ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
June 13, 1985
THOMAS E. GREENLAND,
an Individual,
Complainant,
PCB 84—155
CITY OF LAKE FOI~T, ILLINOIS     
)
a Municipal Corpc;:ation,         
)
Respondent.
THOMAS E, GREENLAND APPEARED ON HIS OWN BEHALF.
MURRAY R, CONZELMANI, OF CONZELMAN, SCHULTZ, SNARSKI & MULLEN AND
THOMAS H. COMPERE, CITY ATTORNEY, APPEARED ON BEHALF OF
RESPONDENT.
OPINION AND ORDER OF THE BOARD (by 
J. 
Marlin):
This matter comes before the Board upon an October 17, 1984
complaint filed by Thomas E. Greenland against the City of Lake
Forest (City) alleging that the City is in violation of Section 9
of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act (Act), Ill, Rev.
Stat. 1983, ch, 111 1/2 
,  
par. 1009, by permitting leaf burning
pursuant to a city ordinance, Mr. Greenland also alleges that
the City is in violat:Lon of two Board regulations, 35 Ill. Adm,
Code 237.102 (prohibition on open burning) and Section 237.120(c)
(open burning of landscape waste). The City’s motion to dismiss
was denied by the Board on January 10, 1985, Hearing was held on
January 16 and Februa-:y 6, 1985 in Lake Forest, Illinois. Board
Orders relating to a briefing schedule were issued on March 7 and
April 
4, 
1985.
PRELIMINARY 
ISSUES
A few preliminary issues need to be disposed of first. The
Board denies the oral motion to strike at page 83 of the
transcript and affirms the decision of the hearing officer. The
question asked by the City, although capable of being answered
with a yes or no, apparently elicited a clarification statement
and question from the witness, The City certainly could have
answered the first or second question of the witness or objected
and let the hearing off:icer decide, The City chose to let the
witness ramble and then move to strike, Arguably the response
was responsive to the question asked, and the Board will let the
response stand,
A second issne involves Complainantts Exhibit 1 which was a
study by the then Illinois Institute of Natural Resources (IINR)
64-233
2
now Department of Energy and Natural Resources (DENR) entitled
“Advisory Report on the Potential Health Effects of Leaf
Burning,” Document No. 78/19, December 1978,, Project No.
90.002. The 
City objected to 
its admission on hearsay grounds
because it could not cross-examine the author and ascertain the
authoritativeness of the study~ Mr. Greenland countered that it
was offered as a breatise 
or a atudy.  The hearing officer
overruled the 
Cit.y~s 
objection 
and admitt.ed the 
document. While
the document is hearsay the 
i~oard 
~,i1laccept the document under
the Board’s rule regarding admission of 
evidence, 
located at 35
Ill. Adm. Code 
103.204, 
which allows evidence which is “material,
relevant and wcr.~ be relied upon by reasonably prudent persons
in 
the conduct 
cS: 
curious affairs.  
..           
Id. In the instant case,
the Advisory Report was issued 
by the IINR 
in regulatory
proceeding R73--5 (See 40 PCB 
8l~ 
December 4, 1980; 13 PCB 645,
September 19, i974)~
Although the 
respondent is 
entitled to the procedural
safeguards of testimony 
under 
o.~th/ cross~-examination, and
confrontation of 
w,itriesses, 
the Board holds that 
there is enough
reliability to the 
document. to 
cu~eany absence of these
safeguards as 
to 
this document, since the agency has been
statutorily mandated to perform such a study, IL. REV. STAT.
1979, ch. 961/2, pars. 
7401 ~h)  (1) and 
7403 
(5~.
DISCUSSION
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: SECTI~JNS 9 AND 10
Mr. Greenland is a resident of 
Lake Forest. The City is a
municipal corporation  
of 
the 
State 
of Illincrs  located 
in Lake
County.  The City 
population 
is approximately 15,245 while that
of the County is in excess of 
440 
p000 people.  
At t:he heart of
the controversy 
is 
the 
leaf burninq 
ord:inance 
of the 
City,
adopted October 
13, 
i9~4ç 
which perr~its leaf burning (See Joint
Exhibit 1).
