1. tute a denial of equal protection of the laws.
      2. 9. That there is a need for Respondent’s product
      3. and that Respondent employs or engages local businesspeople.
      4. We find Respondent guilty of violating Section 9(b) of the
      5. 1— iso

ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
June
9,
1971
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECT ION AGENCY
#7l~31
V.
SOUTHERN ILLINOIS ASPHALT CO., INC.
LARRY P. EATON, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO ATTORNEY GENERAL,
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
CRAIG & CRAIG, MOUNT VERNON, ILLINOIS,
FOR SOUTHERN ILLINOIS ASPHALT CO., INC.
OPINION OF THE BOARD (BY MR. LAWTON:)
Complaint
was
filed, by the Environmental Protection Agency
against Southern Illinois Asphalt Co., Inc.,
Resnondent,
alleging
that on or about August 20, 1970, Respondent installed an as~Dhalt
plant at McLeansboro, Illinois, without a permit issued
by the
Environmental Protection Agency,
in violation of Section
9(b)
of
the Environmental Protection Act (~Act”) and Rule 3~~2~l10of
the
Rules and Regulations Coverning the Control of Air ?ollution
continued in effect pursuant to Section 49(c) of the~ct, and
that on or about September 14, 1970, Respondent orerated an
asvhal
plant in violation of Section 9 (b) of the Act.
Respondent~s answer denies the allegations of the complaint
and sets up various affirmative defenses as follows:
1. That failure to obtain the permit was not the fault
of Respondent, but rather that of the equipment
supplier.
2. That Respondent lacked intent to violate the. Regulations.
3. That the Act is unconstitutionally vague.
4. That the Act and Regulations promulgated thereunder
constitute an improper delegation of legislative and
judicial authority and are, therefore,unconstitutional.
1
665

5
That the Act
and Rules
so foreclose one charged
with a misdemeanor of a
jury trial
by a court,
and
are, therefore, unconstitutional.
6. That the
penalty
provisions under the Act
consti-
tute a denial of equal protection of the laws.
7. That fines for violation of the
Act can
only be
sought by the State’ s Attorney or the Attorney
General and the Imposition of a fine by the
Pollution Control
Board
constitutes an unconstitu-
tional usurpation of legislative
and
judicial
authority and is, therefore, unconstitutional.
8
That the emissions of the
plant
are
consistent
w~.thapplicable regulations and that Respondent
ceased operating the plant before the filing of the
complaint and that Respondent’s operation does not ad-
versely affect the health, general welfare and
physical
property.
9. That there is a need for Respondent’s product
and that Respondent employs or engages local business
people.
10
That it
has
installed air pollution
control
equipment
at
a cost of $82,000.00 and that insistence on further
expenditure
would
be unreasonable.
We find Respondent guilty of violating Section 9(b) of the
Act
and Rule 3-2 .110 of the Rules and Regulations governing the
control of air pollution. We order Respondent to cease and desist all
oper’
tion of its plant at its present location without a
cermit.
We impose a
fine of $5,000.00 on Respondent, for its unexcused failure to
obtain a permit. we find Respondent nctguilty of the charge of
operating an asphalt plant without a permit because no regulations
had been adopted requiring an operation permit as distinguished
from
an installation permit.
All
constitutional arguments raised
by Respondent have been previously disposed of in prior rulings
of this Board, and do
not require extended
discussion.
See Environ-
mental
Protection
Agency v. Cooling, #70-21, dealing with the subject
of
vagueness of the statute.
See Environmental Protection Agency v.
Container Stapler Corporation, #70-18, distinguishing the present
proceeding from a misdemeanor prosecution.
See Environmental Protec-
tion Agency v. Granite
City
Steel Company, 1.70-34, resolving in favor
of the Board
all
contentions relative to delegation of legislative
and
judicial
authority. See Environmental Protection Agency v.
Modern
Plating Corporation, #70-38, with regard to
all aspects of
the capability of the Board to impose penalties by way of fines and
1— iso

to do so without the need for trial by
jury, All constitutional
contentions are lacking in merit and do not constitute grounds
for a judgment in favor of the Respondent.
Respondent’s allegations of installation of air pollution
abatement equipment, the need for RespondentTs product, the employ-
ment of local personnel and the purchase of local products may be
considered by way of mitigation if, indeed, evidence exists to
support such allegations, but in no way constitute a defense as
to whether Respondent obtained an installation permit as required
by law, nor does the December application for a permit serve as
a defense for failure to obtain one in September when the installa-
tion was, in fact, completed. Violation of Section 9(b) of the Act
and Rule 3-2.110 are conceded by Respondent’s admission that the
installation of the entire operation was made without a
rermit
(R.l23,l24)
All that remains to be considered is whether there are
any circumstances by way of mitigation; what, if any, impact on
the community resulted from Respondent~s unauthorized installation
and.
what factors should’ be considered in structuring the Order of
the
Board.
Respondent moved the present plant from Missouri to
the
McLeansboro site in July of 1970 and completed installation by
September 14, 1970 (R.l17) (Regendhardt)
Respondent ceased operation in December of 1970,
The plant
is not presently in operation.
The unit installed mixes rocks, sand and petroleum materials
in a rotary kiln under heated conditions to rrotuce asphalt concrete.
The heat source is an oil burner operating 24
hours a day. The
unit
is equipped with a primary cyclone
and
wet scrubber of 98 efficiency
(H. 79)
.
The plant has a production capacity of approximately
200 tons
an hour and emits an estimated maxi:mu:rn of 41 pounds of particulates
per hour though generally, not in excess of
11 pounds per hour.
No charge has been made on the quantity of emissions and the precise
extent of the emissions is not directly in issue.
The asphalt pro-
duced is
used for
road-building,
parking lots and related installations.
The present site was selected because of the availability
of water
and access to the railroad.
While various witnesses characterized
the operation as clean, it is undisputed
that dust,particulates,
steam, smoke and odors emanated from the plant.. Trucks coming to and
from the plant created a substantial degree of noise and dust which
constituted a severe burden on the community.
1
667

