ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
    June 4,
    1992
    VILLAGE OF LINCOLNWOOD,
    )
    a Municipal Corporation,
    )
    )
    Petitioner,
    )
    PCB 91—83
    v
    )
    (Underground Storage
    Tank
    )
    Fund Reimbursement)
    ILLINOIS
    ENVIRONMENTAL
    )
    PROTECTION AGENCY,
    )
    )
    Respondent.
    ORDER OF THE BOARD
    (by M. Nardulli):
    This matter is before the Board on a motion for summary
    judgment filed by the Illinois
    Environmental Protection Agency
    (Agency)
    on April 27,
    1992.
    On May 20,
    1992, the Village of
    Lincolnwood
    (Village) filed its motion for leave to file its
    response instanter and a motion to supplement the record.
    The
    Village’s motion to file its response instanter is granted.
    On February
    1,
    1991,
    the Village filed an application for
    reimbursement from the Underground Storage Tank Fund (Fund)
    for
    corrective action costs associated with seven underground storage
    tanks
    (USTs).
    Three UST5 were registered with the Office of
    State Fire Marshal
    (OSFN)
    on February 20,
    1990.
    The remaining
    four USTs (referred to as the “four abandoned tanks”), which were
    discovered during the removal of the three registered USTS,
    have
    not been registered with the OSFM.
    All seven USTs were removed
    under the guidance of OSFM and the Agency and corrective action
    costs of $510,823.48 have been incurred by the Village
    (R. 21.).
    On February
    1,
    1991,
    the Village filed an application
    seeking reimbursement from the Fund.
    The application states that
    the date the four abandoned tanks were taken out of service is
    unknown, that the contents of the tanks was “unknown/sand” and
    that •they were not registered because they were “exempt/abandoned
    before 1970”.
    (R.
    17—20.)
    On April 15,
    1991, the Agency issued
    its denial letter stating that the three USTs are subject to a
    $100,000 deductible pursuant to Section 22.18b(d) (3) (B)
    (i)
    of the
    Environmental Protection Act (Act)
    because none of the tanks on
    site were registered prior to July 28,
    1989.
    (Ill.
    Rev.
    Stat.
    1989,
    ch.
    111.1/2, par. 1022.18b(d)(3)(B)(i).)
    The Agency also
    found that corrective action costs associated with the four
    abandoned tanks were not eligible for reimbursement from the Fund
    because the tanks were not registered with the OSFM as required
    by Section 22.l8b(a) (4) and because the application indicated
    that the contents of the tanks were unknown and, therefore, the
    costs were not incurred as a result of a release of petroleum
    134—33

    2
    (Ill. Rev.
    Stat.
    1989,
    ch.
    111 1/2, par.
    1022.l8(b)(a)(3).)
    On
    May 20,
    1991, the Village filed its petition seeking review of
    the Agency’s Fund decision.
    In its prayer for relief, the
    Village asks that the Agency’s denial of eligibility be reversed,
    or alternatively, that the Board direct the OSFM to register the
    four abandoned tanks.
    The Agency contends that there is no genuine issue of
    material fact as to whether the four abandoned tanks are
    registered with the OSFH and that, as a matter of law, corrective
    action costs associated with these tanks are not eligible for
    reimbursement from the Fund.
    The Village contends that a genuine
    issue of material fact exists as to whether the four tanks can be
    registered.
    Pursuant to Section 4(b)
    of the Gasoline Storage Act
    (Ill.
    Rev. Stat.
    1989,
    ch.
    127 1/2, par.
    156(b)), the OSFM has taken
    the position that it cannot register tanks taken out of service
    prior to January 1,
    1974.
    (See also,
    Sparkling Spring Mineral
    Water v. IEPA (March 14,
    1991), PCB 91—9.)
    The Village seeks to
    avoid summary judgment by asserting that a genuine issue of
    material fact exists as to whether the OSFN should have
    registered the four USTs.
    According to the Village,
    if this case
    proceeded to hearing, the Village could prove that two of the
    four tanks were not taken out of service until the late 1970’s
    and early 1980’s.
    The Village has attached affidavits in support
    of this contention.’
    The Village has also attached a letter to
    OSFN requesting reconsideration of its decision and the affidavit
    of the Village’s attorney attesting to a conversation with the
    OSFN concerning reconsideration of the OSFN’s determination that
    the four abandoned tanks cannot be registered.
    The Board’s opinions in UST cases illustrate the confusion
    encountered. by Fund applicants.
    (See ~.g., Rockford Drop Forge
    Co.
    v. IEPA (December 20,
    1990),
    PCB 90-46; Lawrence Cadillac v.
    IEPA (February 6,
    1992), PCB 91-133.)
    However, under the
    statutory division of authority, the OSFN is the agency with the
    authority to register USTs.
    (Ill. Rev.
    Stat. 1989,
    ch.
    127 1/2,
    par. 156.)
    The parties agree that the four abandoned USTs are
    not registered.
    Under Section 22.18b(a) (4)
    of the Act, an owner
    or operator of a UST is eligible for reimbursement from the Fund
    only if the UST is registered with the OSFM.
    (Ill. Rev.
    Stat.
    1989,
    ch. 111 1/2, par. 1022.18b(a)(4).)
    The Board has no
    authority over registration of USTs and,
    therefore, the issue of
    whether the four USTs could,
    should, or might be registered is
    1
    The Village filed a motion to supplement the record
    with affidavits and letters attached tO its repsonse.
    The Board will consider these documents in determining
    whether a genuine issue of material fact exists,
    but
    denies the motion to supplement the Agency record.
    134—34

