ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
March 14,
1972
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
v.
PCB 71-325
AIRTEX PRODUCTS,
INC., and
CITY OF FAIRFIELD
Opinion of the Board
(by Mr.
Kissel):
On February
3,
19’12 the Board entered an order against
Airtex and the City of Fairfield
in this case which reads
as
follows:
1.
That respondent Airtex Products,
Inc.
cease
and desist
from discharging any and all cyanide compounds from its opera-
tions at 407 West Main Street
in Fairfield,
Illinois
in viola-
tion of SWB—5 and Section 12
(a)
of the Environsnen.tal Protection
Act.
2.
That respondent City of Fairfield cease and desist from
accepting wastes
from the Airtex plant to its storm
sewer
system
in violation of Section
12(a)
of the Environmental
Protection Act.
3. That Airtex pay to the State of Illinois by March
1,
1972,
the sum of Eleven Thousand Dollars
($11,000.00)
as
a penalty
for the violations found in this proceeding.
Penalty payment
by certified check or money order payable to the State of
Illinois
shall be made to the Fiscal Services Division,
Illinois
Environmental Protection Agency,
2200 Churchill Drive, Spring-
field,
Illinois 62706.
4.
That Fairfield pay to the State of Illinois by March
1,
1972
the sum of One Thousand One Hundred Dollars
($1,100.00)
as
a
penalty for
the violations found
in this proceeding.
Penalty
payment by certified check or money order payable to the State
of Illinois shall be made
to the Fiscal Services Division,
Illinois Environmental Protection Agency,
2200 Churchill Drive,
Springfield, Illinois 62706.
The order was entered after
a
full hearing of the matters before
the Board.
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—
We now have received motions from both the City of Fairfield
and Airtex to stay parts of
the Board’s order.
In
a
letter
directed to the Board
the City requests
that the Board stay
paragraph
4 of the order because the City cannot pay the penalty
of $1100 imposed by the Board.
Its reason is that funds were
not appropriated
for this purpose for this fiscal year,
thus
funds are not available
to pay the penalty.
If indeed the City
has
no funds available at the present time
as it claims,
we,
of
course,would
stay the order until the funds could be budgeted
in the next fiscal year.
However, there must be
a myriad
of other situations where
a City must expend funds unexpectedly,
and it would seem
that
a contingency
fund of some kind would be
available for this purpose.
Also,
no other municipality
has raised this issue with the Board.
Therefore, before staying
the payment of the
funds until the next fiscal year,
we would
ask that
the Agency submit
a recommendation to the Board,
after review of the contention by the City as
to whether there
are funds available
to pay the penalty now.
Based upon that
recommendation and upon any additional evidence
the City wishes
to present on this subject,
we will make
a
decision on whether
to stay
the payment of the penalty by the City.
Airtex’s motion raises two points:
first,
it asks that we
stay that part of the order requiring
the payment of the penalty
pending appeal
of the Board’s original order,
and second,
that
we strike that part of the order which requires Airtex to
“cease
and desist”
from discharging
cyanide compounds generated
in its
operations.
As to the first
issue, we have consistently held
that we will grant
a stay of an order requiring the payment of
a money penalty, pending appeal of the Board’s
order.
But such
a
stay has been granted on the condition that the person against
whom the
order
is directed
files
a bond with the Board which
assures
the payment of the money penalty plus
5
interest on the
money from the
thte of the entry of the Board’s order,
if the
Board’s order requiring the person to pay
is upheld on appeal.
See Molex v.
EPA,
71-200, Opinion dated Jan.
31,
1972 and Agrico
Chemical
Co.
v.
EPA, 71—211, Opinion dated Jan.
31,
1972.
We will follow that Rule in this
case as well.
The second issue raised by Airtex related to the “cease
and desist” order entered by the Board against Airtex.
See
paragraph
1, Board’s order dated Feb.
3,
1972.
The major point
made by Airtex
is
that relief
in the nature of
a
“cease and
desist” order was
not sought by the Agency
in this case,
and
as
a result,
the imposition of this kind of relief was really not
before the Board.
To understand
this argument,
a brief review
of the issue
is necessary.
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—
56
The original complaint filed by the Agency alleged that
“on and after July
1,
1970” Airtex caused cyanides
and
cyanogen compounds to escape to the Fairfield
sewer system
in violation of the Act and certain regulations promulgated
thereunder.
The complaint asked that money penalties be imposed
against Airtex and asked for
“such further relief
that the Board
deems necessary.”
Had
the Agency not amended the complaint,
the general prayer for
relief that the Board deemed
“necessary”
would have been enough to give Airtex proper notice that
a cease
and desist order could have been entered against it.
However,
Agency, through
its attorney, did amend the complaint on
the date of the hearing
in two ways.
First,
it limited the
date of violations to May
4 and May
14,
1971 and second,
it
removed its request that a “cease and desist” order be entered
against Airtex.
The specific request was made
in the Agency’s
opening statement when the Assistant Attorney General, representing
the Agency said:
“.
.
.1 would at this time make
a motion to amend the
complaint that had been
filed herein to state that the
violations that are in question here were violations
that
occurred on or about May
4,
1971 and May
14,
1971 solely.
It
is not meant to be
a continuous violation for which we
would be asking
a cease and desist order
or anything of
this nature.”
(emphasis supplied)
see record, page
5.
The hearing officer properly granted
the Agency’s motion to
amend
the complaint,
and as of that time
the sole issue in
the
case revolved around violations
of the
law by Airtex on May
4
and May
14.
The issue of a continuous violation was not
then
a subject for the Board’s decision and
order.
Thus, Airtex
properly points out that the
Board should not have entered a
cease and desist order against Airtex.
To enter
a cease and
desist order after it was dropped from
the case violates
the
traditional legal principle
of giving the respondents adequate
notice of the complaint against them.
It can be amended that the
respondent did not enter proof in this point because he
felt
it was no longer an issue in the case.
This position is consistent with the fact
that Airtex
stated that the plating process which was
the source of the
contaminants alleged to have caused water pollution was closed
down and no longer operating.
We will,
therefore, expunge
paragraph
1 of the order of the Board entered on February
3,
1972.
Mr.
Dumelle dissents
in part.
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—
57
Upon motion of
the Respondents, and consideration of the
arguments and the record,
the Board hereby enters the following
order:
0
R D
E R
1.
The Agency shall determine upon investigation within
15 days whether
the City of Fairfield is able to pay
the $1100
money penalty assessed against it from the City’s funds in the
current fiscal year.
Upon receipt of such information,
and any
additional information
from the City of Fairfield within the
same
15 day period,
the Board shall make
such further order as
it deems necessary.
2.
Paragraph
3 of
the order of the Board entered in this
cause on February
3,
1972
is hereby stayed pending appeal of
the Board’s decision provided that within
15 days froM this date
Airtex files with the Agency a surety Bond guaranteeing payment
of the penalty with
5
interest if the Board’s order directing
the payment of
a penalty is upheld on appeal.
3.
Paragraph
1 of the order of the Board in this cause
is hereby expunged ab initio.
I, Christan Moffett,
Clerk of the Pollution Control Board,
certify that the Board adopted the above Opinion and Order this
/~/e’~?
day of March,
1972, by
a vote of
~—/.
4—5S