ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
    May 4,
    1995
    PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF
    )
    ILLINOIS,
    Complainant,
    v.
    )
    PCB 92—164
    )
    (Enforcement-Water)
    BERNIECE
    KERSHAW
    and
    DARWIN
    )
    DALE
    KERSHAW
    d/b/a
    KERSHAW
    )
    MOBILE HOME PARK,
    )
    Respondents.
    SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION OF THE BOARD
    (by G.T. Girard):
    This matter comes before the Board on its own motion.
    On
    April
    20,
    1995, the Board entered its opinion and order upon
    reconsideration of the penalty.
    Among other things, the opinion
    at p.
    15 addresses the issue of award of $5,190.69 in costs and
    fees to the People.
    The third sentence of the first paragraph in
    that portion of the opinion recited that:
    Kershaws did not respond directly to Complainant’s
    May
    6,
    1993
    Affidavit of Costs,
    but, instead, responded
    that Kershaws’ costs in litigating the attorney
    disqualification issue should be a mitigating factor in
    the final penalty assessment.
    (Resp.
    Br. at 19).
    (Opinion of 4/20/95,
    p.
    15)
    In making this statement, the Board overlooked a one—page
    memorandum filed by the Kershaws on May 13,
    1993 which does in
    fact directly respond to the affidavit of costs.
    In order to
    cure this omission, the Board hereby vacates that section of its
    Opinion of April 20,
    1995 entitled Costs and Fees, and replaces
    it with the following discussion.
    The Board is not today in any
    way modifying its April 20,
    1995 order.
    COSTS
    AND
    FEES
    In the original Board decision order issued April
    8,
    1993,
    a
    Docket B was opened in this proceeding to assess reasonable costs
    and fees to complainant as provided in Section 42(f) of the Act.
    Complainant filed an affidavit with the Board on May 6,
    1993,
    which outlined the People’s costs in pursuing this matter.
    On
    May 13, 1993, the Kershaws filed a one-page memorandum in
    opposition.
    Additionally, in their October,
    1994 brief, Kershaws
    argued that their costs
    in litigating the attorney
    disqualification issue should be a mitigating factor in the final

    2
    penalty assessment.
    (Res.
    Br.
    at 19.)
    The expenses presented by the People total $5,190.69.
    (Comp.
    Affid.
    at 1.)
    The major cost categories include:
    $1,791.39 for
    attorney’s fees;
    $3,123.49 for expert witness and consultant
    fees;
    $58.85 for clerical costs; and $216.96 for other costs.
    (Comp. Affid. at 1.)
    The Board notes that attorneys’s fees in
    the People’s affidavit are charged at rates ranging from 15 to
    53
    dollars per hour, which is below the reasonable rate of $100 per
    hour as determined in a prior Board opinion.
    (See,
    People v.
    Freedom Oil
    (May
    6,
    1994)
    PCB 93—59, Stip.
    Op. at 11 and
    supplemental opinion, People v. Freedom Oil (June
    6,
    1994)
    PCB 3-
    59)
    The respondents have two specific challenges to the costs.
    The first is that:
    Complainants claim attorneys’
    fees in this matter
    dating back to October
    2,
    1986,
    (Affidavit at 2),
    and
    expert witness/consultant costs as early as August 30,
    1981
    (~
    at 9.)
    The Complaint in this matter was not
    filed until October 29,
    1992.
    Preparation of the
    complaint, according to the Affidavit, commenced on
    December 28,
    1991.
    ~
    at 5.
    Respondents respectfully
    request that no award fees or costs be allowed for work
    which predates this proceeding
    .
    .
    .
    The state’s
    generalized enforcement program costs, unrelated to the
    proceeding before the Pollution Control Board,
    cannot
    be recovered under
    S 42(f)
    of the Environmental
    Protection Act.
    (Memo. of 5/13/94, par.
    1-3).
    Section 42(f)
    of the Act does not, by its terms,
    limit a
    costs and fees award to costs incurred only after the filing of a
    complaint.
    To the extent that Kershaws are attempting to make a
    “statute of limitations” type argument as it relates to costs and
    fees,
    the Board rejects it as we did the argument as it related
    to penalties (see su~ra, pp. 6-7).
    The People’s affidavit does
    not claim “generalized enforcement program costs”, such as a
    portion of its office overhead costs.
    Rather, the affidavit
    named witnesses/consultants and attorneys who spent time in
    specific site inspections, travel, meeting with the Kershaws,
    corresponding with the Kershaws and others, drafting and review
    of the complaint and other pleadings of this case,
    and so on.
    The dates of all of the specific listed activities occur within
    the time frame covered by the complaint.
    The Board is not
    persuaded that the People seek costs and fees in excess of those
    authorized by Section 42(f).
    The Kershaws’ second challenge was that:
    it is not “reasonable” to assess costs for seven
    attorneys from the Attorney General’s Office to bill on

    3
    the case on the same day; ~
    Affidavit at
    6.
    (Memo. of
    5/13/94, par.
    4)
    The entry in question is a
    .75 hour charge made by each of 7
    attorneys for activity which occurred on July 30,
    1992 which was
    characterized as “Litigation Committee;
    review and approval of
    complaint”.
    The Board does not find it unreasonable for seven
    attorneys to meet for 45 minutes to discuss a four count
    complaint alleging violation of two sections of the Act and
    roughly a dozen regulations, during a time period, covering many
    years, beginning May, 1983.
    In summary, the Board finds the costs and fees’s claimed by
    the People to be reasonable, and will award the Office of the
    Attorney General five thousand one hundred ninety dollars and
    sixty nine cents
    ($5,190.69).
    Kershaws will be ordered to pay
    this sum to the Hazardous Waste Fund, created in Section 22.2 of
    the Act, as required by Section 42(f)
    of the Act.
    This supplemental opinion constitutes the Board’s
    supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law in this
    matter.
    Board Member J. Theodore Meyer dissented.
    I, Dorothy M. Gunn,
    Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control
    Board, here~ycertify the above supplemental opinion was adopted
    on the ‘/~ day of
    ________________,
    1995, by a
    voteof
    ~‘/
    /1
    ~
    ~
    Control Board

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