ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
    July 30, 1992
    SHEREX CHEMICAL COMPANY, INC.,
    )
    Petitioner,
    v.
    )
    PCB 91—202
    (Permit Appeal)
    ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL
    )
    PROTECTION AGENCY,
    )
    )
    Respondent.
    ORDER OF THE BOARD (by N. Nardulli):
    This matter is before the Board on Sherex Chemical Company,
    Inc.’s (Sherex) motion for summary judgment filed June 5, 1992.
    On June 24, 1992 the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency
    (Agency) filed a motion to file its response and cross motion for
    summary judgment instanter. The Agency’s motion to file
    instanter is granted. On July 5, 1992, Sherex filed its response
    to the Agency’s cross motion.
    BACKGROUND
    The facts are not in dispute. Sherex purchased its Mapleton
    facility in 1979 from Ashland Chemical Company (Ashland).
    Ashland purchased the property in 1967 from Archer—Daniels—
    Midland Company (ADM). While ADM owned the property, it operated
    a high pressure alcohol reactor (HPAreactor). ADM cleaned the
    reactor with a nitric acid cleaning solution which contained
    copper and cadmium. The cleaning solution was disposed of on—
    site until 1975 or 1976, after which the solution was sent off—
    site for disposal.
    The HPA reactor on—site disposal area at the Mapleton
    facility was added to Illinois’ State Remedial Action Priorities
    List (SRAPL)1 and investigatory efforts were performed by Sherex.
    Ashland, Sherex and the Agency agreed to jointly fund a Remedial
    Investigation (RI) and also agreed to pursue costs from ADM. The
    final RI was completed in May of 1988 at a cost of $300,000.
    The RI concluded that the cleaning material had not shown
    significant migration and recommended further monitoring and
    installation of an additional well.
    The Board notes that on June 25, 1992, the Illinois
    Appellate Court, Fourth Judicial District, held that
    the Agency’s regulations purporting to authorize the
    SRAPL are void. (States Land Improvement Corp.
    V.
    IEPA
    No. 4—91—0365, slip op. (June 25, 1992).)
    0135-0131

    2
    In March, 1988, the Illinois Attorney General, at the
    request of the Agency, filed a civil action against ADM for the
    recovery of response costs. ADM filed a contribution action
    against Ashland and Sherex and Ashland and Sherex filed
    counterclaims. On January 7, 1991, the federal district court
    entered a consent decree agreed to by ADM, Sherex, Ashland, the
    State and the Agency governing past and future response costs.
    On September 20, 1991, the Agen~yissued Sherex’s RCRA Part
    B Permit. The permit designates certain sites at the Mapleton
    facility as Solid Waste Management Units (SWMU) subject to
    corrective action, including investigation and possible remedial
    action. Sherex filed a permit appeal with the Board challenging
    the designation of the SWNU5. Pursuant to a stipulation
    agreement, Sherex and the Agency have resolved all issues
    appealed by Sherex except for item #14 in Section III of the
    permit designating the HPA reactor disposal area as a SWMU.
    DISCUSSION
    The parties agree that there are no genuine issues of
    material fact and that the only question remaining is whether the
    Agency’s designation of the HPA reactor area as a SWMU is
    improper because the Agency has already agreed to the appropriate
    remediation in the consent decree which also releases the parties
    from future claims. In a permit appeal before the Board, the
    issue is whether the disputed permit condition is necessary to
    accomplish the purposes of the Environmental Protection Act (Act)
    and Board regulations. (Joliet Sand & Gravel v. IPCB (3d Dist.
    1987), 163 Ill. App. 3d 830, 516 N.E.2d 955, 958.) Because the
    Board is presented with motions for summary judgment, the proper
    inquiry is whether, as a matter of law, the designation of the
    HPA reactor area as a SWMU is necessary to accomplish the
    purposes of the Act and Board regulations in light of the consent
    decree. To decide this issue, the Board must compare the
    provisions of the consent decree and the permit condition.
    The section of the permit governing corrective action
    provides that Sherex shall submit to the Agency a “written RCRA
    Facility Investigation (RFI) Phase I Workplan to document the
    absence or presence of hazardous waste or hazardous constituents”
    from the
    “SRAPL
    site (HPA reactor cleaning solution area).” (R.
    162-63.) The requirements for the RFI Phase I Workplan are
    outlined in Attachment A which provides that the purpose of Phase
    I is to demonstrate conclusively whether or not any release of
    hazardous wastes or constituents has occurred from the SWNU. (R.
    184.) If the Agency determines that the data submitted in the
    Phase I Workplan establishes that no release occt~rred, no further
    action is required. (R. 163.) If the Agency concludes a release
    did occur, Sherex must submit a Phase II Workplan to determine
    the extent of migration. (R. 163.) The Agency will determine
    whether corrective action is necessary based upon the Phase II
    0135-0138

