ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
    July 8, 1998
    CITY OF SALEM,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL
    PROTECTION AGENCY,
    Respondent.
    )
    )
    )
    )
    )
    )
    )
    )
    )
    )
    PCB 98-1
    (Variance - Land)
    ORDER OF THE BOARD (by M. McFawn):
    Before the Board is a “Petition for Variance” filed by the City of Salem, Illinois,
    seeking a variance from either 35 Ill. Adm. Code 814.401(a) or in the alternative the
    requirements of 35 Ill. Adm. Code 814.Subpart C to the extent they exceed the requirements
    of 35 Ill. Adm. Code 814.Subpart D. For the reasons set forth below, the petition is denied.
    PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    The City of Salem (Salem) filed its “Petition for Variance” on July 2, 1997. On July
    28, 1997, the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (Agency) filed its “Recommendation,”
    in which it recommended that the variance be denied. On September 12, 1997, Salem filed a
    “Motion for Leave to File Instanter Petitioner’s Response to Agency Recommendation” and
    “Petitioner’s Response to Agency Recommendation” (Response). By an order adopted on
    September 18, 1997, the Board granted Salem’s motion and accepted its Response. Salem
    waived a hearing and no other person requested a hearing; accordingly, no hearing was held.
    STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
    The Board’s jurisdiction and authority in this matter arise from the Environmental
    Protection Act (Act), 415 ILCS 5 (1996). The Board is charged therein with the responsibility
    to “grant individual variances beyond the limitations prescribed in this Act, whenever it is
    found upon presentation of adequate proof, that compliance with any rule or regulation,
    requirement or order of the Board would impose an arbitrary or unreasonable hardship.” 415
    ILCS 5/35(a) (1996). The Agency is charged, among other things, with the responsibility of
    investigating each variance petition and making a recommendation to the Board as to the
    disposition of the petition. 415 ILCS 5/37(a) (1996).
    In determining whether any variance is to be granted, the Act requires the Board to
    determine whether a petitioner has presented adequate proof that immediate compliance with
    the Board regulations at issue would impose an arbitrary or unreasonable hardship. 415 ILCS
    5/35(a) (1996). Furthermore, the burden is upon the petitioner to show that its claimed

    2
    hardship outweighs the public interest in attaining compliance with regulations designed to
    protect the public. Willowbrook Motel v. IPCB, 135 Ill. App. 3d 343, 481 N.E.2d 1032, (1st
    Dist. 1977). Only with such a showing can the claimed hardship rise to the level of arbitrary
    or unreasonable hardship.
    A further feature of a variance is that it is, by its nature, a temporary reprieve from
    compliance with the Board's regulations and compliance is to be sought regardless of the
    hardship which the task of eventual compliance presents an individual polluter. Monsanto Co.
    v. IPCB, 67 Ill.2d 276, 367 N.E.2d 684 (1977). Accordingly, except in certain special
    circumstances, a variance petitioner is required, as a condition to grant of variance, to commit
    to a plan which is reasonably calculated to achieve compliance within the term of the variance.
    Accordingly, a variance petition is required under 35 Ill. Adm. Code 104.121(f) to include:
    A detailed description of the existing and proposed equipment or
    proposed method of control to be undertaken to achieve full
    compliance with the Act and regulations, including a time
    schedule for the implementation of all phases of the control
    program from initiation of design to program completion and the
    estimated costs involved for each phase and the total cost to
    achieve compliance[.]
    The petition before the Board seeks a variance from either 35 Ill. Adm. Code
    814.401(a), or the requirements of 35 Ill. Adm. Code 814.Subpart C to the extent they exceed
    the requirements of 35 Ill. Adm. Code 814.Subpart D. Subparts C and D set forth standards
    for landfills. Subpart C sets forth standards for landfills which are to remain open beyond
    seven years after the effective date of Part 814; Subpart D sets forth the standards for landfills
    which will close within seven years. The requirements of Subpart C are considerably more
    stringent than those of Subpart D. Section 814.401(a) provides (emphasis added):
    The standards in [Subpart D] are applicable to all existing units
    of landfills, including those exempt from permit requirements in
    accordance with Section 21(d) of the Act, that have accepted or
    accept chemical and putrescible wastes. Based on an evaluation
    of the information submitted pursuant to Subpart A and any
    Agency site inspection, units that meet the requirements of this
    Subpart shall initiate closure between two and seven years after
    the effective date of this Part.
    Part 814 was effective September 18, 1990; accordingly, the latest date for landfills subject to
    Subpart D to initiate closure was September 18, 1997.