Mr. Greenland alleges 
that the City has 
violated Section 9
of 
the Act, 
which in 
pertinent parl:.r 
provides as 
follows:
No 
person 
shali~
a)   
Cause or threaten or allow the diseharce or emission of
any contaminant into the environment in any State so as
to 
cause 
or tend to 
cause air pollution in 
Illinois,
either alone or in combination with contaminants from
other sources, 
or 
so as 
t.o violate regulations  
or
standards 
adopted by the Board under this Act;
*
c)   
Cause or allow the open burning of refuse,  conduct any
salvage operation by 
open, burning, or cause or allow the
burning :~i 
any refuse in any chamber not specifically
~4.~234
3
designed for the purpose and approved by the Agency
pursuant to regulations adopted by the Board under this
Act; except that the Board 
may adopt regulations
permitting  open burning 
of refuse in certain cases upon
a finding that no harm will result  from such burning,  or
that any 
alternative method of disposing of such refuse
would create a safety hazard so extreme as to justify
the pollution  that would result  from such burning.
***
This. Section shall not limit the burning of landscape
wacte 
upon 
the premises where it is produced or at sites
provided and supervised by any unit of local government,
except within any county having a population of more
than 200,000, Added by P,A. 82—678, eff. 1—1—821.
Section 3(s) defines person to include political sub-
divisions and corporations.
Section  10 
is a limitation 
on 
the Board’s authority and
provides as follows:
The Board, pursuant to procedures prescribed in Title
VII of this Act, may adopt regulations to promote the
purposes of this Title,  
Without limiting  the generality
of this authority, such regulations may among other
things prescribe:
***
The Board may not adopt any regulation banning the
burning of landscape waste throughout the State
generally, The Board may, by regulation, restrict or
prohibit the burning sic landscape waste within any
geographical area of the State if it determines based on
medical and biological evidence generally accepted by
the scientific community that such burning will produce
in the atmosphere of that geographical area contaminants
in sufficient quantities and of such characteristics and
duration as to be injurious to humans, plant, or animal
life, or health,
The cardinal  rule in construing  a statute  is to ascertain
and give effect  to the intent of the legislature.   
People v.
Boykin, 94 Iii, 2d 138, 445 N.E. 2d 1174  (1983).   
In order to
determine this intent,  one 
must first look to the statutory
language itself.   
If the meaning of the language itself  is clear
on its face, then 
it will be given effect,   
Where the meaning of
the language is ambiguous, one must look to the legislative
history.   
Id,
The City contends that. 
Section 9  is invalid  because it is
inconsistent  c~iith Section 10.  The Board disagrees.   
Section 9
64-235
establishes a statutory prohibition against the burning of
landscape wastes in counties over 200,000 in ~opuiation. Section
10 limits the Board’s regulatory autnorlty in this area and does
not address the statutory  ban 
of Sect~on 
9.  
The language of the
statute on its face is 
clear~ 
The 
i~1oard need 
not. look to the
legislative history, Whie 
Section 9 
was arnenced in 
1981, the
General Assembly simultaneousl~ chose to amend the Section 10
limiting paragraph 
by replacirg 
the ~~iord :Le~.~s”with 
“landscape
wastes.”  
The legislature  
continued its Sect.ioL~ 10  limitation  on
Board authority  ‘ret   also decided in Sec~:ion ~) to ban the burning
of landscape wa~•:~within any cc~un’::yhaving  a poouiation of more
than 200,000, 1 ction 10 should not be 
read, as the City does,
to limit the Se’., ion 9  ban,  -:~berefore the open burning of
landscape wastes i.n counties having populations  
of greater  than
200, 000 
is 
flatly  
proh:ihited by the Act, ru counties 
having
populations  
of less than 200,000 
F     
it: ~s ai!o~edby state law only
if it is burned upon the premises where it is croduced or at
sites provided and supervised  by any unit, of local qovernment.
The City mistakenly reJe~ on t.t&e Attorrte3 General’s Opinion
No, 
S—633, October 16, l~iT’i. Thau opinion was Issued 
before the
new amendments and does net control  the statutory  
construction of
Sections  9  and 10 (See effect of opinion on regulations,
discussed 
below 
under 
BOARD REGbnATIONS 
i-:eading),   Furthermore,
the City’s assertion 
that 
the Attorney 
Genora1~s 
opinion is
legally binding on a state agency is without tier:, The opinion
was merely an advisory opin:~oniDrovided 
to an 
Agency. Such an
opinion has been held to 
be nonbinding on the Illinois Supreme
Court and appellate  courts,   
Ci~o   
rinrfieldv,Allhth,    
74
Ill, 2d 117, 384 
N.E. Vt 310 (19~8~ Rç~ers 
Park ?ost.No, 108 v.
