1. Agency2200 Churchill Road
      2. Springfield, Illinois 62706

I LLINOIS
POLLUTION
CONTROL
BOARD
November
10,1976
FNVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION
AGENCY,
Complainant,
v.
)
PCB
75—219
EGON
K.
KAMARSAY,
an
individual,
and
UNION
HILL
HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION,
a not—for-profit corporation,
Respondents.
Ms. Marilyn
B.
Resch, Assistant Attorney General, appeared for
the Complainant;
Mr. James W.
Morris,
appeared for Respondent Kamarasy;
Mr.
J.C.
Feirich,
appeared
for Respondent Union Hill Homeowner’s
Association.
OPINION AND ORDER OF THE BOARD
(by Mr. Dumelle):
The original complaint in this matter was filed by the
Environmental Protection Agency
(Agency)
on May 28,
1975 against
Respondent Egon Kamarasy,
On motion of Respondent Kamarasy
this
Board,
on August
7,
1975, ordered the Union Hill Homeowners
Association
(Union Hill)
joined as
a third-party respondent
in
this matter
in order
to facilitate
a complete determination of
the controversy and to avoid a multiplicity of actions arising
from the same facts.
On October 23, 1975 a hearing was held
in
the Jackson County Courthouse,
in Murphysboro,
Illinois at
which Union Hill specially appeared for the purpose of contesting
jurisdiction.
Contrary
to
the Board’s August
7,
1975 Order,
Union
Hill
had
not
been
properly
joined
as
a
party
res~:ondcnt
by
proper
service
of
~~OCOSS
.
So
~nd
i nq
,
t:
he
Rca rd
,
on
Ma rch
25
1
976
~I(N~
fl
O~(I
(I
tifl
()fl
II
i
ii
jOifl(’
d
as
a
r
I y
iid
The Board
Lherc
confirmed
its prior finding
LhaL Union Hill
was necessary for the complete adjudication of this cause and
that its presence
as
a party respondent was necessary for the
proper protection of the environment.
On May 3,
1976,
Assistant Attorney General Reiland filed the
Agency’s Amended Complaint which added Union Hill
as a party
respondent in this cause,
However,
the Amended Complaint did
not charge Union Hill with any violation of the Act or Board
Regulations, nor did it seek any relief against Union Hill.
On May 17,
1976 Respondent Kamarasy filed a Motion to Compel
Agency
to Comply with Interim Order of the Board, alleging that
complainant’s failure to seek relief against Respondent Union
24
187

—2—
Hill was in violation of the Board’s March 26,
1976 and August
7,
1975 Interim Orders.
The Board must deny this motion because it
cannot compel
a Complainant to prosecute
a Respondent.
The
issue of whether this failure f:csrosecute is
a violation of
Section
31 of the Act
is not properly before the Board.
A second hearing was held pursuant to the Board’s March 25,
1976 Interim Order.
The obvious purpose for this hearing was
to
provide
the Board with all facts necessary to completely resolve
the issues
in this cause and fashion a remedy which will be
effective
in protecting Rocky Branch Creek and Cedar Lake Reservoir
from the alleged pollution.At the May 20, 1976 hearing Union Hill
stated that no proper issue
in this matter concerned Union Hill
(R.
128)
While Respondent Union Hill admits every allegation contained in the
Amended Complaint,
Respondent Kamarasy denies the alleged viola-
tions
(R.
133).
The hearing closed with no additional evidence
concerning who,
in
fact,
is the owner of the subject sewage treat-
ment facility.
THE MERITS OF THE CASE
With the procedural background already given,
the Board will
next discuss the merits of this case.
The Amended Complaint alleges that Respondent Kamarasy
owns_and/or operates a sewage treatment lagoon which serves a
portion of the Community of Union Hills Subdivision and treats
only domestic wastes.
The lagoon is known as Lake Lilac.
(The
original Complaint alleged that Respondent Kamarasy was
the
owner.)
The effluent from this lagoon is discharged
into Cedar
Lake Reservoir via Rocky Branch Creek.
The Complaint further
alleges that effluent from this lagoon violated Rules 404(a),
405, and 1201 of the Board’s Water Pollution Regulations and
Section 12(a)
of the Act.
These alleged violations relate
to suspended solids,
fecal coliforms, and operation without
a
certified operator, respectively.
The record contains no sub-
stantial debate concerning whether the above—stated regulations
were violated.
Based upon the
testimony
and
exhi
hi t~s in
this
case the Board
ii rids
t:hat
Lhc viola lions occurred
.
The real
issue
is
as to who shall
he
I iablv Fort hes’ violations.
The record contains sufficient evidence
to establish that
Respondent Kamarasy
is an owner of the sewage treatment
lagoon.
He constructed and paid for the lagoon and obtained permits
for
the construction of additional lagoons.
Mr. Kamarasv owns
part of the land upon which the lagoon is located
(R.
56,
57)
.
He
did sign a permit application as “owner”
(R.
60)
.
However, Mr.
Kamarasy stated at the October 23 hearing that although he had
begun construction, after obtaining permits, of additional
24
188