Respondent employs approximately 50 persons and has ~a weekly
payroll of approximately $l6,O00~00, The oil burner is operated on
a 24—hour basis emitting a discernible and disagreeable odor, Homes
are located
as close as 100 feet from
the
plant and approximately 25
of
them within a block of the
plant, The plant ceased operation in
December, not as a consequence of action by
the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency
but rather, upon the
termination
of its normal operating
period, and
has not been re-opened since.
Respondent’s principal defense is the feeble excuse that they
thought the contractor would obtain the permit (R~l02,l03,l35).
There
is no evidence what follow
up
was made
by
the Respondent
to
determine
if, in fact, such application was made,
Obviously, Respondent’s in”
difference to ascertain the true status of
the permit application
cannot serve as an excuse for
its dereliction, We have previously
held that responsibility to obtain that which is needed and to do that
which is required in
order
to comply with
the
law is that of the
operator and that negligence of materialmen or contractors in no way
absolves the operator~ See Malibu Village Land Trust v. EPA, #70-45,
The present case is illustrative of the consequences of such indifference
and calls for the imposition of a penalty. Nor is the Attorney General’s
letter, Ex, 1, stating that the plant is well-operated any excuse
for the failure to obtain the needed permit or a defense in law to
the violation, Likewise, evidence of cost to be assumed by Respondent
in the event the plant is moved, in no way serves in mitigation.
Section 9(c) of the Act states that no person shall cause, or
threaten or allow the discharge or emission of any contaminant into
the environment in any state so as to cause, or tend to cause, air
pollution~ Air pollution is defined, among other things, as the pre~
sence in the atmosphere of contaminants in sufficient quantities to
unreasonably interfere with the enjoyment of life or property, It is
manifest from the testimony that Respondent’s operation, even if con-
ducted within the emission limits of the regulations, would constitute
a severe nuisance and greatly interfere with the enjoyment of life
and property of the residents in the immediate vicinity. it is our
belief that the present location of the plant is inappropriate for
the operation of
an
asphalt plant and we urge the Environmental
Protection Agency
to
give consideration to this element when action
is taken on the pending permit application. A permit should not be
granted under circumstances where its immediate use would constitute
a violation
of the Act,
The evidence of residents of the area supports this position,
George Reul~•lives within 350 feet of the plant, He testified that
southwesterly winds blew dust, smoke and exhaust from the plant over
~his property, that truck. traffic generated noise and dust, that the
smoke appeared as a dense fog, so thick in the morning that the sun

would not be seen, (R.l70)
,
and that
in his
opinion, his real
estate values have decreased.
He testified that the
operation of
the plant precluded the use
of his
yard for outdoor activities
and that approximately 100 homes were affected by the operation.
Ray Smith testified
that he lived 100 feet from the plant and
that when smoke comes down “you have to hold your nose to go cut~-
side,~ Noise, both from the operation of the plant and the truck
traffic
affected his sleep.
Roy Cole testified
that dust and dirt
generated by the trucks covered his porch and that noise from the
trucks prevented sleep and that the use of the outside portion of
his property was foreclosed for recreational
activities.
Paul Irvin
testified
that he lives near the plant and that he has an asthmatic
condition and that the dirt and dust generated by the operation of
the plant and by the trucks had an adverse effect on him,
Riley
Mangus testified that he suffered from emohysema which was worsened
after the plant began operation, (P.171-220)
However, the Environmental Protection Agency did not ciarge
Res~
pondent with the causing of air pollution either unher the Sterute
or Regulations.
Accordingly,
our Order must be frameD eel: in terms
of the failure to obtain a permit for the installation of the
plant.
We direct Respondent to
cease and desist
the ororation of
its plant at its present location without a
oermst
and assess a
penalty in the amount of $5~000,00 for its failure to nttain the
required permit,
This opinion constitutes
the Hoard s finding of fact and con~
clusions of law,
IT IS THE ORDER OF THE POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD:
1. That Respondent cease and desist the operation of an
asphalt plant at its present location without a nero it~
2. That Respondent be assessed a penalty of
$5,000.00
too
its failure to obtain a permit for the p1ant~ as re~..Luire3
by statute and regulation.
I, Regina E. Ryan, Clerk of the Pollution Cbntroi Board. certify
that the Board adopted the above Opinion this tP~day of June, 1971.

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