Brenza, 8 Iii. 2d 
286. (L956L tong 
~    
Loni.,~, 15 11.1, 
App, 2d 276,
145 N.E. 2d 
509 
(2d Dist, L357~, The latest 
court 
decision on
this issue emanates 
from che Fiy:vt Appeliate 
District, which
stated,  
“ 
we  
are 
aware 
that the Attorney General’s 
opinion does
not have the force 
ant effect of 
law,”  ~nidz~r’i.J~s~r,           
118
Ill. App. 3d 83, 454 N.E. 2d i0’?O 
(1st 
Disc, =1983), This
interpretation   
is 
binding on the Board~ 
~~he~_y.Medendorp,          
294
Ill. App. 424, 13 ~,E,   
2d 1015 Li938~.  The cases cited by the
City do not support. its contention  the: the op:nion of the
Attorney General is 
binding on the Foat’d. The City 
is confusing
the issue of precedent~ul ciaiue ~Tit.h the non—issue of
representation.    
The ~nice!arkd decision and 
related cases are
solely based on the authority of the Attorney 
General as the
chief legal officer of the nrrmte oct oco he may 
represent.
Peopleexre 
Scott 
v.B:r’celand. 
~i1  
11.1. Id 4F5, 
359 N.E. 2d 149
(1976). Briceland does not address whether tns opinion of the
Attorney General is of precedentiaJ. value,
“CAUSE OR ALLOW” AIR PDL~1’iON
The issues then become whether the City has caused or
allowed the discharge  o1  a contaminant  so as::o cause or tend to
cause air pollution  pursuant 
to 
Section 9 a)  
arid whether the
City caused or allowed the open burning of refuse pursuant to
5
9(c).  
A “contarrilnanti is any 
soli.d~ liquid, or gaseous matter,
any odor or any form of energy,  from whatever source”   
(Section
3(d)).   
Leaf smoke contains  contautinant.s,
Whether the City caused or allowed the discharge  of a
cont.aminant  by the existence  
of 
its municipal  ordinance
permitting leaf 
burning in violation  
of a state statute is 
one of
first impression before the Board,. The Second District Appellate
Court entertained the cause or allow clause of Section 9(a) and
stated that 
the 
respondent  
must “~exercise1 sufficient control
over the sourc’ of the 
oiluticn.”   
Phillips  Petroleum Co. v.
IEPA, et al., 
.     
Ill. 
App.. 3d 2?, 390 N.E. Vt 620 (2d Dist.
1979) 
,     
The Fiit~. 
i 
District, in construing identical language in
Section 12(a) of the Act~ affirmed the Board and found that the
respondent “had the capability of controlling the pollutional
discharge.” Meadowiark Farms, Thc~v. IPCB, et: al., 17 Ill. App.
3d 851, 308 N.E. 2~i826 (5th Diet, 1974) Freeman Coal Mining
Corp. v. IPCB, et at,, 21 III. App. 3d 
:is’/, 
313 N.E. 2d 616 (5th
Dist. 1974)  In interpreting the word allow 
F      
the Board has found
that one can allow a discharge by poor practices which contribute
to the problem. Ifl?Av. Sat’n~ inc. 
cc 
el., PCb ;1—52; Bath, Inc.
et a., v. IEPA, PCP 71~224,. (ccnsol.), 2 PCB 433, September 16,
1971. The Fourth Uistr:i,ct~. in fit~dnci t:.he 
Board, 
noted that to
argue that a violation cannot be prethcated upon the existence of
burning in the absence of: a finding that: respondent by its
affirmative act caused,...the burnicg~ is not: persuasive. Bath,
Inc. et al. v. IPCB, etal., 
10  1)1, App 
Id 507,. 294 N.E. 2d 778
(4th Dist. 1973).
Herein, the Board finds that. the 
City 
uas caused or allowed
the discharge of conra’~inantc into 
the 
environment, Although the
leaves are burned on private property, the City has openly
encouraged it.s residents to burn .ieaves by 
passing 
an ordinance
in direct contravention of the state stetutory ban on leaf
burning contained in Section 9 of oLe Act, The record shows that
in fact 17 percent  ol the residents  
do burn leaves  (R, 32).  
The
Phillips test of 
suff:Lcient  cont:ro  
over the source of the
pollution  has been satisfied,   
)3ad 
the 
City 
obeyed the statutory
mandate and enforced  iL~ 
the wthe~~readburning of leaves in the
City would not occur~
Air Pollution: Injurto   
Heaoth.  
