BEFORE THE ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
IN THE MATTER OF:
)
)
R06-25
PROPOSED NEW 35 ILL. ADM. CODE 225
)
(Rulemaking – Air)
CONTROL OF EMISSIONS FROM
)
LARGE COMBUSTION SOURCES (MERCURY) )
NOTICE
TO:
Dorothy Gunn
Clerk
Illinois Pollution Control Board
James R. Thompson Center
100 West Randolph St., Suite 11-500
Chicago, IL 60601-3218
SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that I have today filed with the Office of the Clerk of the
Illinois Pollution Control Board the
RESPONSE TO MIDWEST GENERATION’S MOTION
TO SCHEDULE ADDITIONAL HEARINGS, a copy of which is herewith served upon you.
ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY
By: ______________________
Charles E. Matoesian
Assistant Counsel
Division of Legal Counsel
DATED: August 31, 2006
1021 North Grand Avenue East
P. O. Box 19276
Springfield, IL 62794-9276
THIS FILING IS SUBMITTED
217/782-5544
ON RECYCLED PAPER
ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, AUGUST 31 2006
BEFORE THE ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
IN THE MATTER OF:
)
)
R06-25
PROPOSED NEW 35 ILL. ADM. CODE 225
)
(Rulemaking – Air)
CONTROL OF EMISSIONS FROM
)
LARGE COMBUSTION SOURCES (MERCURY) )
RESPONSE TO MIDWEST GENERATION’S MOTION TO SCHEDULE
ADDITIONAL HEARINGS
NOW COMES the ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
(“Illinois EPA”), by its attorneys, and, pursuant to the Illinois Pollution Control Board
(“Board”) Rules at 35 Ill. Adm. Code 101.500 and 101.504, hereby responds to Midwest
Generation LLC’s (“Midwest Generation”) Motion to Schedule Additional Hearings
(“Motion”). The Illinois EPA requests that the Board enter an order denying the Motion,
and in support of this request, the Illinois EPA states as follows:
Midwest Generation’s initial issue in support of its Motion is that without
additional hearings, Midwest Generation and other participants have no opportunity to
present evidence regarding the Multi-Pollutant Standards (“MPS”) of proposed Section
225.233 of the Illinois EPA’s proposed mercury rule. Motion at 2. However, this
argument is without merit. The MPS language offered by Ameren Energy Generating
Company, AmerenEnergy Resources Generating Company, and Electric Energy, Inc.
(“Ameren,” collectively), with the support of the Illinois EPA, was filed with the Board
on July 28, 2006, when pre-filed testimony was due prior to the hearing held in this
proceeding in Chicago. As such, Midwest Generation had sufficient time to prepare
questions of Ameren and the Illinois EPA prior to and at hearing concerning the MPS
language (“Ameren MPS”).
ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, AUGUST 31 2006
Indeed, Midwest Generation did submit numerous pre-filed questions to
Ameren’s two witnesses that appeared at the Chicago hearing, and followed up the
answers to those questions with additional follow up questions during the hearing.
Furthermore, Midwest Generation took the opportunity at hearing to question the
representatives of the Illinois EPA about the Ameren MPS. On August 21, 2006, Dynegy
Midwest Generation, Inc. (“Dynegy”) submitted an exhibit with the support of the Illinois
EPA that included a slightly revised version of the Ameren MPS. This exhibit was
resubmitted to the Board on August 23, 2006, in corrected form (“Dynegy MPS”). The
Dynegy MPS was provided to the Board with redlines showing the slight changes from
the Ameren MPS language. Given the questioning that was allowed for regarding the
Ameren MPS, and the minor changes from that language found in the Dynegy MPS,
there is no reason to conduct a separate hearing solely on either version of the MPS
language. Given the minor distinctions between the Ameren MPS and Dynegy MPS, and
the fact that the Dynegy MPS effectively supersedes the Ameren MPS, the Dynegy MPS
will henceforth be referred to in this pleading as the MPS.
Furthermore, the hearing in Chicago was scheduled to end on August 25
th
. On
August 23
rd
, when Midwest Generation indicated it had no further witnesses to present,
the Hearing Officer properly adjourned the hearing. The failure of Midwest Generation
to take advantage of the remaining time during the Chicago hearing to offer witnesses
contesting the provisions of the MPS (which was in possession of Midwest Generation at
least by July 28, 2006) highlights the lack of merit in the Motion. It is disingenuous of
Midwest Generation to indicate it has no further testimony to present during the time
allotted but then later file a request asking for just that, additional time and opportunity
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ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, AUGUST 31 2006
for testimony. Indeed, many of the witnesses proffered by Midwest Generation during
the Chicago hearing testified that they had either not read (presumably then they had not
been provided with) the MPS or, if they had, they had no opinion or comment on the
language.
Midwest Generation’s second argument is that it needs additional time for its
experts to analyze the impacts of the MPS.
Id.
at 3. Midwest Generation claims that
“[w]ithout expert analysis, MWG, and the Board, cannot adequately assess the following
potential impacts of the MPS: 1) impacts of opting in or out of the MPS in terms of both
the impact on companies that opt in and the impact of opt-ins on the broader proposal,
including achieving required state caps under CAMR [Clean Air Mercury Rule]; 2)
impacts on future SO2 and NOx, regulations; and 3) impacts created by exchanging
allegedly harmful, neurotoxic mercury emissions for particulate and ozone precursors.”
