ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BAORD
August 5,
1971
Environmental Protection Agency)
v.
)
PCB
71-43
Lipsett
Steel Products,
Inc.
J,
H,
Xeehner, Assistant Attorney General of Illinois
for
the Environmental Protection Agency
R,
E.
Robertson,
for
Lipsett Steel Products,
Inc.
Dissenting Opinion
(by Mr.
Kissel)
I agree with the opinion of the Board in that
it
enters
a cease
and desist order against Lipsett prohibiting
any future open burning of boxcars,
but
I disagree with the
Board
in its decision to impose penalties on Lipsett for
the
six days of burning during 1971.
In order to under~
stand my reasoning,a review of this case
is necessary.
Originally, Lipsett sought
a variance from this Board
to permit it the right
to burn boxcars with the use of
gas
fired blowers, which substantially reduced the visible emis-
sions
from the burning.
Lipsett was operating under an
existing ACERP
(Air Contaminant Emission Reduction Program)
which expired on December
31,
1970.
That ACERP allowed
Lipsett to open burn
a certain number of boxcars every year.
Lipsett realized that its ACERP was going to expire, but it
also realized that
the recycling of boxcars was
an important,
as well as
a moneymaking,
activity.
As
a result, long be-
fore the ACERP was to expire Lipsett participated with the
industry to sponsor
a study by Booz-Allen to find
an emis~
sion free way of burning these cars.
Booz-Allen was given
the money, but the ultimate solution which they proposed
caused greater emissions than the burning~ofthe boxcars
themselves
the building,
in which the boxcars were
to be
burned, itself burned down.
Lipsett began then to look
for a solution to the problem,
and eventually found one.
In fact, they not only found
a complete, permanent solution,
but they
found an interim measure
the gas blowers
which
substantially reduced the emissions from the burning.
2
87
Lipsett tried desperately to get
the
Environmental Protec-
tion Agency to see
the permanent solution in Operation on
the east toast.
Actually,
the Agency representatives prom-
ised to view the operation,
and strung Lipsett along with
continuing promises.
Finally,
the Agency said they cou1d~t
go and told Lipsett that Lipsett would have
to file
a peti-
tion for variance with the Board if the new device was to
be approved.
Immediately, Lipsett filed the variance peti-
tion, but because it was filed in December,
there
was
no
chance of having the decision of the Board b~fore the
ACERP ran out on December
31,
1971,
Lipsett recognized
that their variance had been filed too late
and
in order
to make things clear with the Board, Lipsett appeared before
the Board asking for
a temporary variance until the hearing
was held on the variance itself.
Lipsett agreed at that
time that they would only burn boxcars with
the aid
of
a
gas blower device,
and only under certain conditions.
The
Board, however, noted
at that emergency hearing on the
temporary variance that it did not have the power
to grant
temporary variances, although since that time the Board
has taken somewhat of
a different position.
See
GAF Corpo-
ration v.
EPA, PCB 7l-llS, dated June 23,
1971,
Eventually,
the Board decided the variance
case, and by
a
3-2 vote
denied the variance.
Even before the variance had been
decided by
the Board,
the Agency had filed a complaint
against Lipsett for the
six days
of
“open burning” which
occurred during 1971 after the ACERP
had
expired.
The
majority of the Board decided to enter
a cease
and disist order against Lipsett prohibiting Lipsett from
doing any more boxcar
burning in the open, and to impose
a penalty on Lipsett of $6,000, or $1,000 for each day in
1971 during which Lipsett burned.
I agree with the deci-
sion to impose
a cease and desist order solely on the grounds
stated in the Dissenting Opinion filed by Dr. Aldrich in
the original Lipsett
case,
(Lipsett Steel Products,
Inc.
v. Environmental Protection Agency,
PCB 70-50, dated March
~
and I agreed that we would
grant the variance to Lipsett to allow them to burn boxcars
with the use of gas-fired blowers until June 30,
1971,
Since the Board decision on the second Lipsett case
(this
one) was on July
8,
1971, the cease and desist order was
totally in accord with
my
previous position on this matter.
2
—
88
As to the matter
of
imposing penalities against Lipsett
for the six days of burning
in 1971,
I am completely against
that.
In imposing penalities against any person or company,
I believe the Board should not only look at whether there was
a violation of the
law or regulations,
but also at the good
faith,
or lack of it, of the person or company against whom
the penalty is assessed.
In this particular case, while the
boxcars were burned in the open, perhaps
in violation of existing
regulations,
the burning was done with the aid of
a gas-fired
blower which substantially reduced the emissions from burning.
We saw the movies
to prove that.
Therefore,
I consider the
violations ~s something less than
some of the other boxcar
burners we have had before us,
who have used no devices to
control the emissions.
As
for the good faith of Lipseet,
I
think that there is no question on the record of facts presented
above that Lipsett has made substantial efforts to control the
emissions from boxcar burnir~g.
Time and again
it was Lipsett
who tried to solve the problem.
They have done an excellent
job in trying to promote the recycking of materials,
and we are
penalizing them for it.
This Board must penalize only those
who flagrantly violate the law without any effort to solve their
pollution problems.
We cannot punish those who have done their
best,
for
if
we do, we will find that no one will try.
I,
Regina
E.
Ryan, Clerk of the Board,
certify that
Mr. Richard J,Kissel submitted the above Dissenting Opinion
on the
5th day of August,
1971.
~
.1~)
2—89