Environment or Property
Whether the City caused or ~endcG 
...~  
cause air 
pollution is
another 
issue.  Section 3~h.~ 
det:oies air ~oilution. In
interpreting this SCCt~OflF the Illinois Supreme Court
distinguishes two types 
of 
air pollution, Incinerator, Inc. v.
PCB, 
59 
Ill. 2d 290, 319 N.E  dd 
794 
~1974),     
The first  is
pollution  that is 
injuriouc to riu~tich,. cite 
erivircnment,  
or
property, The second is a nuisance type where 
there is an
unreasonable  interference  with the enjoyment: of Life 
or property.
As for the first: ‘cyoe or air collutior.,  
the record herein
amply demonstra:es  that leaf smoke 
and the 
constituents  
therein
64-237
6
satisfy the first 
and second type of air pollution  
as defined in
Section 3(b). Dr. Ryan testified that the hydrocarbons, present
in leaf smoke, are irritating antigens which cause the body’s
immunological system to respond by producing histamines to combat
the foreign objects (R,l2), Those with allergies and susceptible
to asthma attacks not only display itchiness of the eyes, but
also have other multiple symptoms (R.10). Dr. Addono, an allergy
specialist defined allergies as abnormal responses to normal
exposures of things in the environment (R. 73). The allergic
response can include coughing, wheezing, increased mucous
production and a possibility of secondary iniection (R. 73). Dr.
Ryan described his own allergic response whereby his bronchial
tree secretes excess mucous which overly constricts the bronchial
tubes, thereby causing difficulty in breathing (R. 10), termed
asthma (R. 73). Asthmatic children are prone to pneumonia (R.
ii). In order to reverse asthma, aerosols are injected down the
bronchial tree to break up the mucous so it can be expelled from
the body and drugs such as adrenaline are used to dilate the
bronchial tubes for easier breathing. Aerosol injection can be
by a pocket inhalator and can include time on a breathing machine
at an allergist’s office, Dr., Addono stated that. in his opinion,
there was a causal connection between exposure to leaf smoke and
illnesses such as asthma and chronic bronchitis, apparently in
aggravating these conditions R77—78)., Leaf smoke is materially
irritating to those who have a~ respiratory disease, not solely
asthma (R. 76), Besides illnesses, the doctor testified tht one
particular hydrocarbon in oak leaves is carcinogenic (Id.) Mr.
Lubes stated that there were a lot of oak trees in his
subdivision,  
located in the City (R 86—87),
Dr. Addorto testif:Led that as the leaves die, mold spores
disperse and can trigger allergic reactions. Disturbance of the
leaves by wind and raking may release many spores, but burning
releases billions of spores into the air (R, 75). On leaf
burning days the sports activities of asthmatic children are
curtailed and on bad days sleep is interrupted because of
breathing abnormalities (R..92)
Referring to her eldest daughter, one witness, Mrs. Ryan,
testified that niormally she misses, I would say, five to six
weeks of school in the fall.” (R, 23). ‘~Shecoughs so much that
walking across the room becomes a great big deal.” (Id.).
Furthermore, “...tshe can’t go to football games and things that
lots of kids in high school like to do. it is just because the
air is full of smoke in the fall,” (R, 24).
“..,I know so 
many other 
kids who miss time in
school and who don~tget to do the 
normal 
things the kids
enjoy doing in the fall, 
:~ust because 
of 
all this stuff
in the air. Arid it 
is a shame.  
For several years I was
just so busy trying to keep our family afloat that it
never occurred to me that. this is maybe very unnecessary,
and when I realized it is not done in highland Park, it
is not done in Deerfield, I think, my goodness, what is
64-238
7
the matter 
here 
that our children have to go through this
kind of thing. Because we burn leaves?~’ (R. 26).
To provide some indication of to how many people are
involved, Dr. Addono testified that in the United States 10 to 12
percent of the populace have lower respiratory allergies (R.
79),
As for the first type of air pollution, the Board has
previously found leaf smoke to be an air pollutant and takes
judicial notice of its prior Opinions, After considering the
evidence, the Board stated in a prior Opinion the following:
Dr. George Arnold, on behalf of the Madison County
Sanitation and Pollution Committee, argued that leaf
burning creates a hazard of fire and of traffic
accidents, contributes to the violation of particulate
air quality standards, reduces visibility, endangers
health, and destroys valuable organic matter (R, 64—
67). Several witnesses discussed from personal
experience the adverse health effects of leaf burning,
especially on persons with respiratory problems (R. 214-
32). An allergy specialist testified as to the serious
health effects of burning leaves,, especially those
contaminated with pesticides, upon people with allergies
or respiratory diseases (R. 184—9.)..  In the Matter of Open
Burning Regulations, 2 PCB 373, 374, R70—i. Opinion, September
2, 1971.