Id
.
Neither the Board nor Midwest Generation needs worry that the MPS could
adversely affect the broader proposal, especially since the MPS is intended and was
written to be a key component of the underlying proposed rule. As written, the effect of
both the proposed rule and the MPS is company specific. No averaging or trading
between companies is allowed. The progress of one company, or system, toward
compliance is thus independent of the progress of other systems. The Illinois EPA
testified at hearing how compliance with the CAMR State cap will not be adversely
affected by virtue of utilization of the MPS. This is primarily due to CAMR’s weak cap
prior to 2018. As the MPS ends in 2015, for all except a small fraction of the total EGUs
that constitute the smallest EGUs, and the Illinois proposed rule is more stringent than
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ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, AUGUST 31 2006
CAMR, the MPS will not seriously impact the 2018 Illinois cap. Only a very small
percentage of Illinois electric generating units will be exempt from attaining the 90%
reduction. Even then, these units will be required to install mercury control technology
that will significantly reduce mercury emissions. In particular, calculations performed by
the Illinois EPA indicate that the additional mercury emissions that would occur from the
eligible Ameren and Dynegy units are approximately 1% of the total uncontrolled
emissions, and therefore, the impact of the MPS on the ability to meet the CAMR caps is
believed to be negligible. Considering that the Illinois proposed rule requires a 90%
mercury emissions reduction, compared to a 70% reduction under CAMR, there should
be no conflict. The Illinois EPA has also been and will continue to be in contact with the
United States Environmental Protection Agency (“USEPA”) to determine how the
Illinois proposed rule will comply with the CAMR.
The impact of the MPS on future SO2 and NOx rules should best be discussed in
those future rulemakings. Current rulemakings should not be side tracked over fears of
what future regulations may bring. At present, only one other rulemaking has been
proposed concerning SO2 and NOx, and that is the Illinois Clean Air Interstate Rule
(“Illinois CAIR”). Hearings on that proposed rulemaking are scheduled for October and
November of this year, and this issue is more properly presented there. However, the
Illinois EPA does intend to respond to the Hearing Officer’s request that guidance,
suggestions and/or recommendations be provided in post-hearing comments as to how
the MPS provisions of the Illinois mercury rule should be interpreted and applied in
conjunction with the Illinois CAIR rule. The Illinois EPA has analyzed the interaction
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ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, AUGUST 31 2006
between the proposed rule and the Illinois CAIR and believes that they will work together
to ensure significant reductions in harmful pollutants.
Regarding Midwest Generation’s concern that there will be an impact for
substituting particulate and ozone precursor reductions for mercury reductions, Midwest
Generation does not support the Illinois proposed rule and both the proposed rule and the
MPS are far stricter than the Federal CAMR in reducing mercury emissions. If Midwest
Generation fears for the safety of Illinois citizens, it can always choose to comply with
the proposed rule.
Midwest Generation’s third argument is that “[w]ithout expert analysis, MWG
and the Board are unable to determine why the MPS technology standards cannot be
applied generally to reduce emissions from all [electric generating units] EGUs.”
Id
. In
drafting or assisting in the drafting of proposed provisions of the Illinois rule that are
intended to provide regulatory flexibility, the Illinois EPA’s goal was to ensure that any
alternative method of compliance did not violate the spirit of the Illinois proposed rule or
the Federal CAMR cap. Therefore, the Illinois EPA has negotiated with all owners or
operators that have approached it in good faith seeking to reach an accord on provisions
intended to assist in compliance with the rule. Having said this, there are limits to what
mercury emissions the Illinois EPA can allow to be offset. Keeping the focus on
maintaining the integrity and effectiveness of the proposed rule as a whole resulted in the
defined scope and eligibility of the MPS. Of note is that both Ameren and Dynegy
anticipate, and the Illinois EPA is in agreement, that the installation of controls under the
MPS will result in system-wide mercury emissions reductions of greater than 90% when
fully implemented.
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ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, AUGUST 31 2006
However, it cannot be said that the Illinois EPA has not provided great flexibility
for sources. The allowance of averaging between EGUs in a system, a two-stage
implementation of the rule, the ability to comply with either a 90% reduction requirement
or an output-based standard, the Temporary Technology-Based Standard (“TTBS”), and
the MPS allay any such notions. Thus, the MPS is available to any eligible source that
wishes to take advantage of it. There are, of course, specific circumstances that are
unique to each affected entity under the Illinois proposed rule. CWLP has created a
separate deal which moots the need for it to consider the MPS. As evidenced by their
presenting the MPS to the Board, both Dynegy and Ameren consider it reasonable.
Kincaid Generation LLC (“Kincaid”) has chosen to present its own option to the Board
without the support of the Illinois EPA. Only Midwest Generation and Southern Illinois
Power Cooperative (“SIPC”) have indicated continued objection to the Illinois proposed
rule and the proffered forms of regulatory flexibility without making any similar offering
of their own. Of course, those sources may always comply with the primary rule. If
Midwest Generation is unable to take advantage of the MPS, which is only one option, it
can still apply to use the TTBS. Or, it can comply with the general rule which the Illinois
EPA has demonstrated is feasible and reasonable.
Midwest Generation’s fourth argument is that the MPS, or alternatively, the
proposed rule, may not be a rule of general applicability.
