and
air-
craft flight.
This plan as presently conceived could be implement-
ed as to automobiles by the issuance through the Secretary of
State’s office
a specialized license sticker indicating those
vehicles
which
would
be
allowed
to
operate
during
an
episode.
.
.
.“
(Seotember
24
hearing,
o.
41).
We
agree
that
in
the
short
run
we
must
rely
to
a
large
extent
on
the
Agency
to
work
out
a
tentative
plan
in
the
light
of consultations with police and
other
agencies,
but
in
the interest of assuring fair and equal
treatment,
we
believe
it
advisable
to
insert
as
many
guidelines
as
we
feasibly
can
to
guide
the
Agency’s
discretion.
Accordingly,
the essential uses which may be permitted are defined
as “police,
fire and health services,
the delivery of food, and essential fuel,
waste
collection,
utility
on
pollution
control
emergency
repairs,
and such comparable uses
as may be designated
by
the
Agency.”
Moreover,
in light of the Agency’s acknowledgement
that when
the
Agency’s
plan
reaches
the
stage
of
development
at
which
it
is
ready
for
promulgation
the
resnonsibility
for
its
adoption
is
the
Board’s,
we
have
inserted
the
requirement
that
the
Agency
report
to
the
Board
as
soon
as
is
practicable
with
recommendations
for
a
more
explicit
regulation.
We
emphatically
agree
with
the
EPA’s
plan
to
involve
the
Secretary
of
State
in
the
issuance
of
emergency-vehicle permits;
such
a procedure
is expressly contem-
plated by section
48
(h)
of the Act,
and it will greatly facilitate
the otherwise formidable task of enforcing traffic controls.
The Agency similarly requests
that the absolute ban on
outgoing aircraft flights during
the Emergency state be modified
to give absolute discretion
to the Director
to determine what
restrictions
are desirable,
We cannot go along with
this request
because of its inherent potential
for arbitrary action.
The powers
of enforcement officials
should be
as explicitly defined as
practicality permits.
We recognize the
need for exceptions
to
the aircraft prohibition based on strong countervailing policies;
we have authorized the Agency
to allow flights during emergencies
“for reasons
of public health or safety”.
8.
ge~~Action ~
Facilities Without Plans.
The most
significant change proposed by the Agency in regard
to actions
required at various episode stages
is the suggestion that we
delete the explicit emergency prov isions requiring
the curtailment
of industrial emissions not covered by individual alert plans
and
requiring the closing of
a number of named enterprises.
We do not
accept this proposal,
While we agree that the closing of banks
would impose
a hardship disproportionate
to the benefit,
we have
retained the rest of
the list in its entirety.
The only reason
given
by
the
Agency
for
the
request
that
we
delete
these
provisions
was
the allegation that the regulation as written was
“too
vague.
1
—
111
It
affected
facilities
where
everybody
else
would
not
know
what
to
do”.
(September
24
hearing,
p.
47).
We
do
not
see
the
merit
of
this
argument.
There
is
nothing
vague
about
the
require-
ment
that
a
business
shut
its
doors,
and
anyone
instructed
to
curtail
emissions
“
to
the
extent
possible
without
causing
injury
to
persons
or
serious
damage
to
equipment”
will
know
very
precisely
what
to
do.
Argonne
has
suggested
another
reason
for
deletion:
Many
of
the
sources
to
be
closed
down
are
“non-polluters.”
But
we
believe
this
characterization
is
too
simple.
It
certainly
does
not
apply
to
industrial
emission
sources.
As
for
sáhools,
government agencies, and many others on the
list,
it seems clear
that
their
closing
will
eliminate
the
necessity
for
heating
the
buildings,
for
the
use
of
electricity
on
the
premises,
and
for
commuting
to
work,
all
of
which
c~n cause
substantial
pollution.
At
the
emergency
stage
there
is
a
real
danger
that
people
are
going
to
die.
