ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
May 5,
1994
ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY,
Petitioner,
v.
)
AC 92-86
(IEPA No.
658-92-AC)
(Administrative Citation)
AL SEAMAN,
Respondent.
MR.
JAMES
G. RICHARDSON APPEARED ON BEHALF OF THE ILLINOIS
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY.
MR. AL
SEAMAN
APPEARED PRO SE.
Dissenting Opinion (By C.
A. Manning):
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion and order
which found that Mr. Seaman’s improper “storage” of roughly 8,000
used tires in a dilapidated barn is not a violation of Section
21(p) (1)
of the Environmental Protection Act
(Act).
(415 ILCS
5/21(p) (1) (1992)
.)
I find a violation.
Section 21(p) (1) prohibits anyone from “open dumping” in a
manner that causes the occurrence of
“litter.”
This Board has on
various occasions considered used tires as litter.
(S.~e.
generally,
Sangamon County v. Ruth
Ann
Sheppard (November 4,
1994)
AC93-6, _PCB
_;
IEPA v.
Sickles,
(September 17,
1992)
AC 92-47,
136 PCB
83;
IEPA v. Sickles,
(July 30,
1992) AC 92-47,
135 PCB 223;
IEPA v. Hillebrenner,
(May 21,
1992), AC 92-16,
133
PCB 559; and IEPA v.
Springman,
(May
9,
1991) AC 90-79,
122 PCB
147.)
Additionally, Section 3.24 of the Act defines “open dumping”
as the “consolidation of refuse from one or more sources at a
disposal site that does not fulfill the requirement of a sanitary
landfill.”
(415 ILCS 5/3.24
(1992).)
Section 3.08 of the Act
defines disposal as:
•
.
.
the discharge, deposit,
injection,
dumping,
spilling,
leaking or
placing of any waste
~
into or
on any land or water ~
so that such waste
***
enter the
enviror~mentor be emitted into the air or
discharged into any waters, including ground waters.
(Emphasis added)
(415 ILCS 5/3.08
(1992)
.)
A leaky barn which contains thousands of improperly stored tires
resting on top of
“mounds of hay” where there has been no proper
disposal plan developed in accordance with the Used Tire
Management Act
(415 ILCS 5/55 et.
seg.
(1992))
makes that barn a
“disposal site” which does not meet the definition of a sanitary
landfill.
Moreover,
the definitional requirement that the refuse “may
enter the environment” does not require the Agency to prove that
the objects of “disposal” are in fact entering the environment,
but rather that they have the dangerous propensity to do so.
These tires are exposed to the elements by virtue of being placed
in an open barn that has holes in the roof,
doors and windows
missing, and sections of the walls missing.
Those facts alone
demonstrate that the used tires have the propensity to enter the
environment.
More importantly, the propensity for these 8,000
used tires to dangerously enter the environment in the event of a
tire fire provides further rationale to conclude that the illegal
storage of these 8,000 used tires constitutes
“open dumping”
in
violation of Section 21(p)
(1)
of the Act.
I, Dorothy M.
Gunn,
Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control
Board, hereby certif
t at the above dissenting opinion was
entered on the
_________
day of
7)-i
,
1994.
Dorothy M.,’~unn, Clerk
Illinois ~1lution
Control Board
Claire A. Manning
Chairman