Id
. at 4. This argument is
wholly without merit as the rule and the MPS are clearly of general applicability. Any
owner or operator of an affected EGU can choose to comply with the Illinois proposed
“general” rule. The MPS is intended and presented as an option for those concerned
6
ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, AUGUST 31 2006
about achieving and maintaining the 90% standard. The Illinois EPA has lived up to its
promise to meet with, and discuss concerns of, sources regarding meeting the 90%
emissions reduction requirement in the proposed rule. This is not to say that the Illinois
EPA believes the 90% reduction requirement to be infeasible; rather, it demonstrates a
willingness of the Illinois EPA to listen to and if possible work to alleviate the concerns
of industry. The MPS merely allows a slight relaxation of the mercury emissions
reduction requirements in return for deep cuts in NOx and SO2 emissions. Because all
regulated EGUs are subject to the proposed rule and the MPS is available to all sources
that meet the defined eligibility criteria, the Illinois proposed rule – of which the MPS is
a component – is a rule of general applicability.
Midwest Generation’s fifth argument is that Illinois law requires the Board to
consider the “technological feasibility and economic reasonableness” of measuring or
reducing the particular type of pollution proposed to be regulated, yet the docket contains
no evidence related to SO2 or NOx. 415 ILCS 5/27. Id. at 4. As a result, Midwest
Generation claims that it is unclear if regulating SO2 or NOx under the MPS is
technologically feasible and economically reasonable.
Pollutants SO2 and NOx are only involved tangentially in the Illinois proposed
mercury rule.
The MPS suggests an alternative to reduce
mercury compliance
uncertainty
by utilizing known and well-tested NOx and SO2 technologies, and the
resulting co-benefits achieved from utilization of those control technologies. Given that
the record is replete with copious testimony on the actual issue of mercury compliance,
Midwest Generation is attempting to create a diversion by trying to change the focus of
the rulemaking. The Illinois proposal concerns mercury emissions reductions from
7
ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, AUGUST 31 2006
EGUs, not SO2 and NOx reductions. The technological feasibility and economic
reasonableness of mercury reductions have been thoroughly examined throughout the
course of the hearings. The MPS allows a slight relaxation of the mercury compliance
requirements in exchange for the greatly increased control of SO2 and NOx emissions.
These pollutants have been regulated for decades and can be controlled by equipment that
is thoroughly tried and tested. So commonplace is the notion of SO2 and NOx control
that the Federal CAMR relies on the reduction of these pollutants to achieve the Phase I
mercury limit. The focus of the Illinois proposed rule is thus the technological feasibility
and economic reasonableness of mercury reductions, not SO2 and NOx reductions. The
Illinois EPA reiterates that as part of post-hearing comments to be submitted in this
proceeding, it will address the impact and interplay between the MPS in the Illinois
mercury rule with the provisions of the proposed Illinois CAIR rule.
Midwest Generation’s sixth argument is that the MPS may violate Section 10 of
the Act which prohibits the Board from adopting SO2 regulations and emission standards
for existing fuel combustion stationary sources located outside non-attainment areas
except to attain or maintain the SO2 National Ambient Air Quality Standard
(“NAAQS”).
Id
. The Illinois EPA submitted its mercury regulatory proposal pursuant to
Section 27 of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act (“Act”) (415 ILCS 5/27), and not
Section 10. Therefore, the arguments raised by Midwest Generation pertaining to
whether or not the MPS violates Section 10 are irrelevant and without merit.
The
argument is nothing more than an attempt to distract the Board and invite confusion by
attempting to introduce an irrelevant provision of the Act as the basis for another attack
on the proposed rule.
8
ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, AUGUST 31 2006
However, in the event the Board does decide to give this argument some
consideration, the Illinois EPA notes that it discussed the Section 10(B) issue in the
Statement of Reasons that accompanied the Illinois CAIR regulatory proposal. The
Illinois EPA will thus briefly summarize the Section 10(B) discussion as it appears in the
Illinois CAIR Statement of Reasons.
Again, the Illinois EPA submitted the mercury regulatory proposal, including the
MPS, pursuant to Section 27 of the Act. For reasons other than attainment of the SO2
NAAQS, the proposed MPS would further address SO2 emissions from those EGUs who
voluntarily chose to comply with the mercury proposal through the MPS, where such
EGUs might be located in the three major metropolitan areas of Chicago, Peoria, and
Metro-East/St. Louis.
1
Although Section 10(B) appears to apply to the SO2 portion of
the MPS, such is not the case for several different reasons.
2
A closer reading, however,
of that provision and subsequent regulatory and legislative history prove otherwise.
Section 10(B) of the Act is not applicable to this rulemaking, including the MPS,
since the purpose behind that statutory provision has been fulfilled. It is well-established
that in construing a statute, the most fundamental rule is to give effect to the legislature’s
intent, and the best evidence of that intent is the statutory language. That language must
be given its plain and ordinary meaning, and courts may not properly construe a statute
by altering its language in a way that constitutes a change in the plain meaning of the
words actually adopted by the legislature. If the statutory language is clear, a reviewing
body must give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning without resorting to other
1
On April 4, 1995, USEPA approved the State Implementation Plan revision necessary for the last
remaining SO
2
nonattainment area in the Illinois to be redesignated to attainment of the NAAQS. 40 CFR
52.724(h).
2
Section 10(B) of the Act was adopted as part of Senate Bill 1967, later P.A. 81-1370, effective August 8,
1980.