It
does
not
seem
too
much
to
ask
that
most
businesses
close
at
that
point
to
help
avoid
this
risk.
9.
Space
Beating
and
Electricity.
The
Agency
has
asked
us
to
include
one
important
new
requirement
at
the
Emergency stage:
a
limitation
on
the
heating
of
buildings
to
65°
by
day
and
50
to
55°
at
night.
There
is
precedent
for
this
restriction
in
the
New
York
City
Air
Pollution
Implementation
Manual
for
a
High
Air
Pollution
Alert
and
Warning
System
(1968),
p.
15.
We
think
it
has
considerable
merit.
Not
only
is
the
reduction of
emissions
from
coal
and
oil
burning
for
residential
and
other
space
heating
absolutely
essential
to combat episodes
in some
areas—-there
are
places
where
upwards
of
60
of
SO2
concentrations
are
of
local
space-heating
origin—-but
the
curtailment
of
soace
heating
by
gas
makes
more
gas
available
for
other
uses
such
as
power
generation
which
otherwise
would
require larger amounts
of
polluting
fuels.
We
have
modified the Agency proposal, however,
in one respect.
The
Agency
urged
that
we
require
even
lower
temperatures
at
night
than
in
the
day
in
the
interest
of
fuel
savincm
and
reduction
of
night
emissions.
We
are
advised
by
gas
utility,
however,
that
the
resultant
drain
on
its
reserves during the early morning warmup
period
would
impose
a
serious
burden
on
fuel
supolies,
and by an
industrial
witness
that
the
increased
emissions
during
the
morning
peak,
at
a
time
when
meteorology
is
likely
to
he
most
unfavorable,
might
more
than
counterbalance
the
nighttime
savings.
Along
the
same
lines,
we
have
added
a
new
provision
requiring
curtailment
of
unnecessary
uses
of
electricity
at
the
Emergency
stage.
There
is
precedent
for
this
too
in
the
New
York
City
plan
for
episode
control,
and
it
is
advocated
in
the
Argonne
manual.
We
have
been
asked
to
accelerate
that
restriction
to
the
Yellow
Alert
stage,
on
the
ground
that
decorative
use
of
electricity
should
be
curtailed
at
least
as
early
as
more
important
emission
sources.
There
is
an
appeal
to
this
suggestion,
but
it
appears
more
important
to
get
the
amendments
on
the
books
as
quickly
as
we
reasonably
can
than
to
take
further
time
obtaining
additional
views
on
this
proposal.
1
—
112
At our Edwardsville hearing one industrial witness questioned
our sithority
to require the closing of a business during emergencies.
This contention ignores
the whole history of episode control in
Illinois
as well
as
the plain purport of the statute.
It was
for
want
of such authority that the old Board
sought and received
statutory power
to impose mandatory episode controls in 1969,
and
the present statute
quite explicitly gives
the
same power to
this
Board:
to adopt
not only
(~
10
(a)) whatever regulations
are needed
to prevent air pollution, but specifically
(~
10
(e))
falert and abatement standards relative
to air pollution
episodes.
“Abatement
standards”
clearly include whatever action is
necessary
to avert
or alleviate
an episode; we
see no reason to
distinguish within that broad authority between closing of
a business
and
any other mandatory action such as
a required fuel switch
or
a ban
on traffic.
This conclusion is buttressed
by
the explicit
new authority given
the Environmental Protection Agency,
in
~3~1 (a)
of the
Act,
to seal any equipment or facility operated
in violation of
the episode regulation.
At the Agency’s request
we have added
a section to
the regulations incorporating
this
statutory sealing power.
10.
Local Responsibility.
Finally, we have added at EPA’s
request
a new section detailing the relative responsibilities of
state
and local agencies in the
event of an episode.
This section
makes clear that the
state EPA has ultimate responsibility for
directing the episode control strategy.
