ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL
bOARjJ
October 9, 1975
CHRYSLER CORPORATION,
)
Petitioner,
v.
)
PCB
75—341
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
Respondent.
ORDER OF THE BOARD (by Mr. Dumelle):
The
Motion to Appear As Counsel filed by Petitioner is
granted.
Petitioner is seeking to appeal a denial of an operating
permit by Respondent and a redefinition of its point of discharge
as “exiting to the Kishwaukee River rather than to the drainage
ditch which has been designated as an ‘unnamed tributary~ of the
Kishwaukee River”.
Petitioner has twice been before the Board in regard to its
effluent and the appropriate standards to be applied to its dis-
charge. Because of this the Board feels that some guidance is
needed to focus the parties on the correct issues which the
Board can decide. In Chrysler Corporation v. EPA, PCB 74-366
(October 17, 1974), the Board dismissed a petition for a variance
from the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)
permit requirements because of a lack of jurisdiction until the
State of Illinois had been delegated the authority to administer
the NPDES permit program by the Administer of the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (U.S. EPA).
Subsequently, Petitioner filed a permit appeal and a request
to redefine its points of discharge on December 12, 1974. A
hearing was held. Three issues were presented in this case.
First, whether Petitioner had filed for an Illinois permit pursuant
to
Rule
952 of the Water Pollution Regulations (formerly Rule 902)
We determined that Petitioner had not filed for a state permit
(Chrysler Corporation v. EPA, PCB 74-466 (June 6, 1975)). In so
holding, we rejected a claim that an application to the Army Corps
of Engineers for a 1899 Refuse Act discharge permit, which by
operation of Section 402(a) of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act (FWPCA) is deemed to be
a~licaticn for an NPDES permit, did
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(2)
not constitute an application for a state operating permit
(supra at page 3).
The second issue was whether the action of Respondent in
drafting an NPDES permit for the U.S. EPA and a letter from
Respondent to Petitioner dated November 6, 1973, amounted to
a denial by Respondent of a prior approval of other limitations
in a previous permit which would give cause for a permit appeal
to the Board? We held that no permit was in existence that could
have been the basis for a permit appeal (supra).
The third issue was the request for a redefinition of
Petitioner’s point of discharge. We held that:
The Board agrees with the Agency that a permit appeal,
even if a proper appeal, is not the type of case to
seek such a change. For example, Petitioner has the
regulatory amendment process to seek such a permanent
change. Much of the testimony at the hearing dealt
with
the lack of necessity of meeting the 4-5 standard
when the present quality of effluent adequately protects
the tributary in Petitioner’s opinion. If Petitioner
could demonstrate the required circumstances in a
variance request, Petitioner could be granted a variance
while it came into compliance with the requirements
(supra at 4).
Pursuant to our previous holding in PCB 74-466 we dismiss
the request for a redefinition. In so holding, we find that a
request for redefinition of stream would be a regulatory matter,
inasmuch as the very term implies that the present classification
is correct. This does not mean that Petitioner cannot challenge
the denial of a permit application by the Respondent with respect
to what standards are applicable to Petitioners discharge.
Therefore remaining is the allegation that Respondent has
improperly denied Petitioners application for an operating permit
pursuant to Rule 952 of the Water Pollution Regulations.
The Motion to Dismiss filed by Respondent is denied.
Mr. HenSs dissents.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
I,
Christan L.
Moffett, Clerk of the Illinois Pollution
Control Board, hereb certify the above Order was adopted on the
____
day of
_____________,
1975 by a vote of
J../
lil~no~sPollution
trol Board
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