9
ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, AUGUST 31 2006
construction aids.
U.S. Bank National Association v. Clark
, 216
Ill.2d
334, 346, 837
N.E.2d
74, 82 (2005).
The language of Section 10(B) is clear. The provisions were intended to limit the
extent to which SO2 emissions from fuel combustion sources outside of the three major
metropolitan areas could be controlled, as Illinois EPA was moving forward with its
attainment and maintenance strategies for the SO2 NAAQS, following the adoption of
the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977. Accordingly, the General Assembly clearly
gave the Board the authority to adopt two categories of regulations. First, the General
Assembly stated that the Board would have the authority to adopt certain SO2
regulations and emission standards for existing stationary fuel combustion emission
sources located in all areas of the State except for the Chicago, Peoria and Metro-East/St.
Louis major metropolitan areas. As to those “state-wide” SO2 regulations, the General
Assembly’s language required in pertinent part that such regulations be no more
restrictive than necessary to attain and maintain primary and secondary NAAQS for SO2.
415 ILCS 5/10(B)(1).
To address the second purpose of Section 10(B), i.e., nonattainment in the major
metropolitan areas, Illinois EPA proposed standards for SO2 emissions from fuel
combustion emission sources located within the major metropolitan areas, on December
1, 1980.
3
On February 24, 1983, the Board issued its final order for the adopted rule
stemming from Illinois EPA’s December 1980 proposal.
See
,
In the Matter Of: Sulfur
Dioxide Emission Limitations: Rule 204 of Chapter 2
, R80-22, February 24, 1983. In the
final order, the Board recognized that Illinois EPA’s December 1980 proposal was in
3
See
,
In the Matter Of: Sulfur Dioxide Emission Limitations: Rule 204 of Chapter 2
, R80-22, February 24,
1983.
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ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, AUGUST 31 2006
response to the legislative mandate (of Section 10(B) of the Act) that it review the SO2
emission standards for existing fuel combustion emission sources located within the three
major metropolitan areas and thereafter propose amendments, consistent with the CAA’s
NAAQS program, which would enhance the use of Illinois coal. R80-22, p. 1.
By virtue of the completed rulemaking in R80-22, the Board and Illinois EPA
fulfilled the second purpose of Section 10(B) as set forth by the General Assembly. Thus,
that aspect of Section 10(B) has been met and no longer has any purpose.
With respect to the first purpose of Section 10(B), the Board was left with certain
guidelines as to the nature of regulations affecting SO2 emissions in the remainder of the
State other than the major metropolitan areas. The Board was to adopt such regulations
so long as they were no more restrictive than needed to attain the NAAQS for SO2.
Prospectively from 1983, then, the only remaining function of Section 10(B) was to
provide guidance in the adoption of SO2-related regulations by the Board. A newer
statutory provision superseded Section 10(B) as to that limited purpose, and therefore all
remaining purpose and effect of Section 10(B) has essentially ended.
In 2001, the General Assembly adopted Section 9.10 of the Act pertaining to the
regulation of electric generating units. 415 ILCS 5/9.10. Section 9.10(b)(2) directed
Illinois EPA to propose regulations controlling SO
2
emissions from such sources.
It is clear that the General Assembly fully intended that Illinois EPA should
propose, and the Board should have the authority to adopt, regulations for the control of
SO
2
emissions whose nature went far beyond the minimum needed for attainment of the
SO2 NAAQS, e.g., attainment of the PM
2.5
NAAQS, reduction in interstate transport, and
improvement in visibility. This is obvious because the State of Illinois was in full
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ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, AUGUST 31 2006
attainment of the SO
2
NAAQS when Section 9.10 was adopted.
That being the case, while there may seem to be a conflict between Sections 9.10
and 10(B) insofar as Section 9.10 contemplates regulation of SO
2
emissions statewide for
several different purposes based on Illinois EPA findings and Section 10(B) envisions a
more restricted regulation of SO
2
emissions, a review of relevant case law shows that
there is no such conflict.
It is presumed that the legislature, in enacting various statutes, acts rationally and
with full knowledge of all previous enactments. It is further presumed that the legislature
would not enact a law that completely contradicts a prior statute without an express
repeal of it and that statutes that relate to the same subject are to be governed by one
spirit and a single policy.
Spina v. Toyota Motor Credit Corporation
, 301
Ill.App.3d
364,
376, 703
N.E.2d
484, 492 (1
st
Dist. 1998). In general, repeal of a previous enactment
by implication through passage of a new law is not favored. Courts assume that the
legislature will not draft a new law that contradicts an existing one without expressly
repealing it, and that the legislature intends a consistent body of law when it amends or
enacts new legislation. Thus, courts construe statutory provisions in a manner that avoids
inconsistency and gives full effect to each provision wherever reasonably possible.
In re
Marriage of Lasky
, 176 Ill.2d 75, 79-80, 678 N.E.2d 1035, 1037 (1997).
Applying those rules to the interplay of Sections 9.10 and 10(B), the appropriate
conclusion to be drawn is that the General Assembly intended Section 10(B) to allow for
the adoption of SO
2
regulations for the three major metropolitan areas, and also to
provide a framework for other SO
2
emission-related regulations applicable to the
remaining areas of the State. As a natural progression, over two decades later, the
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ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, AUGUST 31 2006
General Assembly revised its previous stance, seeking to take into account the change in
conditions throughout the State, and the increase in knowledge concerning atmospheric
chemistry, the health effects of pollution and the availability of new emission control
technology, it enacted Section 9.10 which allowed for,
inter alia
, broad-based regulation
of SO
2
emissions throughout the State with no specific exclusion of the three major
metropolitan areas identified in Section 10(B).