Furthermore, the Board was concerned with the solid and
liquid particulates of leaf smoke; solid particulates consisting
of dust, smoke and fumes and 
!iqui.d 
particulates consisting of
mist and spray. in the 
Matt r 
Df 
Oen Burning Regulations, 6 PCB
357, 361, R 72—li Opinion, November 28, 1972, The evidence
cont inued:
Solid particulates, with which we are now concerned,
have a diverse chemical composition, They may exert a
toxic effect in three ways: 1) the particulate may be
intrinsically   
toxic duo to its inherent chemical or
physical characteristics (although few common atmospheric
particulates have been shown to be intrinsically
toxic). 2) The 
particulate  may 
interfere with one or
more of the clearance mechanisms in the respiratory
tract. 3) The particulate may act as a carrier of an
absorbed toxic substance, Particulates sometimes combine
with other pollutants, to form harmful products,
Synergism occurs when two or more pollutants combine to
produce a pollutant more damaging than the sum of the
effects of the ind:Lvidua! ooLLutants 
acting
independently.   
The presence  
of carbon or soot as a
common particulate  poLLutant 
is 
noteworthy, as carbon is
well known as an efficient absorber of a wide range of
organic and inorganic compounds. Carcinogenic materials
have been identified in the atmosphere of virtually all
64-239
large cities  in 
which studies have been conducted and it
may be seen t:hat large quantities  of 
particulates may
help carry these pollut:ants  into the human body.  
(Air
Quality Criteria for Particulate Matt:er, U.S.. Dept. of
Health, Education and Welfare, 
Jan. 
1969, AP—49, Page
137) 
.   ~
Notwithstanding the evidence contained in prior
Board 
Opinions,  the Board 
finds sufficient evidence in
this record 
:‘: 
show that smoke from leaf burning contains
contaminant    
hat are 
injurious to human health and that
leaf burnir: 
.     
oherefore,  is air pollution  under the first
category of 
.~. 
;ti.on 3(b),
The DEk:~ 
advisory report referenced earlier,
submitted  
in Board 
regulatory  proceeding R 73—5,  In the
Matter of Leaf 
Burnin~1, 
generally  supports  the above
record evidence  
(Cplt.~s Exh.. I)..  The advisory report
found the open burning ci leaves to be injurious to human
health  (Id. 
at. 
12),
Air Pollution:   
Unreasonable  Interference
As for the second type of air po:Llutioni recognized
under Section 3(b), to find art unreasonable interference,
the Board must address 
the Section  33(c) factors.
Incinerator, Inc. 
V. 
PCB, 59 Ill. 2d 290, 319 N.E. 2d 794
(1974); Mystik Tape v. PCB, 60 Ill, 2d 330, 328 N.E. 2d 5
(1975); Processing and Books, Inc., et al, v. IPCB et
al,, 64 Iii. 2d 68, 351 N.E. 2d 865 
(1976),   Section
33(c) provides that.
c)  In icakcnq its orders and determinations, the Board
shall take into consideration all the facts and
circumstances hearing upon the reasonableness of
the emissions, discharges, or deposits involved
includ:hiq, but not 
:Limited to:
1)     
character and degree of injury to, or
interference wit:h 
the protection  
of the
heait~, 
general welfare 
and physical property
of the people;
40 PCB 81, December 4, 1980, The Board dismissal of this
proceeding was due to many actors, most important of which were
the probability of a federa.1 respirable standard in the near
future and the Agency withdrawal of the pooposal 
besides  the age
of the proceeding. The 
Board 
stated, however, that dismissal
does not mean “that eiement.s from the record,,,whjch have
continuing  valido.o,~ 
cannot no brought into the 
later record.”
The Board notes t:h~t the 
health aspects  in the study are still
valid,
64~24O
9
2)  the social and 
economic value 
of the pollution
source;
3)    
the 
suitability  
or unsuitability  
of 
the
pollution 
source to the area in which it is
located, including the question of priority of
boat ion in the 
area 
involved; and
4~  the technical  :~racticabi1ity  and 
economic
~~abieness      
of reducing or eliminating  
the
esions, discharges or deposits resulting
I: :on such pollution source.
Concerninc 
..  .~ 
‘I ‘rst factor,~ the City asserts that
notwithstanding 
‘.t~ 
et;ldence on 
health 
above, only 0,04 percent
of the populati::~ testified as to adverse health effects (Resp.
