ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
April
 12,
 1990
LEFTON IRON AND METAL COMPANY,
 )
INC.,
 a Missouri Corporation,
 )
Complainant,
 )
 PCB 89-53
(Enforcement)
v.
CITY OF EAST ST. LOUIS,
Respondent.
Thomas Immel,
 Immel,
 Zelle, Ogren, McClain, Germeraad
 & Costello,
on behalf of complainant;
Eric Vickers, Corporate Counsel for the City of East St. Louis, on
behalf of respondent.
OPINION AND ORDER OF THE BOARD
 (by N. Nardulli):
This matter comes before the Board on
 a complaint
 filed
 by
Lefton Iron and Metal Company,
 Inc.
 (“Lefton”)
 on March
 15,
 1989
against respondent,
 the City of East St. Louis
 (“City”)
 alleging
violations
 of
 section
 21(a)
 of
 the
 Illinois
 Environmental
Protection Act (“Act”) which prohibits allowing open dumping
 (Ill.
Rev.
 Stat.
 1987,
 ch. 111 1/2,
 par.
 1021(a)) and 35 Iii. Adm. Code
807.201 which prohibits allowing the development of a solid waste
management site without a permit.
 The City did not file an answer
to
 the
 complaint
 and,
 therefore,
 all material
 allegations
 are
deemed denied.
 (35 Ill. Adm. Code 103.122(d).)
 A hearing was held
on July 24,
 1989
 at which no members of the public attended.
 No
post—hearing briefs were filed.
Lefton operates
 a
 scrap
 metal
 business
 on
 leased property
located
 in East St.
 Louis.
 Lefton’s property is bounded
 on
 the
east by Brady Avenue and on the west by Converse Avenue.
 Brady and
Converse Avenues are unpaved right—of-ways owned and controlled by
the City.
 Lefton alleges that during the spring
 and
 summer of
1988,
 the City
 failed to
 provide
 trash collection
 services
 and
allowed refuse and trash to be dumped on Brady and Converse and
accumulate to the point that Lefton encountered difficulty gaining
access to
 its property.
 (Complaint at par.
 6-7.)
 Lefton states
that the
 City was
 aware
 of
 the discarded
 refuse
 on
 its
 public
streets and failed to respond
 to complaints by Lefton and other
residents.
 Lefton alleges that the City has violated section 21(a)
of the Act and section 807.201 of the Board’s regulations.
 (Ia.
 at
par.
 11-12.)
 Lefton requests that the Board
 direct the City to
cease
 and desist
 from
 such
 violations
 and
 to
 submit
 a plan
 of
compliance to the Board.
 (~.
 at p.4.)
110—19
2
Two
 witnesses
 testified
 at
 hearing.
 Benjamin
 Lefton,
president of Lefton,
 testified that he viewed the accumulation of
debris on Brady and Converse Avenues.
 (Tr. 7/24/89 at 6.)
 Lefton
introduced a June
 10,
 1988 letter from Norman Lefton, chairman of
Lefton,
 to the mayor of East St. Louis and a June 27, 1988 letter
from another resident notifying the City of the debris and asking
that
 it be removed.
 ((Ex.
 1,
 2.)
 Lefton also testified
 that he
took the two photographs which were attached to Lefton’s response
to the Board’s
 Order
 of March
 23,
 1989.
 (Tr.
 7/24/89
 at
 12.)
These photographs of Brady and Converse Avenues were taken on April
13,
 1989
 and show
 the
 accumulation
 of
 discarded
 debris.
 (Tr.
7/24/89
 at 12-13; Response Ex.
 2,
 3.)
 Lefton introduced two maps
showing the location of Brady and Converse Avenues and noting the
 accumulation of the refuse.
 (Ex.
 3,
 4.)
 Mr.
 Lefton stated that
the debris was still on the streets the last time he looked one
week prior to the hearing.
 (Tr. 7/24/89 at
 14.)
On cross-examination,
 Mr.
 Lefton testified that he did not
know who placed the refuse on Brady and Converse Avenues.
