ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
June
4,
1992
ENTERPRISE
LEASING
COMPANY,
)
)
Petitioner,
)
v.
)
PCB 91—174
(Underground Storage
ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL
Tank Fund)
PROTECTION AGENCY,
)
Respondent.
ORDER OF THE BOARD
(by 3.
Theodore Meyer):
This matter is before the Board on the Illinois
Environmental Protection Agency’s (Agency) May 18,
1992 motion
for reconsideration.
The Agency asks the Board to reconsider its
April
9,
1992 decision in this appeal.
Enterprise Leasing
Company
(Enterprise)
filed its response to the Agency motion on
May 28,
1992. The Board grants reconsideration so that it can
clarify its April
9 decision and respond to the Agency’s
arguments.
The Agency seeks reconsideration of the Board’s April
9
decision that $27,871.68
for, costs associated with tank removal
is reimbursable by the Underground Storage Tank Fund.
The Agency
contends that the Board’s decision in this case is inconsistent
with its prior decision
in Rosxnan v.
Illinois Environmental
Protection Agency
(December’ 19,
1991), PCB 91-80.
Additionally,
the Agency argues that the tank removal
in this case does not
constitute “corrective action” under the statute.
(Ill.Rev.Stat.
1989,
ch.
111
½,
par. 1022.l8(e)(1(C).)
Enterprise responds in
opposition to the Agency’s motion, contending that the Board’s
April
9 decision correctly focused on whether the tank removal
costs met the statutory definition.
Enterprise maintains that
those costs do meet the definition of “corrective action”.
As stated in our April
9 decision, the Board believes that
the Agency has read the decision in Rosman too narrowly.
Rosman
turns on whether the tank removal met the statutory definition of
“corrective action”, and that is the inquiry which was the focus
of the April
9 decision in this case.
However, the Agency
continues to focus instead on other language in the Rosinan
opinion, which is
included in the discussion of tank removal as
corrective action.
As the Board stated in our April 9 decision,
the inclusion of the statement in Rosman that tank removal
is
corrective action only when in response to a preidentified
release was erroneous.
The Agency’s interpretation ignores the
Board’s statement in Rosman that:
13
4—4
1
2
w)hile
the Agency equates costs which are not related
to corrective action with a “planned removal”, we fail
to see the correlation.
Simply because a tank removal
is planned does not rule out the possibility of
corrective action.
(Rosman at 7.)
As the Board stated on April
9, the heart of the inquiry in
Rosman was whether the tank removal constituted “corrective
action”.
That was the focus of the Board’s determination in this
case.
The fact that the result in Rosman was different than the
result in this case does not mean that the cases are
inconsistent.
The Agency also contends that Enterprise’s removal of its
tanks did not constitute corrective action under the statute.
The Agency argues that Enterprise’s actions fail the first part
of the two—step test: whether the actions were for the purpose of
stopping, minimizing,
eliminating, or cleaning up a release of
petroleum.
The Agency maintains that because Enterprise had
planned on removing the tanks, the tank removal costs fail that
test.
Although the Agency recognizes that Enterprise undertook
other remedial activities after discovering a release, the Agency
asserts that it was never supplied with a breakdown of costs
associated with remedial activities
(as opposed to strict tank
removal costs)
prior to the Agency’s final decision on August 15,
1991.
The Board rejects the Agency’s claims.
First, the Agency
continues to argue that because Enterprise had planned on
removing the tanks, the tank removal costs do not meet the first
test under the definition of corrective action.
This argument
ignores the Board’s previous finding, both in Rosman and in this
case, that simply because a tank removal is planned does not
exclude the possibility of that removal meeting the definition.
The Agency’s argument is circular:
despite the Board’s holding
that a tank removal in~yconstitute corrective action even if it
is planned, the Agency continues to assert, without more,
that
the Board’s decision was wrong because a planned tank removal
cannot constitute corrective action.
Second, the Agency’s contention that it was not supplied
with a breakdown of costs of remedial activities prior to its
final decision on August 15, 1991,
is simply not true.
In fact,
the Agency itself noted in its initial brief that it requested a
further breakdown of costs on June 6,
1991, that it waited until
August
1,
1991 for a response to that request, that it sent a
voucher to the Comptroller’s office on August 8,
1991,
and that
it received Enterprise’s response to the request on August
9,
1991.
The Agency stated that it did not consider this response
because the voucher had already been sent to the Comptroller’s
office.
On August 15,
1991,
the Agency sent a letter to
134—42
3
Enterprise informing it of the Agency’s decision on the
application for reimbursement. This chronology is included in the
Agency’s brief
(Br.at 3), and was testified to at hearing by
Julie Hollis, an Agency employee.
(Tr. at 95-97.)
For the
Agency to now assert that it did not receive a reply to its
request for additional information until after August 15,
1991 is
untrue and inconsistent with the Agency’s previous testimony and
arguments in this case.
Although this misstatement does not have
great bearing ‘on the outcome of this case, the Board is
nevertheless concerned by the representation.’
The Board reaffirms its April
9,
1992 decision that
$27,871.68 for costs associated with tank removal is reimbursable
by the Underground Storage Tank Fund.
IT
IS
SO
ORDERED.
I, Dorothy M.
Gunn,
Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control
Board~hereby cert
y that the above order was adopted on the
~~Lt1-
day of
_______________,
1992,
by a vote of
70
‘~
The Board is also concerned with the propriety of the
Agency’s refusal to consider information it received before it
issued its final decision on August 15,
1991.
If the Agency’s
decision cannot be changed after the voucher is sent to the
Comptroller’s office, the voucher should not be sent until after
the Agency’s letter is written.
134—43