Brief 1—2 incor~c:.:.iy stated as 0,0004). In addition, it asserts
that wood smoke 
•~  
auto exhaust contain the same irritants as
leaf smoke and a’~: in far 
greater number 
(Id. at 
2). The City
appears to misuncurstand  
Its burden of persuasion,   
Mr. Greenland
produced substantial testimony on the health effects of leaf
smoke, yet the City 
failed  to 
rebut this evidence. The evidence
shows substantial injury 
t:o arid ~.nterference     
with the health of
people exposed and 
susceptt.ole  to smoke from leaf 
burning.
As for the second factor, there has been no testimony that
the open burning of leaves ‘is of social or economic value. Even
if one would argue otherwise,, the proper focus is akin to a Board
finding that a properly operated wastewater treatment plant is of
value, which value i.s reduced by inadequate maintenance and
operation. IEPA v~ 
Citi  
crr  lton, 47 PCB 405, 411 
(PCB 81-
145, 1982). There  no intrinsic value in burning leaves.
Economic reasonabbenect is properly considered under the fourth
factor.
Regarding t.he tnirh factor, the City baldly asserts that it
is suitable to burn 
~L5SVOS         
on the property where they were
generated. 
(,~ 
at   
The Board does not agree.. Leaf smoke
knows no boundar:ies~  it leaves the property  of 
origin and drifts
onto other private and 
puh.1~c 
properties.. Testimony has shown
that there are 
many people susceptible to the constituents of
leaf smoke. Based on the evidence presented above, the burning
of leaves in the City 
is 
unsuitable,
The fourth factor, technical 
practicability,   
is not an
issue. The evidence has shown that many alternative options were
studied by the city staff’.. The options included City pick—up,
landscape service, or compnst:ing. 
The City staff 
appears to
favor continuing its ext3ting collection 
system,  This system
requires residents. 
t.o~ bag the leaves with plastic  bags 
provided
by the City at re-..co~ 1  rates,. The City then collects the full
bags with the reçpi.a.: ç~srbage collection, 
The 
City manager
stated at hearitl’:ca’: the City staff 
was recommending to the
64~241
10
City council that leaf burning ~e banned in the City 
(R.. 100).
Currently, forty percent of the resident.s have City 
pick—up,
seventeen percent burn and approximately forty percent employ a
landscaping service to rid their properties of leaves (R.
46,32), Technical and economic feasibility of a:iternatives to
leaf burning are clearly evidenced by the fact that 
83 
percent of
the residents  
currently erarthy chem. Assn~ri.n 
t.nat the City
repeals  its ordinance  
and that all seventeen percent 
of those
burning leaves 
choose 
the City p:ick’-~upplan? the City anticipates
a first year cost of $88, 53U which includes, the 
purchase of a 
new
packer truck for 
$75,000 ~CLty’ Cxhl~it ‘ircI~ Report to City
Council, p. 101). if the cost. of the truck 
it; amortized over ten
years, the annuaL cost of the truc~ is approximately 
$8,000.
Annual operation and maintenance costs will be approximately
$14,150 for personnel and fuel, Nowhere has the 
City argued that
this expenditure  would be 
an arhiti:’ary or unreasonable
hardship. The Board finds that the elimination of 
leaf 
burning
in the City is economically reasonable, The Board further finds
that 
leaf 
burning constitutes an unreasonable 
~nterterence      
with
life or property.
The Board 
finds that. by 
enactment of an ordinance 
in direct
contravention of a state statute, the City 
has caused 
or allowed
the discharge of contaminants into the environment 
so as to 
cause
or tend to cause air pollution in Illinois in violation of
Section 9(a) of the Act, It. has been held 
that  municipal
authorities cannot adopt ordinances which infringe upon the
spirit  of a State law 
or which are repugnant to 
the 
general
policy ‘of the State. Husz~hv, City of Oakbruok Terrace, 41
Ill.. 2d 387, 243 N.E. 2d ~3i ~L968 ;  Ci~rof 
~~en~ov.      
Rowland,
263 Ill. 531, 105 N.E.. 285. (1914). Tue test ~s whether the
ordinance permits an act which the statute prohibits or prohibits
what the statute permit:s :see 
Citcj.~Chica~i.Unio~IceCream
Manufacturing Co., 252 111,, 311, 95 N,E, B72 !‘19.l), and in case
of a conflict, the omct:nance fails. Dean Milk Co. v. 
