ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
April 8, 1993
KEWANEE COMMUNITY UNIT SCHOOL
)
DISTRICT NO. 229,
Petitioner,
V.
)
PCB 93-39
(UST Fund)
ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL
)
PROTECTION AGENCY,
)
Respondent.
ORDER OF THE BOARD (by J. Theodore Meyer):
This matter is before the Board on a March 30, 1993 motion
£ or summary judgment, filed by respondent Illinois Environmental
Protection Agency (Agency). Petitioner Kewanee Community Unit
School District No. 229 (Kewanee) filed its response in
opposition to the motion on April 2, 1993.
The Agency contends that all costs which are the subject of
this appeal were incurred before Kewanee notified the Illinois
Emergency Services and Disaster Agency (ESDA). The Agency points
to prior Board decisions holding that costs incurred before ESDA
was notified of a release should not be reimbursed. (North
Suburban Development Corp. v. Illinois Environmental Protection
Agency (December 19, 1991), PCB 91—109; Kronon Motor Sales, Inc.
v. Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (January 9, 1992),
PCB 91-138, aff’d. Kronon Motor Sales, Inc. v. Pollution Control
Board (1st Dist. October 30, 1992), No. 1-92-1032.) Thus, the
Agency maintains that because the costs in dispute were clearly
incurred before notification of ESDA, and because the disputed
costs in combination with the $10,000 deductible total more than
the amount sought by Kewanee, there are no reimbursable costs for
the Agency to pay. The Agency asserts that there is no genuine
issue of material fact, and that it is entitled to summary
judgment.
In response, Kewanee disputes the Agency’s contention that
there is no genuine issue of material fact. Kewanee states that
it does not dispute that a $10,000 deductible is applicable, nor
does it dispute that costs incurred before ESDA notification do
not qualify for reimbursement. However, Kewanee does contend
that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to how much of
the disputed costs were billed prior to ESDA notification.
Kewanee argues that the Agency has erroneously doubled the
expenditures for two months before ESDA notification, by listing
the backup for the invoices as separate bills. Kewanee has
included an affidavit from its consultant, stating that two pages
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of costs referred to by the Agency (R. at 69, 82) are not
separate bills but are documentation of two invoices. (R. at 62,
65.) In sum, Kewanee maintains that because of this factual
dispute, summary judgment must be denied.
After reviewing the record, the Board finds that there is a
genuine issue of material fact as to what costs were incurred
prior to ESDA notification. It is not possible to tell, from the
face of the record, whether the pages in dispute comprise
separate bills or backup documentation. Because there is a
genuine issue of material fact, summary judgment is not
appropriate. Therefore, the Agency’s motion is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
I, Dorothy M. Gunn, Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control
Bo~r~.hereby certi~ythat the above order was adopted on the
-
day of
________________,
1993, by a vote of ~
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~borothy M. Gu~n, Clerk
Illinois Po1,~4ition Control Board
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