The City
of Chicago
objected to the original form of this provision, asking
in substance
for an exemption from
the
state
law
and
regulations because
of
its “demonstrated effective administrative procedures for
implementing episode control programs”.
Chicago’s position has
the
sunport of the Clean Air Coordinating Committee,
which argues that
state oversight
of local responsibilities could result in
a duplication
of effort at
a time when staffs are overburdened and that
“the
city
officials have requisite
skills
to prorerly operate this
apoaratus
whereas
Agency
members
may
not”.
We
agree
that
the
Agency
should
not
be
required
to
squander
its
limited
personnel
in
occupying
the
offices of every little
local
agency
during
an
episode,
and
the
rule
is
clear
that
it
need
not.
hut
the
City’s
request
for
an
exemption
is
one
that
we
cannot
honor
consistent
with
our
responsibilities
under
either
federal
or state
law.
The
conce
t
of
local
exemptions
from
state
control
was deliberately
omitted
from
the
Environmental
Protection
Act,
as
we
held
in
repealing the
redulations
providing
for
such
exemptions
in
#R70—l.
Exemotions
dad
made
it
impossible
for
the
state
to
operate
an
effective
state—wide
program;
the
state
could
no
longer
afford
to
delegate
its
resnonsib:lity
for
protecting
its
citizens——both
inside
and
outside
of
the
exempted
areas——to
the
vagaries
of
local
control.
iPoreover,
the
federal
requirements
are
clear:
1
—
113
The various requirements
included in an implementation plan
must be enforceable by State action.
This
does not mean that
States must assume exclusive responsibility for enforcement.
They may rely
on the capabilities
of local and regional
agencies; however,
to comply with the Air Quality Act,
states must have the legal authority necessary
to conduct
enforcement activities.
This authority must be broad
enough to permit the State to enforce requirements
for
the orderly application of control techniques
in accordance
with
the timetable
set forth in the implementation plan and,
when necessary,
to curtail air—polluting activities
on
an interim basis to prevent
the occurrence of short—term
episodes
of high pollutant concentrations.
Guidelines
for the Development
of Air Quality Standards and
Implementation Plans, USDHEW 1969, pp.
10—11.
We have
no intention of preventing the
City from taking
whatever action it considers necessary and appropriate to combat
an episode
or any other pollution problem.
What
we mean
to
ensure by the new rule
is merely that there is some coordination
rather than duplication
of effort between local
and state
agencies
and that
if the local agency fails
to take adequate
action
a
state official will be on the scene with authority
to
do
so.
At Mr. Dumelle’s
suggestion, however,
we have amended
the
EPA proposal
so that the State representative may direct
only the activities
of pollution
sources and not those
of local
enforcement
officials.
Chicago also argues that certain of the requir~mentsin the
amended regulations conflict with its own ordinances.
We
have removed
a proposed provision that might have been interpreted
as requiring storage of oil on the premises
in violation of local
fire
laws.
But
the contention that
our definition
of low—sulfur
fuel to permit oil containing 1.5
sulfur conflicts with the
Chicago ordinance
is wholly without merit.
At present Chicago
allows fuels to contain more sulfur than that under non—episode
conditions;
it
is clearly
the obligation of the State to prescribe
more stringent regulations
in order
to protect the public health
in times
of special danger.
Chicago will require
a lower sulfur
content than our episode regulations require in 1972,
but there
is no conflict
in that;
the Environmental Protection Act plainly
contemplates that cities may enact restrictions more restrictive
than those
of the State in order
to protect
the
health
of their
people.
I
—
114
11.
More
Specific
Action
Requirements.
In
addition
to
accepting
a
i~iuitberof changes proposed by
EPA,
the Board has
amended the episode regulations in several respects in response
to suggestions made by Board members and others at the hearings.
The most significant change from the existing regulations
and
the
EPA
proposal
is
to
write
into
the
regulations
themselves
more specific requirements
as to actions to be taken
to reduce
pollution emissions during various alert levels.