City of
Chicago, 385 Ill. 565,~ 53 N.E. 2ci 612 ~,i944) Village of
Mundelein v, Hartacit, 11.7 1.11,, App~. 3d 1011, 454 N.E. 2d 29 (2d
Dist, 1983), The municipal ordinance of the 
City 
permits an act
which the statute prt;hioits and, therefore,. lacks force and
effect.   The Court 
in ~sza~jIi found an ordinance to 
be contrary
to public policy and spoke of ilieaality in 
voiding 
the
ordinance. Hus~agh, ~   
The Board declines to declare the
ordinance of the City of 
Lake 
Forest. void as 
being 
unnecessary to
disposition of this case. Iris sufficient 
to 
find that the City
ordinance conflicts with tne banning clause of 
Section  9 of 
the
Act and that therefore the City is 
in violation  of that 
Section
of the Act..
WASTE DEFINITIONSt   
SECTlON~’~:’,
Mr. Greenland further alleqes tnat. the City 
has violated
Section 9(c) of 
the I~ct, The Board 
must construe 
t.he 
definitions
of refuse and waste in 
relation to landscape t~iaste. Refuse is
defined in 
Sect.:on 3 (w) of the 
Act. 
as 
waste, Waste is further
64-242
11
defined  in subsection  (11) as~
...any  garbage,  sludge 
from a 
waste treatment  plant,
water supply 
treatment 
plant, or air pollution control
facility  
or other discarded  material,  
including  solid,
liquid, semi—solid or contained gaseous material
resulting from industrial, commercial, mining and
agricultural  
operations,  
and from community
activities,,.,, (emphasis supplied)..
Waste includes garbage, sludos .:~r other discarded material, The
statutory language provides cert.:.in inclus~.ons, but not to the
exclusion of those categories not. mentioned. The Board
interprets  
the definition  
of waste to include landscape waste and
therefore, leaves. This interpretation is consistent with 1) the
inclusion of the general phrase ~or other discarded material” in
the 
definition 
of waste,  2) 
the 
liberal  construction  
of the Act
as 
provided in Section 
2’:~), and 
3) the legislature’s use of the
word “waste” after 
the 
word “landscape”  in the definition  
of
“landscape waste” irk subsection (uu), which definition does
specifically include leaves,
The Board has found that 
the 
City caused or allowed the
discharge of contaminants so as to cause or tend to cause air
pollution. Likewise, the Board finds that the City has also
caused or allowed the open burning of 
refuse in 
violation of
Section 9 (c) of the Act,
BOARD REGULATIONS: OPEN BURNING
Mr. Greenland asserts that the City is 
in violation  
of 35
Ill. Adm. Code 237,102 and 237.120(c), the open burning of
landscape waste regulations.. The City asserts that they are
invalid.
Section 237.102 provides as follows:
a)  No person shai’,l cause or allow open burning, except as
provided in tiis Part,.
b)   No person 
shall cause or allow 
the burning of 
any refuse
in any chamber or 
apparatus,  unless such chamber or
apparatus is 
designed  
for the 
purpose 
of disposing of
the class of refuse heinq burned..
Section 237.120(c) provides as follows:
The following 
activities  are not in violation  
of Section 9(c)
of the Act (Ill.. Rev. Stat. 198l~ oh, 111 ~ par.. lOO9(c)) or of
this Part unless they cause air pollution as defined in the
Act..  
Nothing in this Section shall 
exempt such activities  
from
applicable  local 
restrictions,
**
B4~243
12
c) 
The open 
burning of landscape waste, but only:
1)  On the premises on which such waste is generated;
and
2) 
When 
atmospheric conditions will readily dissipate
contaminants; and
3) If such burning does not create a visibility hazard
on roadways. railroad tracks or air fields; and
4) In those areas of the State which are not in the
following prohibited areas:
A) Muniripalittes having a population in excess
of 2,500 according to the latest federal
census.
B) Municipalities of any size which adjoin a
municipality having a population in excess of
2,500.
C) All municipalities wholly within 40 air miles
(64.5 kilometers) of Meigs Field, Chicago,
Illinois.
D) All municipalities wholly within 20 air miles
(32.3 kilometers) of McKinley Bridge
connecting St. Louis, Missouri and Venice,
Ilflnois.
E) Rura~. areas 305 meters (1,000 feet) or less
from a munic~.pal1ty in which open burning of
landscape waste is prohibited.