    3
    Workplan. (R. 163.) These provisions are sta;~iard “boiler-
    plate” language in RCP.A Part B Permits. (Pet. Mot. for Suinm.
    Judg. Ex. E Dep. James Moore at 63.)
    The consent decree recognizes that there was an actual and
    threatened release of copper and cadmium, which are hazardous
    substances, from the SRAPL HPA reactor disposal area at the
    Napleton site. (Pet. Mot. for Summ. Judg. Ex. C at 3.) The
    parties agreed that the State would be reimbursed for past and
    certain future response costs and that ADM, Ashland and Sherex
    will share past, future and contingent response costs.
    (~
    at
    4.) The decree provides that the State or its designee may
    undertake a monitoring program to determine the levels of cadmium
    and copper in the groundwater and that the Agency, in
    consultation with the other parties, will determine which wells
    to sample, the method of sampling and the schedule for sampling
    and analysis.
    (I~
    at 6.) The decree creates a fund allowing
    the state to perform further response action, possibly including
    the construction of a slurry wall.
    (~
    at 7—10.) The release
    section of the decree, which is the focal point of the Agency’s
    cross motion for summary judgment, provides as follows:
    In consideration of the mutual promises and undertakings
    contained herein, the parties agree that upon entry of this
    Consent Decree, they hereby release each other.. .froin any
    and all claims of any party to the disposal of spent nitric
    acid wash from the !WA reactor at the Mapleton site,
    including all claims which were raised or which could have
    been raised with respect thereto.
    Further, nothing in this Consent Decree shall be construed
    as a release of any right to bring an action to redress
    violations of this Consent Decree or of any applicable State
    or Federal laws or regulations or to obtain response costs
    with respect to the migration of hazardous substances from
    the Site or to the Site from another site.
    (j~
    at 13—15.)
    Sherex contends that the language of the consent decree bars
    the Agency from requiring any corrective action for the SRAPL HPA
    reactor site unless such action is required by the consent
    decree. The Agency contends that the release language quoted
    above preserves the Agency’s right to designate the SRAPL site as
    a SWMU subject to corrective action.
    The second paragraph of the release language quoted above
    preserves the right to bring an action to enforce the terms of
    the consent decree or an action to enforce any applicable laws or
    regulations. This language simply preserves the Agency’s ability
    to bring an enforcement action to address violations of the Act
    0135-0139

    4
    or regulations. Designation of the SRAPL site as a SWMU during
    the permitting process is not an “action to redress violations”
    of the laws or regulations. Contrary to the Agency’s contention,
    this release language does not preserve the right to impose
    permit conditions.
    The first paragraph of the release quoted above provides
    that the parties have agreed to release each other from any
    “claims” relating to the disposal of acid nitric wash at the HPA
    reactor disposal area which were raised or could have been
    raised. However, the Agency’s authority to impose a permit
    condition is not a claim. The Board finds that this language by
    itself does not preclude the Agency from imposing permit
    conditions relating to the HPA reactor area.
    Based upon a review of the release provisions, the Board
    finds that this language preserves the Agency’s ability to bring
    certain enforcement actions and that the release does not
    preclude the Agency from imposing permit conditions. Apart from
    the release provisions of the decree, however, the Board is still
    left with the question of whether the remaining provisions of the
    decree prevent the Agency from requiring further response action
    with regard to the SRAPL HPA reactor site.
    The consent decree governs corrective action necessitated by
    the release of cadmium and copper which was present in the nitric
    acid solution used in cleaning the HPA reactor and disposed of
    on-site at the Mapleton facility. The parties agree that this
    consent decree was entered into after adding the HPA reactor
    disposal area to the SRAPL and the completion of the Remedial
    Investigation (RI) funded by Ashland, Sherex and the Agency. The
    subject matter of the decree and the challenged permit condition
    is identical. Both the decree and the permit condition concern.
    the release of cadmium and copper from the HPA reactor disposal
    area. The consent decree sets forth the Agency’s agreement as to
    the appropriate corrective action to be performed at the SRAPL
    HPA reactor disposal area. The challenged permit condition
    requires that Sherex perform certain studies investigating the
    occurrence of a release from the SRAPL HPA reactor disposal area.
    The Board concludes that because the Agency has entered into
    a consent decree agreeing to the corrective action measures to be
    performed at the SRAPL HPA reactor site as a result of the
    release of cadmium and copper, it is barred from imposing a
    permit condition designating that same site as a SWMU subject to
    investigation and corrective action.
    Moreover, the Board finds that, as a matter of law, the
    challenged permit condition requiring investigation into whether
    a release has occurred and possible corrective action is not
    necessary to accomplish the purposes of the Act and regulations.
    While the parties have focused on the release provisions of the
    0135-ORO

