ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
October 25, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE STATE
OF ILLINOIS,
Complainant,
v.
)
PCB 90-84
(Enforcement)
WE-TOAST BREAD
COMPANY, INC.,
Respondent.
PAMELA CIARROCCHI APPEARED FOR COMPLAINANT
ROBERT MELTZER, ROBERT MELTZER & ASSOCIATES APPEARED FOR
RESPONDENT
CONCURRING OPINION (by
3.
Anderson):
As the Board’s Opinion of this same day recites, on August
30, 1990, the Board requested additional information from the
People, to which Board Members Ronald Flemal and I voted in
dissent. The Opinion then states that the Attorney General1s
October 15, 1990 response “assisted the Board in resolving this
matter.”
I have concurred here so as to make clear that the reason
that I believe that the Attorney General’s response was of
assistance is because it verifies the views expressed in our
earlier dissent as to why the additional information should not
have been requested in the first place.
For example, specific questions articulated in the Board’s
August 30, 1990, request for information still remain
unanswered. We still have no idea why Wee—Toast went so long
without getting a permit. Nor do we know whether it got the
permit after it got a “Section 31(d)” notice (I consider delaying
compliance until threatened as an aggravating factor; the
response says only that Wee—Toast complied “prior to initiation
of the enforcement action.” (AG response, p. 5)). If we are to
assume that “genuine” efforts toward compliance have been made
(AG response, p. 5), what does that mean here? Also, we have no
idea of the nature of Wee—Toast’s financial difficulty, including
the length of time Wee—Toast has been operating at a loss (six
months?, six years?). (AG response, p. 5) “Operating at a loss”
can mean many things.
As the Attorney General points out, he considered mitigation
“in the context of negotiations”, (AG response p. 3) including
115—431
—2—
court precedent; he also points out that the penalty was three
times what this Board was able to get in the recent Modine
case. Modine Manufacturing Company v. Pollution Control Board,
193 Ill. App. 3d 643, 549 N.E.2d 1379 (2nd Dist. 1990).
Additionally, he got admissions of the violations (which might
here be more important in terms of deterrance than the
penalty). In any event, one still can only speculate as to how
the Attorney General balanced the factors he selected so as to
end up with the $3000 amount. I don’t believe it makes sense
——
and it is certainly not fruitful
——
to rely on the method of
inquiry and response used here; it purports to, but really can’t,
elicit from the negotiated settlement process the kind of
information the Board really needs to determine whether the
penalty is appropriate. What if there had been no admissions and
thus no findings of violation; how would we evaluate that in
relation to a “penalty”? If we have real concerns, we should
shift into the full hearing record process and then exercize our
own independent judgment.
Most all of us share the belief that our penalties are
generally much too low to assure that compliance, not
noncompliance, is rewarded; however, I don’t believe we should
fail to recognize that the Attorney General and we share the same
problem, the state courts. With rare exception the courts
continue to believe that operating without a permit is no big
deal unless the environmental equivalent of bodily injury has
occurred. Maybe we need to articulate better the reality of what
happens to the system of environmental protection when persons
operate outside a permit setting and why it is so important to
deter this kind of activity. In any event, I hope that the new
“penalty powers” legislation as well as the earlier amendments to
Section 33(a) and (c) of the Act regarding compliance will
succeed in achieving a turnaround.
It is for these reasons that I respectfully concur.
~
~-/~/~
~ /
,~oanG. Anderson
Board Member
I, Dorothy M. Gunn, Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control
Board, hereby certify that the above Concurring Opinion was
submitted on the .3crtZ day of ~
,
1990.
Dorothy ~
Clerk
Illinois ~llution Control Board
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