ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
    July 19, 1971
    ROBERT H. MONYEK
    v.
    )
    PCB 71—80
    ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
    Opinion and Order of the Board (by Mr. Dumelle)
    Petitioner, Mr. Robert H. Monyek, an individual citizen
    planning to have a residence constructed in the area served by
    the North Shore Sanitary District (District) petitioned for a
    variance from part of the Board~sOrder in a previously decided
    case entitled ~~f~g~en
    Voters, et al v. North Shore Sanitary
    District, PCB 70-7,12,13,14 (March 31, 1971). Mr. Monyek was
    not a party to that case.
    The portion of the order from which the variance was sought
    is as follows:
    7. The District shall not permit any additions to
    present sewer connections, or new sewer connections
    to its facilities until the District can demonstrate
    to the Board that it can adeauately treat the wastes
    from those new sources so as not to violate the En—
    vironrnental Protection Act or the Rules and Regula-
    tions promulgated thereunder.
    Mr. Monyek sought permission from the Board to be allowed to
    make a sewer connection sometime after April 1972 (R. 72) so that
    he could in the meantime proceed to construct a single family dwelling
    on unimproved real estate which he owns in Lake Forest. Mr. Moneyk
    purchased the lot in April 1970 but could not build during the subsequent
    year because mortgage financing could not be obtained.
    Variances are usually requested from regulations or statutory
    requirements. However, in this case an individual variance is sought
    from the operation of a Board Order. Such a procedure is clearly
    provided for by the Environmental Protection Act (Act), Section 35.
    The standard to be applied in such cases is likewi~eprovided for
    in the Statute and the ~oard~s Rules. In considering whether to
    grant the variance the Board must consider all the facts and ultimately
    use its best judgment coupled with the expertise it is statutorily
    presumed to embody to determine if compliance with the Order from
    which exemption is being sought will impose an arbitrary or unreasonable
    hardship on the petitioner. This hardship must then be balanced
    against the harm done to the environment. Grant of a variance is in
    effect a license to pollute and as such is an extraordinary privilege.
    To be sure, in this case the license sought is not the expansive grant
    asked for in many cases of industrial pollution, nonetheless, it is
    2
    125

    one of literally hundreds of units which we are asked to make an
    exception of. While we are not unmindful or unsympathetic of the
    inconvenience of the present dilemma we are not persuaded that the
    instant situation constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable hard-
    ship. The statutory standard does not embrace every hardship, it
    speaks of arbitrary or unreasonable hardship. Undeniably petitioner
    is confronted with some measure of inconvenience in this case. We.
    cannot, however, view petitioner~s plight as singular and therefore
    arbitrary nor can we commiserate to such a degree that we grant rather
    than deny this request. In cases where a house has been completely
    built before the date of the order (March 31, 1971) or where
    substantial steps toward completion have been taken we can clearly
    judge the hardship of non-connection to be unreasonable. In fact we
    have done so in the recently decided case of Wachta and Mota d/b/a
    Belle Plaine Subdivision v. EPA, PCB 71-77. There the petitioner had
    seven units completely built, and the Board granted a variance to permit
    the sewer connections. For the remaining lots in the subdivision
    the Board ordered the builders to present a program to the Board
    demonstrating the feasibility of alternatives.
    Building a house is not simply a matter of dealing with bricks
    and mortar. Various other matters such as permissions from govern-
    mental bodies and financing from lending institutions are involved.
    Mr. Monyek testified regarding financing,”. ..I was told by mortgage
    financers not to even bother with the application because there was
    no chance” (R. 31). He was saying that during 1970 there was no
    chance of getting the necessary money for a mortgage because the prime
    loan rate was then 8-1/2 and state law prohibits legal loans at
    annual rates in excess of 8. Home mortgage loans were simply not
    available, So too is there no chance of making a sewer connection
    if doing so in effect results in the passage of ~aw sewage to Lake
    Michigan. The Board~s order imposes a sewer connection ban on the
    District because allowing new connections is tantomoun~tto condoning
    the passage of raw sewage into Lake Michigan. The North Shore
    beaches are closed this summer and the operations of the North Shore
    Sanitary District are coupled to those closings in a direct cause
    and effect relationship. If the District were not discharging into
    Lake Michigan or if the District was discharging fully treated sewage
    the beaches would be open.
    Preliminary to the hearing in this matter, Mr. Monyek presenLed
    a motion to the Hearing Officer asking to find the EPA in default
    for failing “to proceed as ordered by the Board”1 inasmuch as the
    Agency had not made a timely filing of its recommendation at the hearing
    held on June 18, 1971.
    In his motion Mr. Monyek asked that the EPA, because of their
    default, be prohibited from testifying and otherwise participating
    in the hearing. The hearing officer reserved ruling on the motion for
    3-Pollution Control Board Regulations, Rule 319
    2—12k

    the Board.
    Since the petitioner in every variance oreceeding must anticipate
    a recommendation of denial it must 1~arnostuncorinon
    situation where
    the petitioner can show actual surprise and prejudice due to the late
    filing of an Agency recommendation. While we do not condone the
    Agency’s late filing we are not prepared to construct an
    unnecessary procedural requirement to the resolution of issues on
    their merits. Defaults are to be discouraged. We believe the principle
    recently reiterated
    in ~4j~e~p~e
    1k and Western ~
    243 N.E. 2d 27
    (1968)
    is a salutary one which governs the instant
    situation,
    There the Illinois Appellate Court reversed the trial
    court’s imposition of a default ~udgmont for
    failure of plaintiff
    to precisely comply with the court rule regarding the answering of
    interrogatories.
    The court said that, “Defaults
    are based on a
    technique of precedure and should be subject to careful scrutiny.”
    (at 31). The court
    went
    on to say that defaults should he employed
    only when necessary to enforce a just demand and
    not
    when a hearing
    on the merits
    can be had
    without undue burden on the parties.
    We
    deny petitioner’s
    motion for entry of a default.
    This opinion
    and
    order constitutes
    the
    Board’s findings of fact,
    conclusions of law and order in this case.
    The requested variance
    is denied,
    I, Regina F. Ryan, Clerk of the Pollution Control Board certify that
    the Board adopted the above
    opinion this 19 day ~
    1971.
    ~
    2— 12)

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