    3
    not material to the Board’s review of the Agency’s motion for
    summary
    judgment.
    Because
    it is undisputed that the four abandoned UST5 are
    not registered with the
    OSFM,
    and because the Act requires that
    tanks be registered on order to qualify for reimbursement, the
    Board finds that there are no genuine issues of material fact
    and the Agency’s denial of eligibility is correct as a matter of
    law.
    The Agency also moves for summary judgment on its
    determination that the three registered tanks are subject to a
    $100,000 deductible pursuant to Section 22.28b(d)(3)(B)(i) of the
    Act.
    In Ideal Heating Co.
    v.
    IEPA (January 23,
    1992), PCB 91-
    253, the Board held that Agency determinations on the applicable
    deductible amount are not ripe for Board review.
    Consequently,
    only those Agency UST decisions which:
    (1) deny eligibility or;
    (2)
    reach a complete determination on both the applicable
    deductible and the reimbursement of costs are appealable to the
    Board.
    The instant situation presents an issue of first impression
    for the Board as to how Ideal Heating applies to an Agency denial
    of eligibility and application of a deductible in a single denial
    letter.
    Because an Agency denial of eligibility alone is
    appealable under Ideal Heating, the Board concludes that such a
    determination remains appealable even when coupled with a
    deductible determination as in the instant case.
    However, an
    Agency deductible determination is still not ripe for review even
    when coupled with a denial of eligibility.
    Therefore, the Board
    finds that the Agency’s motion for summary judgment on its
    determination that the three registered tanks are subject to a
    $100,000 deductible is denied as this deductible determination is
    not ripe for review pursuant to Ideal Heating.
    Summary judgment is granted in favor of the Agency as to
    its determination that costs of corrective action associated with
    the four abandoned USTs are not eligible for reimbursement from
    the Fund.
    Summary judgment is denied as to the Agency’s
    deductible decision pursuant to Ideal Heating.
    This docket is
    closed.
    Any
    appeal of an Agency final determination as to the
    three registered tanks should be filed as a new petition for
    review.
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    Section 41 of the Environmental Protection Act
    (Ill. Rev.
    Stat.
    1989,
    ch.
    111 1/2,
    par. 1041) provides for the appeal of
    final Board orders within 35 days.
    The Rules of the Supreme
    Court of Illinois establish filing requirements.
    134—35

    4
    I, Dorothy N. Gunn, Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control
    Bq~d,
    hereby c
    ify that the above order was adapted on the
    ~-‘~-Lday of
    ____________,
    1992
    b
    a vote of
    /—O,~,
    //
    orothy N. ~,ünn,C1e±~kT
    Illinois P~,1lutionControl Board
    13 4—36

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