    3
    FINDINGS OF FACT
    The Board finds the facts set forth here based upon the affidavits of Roger D. Kinney
    and Ronald R. Steward, verifying the factual assertions in Salem’s petition and the Agency’s
    recommendation, respectively.
    Salem is a municipality in Marion County, Illinois, which owns and operates a
    municipal solid waste and non-hazardous special waste landfill located in the city. Salem
    operates the landfill as part of the ongoing municipal services provided to its residents. The
    landfill includes two units of approximately eleven acres each: a southern unit which operated
    under Subpart D, and a northern unit (currently under development) which will operate under
    Subpart C.
    The Agency originally received notice that the landfill (a single unit at the time) would
    be complying with Subpart C. A “significant modification” permit application was received
    by the Agency on September 13, 1993. The first application was denied as incomplete in a
    letter dated October 6, 1993, and deemed not filed 35 days after that letter since Salem did not
    address deficiencies identified in the letter. A second application was received by the Agency
    on September 16, 1994. This application was also identified as incomplete in a letter dated
    October 14, 1994. A third application was received on May 15, 1995. This application also
    did not meet requirements. At Salem’s request, this application was not denied, but kept
    pending while siting for a proposed expansion was resolved. On December 20, 1995, the
    Agency received an addendum to the application, which proposed treatment of part of the
    landfill as a Subpart D unit and part as a Subpart C unit. On June 2, 1997, after five
    additional submissions of additional information during 1996 and 1997, Salem was issued a
    significant modification permit evidencing that as of that date it had adequately demonstrated
    that the southern unit of the landfill met the requirements of Subpart D and the northern unit
    would be developed and operated so as to meet the requirements of Subpart C.
    Development of the northern unit for operation by Salem will require approximately
    one year from the date this variance petition was filed. Salem seeks a variance to keep the
    southern unit open until the northern unit is operational. If the southern unit is required to
    close prior to that time, Salem will incur the costs and suffer the inconvenience of trucking
    the city’s waste to another landfill, as well as lose income from tipping fees for the time
    between closure of the southern unit and opening of the northern unit.
    DISCUSSION
    Salem’s variance petition contains no compliance plan, as required by 35 Ill. Adm.
    Code 104.121(f). Based upon the petition, even if the requested variance were granted, Salem
    would never achieve compliance with the regulations from which a variance is requested.
    Should variance from Section 814.401(a) be granted, by definition compliance would be
    impossible,
    i.e.
    , if Salem is granted a variance from the closing date of September 18, 1997,
    and its landfill continues to receive waste for one year thereafter, then there is no way for the
    landfill to have closed by September 18, 1997. Yet closure by September 18, 1997, would be

    4
    required for compliance with Section 814.401(a). Furthermore, a variance for one year from
    various requirements of Subpart C would not result, at the end of that year, in compliance by
    Salem with the requirements of Subpart C. Salem is not proposing to upgrade the southern
    unit of the landfill to Subpart C specifications.
    The only way in which Salem could possibly come into compliance would be through
    its petition for an adjusted standard, pending before the Board under docket number AS 98-2.
    The Board faced a similar situation in Waste Professionals, Inc. v. Illinois Environmental
    Protection Agency (September 18, 1997), PCB 97-228. In Waste Professionals, the Board
    noted
    [I]t is unusual to grant variance where the only compliance plan
    is to have the regulation at issue changed at some future date. As
    the Board has long held, a proposal for prospective regulatory
    relief does not constitute a compliance plan and cannot be the
    basis for finding arbitrary or unreasonable hardship.
    Nevertheless, the Board has under special circumstances found
    exception to this rule. Waste Professionals, slip op. at 6.
    In Waste Professionals, the Board found that special circumstances were present, and granted
    Waste Professionals a variance. Several important circumstances, however, distinguish that
    case from this one. The variance in Waste Professionals was granted upon the
    recommendation of the Agency and with inclusion of a number of agreed conditions. The
    term of the variance was relatively short, and was intended only to facilitate Board
    consideration of an adjusted standard petition. Although the entire landfill in Waste
    Professionals did not meet Subpart C requirements, the trench which Waste Professionals
    sought to keep open did. In this case, by contrast, the Board finds no special circumstances
    which would warrant granting Salem a variance based only on a pending adjusted standard
    petition.
    Additionally, Salem has not established that compliance with the Subpart D closure
    date would result in an arbitrary or unreasonable hardship. In this case, the Board finds that
    the hardship suffered by Salem is substantially self-imposed. Salem (like every other landfill
    operator in Illinois) has been on notice of the closing deadline for Subpart D landfills for
    years. From the chronology set forth above the Board concludes that Salem’s inability to
    obtain the necessary permits in time to complete development of the northern unit prior to the
    date by which the southern unit was required to close was due more to Salem’s failure to
    timely submit the necessary applications and information to the Agency, than time necessary
    for review of that information. A self-imposed hardship cannot be the unreasonable or
    arbitrary hardship upon which the grant of a variance can be predicated. Willowbrook Motel
    Partnership v. Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (September 8, 1983), PCB 81-149. It
    was clear that the hardship faced by the petitioner in Waste Professionals was due to an
    external factor,
    i.e.
    , unanticipated loss of a major customer of the landfill.
    Salem has provided no compliance plan, nor has Salem demonstrated that it would
    suffer an arbitrary or unreasonable hardship if the variance is denied. The Board thus finds

    5
    that Salem is not entitled to a variance from the closure deadline of Subpart D, or from the
    requirements of Subpart C to the extent they exceed the requirements of Subpart D.
    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, the petition of the City of Salem for a variance from 35 Ill.
    Adm. Code 814.401(a), or in the alternative for the requirements of 35 Ill. Adm. Code
    814.Subpart C which exceed the requirements of 35 Ill. Adm. Code 814.Subpart D, is denied.
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    Section 41 of the Environmental Protection Act (415 ILCS 5/41 (1996)) provides for
    the appeal of final Board orders to the Illinois Appellate Court within 35 days of service of this
    order. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 335 establishes such filing requirements. See 172 Ill. 2d
    R. 335; see also 35 Ill. Adm. Code 101.246, Motions for Reconsideration.
    I, Dorothy M. Gunn, Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control Board, hereby certify that
    the above order was adopted on the 8th day of July 1998 by a vote of 5-0.
    Dorothy M. Gunn, Clerk
    Illinois Pollution Control Board

    Back to top