—3—
lacoons
to improve treatment of the sewage, he nevertheless had
no responsibility
to do so and had therefore discontinued work
on the system
(R.
67).
From all of these facts it is evident that Respondent
Kamarasy had exercised such control over the lagoon as
is normally
incident to ownership.
The record also supports the allegation
that he is in fact the operator of this treatment system.
The
Board finds that Respondent Kamarasy is an owner and operator of
the subject sewage treatment lagoon.
That lagoon has been found
above to be in violation of various Board Regulations and the
Act.
There
is no doubt that Mr. Kamarasy has caused or allowed
those violations
to occur whether
as owner or operator or both.
Respondent Kamarasy’s desire to deny any legal duty
to operate
the lagoon will not absolve him from liability in this case.
Even
if done under no legal obligation and out of purely humanitarian
motives,
the owner or operator of a sewage treatment facility
must not cause or allow violations of Board Regulations or the
Act.
However,
the question of ownership and duty must be consi-
dered in the fashioning of a just and reasonable remedy.
The issue of the ownership of the lagoon is not resolved
in
the record, nor is the Board empowered to find against
a Respondent
when no prosecution has been undertaken.
Therefore,
this Order
must be limited to Respondent Kamarasy.
However, the very reason
for Ordering Union Hill joined as a Respondent was
to completely
resolve these issues,
Union Hill has not seen fit to aid the
resolution of the issue; nor has the Agency.
For this reason
kt
has been very difficult to fashion a remedy
in this cause.
There
is testimony regarding the efforts
of Mr. Kamarasy to con-
struct a new treatment system
(R.
65).
This system, which serves
about
30 homes
(R.
55) will,
in the opinion of the Agency’s Regional
Supervisor of Field Operations,
meet the requirements of Board Regu—
lations and the Act upon its completion
(R.
50).
The record contains no factual reason why Mr. Kamarasy
had not been able to complete construction by the time of the
hearing on May 20,
1976.
The Board has found
that
Mr. Kamarasy
is
the
owner
and
operator
of
the
presenL
inadequate
Lrcatment
facility.
The
Board
cannot
determine
the
vol
diity of any
alleged
contractual obligations which Mr. Kamarasy may have
to the residents
of Union Hill.
Neither can the Board absolve the individual
homeowners hooked up to Mr. Kamarasy’s lagoon from responsibility
for any pollution caused.
Those homeowners are not parties
to this
Complaint.
The issues of contract law and third party liabilities
belong in the Courts.
However, the Board does have the authority to order the owner
and operator of a pollution source to cease and desist from viola-
tions of the Act.
Such an order will have a relatively little
24
189

—4—
economic impact upon Mr. Kamarasy considering the potential of
polluting Cedar Lake, which
is
a reservoir and public water supply
for the City of Carbondale
CR.
16).
The cost of completing the
new sand filter system is estimated at $5,000.00
(R.
66,51)
and
the project would take less than two weeks
CR.
51,66).
There
is no doubt that Mr. Kamarasy could have completed the
project by or shortly after the October 23, 1975 hearing.
However,
he chose to stop work because of the issues of responsibility for
finishing the system
CR.
67)
.
The Board is unable
to find that
delay to have been in bad faith.
There is insufficient information
in the Record for the Board to find otherwise.
Considering the factors stated in Section
33(c)
of the Act,
the Board finds the character and degree of the injury to
the environment to substantially outweigh the value and suitability
factors regarding the instant treatment system.
The completion
of the new system is both technologically practicable and
economically reasonable.
However, the Board does find that
under the particular facts of this case a substantial penalty
is not warranted.
A penalty of $500.00 should be sufficient,
in conjunction with the cease
and desist order,
to aid in the
enforcement of the Act,
The Board finds that
45 days from the date
of this Order is ample time
for Respondent to have the new treatment
system completed and operational.
This Opinion constitutes the Board’s findings of fact and
conclusions of
law.
Mr. Young and Dr. Satchell abstained,
ORDER
1.
Respondent Egon Kamarasy is hereby found to have violated
Rules 404(a),
505,
and 1201 of the Board’s Water Pollution
Regulations and Section 12(a)
of the Act.
2.
Respondent Eqon
K. Kamarasy shall cease and desist the
aforesaid violations within
45 days of the date of this
Order.
3.
Respondent Egon
K. Kamarasy shall pay as a penalty for the
aforesaid violations the sum of $500.00
to the State of Illinois.
Payment shall be made by certified check or money order within
35 days of the date of this Order to:
24
190

IT IS SO ORDERED.
—5—
State of Illinois
Fiscal Services Division
Illinois Environmental Protection
Agency
2200 Churchill Road
Springfield,
Illinois
62706
I, Christan L.
Moffett,
Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control
Board(
hereby certify
the
above Opinion and Order were adopted on the
__________day of November,
1976 by a vote of
~3-o
Illinois
Pollution
1 Board
24—
191

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