Section 10(B)’s purpose in terms of
directing regulation of SO
2
emissions was not without function in its historical context.
However, it must be concluded that the General Assembly’s intent for regulating SO
2
emissions has progressed to the broader instructions found in Section 9.10. For all these
reasons, the Board should find that, to the extent any argument concerning the
applicability or affect of Section 10(B) on the MPS be allowed, that Section 10(B) is not
an impediment to the inclusion of the MPS into the Illinois proposed mercury rule, nor
the adoption of that underlying rule as a whole.
Midwest Generation’s seventh argument is that the MPS may not be a rule of
general applicability, but rather an emission standard for only Ameren and Dynegy.
Motion at 5. Citing to
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Pollution Control Board
, 25 Ill.
App. 3d 271 (1
st
Dist. 1974), Midwest Generation claims that if such is the case, these
companies may be required to seek a variance or adjusted standard. Ameren and Dynegy
have accepted the MPS alternative. Kincaid has suggested its own alternative. CWLP
has created a separate deal which moots the need to consider the MPS. The rule and the
MPS are of general applicability. Rather, it is Midwest Generation that is arguing that it
cannot abide by the rule or any proffered alternative. Accordingly, it is Midwest
Generation that may need to seek an adjusted standard or other site-specific relief. An
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ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, AUGUST 31 2006
alternative does not have to be accepted by everyone to be generally applicable, only
made available to them. The MPS is reasonably available to all affected sources.
Midwest Generation cites dicta from
Commonwealth Edison
for the proposition
that the MPS is more appropriately an emission standard for Ameren and Dynegy.
However, reviewing
Commonwealth Edison
, one sees that the MPS is generally
applicable. The Court in
Commonwealth Edison
stated:
The Board cannot be expected to research, evaluate, and make allowance
for every special, unusual, or unique problem involving every producer of
electrical energy. Where one fails to challenge the rules generally and
instead seeks to relax their enforcement against him exclusively due to
arbitrary and unreasonable hardship, the legislature has determined that
the appropriate remedy is for the aggrieved party to seek a variance in
accordance with Title 9 of the Act.
25 Ill.App.3d 271, 281. More importantly, the Court stated:
We believe that the rules in question should be found valid when one can
reasonably infer from the evidence in the record that the Board concluded
in promulgating the rules that it was technically feasible and economically
reasonable for a substantial number of the individual emission sources in
this state to comply by the specified deadline.
Id.
at 281-282.
From this, it is apparent that the Board does not have to ensure that every source
can avail itself of a potential rule. Rather, the Board must assure that “a substantial
number” of the sources are able to comply. If a source is unable to comply with the MPS
or TTBS, and it believes that it cannot comply with the general rule, then it may petition
the Board for a variance or adjusted standard. Although in the present case Midwest
Generation has challenged the rule generally, it is nevertheless such a source. Ameren
and Dynegy have expressed support for the MPS, and they represent 31 of the 59 units in
the State. CWLP, representing five units, could avail itself of the MPS, but has come to a
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ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, AUGUST 31 2006
separate arrangement independent of the proposed rulemaking. Thus, this arrangement
moots the MPS. In addition, Kincaid, representing two units, has submitted its own
proposal to the Board. This leaves only Midwest Generation and SIPC remaining.
There has been ample testimony concerning the technical feasibility and
economic reasonableness of the mercury standards. The MPS is purely voluntary;
Midwest Generation is under no obligation to utilize its provisions. Midwest Generation
could also elect to use the provisions of the TTBS, if it preferred to do so. The method of
compliance is within the discretion of Midwest Generation. If Midwest Generation
believes that none of the compliance methods truly countenances its particular situation,
it may seek a variance or adjusted standard. But if it only wants to avoid the capital
investment necessary to install mercury control technology, it is left to its own devices. It
should not be allowed to pull down the whole edifice of the rule to avoid compliance.
Midwest Generation is able to comply with the general rule, though it clearly wishes not
to do so. That distaste of the rule, however, should not be equated to an inability to
comply with the rule.
Midwest Generation’s eighth argument is that if all of the sources in the State
have the same coordination, financing and technology problems with the rule then the
rule should be changed rather than creating an MPS. Motion at 6. Contrary to Midwest
Generation’s erroneous assumption, however, all sources do not have the same problems
with the rule. As stated above, CWLP, Kincaid, Ameren, and Dynegy have suggested
alternatives that fit their general economic planning. Since some of those alternatives
involve minor changes to the mercury control requirements in the rule, in return for
substantial reductions of other pollutants, the Illinois EPA has agreed to support some of
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ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, AUGUST 31 2006
those alternatives. The Illinois EPA is not suggesting that the rule is unworkable or
unmanageable. Rather, there has been extensive testimony on how the Illinois EPA
believes the rule is both technologically feasible and economically reasonable. The MPS
provides an alternate form of compliance. It is not an admission that the rule is improper.
But, like the STAPPA/ALAPCO model rule and New Jersey’s mercury rule, the Illinois
EPA believes in the principle of flexibility.