The exact actions
to be taken
will
continue to be spelled out in alert action plans
filed by individual pollution sources.
However,
the new regulations
seek both
to give greater guidance
for the contents of those
plans and
to assure that reasonably adequate measures will be
taken
to reduce
the emission of contaminants whether or not such
olans
have
actually
been
approved.
Under
the
EPA
proposal,
for
example,
it
is
difficult
to
see
what
would
be
done
if
an
alert were
to be called in the East
St.
Louis area this winter,
since the Agency’s efforts toward nailing down action plans have
so far centered on the most
acute
problem,
namely
Chicago.
Specific
provision
is
made
in
the
amended
regulations
to require the
assurance
of
four
days’
supply
of
low—sulfur
fuels
and
to
require
facilities
for
the
storage
and
handling for four days’
accumulation
of
wastes.
It
is
made
clear
that,
if
low-sulfur
fuel
is
not
available,
all
non-essential large fuel—burning facilities shall
be
shut
down
during
a
Yellow
Alert,
as
was
already suggested in
the
guidelines
sent
out
by
the
Agency
to
individual
emission
sources.
The
unnecessary
use
of
electricity
is
prohibited
during
Emergencies.
The automobile and aircraft sections have been
modified
to
make
them
more
specific
and
more
restrictive,
and
the
provision
of the existing regulations providing for mandatory
closing of certain named businesses during Emergencies, which
would
have
been
omitted
under
the
EPA
proposal,
is
retained.
12.
Summary of Required Actions.
The action required to be
taken at each stage of alert under
the revised regulations
can be
briefly described.
The air pollution Watch,
as under
the EPA
proposal,
is
a purely preparatory stage during which
the public,
governmental agencies
and major facilities required to take action
at later stages are notified that
they may be required to take
action in the
next
few hours.
During the Yellow Alert maximum
use
is
to be made of
low—sulfur fuels; manufacturing industries
are
to reduce emissions
to those allowed by the particulate emission
regulations,
notwithstanding any existing variance
or program for
delayed compliance*;
and all ooen burning and incineration are pro-
hibited, except that incinerators satisfying.the particulate
emission regulations
may be operated during hours of maximum
atmospheric
turbulence.
The public is also to be requested,
but
not
required
at
Yellow
Alert
to
avoid
the
unnecessary
use
of
automotiles
or
of
electricity.
*
To require proportional reductions by
all sources would seem
unfair to those facilities which have installed expensive equip-
ment to control emissions.
1
—
115
Yellow Alert procedures
are
continued
during
the Red and
Emergency levels.
In addition, at the
Red
Alert level all
incineration
and
open burning are prohibited, and manufacturing
industries
required
to
submit
Red
Alert
plans
are
required
to
curtail production to the greatest extent possible without causing
injury
or serious damage to equipment.
In an Emergency the unnecessary use of electricity,
and
most automobile and
aircraft
uses, are prohibited; heat must
be reduced in most buildings; a number of named businesses
and
other activities must cease operations; and manufacturing
facilities not covered by preceding requirements are required
to curtail production, again without causing injury to persons
or serious damage to the equipment.
In a Carbon Monoxide Alert incineration, open burning,
end
unnecessary motor—vehicle or aircraft use
are
prohibited.
13.
Further Ccnunents.
The
EPA
proposal and the Board’s pro-
posed final draft were submitted to the National Air Pollution
Control Administration for comment as soon as they were available.
On November 19, informally and for the first time, NAPCA suggested
that for inclusion in an approvable implementation plan the episode
regulations should contain additional alert criteria based on COH
readings alone and should permit the calling of a Watch on the basis
of a twelve—hour rather than of a 211—hour adverse forecast.
We
have sympathy for these suggestions, and we shall explore at a later
date the possibility of amending the regulations to embrace them.
But
we do not think it would be fair to other interested parties
to adopt these suggestions without allowing an opportunity for comment.