    5
    consent decree, they have failed to focus on whether the
    challenged condition is necessary to accomplish the purposes of
    the Act and regulations. As noted above, this is the proper
    inquiry in a permit appeal before the Board. Here, this inquiry
    must be addressed in the context of a motion for summary
    judgment.
    Citing 35 Ill. Adm. Code 724.201, the Agency does make the
    general assertion that the condition is consistent with the
    Board’s regulations. However, Section 724.201 merely provides
    that owners and operators seeking hazardous waste disposal
    permits must institute corrective action for all releases from
    SWMUs. This general provision does not support the Agency’s
    imposition of the challenged permit condition in light of the
    investigative and remedial actions taken by the parties to the
    consent decree. •The instant condition is not necessary because a
    release has already been identified, a RI has been performed
    assessing the extent of migration and appropriate corrective
    action has been established. To require, by way of a permit
    condition, actions which have already been undertaken pursuant to
    a consent decree does nc~thingto further the purposes of the Act
    or regulations. Theref.re, the Board reverses the Agency’s
    imposition of the permit condition designating the SRAPL HPA
    reactor site as a SWMU subject to corrective action. Sherex’s
    motion for summary judgment is granted. The Agency’s cross
    motion for summary judgment is denied. The Agency is instructed
    to strike the challenged condition from Sherex’s RCRA Part B
    Permit.
    The Board notes that the stipulation entered into by Sherex
    and the Agency provides that “the parties will request a
    continuance of the hearing as it concerns three itents)...to
    allow Sherex to complete its the sic) proposed sampling and
    analysis plan...and in order to allow the Agency to complete its
    review of) Sherex’s sampling and analysis results.” However,
    the stipulation also provides that the stipulation will. be
    implemented by means of a permit application filed by Sherex
    -after completion of the sampling results. Sherex also states in
    its memorandum in support of summary judgment that “ajfter
    completion of the sampling the parties hope to be able to resolve
    all remaining issues. If not, the hearing will resume.” (Mem.
    at 3 fn. 3.) Sherex’s motion for summary judgment does not
    indicate that it is a partial motion for summary judgment, but
    rather states that the issue concerning the designation of the
    SRAPL HPA reactor site as a SWNU is the “only issue currently
    pending in its appeal of the RCRA Part B Permit”.
    ~
    at 1.)
    Although the parties have agreed to continue the hearing in this
    docket, they have also agreed that any issues stemming from the
    three “sampling items” will be dealt with via a new permit
    application. The Board concludes that the instant order disposes
    of all remaining issues in this docket and, therefore, this
    docket is closed.
    0135-01
    I~
    1

    6
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    B. Forcade concurs.
    Section 41 of the Environmental Protection Act (Ill. Rev.
    Stat. 1991, ch. 111 1/2, par. 1041) provides for the appeal of
    final Board orders within 35 days. The Rules of the Supreme
    Court of Illinois establish filing requirements. (But see also,
    35 Ill. Adm. Code 101.246, Motions for Reconsideration, and
    Casteneda
    V.
    Illinois Human Rights Commission (1989), 132 Ill. 2d
    304, 547 N.E.2d 437.)
    I, Dorothy M. Gunn, Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control
    Board, hereby cert~fythat the above order was adopted on the
    ~
    day of
    ____________
    ,
    1992 by a vote of
    ~-~‘
    Dorothy N. G~(j’in, Clerk
    Illinois PolU/ution Control Board
    0135-01142

    Back to top