See
,
Regulating Mercury from Power Plants:
A Model Rule for States and Localities
, STAPPA/ALAPCO, November 2005 (copy
attached to Statement of Reasons in initial filing) and N.J.A.C. 7:27
et seq
.
Midwest Generation’s ninth argument is that the MPS may raise compliance
problems with meeting both the mercury regulations and the CAIR. Motion at 6. Once
again, any possible problems would be better dealt with in future rulemakings. The
present rule cannot be defeated over fears of what the future may bring. Hearings on how
Illinois CAIR may be impacted by the current rule are appropriate for the Illinois CAIR
hearings. Those hearings have already been scheduled. Midwest Generation should wait
until those hearings to determine how that rulemaking will impact the present proposal.
To do otherwise would put the cart before the horse. Merely because there is some
overlap in subject matter between the rules does not mean there will be conflict. Indeed,
the Federal CAIR was written with CAMR in mind. The Illinois EPA has analyzed the
interaction between the proposed rule and the Illinois CAIR and believes they will work
together to ensure significant reductions in harmful pollutants.
Midwest Generation’s tenth argument is that the MPS may violate the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution by restricting the trading of SO2 allowances,
citing
Clean Air Markets Group v. Pataki
, 194 F. Supp. 2d 147, 157 (N.D.N.Y. 2002),
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ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, AUGUST 31 2006
aff’d,
338 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2003).
Id
. Midwest Generation claims that since the MPS
requires parties opting into it to surrender SO2 allowances, such action effectively
prohibits the trading of such allowances, thereby reducing the size of the market
Congress created under Title IV of the CAA.
Midwest Generation’s eleventh argument is that the MPS may violate the
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.
Id
. at 7. Citing to
Clean Air
Markets
, Midwest Generation claims that the MPS burdens interstate commerce without
justifying those burdens in terms of "local benefits flowing from the statute and the
unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to preserve the local interests at
stake."
Id
.
Midwest Generation’s tenth and eleventh arguments concern the interplay of the
Illinois proposed rule and the Federal Supremacy and Commerce Clauses. In support of
the proposition that the Illinois proposed rule violates these clauses, Midwest Generation
cites to
Clean Air Markets
, which concerned a New York law that sought to limit
participation by New York sources in the Federal Acid Rain SO2 Allowance Trading
Program under Title IV of the CAA. New York sources that transferred excess
allowances to states “upwind” of New York (the law listed such states) had to report the
sales to the New York Public Service Commission that would assess an air pollution
mitigation offset against the seller.
Clean Air Markets
at 154. This offset would be equal
to the amount received for the SO2 allowances.
Id
. Transfers to entities that were not in
upwind states would have to contain a restrictive covenant prohibiting future sales to
upwind states.
Id
. The attachment of the restrictive covenant was found to lower the
value of the New York allowances.
Id
.
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Using a Supremacy Clause analysis, the Court found that the New York law
“actually conflicts with federal law.”
Id
. at 158. The Court made this determination
because although there was no physical impediment to the transfer of allowances, the
New York law was contrary to the Federal provision that allowances be tradable to any
other person.
Id
. Specifically, the New York law “is preempted because it interferes
with the Clean Air Act's method for achieving the goal of air pollution control: a cap and
nationwide SO2 allowance trading system.”
Id
. at 158. The New York law also resulted
in the decreased availability of SO2 allowances to states upwind of New York.
Id
. Thus,
the law indirectly regulated the trading of allowances in other states.
Id
. at 159. The
New York law effectively went beyond controlling emissions in New York to controlling
emissions in other states.
Id
.
The Court in
Clean Air Markets
also performed a Commerce Clause analysis and
such analysis centered on the principle of whether the law “is basically a protectionist
measure, or whether it can fairly be viewed as a law directed to legitimate local concerns,
with effects upon interstate commerce that are only incidental.”
Id
. at 160. That is, “If
the legislative means result in ‘isolating the State from the national economy,’ then the
statute is unconstitutional despite a legitimate legislative goal.”
Id
. In other words, a
state cannot block imports from other states, nor exports from within its boundaries,
without offending the Constitution.
Id
.
Accordingly, was the New York law
protectionist or isolationist?
The Court found that the New York law did impose a 100% penalty on New York
unit allowance transfers to upwind states.
Id
. Since most units would not reasonably
agree to make such transfers, the law discriminated against articles of commerce,
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“isolating [New York State] from the national economy.”
Id
. Moreover, the law did not
restrict the transfer of SO2 allowances from one New York unit to another, thus giving a
preferred right of access to SO2 allowances to in-state units over out-of-state units.
Id
.
Nor did the Court consider the New York law to be “fairly viewed as a law
directed to legitimate local concerns, with effects upon interstate commerce that are only
incidental.”
Id
. at 161. Concerning this, the Court found no “direct connection between
the law’s requirements and the purported concerns being addressed.”
Id
. This is because
the law could not guarantee that other states would not simply transfer their allowances to
“upwind states.”
Id
. at 162. Accordingly, there was no guarantee that the law would
actually reduce pollution coming into New York.
Id
. Thus, the Court held that local
concerns were not sufficiently strong for the burden placed on interstate commerce.
Id
. at
162.
The USEPA reviewed and dismissed the
Clean Air Markets
case when
formulating CAIR. In describing the workings of the CAIR program, See, 70 Fed. Reg.