In 1973, by P.A.J8’243, 
the 
Illinois General Assembly
limited the Pollution Control Board’s regulatory authority to
“restrict or prohibit1’ the burning of landscape waste to
situations in which it determines ‘based on medical and
biological evidence generally accepted by the scientific
community that such burning will produce in the atmosphere of
that geographical area contaminants in sufficient quantities and
of such characteristics and duration as to be injurious to
humans, plant, or animal life, or health.’
As previously noted on page 4, in October 1973 the Illinois
Attorney General issued a written opinion finding that the
previously adopted Board regulataon (35 Ill. Adm. Code
237.120(c)) had not been adopted on the basis of this new
standard (IL. A.G. No. 8—633, October 16, 1973). Additionally,
the Attorney General opined that the Board regulation banned the
burning of leaves generally, in excess of the Board’s statutory
authority. While the Board does not agree that it went beyond
64-244
13
its authority and that its regulation banned the burning of
leaves generally, it does agree that Section 237, 120(c) was
promulgated without cons:iderat.ion of the new standard enunciated
in P.A, 78—243 and is therefore invalid, In addition, until a
new open burning of landscape waste regulation is adopted, the
general prohibition section on open b~rning, Section 237.102(a),
is of no effect as to landscape waste 
•     
The Board finds that the
City has not violated Sections 237.102 or 237,120(c).
RELIEF
The Bc~~:dhas 
found the City 
in violation  of 
Sections 9(a)
and 9(c). LIr, Greenland requests that the Board declare the
City’s ordinance in 
violation  
of the Act and Board regulations,
enjoin the open burning of leaves within the City, order the City
to provide notice to all residents that the open burning of
leaves is in violation of the Act and Board regulations, and that
the Board provide other relief if warranted (Complaint at 4).
The City asserts the Board has no authority to declare
ordinances of a city inva1id~ to enjoin any acts by a city, or
otherwise  
grant 
relief  including  
requiring a municipal corportion
to provide notice to its residents, yet offers no support for its
assertions.
Pursuant  to Section 3(c) the City, a municipal  corporation
and political subdivision, is a person. As such and pursuant to
Section 
41, 
it must comply with the Act and the regulations
promulgated thereunder. City of Waukegan v. IPCB, 57 Ill. 2d
170, 311 N.E. 2d 146 (1974), Although the Board has no authority
to issue an injunction,  
it has the authority to issue a cease and
desist order pursuant to Section 33(b). Processing and Books,
Inc. v, IPCB, 64 iii. 2d 68~ 351 N.1~, 2d 865 (1976), The Board
has o~-deredmunicipal corporations: to cease and desist from
violation of the Act and Board regulations and has been upheld by
the Illinois Supreme Court. North Shore Sanitary District v
IPCB, 55 Ill. 2d 1Oi~ 
302 N~E. 
2d 
50 
(1973). The legislature has
conferred upon the Board those powers that are reasonably
necessary to 
accornplirh  the legislative  purposes 
of the Act.
City of Waukegan, sup~~. Finally, while the Board declines to
order the City to notify its 
residents  that open burning of
leaves in Lake Forest is in violation of state law, the Board
trusts that the City 
will, take 
whatever steps necessary to
eliminate the violations~
2 Public Act 78—243 would allow a Board regulation banning the
open burning of landscape waste only in specific  geographical
areas where evidence snows that such burning will produce air
pollution in 
those geo;raphical  areas,   
The term ‘~geographical
areali is a flexible  
one an~ its 
definition  will depend 
on the
evidence 
before the 
Board in 
any 
subsequent  regulatory
proceeding.
64-245
14
The Board has found the 
City 
to be in violation of the
~ct. It need not also 
find 
the ordinance invalid for the
resolution of this 
matter.   The Board 
will order the City to
cease and desist from further violations of the Act.
This Opinion constitutes the Board~s findings of fact and
conclusions of law in this matter.
ORDER
1.  The res~:~dentCity of Lake Forest has violated Section
9(a)         
~ct~
2.  The rest 
~ent  
City of Lake Forest has violated Section
9(c) 
of    
~ 
Act.
3.  
The resp 
sent 
City 
of Lake Forest shall cease and
desist 
fr~afurther 
violations of the Act.
3. 
Theodore Meyer thssented.
IT IS SO ORDERED,
I, 
Dorothy N. Gunn, 
Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control
Board, hereby certify that the above Opinion and Order was
adopted on the  
/.~tZ-’      
day of 
____________________,                      
1985
byavoteof 
___________
Dorothy N. 
~inn, Clerk
Illinois Pollution Control Board
64-246