 (Tr.
7/24/89
 at
 16.)
 Mr. Lefton was asked what proof he had that the
City owned the property where the debris was located.
 (Tr. 7/24/89
at
 19-20.)
 Mr.
 Lefton
 responded
 that
 the
 streets
 were
 public
streets
 as evinced
 by the maps introduced
 into evidence.
 (Tr.
7/24/89
 at 19—20;
 Ex.
 3,
 4.)
George Foster,
 coordinator of Emergency Service and Disaster
Agency
 for East St.
 Louis, testified that,
 on the morning of the
hearing, he viewed the area in question and did not see the amount
of debris present as depicted in Lefton’s photograph
 of Converse
Avenue.
 (Tr. 7/24/89 at 30-32.)
 Foster testified that it appeared
that some of the trash had been burned.
 (a.)
 Foster did state
that considerable debris remained on Brady Avenue.
 (~4.)
 Foster
also stated
 that the City began
 an
 emergency
 city-wide
 cleanup
effort
 in
 1987
 or
 1988
 and that
 this
 effort was halted
 in
 the
latter part of 1988 or the early part of 1989.
 (Tr. 7/24/89 at 33-
34.)
Section
 21(a)
 of the Act provides
 that
 “no
 person
 shall
cause or allow the open dumping of any waste.”
 (Ill. Rev. Stat.
1987,
 ch.
 111 1/2, par.
 1021(a).)
 The Act is malum prohibitum so
that the owner’s lack of knowledge
 of the dumping
 is no defense.
(Meadowlark Farms,
 Inc.
 v.
 PCB,
 17
 Ill.
 App.
 3d
 851,
 308 N.E.2d
829,
 836
 (5th
 Dist.
 1974.)
 The
 owner
 of
 the
 source
 of
 the
pollution “causes or allows” the pollution within the meaning
 of
the statute and is responsible for that pollution unless the facts
establish
 the owner either lacked the capability
 to control the
source or had taken extensive precautions to prevent
 intervening
causes.
 (Perkinson v.
 PCB,
 187 Ill. App.
 3d 689,
 543 N.E.2d 901,
903
 (3d Dist.
 1989).)
Lefton introduced two photographs showing the accumulation of
110—20
3
a great deal of debris.
 (Response Ex.
 3,
 4.)
 Mr. Lefton testified
that
 he
 took
 the
 photographs
 on
 April
 13,
 1989
 and
 that
 the
photographs depicted trash
 on
 Brady and Converse Avenues.
 (Tr.
7/24/89 at 12.)
 The evidence establishes that the debris had been
at that location from the summer of 1988 until at
 least one week
prior to the hearing in July of 1989.
 (Tr. 7/24/89 at 14; Ex.
 1,2.)
In
 support
 of
 its assertion that the debris was
 located on
 the
public
 streets,
 Lefton
 introduced
 two maps depicting
 Brady
 and
Converse Avenues and the location of the refuse.
 While the City’s
cross-examination of Mr. Lefton attempted to cast doubt on whether
the debris was located on the public streets,
 the Board finds that
Lefton
 established by
 a
 preponderance
 of
 the
 evidence that the
refuse was indeed located on public streets owned by the City.
 The
City failed to introduce any evidence to rebut Lefton’s assertion
that the refuse was located on
 Brady and Converse Avenues.
 At
best, the City introduced some evidence that, at one point in time,
 the City attempted a clean-up of the area.
 (Tr.
 7/24/89
 at 33-
34.)
 The Board finds that the City had control of the land where
the
 debris
 accumulated
 and
 allowed
 the
 dumping
 of
 waste
 in
violation of section 21(a)
 of the Act.
Lefton also contends that
 the City’s conduct constitutes
 a
violation
 of
 section
 807.201
 of
 the
 Board’s
 waste
 disposal
regulations.
 Section 807.201 provides that “no person shall cause
or allow the development of any new solid waste management site
without a Development Permit issued by the Agency.”
 (35 Ill.