25162 (May 12, 2005), USEPA stated:
The EPA’s approach provides States the opportunity to impose more
stringent control requirements for EGUs’ SO2 emissions than under title
IV through an EPA-administered cap and trade program that requires the
use of title IV allowances for compliance at a ratio of 2 allowances per ton
of emissions for allowances allocated for 2010 through 2014 and 2.86
allowances per ton of emissions for allowances allocated for 2015 or
thereafter.
Id
. at 25291. Concerning the role of states, USEPA stated:
Further, as discussed above, if a State wants to achieve the SO2 emissions
reductions required by today’s action through more stringent EGU
emission limitations only but without using the model cap and trade
program, then EPA is requiring that the State include in its SIP a
mechanism for retiring the excess title IV allowances that will result from
imposition of these more stringent EGU requirements. In this case, the
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State must retire an amount of title IV allowances equal to the total
amount of title IV allowances allocated to the units in the State minus the
amount of title IV allowances equivalent to the tonnage cap set by the
State on SO2 emissions by EGUs, and the State can choose what
retirement mechanism to use.
Id
. Importantly, concerning the use of Title IV allowances in a different program,
USEPA asserted:
The EPA maintains that it has the authority under section 110(a)(2)(D)
and title IV to establish a new cap and trade program requiring the use of
title IV allowances at a different tonnage authorization than under the
Acid Rain Program and the retirement of such allowances for purposes of
both programs. First, as discussed in section V above, EPA has the
authority under section 110(a)(2)(D) to establish a new SO2 cap and trade
program, administered by EPA if requested in a State’s SIP, to prohibit
emissions that contribute significantly to nonattainment, or interfere with
maintenance, of the PM2.5 NAAQS. Further, EPA notes that under
section 402(3), a title IV allowance is:
An authorization, allocated to an affected unit by the
Administrator under this title [IV], to emit, during or after a
specified calendar year, one ton of sulfur dioxide. 42
U.S.C. 7651(a)(3).
.
However, section 403(f) states that:
An allowance allocated under this title is a limited authorization to
emit sulfur dioxide in accordance with the provision of this title
[IV]. Such allowance does not constitute a property right. Nothing
in this title [IV] or in any other provision of law shall be construed
to limit the authority of the United States to terminate or limit such
authorization. Nothing in this section relating to allowances shall
be construed as affecting the application of, or compliance with,
any other provision of this Act to an affected unit or source,
including the provisions related to applicable National Ambient
Air Quality Standards and State implementation plans. 42 U.S.C.
7651b(f).
Id
.
In opposition to USEPA, Commenters cited the
Clean Air Markets
case.
Id
. at 25293. In distinguishing CAIR from the
Clean Air Markets
case, USEPA
proffered:
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EPA believes that the exercise of its explicit authority under section 403(f)
to limit the tonnage authorization of a title IV allowance in the CAIR SO2
cap and trade program and to terminate the tonnage authorization in the
Acid Rain Program once the allowance is used in the CAIR SO2 program
is consistent with—and necessary to preserve—the operation of the Acid
Rain Program. Therefore, EPA concludes that its approach of limiting and
terminating of the tonnage authorization of title IV allowances does not
impermissibly interfere with the interstate operation of the Acid Rain
Program and is reasonable.
Id
. Moreover, USEPA declared:
Unlike the circumstances in
Clean Air Markets Group,
under EPA’s
approach in today’s action, each title IV allowance is freely transferable
nationwide unless and until a source uses the allowance to meet the
allowance-holding requirements of the CAIR SO2 program, at which time
the allowance is deducted from the source’s allowance tracking system
account and retired for purposes of both the CAIR SO2 program and the
Acid Rain Program.
Id
. Thus, USEPA stated:
EPA maintains that, on balance, the retirement of title IV allowances used
for compliance in the CAIR model SO2 cap and trade program does not
constitute impermissible interference with the interstate operation of the
Acid Rain Program, but rather is consistent with, and necessary to
preserve, the operation of the Acid Rain Program.
Id
. Furthermore, USEPA believed that due to the fact that CAIR is not a nationwide
program, the flood of Title IV allowances, were they not retired under CAIR, would
cause the Title IV SO2 allowance market in those states not covered by CAIR, but still
under Title IV to collapse.
Id
.
The MPS is similar to the Federal CAIR and, indeed, Illinois has proposed a
CAIR rulemaking where this issue may more appropriately be discussed. Regardless,
Federal CAIR anticipates the situation that Illinois is in and supports it. Beyond this,
CAIR recognizes that a state allowance program may differ from the Federal program.
That is, USEPA allows states to comply with CAIR by either: 1) requiring all SO2
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reductions from EGUs; 2) requiring some SO2 reductions from EGUs and some from
non-EGUs; or 3) requiring all reductions from non-EGUs.
Id
. at 25295. As USEPA
stated:
the allowance retirement requirement echoes the State’s decision in the
first instance concerning the amount of SO2 emissions reductions to
require from EGUs in the State.
Id
.
Other important differences exist between the Illinois MPS and the New York law
at issue in
Clean Air Market
. First, the MPS does not prohibit trading with anyone.
