ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
May 3, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,
Complainant,
v.
SKOKIE VALLEY ASPHALT, INC.,
Respondent.
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PCB 96-98
(Enforcement – Water)
ORDER OF THE BOARD (by R. C. Flemal):
This matter is before the Board on a motion for summary judgment (motion) filed on
April 18, 2001, by the Illinois Attorney General’s Office on behalf of the People of the State of
Illinois (complainant). Complainant alleges respondent, Skokie Valley Asphalt, Inc., a vehicle
storage, dispatching, and material storage facility, violated Sections 12(a) and (f) of the
Environmental Protection Act (Act) (415 ILCS 5
et seq.
(1998)), and 35 Ill. Adm. Code 302.
203, 304.105, 304.106, 304.141(a), 305.102(a) and (b), 309.102(a), and 309.104(a) of the
Board’s water pollution regulations.
Complainant filed the complaint on November 3, 1995, and an amended complaint on
December 29, 1997. Respondent filed a response to the motion for summary judgment on
April 30, 2001. For the reasons set forth below, the Board denies the complainant’s motion
and orders the matter set for hearing.
MOTION
In its motion, complainant provides an affidavit from Chris Kallis, an Environmental
Protection Specialist with the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency. In the affidavit,
Kallis states that as a result of his inspections at respondent’s facility and a review of
documents provided by respondent, he concludes among other things, that respondent filed
false discharge monitoring reports for December 1990 and January 1991, and has not had a
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit since March 1, 1991.
Complainant alleges that the pleadings and affidavit show there is no genuine issue of
material fact, and is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
RESPONSE
In its response, respondent asserts that Kallis’ conclusions are not supported by the
facts. Respondent opposes the motion and requests a hearing.
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Standard for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings and depositions, together with
any affidavits and other items in the record, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd. v.
Gleason, 181 Ill. 2d 460, 693 N.E.2d 358 (1998). In ruling on a motion for summary
judgment, the Board “must consider the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits strictly against
the movant and in favor of the opposing party.” Dowd, 181 Ill. 2d at 483, 693 N.E.2d at 370.
Summary judgment “is a drastic means of disposing of litigation,” and therefore it
should be granted only when the movant’s right to the relief, “is clear and free from doubt.”
Dowd, 181 Ill. 2d at 483, 693 N.E.2d at 370, citing Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill. 2d 229, 240, 489
N.E.2d 867, 871 (1986). However, a party opposing a motion for summary judgment may not
rest on its pleadings, but must “present a factual basis which would arguably entitle [it] to a
judgment.” Gauthier v. Westfall, 266 Ill. App. 3d 213, 219, 639 N.E.2d 994, 999 (2nd Dist.
1994).
In order to grant complainant’s motion for summary judgment, the Board must find that
there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts show that complainant’s
right to the relief requested is “clear and free from doubt.” See Dowd, 181 Ill. 2d at 483, 693
N.E.2d at 370, citing Purtill, 111 Ill. 2d at 240, 489 N.E.2d at 871.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that the facts are disputed. Since complainant’s right to relief is not
“clear and free from doubt,” the Board denies complainant’s motion and orders that the matter
be set for hearing.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
I, Dorothy M. Gunn, Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control Board, hereby certify that
the above order was adopted on the 3rd day of May 2001 by a vote of 7-0.
Dorothy M. Gunn, Clerk
Illinois Pollution Control Board