It is perhaps for this reason
that
the statute and
ouv
procedural
rules permit us to revise proposed regulations wIthout further
hearing “on the basis of suggestions made at the hearing”.
At
the
November 2~1meeting Mr. Dumelle proposed two sugnificant
additional revisions:
to list activities permitted rather than
those prohibited during Emergencies, and to extend the Emergency
ban
on
aircraft to incoming as well as outgoing flights.
In the
interest of time he agreed to postpone consideration of these changes
as well until a later date.
We have been asked to schedule further hearings qr to allow
additional time for comments on
the
proposed
fInal
draft.
We
cannot do so without jeopardizing the effectiveness of an episode
plan for the present heating season.
When the EPA filed with us
its proposed amendments on September
5,
It was with the express
purpose of securing an adequate set of regulations to make possible
an operative control strategy for this season.
We have already
taken a good deal of time in soliciting public views and in
making necessary emeradations to the proposal.
We have given a
greater opportunity for comment
than
the statute requires, for in
accord with our ruin the proposed final draft was made avail-
able to all who
wish’~•.2it
two
weeks before final action
was
taken.
Numerous com~.:atshave been received, and several
hate
been adopted by the
£‘
,ard
•
The only changes we made in adopting
the ultimate draft we’e relatively minor ones in accordance with
i—lie
the latest suggestions received.
We think no one can legitimately
claim
that he was denied an adequate
chance to be heard
on any
significant
issue before the Board.
There must be
a time
for an
end
to discussion if action
is
ever to be
taken.
We believe
that
time
has
come.
The Board
is
of
course open at any time to
suggestions for amending the regulations.
The present plan is
the
best we can do at the present state of our knowledge;
we
have every intention of improving
it in the
light
of experience
in its administration, mathematical modeling to determine its
adequacy,
and
new information.
It
should
be
said
that
the adoption of these amended reg-
ulations
is
no panacea for
the elimination
of
the dangers of
air
pollution episodes.
We already have
had mandatory episode
regulations
for over six months,
and what
is needed now
is their
rapid
and
efficient
implementation.
It
is
of
the
first importance
that
the
individual
action
plans
for
various
alert
stages
be
nailed
down,
since
even
wider
the
Board’s
amendments
a
great
deal
sti:Ll
rests
on
the
assurance
of
exactly
what
each
emitter
will
do
if
an
episode
is
called.
We
repeat
wIth
some
concern
the
Agency’s
frank
statement
in
its
latter of November 16
to the
Board:
I feel that
it
is important
at this point
to go on record
with
the
facts
that
the
Agency currently does
not have
sufficient
monitoring
equipment
in
potential
episode
areas,
nor
a
sufficient
number
of
personnel
to
carry
out
the
porposed
regulations
effectively.
What
can
be
done
about
this
lack
of
enforcement
capability
we
do
not
know.
We
have
attempted,
in
light of anticipated
difficulties
of
this
nature,
to
make
the
regulations
as
nearly
self—executing
as
possible
with
regard
to
what
must
be
done
to
abate
emissions
during
an
episode.
But
no
regulations
can
be
effective
without
enforcement;
and
there
may
be
no
more
important
pollution
problem
than
the
air
pollution
erisode.
We
trust
the
Agency
will
move
as
rapidly
as
it
can
to
remedy
the
dlsturhtng
deficiencies
in
its
enforcement
and
detection
machinery,
deficiencies
which
no
doubt
stem
in
large
part
from
a
long
history,
until
very
recently,
of
starvation
budgets
resulting
from
legislative
inattention
to
the
seriousness
of
the
pollution
pro b len.
-
I
ccncun:
I
dissent:
1/
—
~
I,
Regina
E.
Ryan,
certify that
the
~
Boaid has appreve~~eaDov~~pa~don
:1_I
~
/
this 9th
day
of
Dc~1nber~/l97O~,’
E.
Clerk of
the ~6ard
—
117

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