Second, it imposes no restrictive covenants on anyone. Third, the MPS does not
differentiate between in-State and out-of-State purchasers. Illinois sources cannot sell
any excess allowances made available from compliance with the MPS to other sources
whether they are in Illinois or in other states. Finally, and most importantly, the MPS is
voluntary. No unit is required to utilize it. It is only an option for sources that consider it
the best fit for their business plan. Sources voluntarily agree to retire allowances directly
attributable to the lower SO2 emissions standard that they become subject to under the
MPS. Any additional allowances the source generates from SO2 emissions reductions
beyond that required for compliance with the MPS, or from banking, may be freely
transferred to any other entity.
Midwest Generation’s twelfth argument is that it is not clear on the record how
Illinois will demonstrate compliance with the CAMR emissions cap if other sources
opted into the MPS. Motion at 8. This is not Midwest Generation’s concern. The
Illinois EPA testified at hearing that Illinois intends to successfully demonstrate to
USEPA that it will be able to comply with the State cap. The Illinois EPA has had
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extensive conversations with the USEPA on this matter, and those conversations will
continue. Once again, the MPS ends in 2015, at which time virtually all sources will be
required to meet the 90% mercury emissions reduction standard. Thus, compliance with
the CAMR cap should not be a concern. In addition, the MPS is voluntary, and thus, no
source is under any obligation to make use of its provisions.
Since both companies that have indicated they will utilize the MPS (i.e., Ameren
and Dynegy) have estimated that from 2015 forward they will be achieving greater than
90% mercury emissions reductions system-wide, an assessment that the Illinois EPA
agrees with, the issue of demonstrating that the CAMR caps will be met should be readily
achievable. In fact, the Illinois EPA estimates that all companies will be achieving 90%
or greater mercury emissions reductions from 2015 forward, which is significantly more
stringent than the Federal CAMR caps.
WHEREFORE, for the reasons set forth above, the Illinois EPA requests that the
Board enter an order denying the Motion to Schedule Additional Hearings.
Respectfully submitted,
ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY
By:
/s/__________________
Charles E. Matoesian
Assistant Counsel
Division of Legal Counsel
DATED: August 31, 2006
1021 North Grand Avenue, East
P.O. Box 19276
Springfield, Illinois 62794-9276
217.782.5544
217.782.9807 (fax)
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ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, AUGUST 31 2006
STATE OF ILLINOIS
)
)
SS
COUNTY OF SANGAMON
)
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, the undersigned, an attorney, state that I have served electronically the attached
RESPONSE TO MIDWEST GENERATION’S MOTION TO SCHEDULE
ADDITIONAL HEARINGS upon the following person:
Dorothy Gunn
Clerk
Illinois Pollution Control Board
James R. Thompson Center
100 West Randolph St., Suite 11-500
Chicago, IL 60601-3218
and mailing it by first-class mail from Springfield, Illinois, with sufficient postage affixed
to the following persons:
SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST
ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY,
__________________________
Charles E. Matoesian
Assistant Counsel
Division of Legal Counsel
Dated: August 31, 2006
1021 North Grand Avenue East
Springfield, Illinois 62794-9276
(217) 782-5544
ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, AUGUST 31 2006
SERVICE LIST 06-25
Marie Tipsord
Hearing Officer
Illinois Pollution Control Board
James R. Thompson Center
100 West Randolph St., Suite 11-500
Chicago, IL 60601-3218
James T. Harrington
David L. Rieser
Jeremy R. Hojnicki
McGuire Woods LLP
77 West Wacker, Suite 4100
Chicago, IL 60601
Bill S. Forcade
Katherine M. Rahill
Jenner & Block LLP
One IBM Plaza
Chicago, IL 60611
William A. Murray
Special Assistant Corporation Counsel
Office of Public Utilities
800 East Monroe
Springfield, IL 62757
S. David Farris
Environmental, Health and Safety
Manager
Office of Public Utilities
City of Springfield
201 East Lake Shore Drive
Springfield, IL 62757
Faith E. Bugel
Howard A. Lerner
Meleah Geertsma
Environmental Law and Policy Center
35 East Wacker Drive
Suite 1300
Chicago, IL 60601
Keith I. Harley
Chicago Legal Clinic
205 West Monroe Street, 4th Floor
Chicago, IL 60606
Christopher W. Newcomb
Karaganis, White & Magel, Ltd.
414 North Orleans Street
Suite 810
Chicago, IL 60610
Katherine D. Hodge
N. LaDonna Driver
Hodge Dwyer Zeman
3150 Roland Avenue
Post Office Box 5776
Springfield, IL 62705-5776
Kathleen C. Bassi
Sheldon A. Zabel
Stephen J. Bonebrake
Joshua R. More
Glenna L. Gilbert
Schiff Hardin LLP
6600 Sears Tower
233 South Wacker Drive
Chicago, IL 60606
Bruce Nilles
Attorney
Sierra Club
122 W. Washington Ave., Suite 830
Madison, WI 53703
James W. Ingram
Senior Corporate Counsel
Dynegy Midwest Generation, Inc.
1000 Louisiana, Suite 5800
Houston, TX 77002
Dianna Tickner
Prairie State Generating Company, LLC
701 Market Street
Suite 781
St. Louis, MO 63101
Mary Frontczak
Peabody Energy
701 Market Street
St. Louis, MO 63101-1826
ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, AUGUST 31 2006
Robert Asplund
5000 Dominion Blvd.
Glen Allen, VA 23060
Daniel McDevitt
General Counsel
Midwest Generation, LLC
440 S. LaSalle Street, Suite 3500
Chicago, IL 60605
ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, AUGUST 31 2006