 Adin.
Code 807.201.)
 The Board does not believe that the City’s conduct
in
 this
 cause
 constitutes
 the
 “development”
 of
 a
 solid
 waste
management
 site which
 section
 807.201
 is
 designed to regulate.
Therefore,
 the Board finds no violation of that section.
Pursuant to section 42(a)
 of the Act, the Board is empowered
to impose a maximum penalty of $10,000
 and an additional penalty
of $1,000 for each day the violation continues.
 (Ill. Rev. Stat.
1987,
 ch.
 111 1/2, par.
 1042(a).)1
 Lefton has taken the position
 that, because of the City’s poor financial situation,
 no monetary
penalty should be
 imposed upon the
 City.
 Lefton requests that
the Board enter a cease and desist order and require that the City
submit
 a plan to bring
 itself
 into compliance with the
 Board’s
cease and desist order.
A consideration of the factors set forth in section 33(c)
 of
the Act supports the relief requested by Lefton.
 (Ill. Rev.
 Stat.
1987,
 ch.
 ill
 1/2, par.
 1033(c).)
 Pursuant to section 33(c)(l),
the
 Board
 finds
 the
 interference with
 Lefton’s
 property
 to
 be
substantial.
 The Board finds that there is no “social or economic
value”
 to
 be
 accorded to
 the
 source
 of
 the
 pollution
 (section
1
 The Board notes that P.A.
 86-1014 was recently enacted to
increase the minimum penalty to $10,000 and the maximum penalty to
$5”,OOO.
 P.A.
 86—1014 becoin~sef.~’ectiveJuly 1,
 1990.
110—21
4
33(c)(2))
 and that section 33(c)(3)
 is inapplicable to this cause.
Regarding section 33(c) (4), the Board finds that, even for East St.
Louis,
 it
 is technically practicable and economically reasonable
to eliminate the pollution source.
 The Board also finds that the
City has accrued some economic benefit from its failure to remove
the debris to the extent that the evidence shows that the trash has
interfered with Lefton’s use of its property since the summer of
1988.
 (See,
 Ill. Rev.
 Stat.
 1987,
 ch.
 111 1/2, par.
 1033(c) (5).)
Although the City made an ineffective attempt to clean up the area,
there has been no compliance to date.
 Therefore,
 the Board finds
that section 33(c)(6)
 is not germane to this matter.
The Board will not impose a penalty upon the City but directs
the City to remove the debris located on Brady and Converse Avenues
and to cease and desist from allowing the dumping of waste on those
streets so that Lefton’s operation of its business and enjoyment
of its property
 is not interfered with any longer.
 However, the
Board
 does not believe that
 it
 is appropriate
 in this cause
 to
require the
 City
 to
 submit
 a
 compliance
 plan;
 the
 City
 either
cleans
 the
 area
 in
 question
 or
 it
 does
 not.
 The
 situation
presented here does not necessitate that this Board put its stamp
 of approval on the method of ridding the area of debris.
This Opinion constitutes
 the
 Board’s
 findings
 of
 fact
 and
conclusions of law on this matter.
ORDER
Within 60 days of the date of this Order, respondent,
 City of
East St.
 Louis,
 is hereby directed to take all steps necessary to
rid Brady and Converse Avenues of all debris so that complainant’s
enjoyment of its property is not interfered’ with and to cease and
desist from allowing the open dumping of waste at the location in
question.
Section 41 of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act
 (Ill.
Rev.
 Stat.
 1987,
 ch.
 111 1/2,
 par.
 1042)
 provides for appeal of
final Orders of the Board within 35 days.
 The Rules of the Supreme
Court of Illinois establish filing requirements.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
I,
 Dorothy N.
 Gunn,
 Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control
Board, hereby certj~fythat the above Order was adopted on the
/~‘~
 day of
j~e.2~_
 ,
 1990 by a vote of
 7-O
/
 ~‘
~
 ~
 J~
 ~
Dorothy M./Gunn, Clerk
Illinois Pollution Control Board
110—22