ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
    April
    12,
    1990
    LEFTON IRON AND METAL COMPANY,
    )
    INC.,
    a Missouri Corporation,
    )
    Complainant,
    )
    PCB 89-53
    (Enforcement)
    v.
    CITY OF EAST ST. LOUIS,
    Respondent.
    Thomas Immel,
    Immel,
    Zelle, Ogren, McClain, Germeraad
    & Costello,
    on behalf of complainant;
    Eric Vickers, Corporate Counsel for the City of East St. Louis, on
    behalf of respondent.
    OPINION AND ORDER OF THE BOARD
    (by N. Nardulli):
    This matter comes before the Board on
    a complaint
    filed
    by
    Lefton Iron and Metal Company,
    Inc.
    (“Lefton”)
    on March
    15,
    1989
    against respondent,
    the City of East St. Louis
    (“City”)
    alleging
    violations
    of
    section
    21(a)
    of
    the
    Illinois
    Environmental
    Protection Act (“Act”) which prohibits allowing open dumping
    (Ill.
    Rev.
    Stat.
    1987,
    ch. 111 1/2,
    par.
    1021(a)) and 35 Iii. Adm. Code
    807.201 which prohibits allowing the development of a solid waste
    management site without a permit.
    The City did not file an answer
    to
    the
    complaint
    and,
    therefore,
    all material
    allegations
    are
    deemed denied.
    (35 Ill. Adm. Code 103.122(d).)
    A hearing was held
    on July 24,
    1989
    at which no members of the public attended.
    No
    post—hearing briefs were filed.
    Lefton operates
    a
    scrap
    metal
    business
    on
    leased property
    located
    in East St.
    Louis.
    Lefton’s property is bounded
    on
    the
    east by Brady Avenue and on the west by Converse Avenue.
    Brady and
    Converse Avenues are unpaved right—of-ways owned and controlled by
    the City.
    Lefton alleges that during the spring
    and
    summer of
    1988,
    the City
    failed to
    provide
    trash collection
    services
    and
    allowed refuse and trash to be dumped on Brady and Converse and
    accumulate to the point that Lefton encountered difficulty gaining
    access to
    its property.
    (Complaint at par.
    6-7.)
    Lefton states
    that the
    City was
    aware
    of
    the discarded
    refuse
    on
    its
    public
    streets and failed to respond
    to complaints by Lefton and other
    residents.
    Lefton alleges that the City has violated section 21(a)
    of the Act and section 807.201 of the Board’s regulations.
    (Ia.
    at
    par.
    11-12.)
    Lefton requests that the Board
    direct the City to
    cease
    and desist
    from
    such
    violations
    and
    to
    submit
    a plan
    of
    compliance to the Board.
    (~.
    at p.4.)
    110—19

    2
    Two
    witnesses
    testified
    at
    hearing.
    Benjamin
    Lefton,
    president of Lefton,
    testified that he viewed the accumulation of
    debris on Brady and Converse Avenues.
    (Tr. 7/24/89 at 6.)
    Lefton
    introduced a June
    10,
    1988 letter from Norman Lefton, chairman of
    Lefton,
    to the mayor of East St. Louis and a June 27, 1988 letter
    from another resident notifying the City of the debris and asking
    that
    it be removed.
    ((Ex.
    1,
    2.)
    Lefton also testified
    that he
    took the two photographs which were attached to Lefton’s response
    to the Board’s
    Order
    of March
    23,
    1989.
    (Tr.
    7/24/89
    at
    12.)
    These photographs of Brady and Converse Avenues were taken on April
    13,
    1989
    and show
    the
    accumulation
    of
    discarded
    debris.
    (Tr.
    7/24/89
    at 12-13; Response Ex.
    2,
    3.)
    Lefton introduced two maps
    showing the location of Brady and Converse Avenues and noting the
    accumulation of the refuse.
    (Ex.
    3,
    4.)
    Mr.
    Lefton stated that
    the debris was still on the streets the last time he looked one
    week prior to the hearing.
    (Tr. 7/24/89 at
    14.)
    On cross-examination,
    Mr.
    Lefton testified that he did not
    know who placed the refuse on Brady and Converse Avenues.
    (Tr.
    7/24/89
    at
    16.)
    Mr. Lefton was asked what proof he had that the
    City owned the property where the debris was located.
    (Tr. 7/24/89
    at
    19-20.)
    Mr.
    Lefton
    responded
    that
    the
    streets
    were
    public
    streets
    as evinced
    by the maps introduced
    into evidence.
    (Tr.
    7/24/89
    at 19—20;
    Ex.
    3,
    4.)
    George Foster,
    coordinator of Emergency Service and Disaster
    Agency
    for East St.
    Louis, testified that,
    on the morning of the
    hearing, he viewed the area in question and did not see the amount
    of debris present as depicted in Lefton’s photograph
    of Converse
    Avenue.
    (Tr. 7/24/89 at 30-32.)
    Foster testified that it appeared
    that some of the trash had been burned.
    (a.)
    Foster did state
    that considerable debris remained on Brady Avenue.
    (~4.)
    Foster
    also stated
    that the City began
    an
    emergency
    city-wide
    cleanup
    effort
    in
    1987
    or
    1988
    and that
    this
    effort was halted
    in
    the
    latter part of 1988 or the early part of 1989.
    (Tr. 7/24/89 at 33-
    34.)
    Section
    21(a)
    of the Act provides
    that
    “no
    person
    shall
    cause or allow the open dumping of any waste.”
    (Ill. Rev. Stat.
    1987,
    ch.
    111 1/2, par.
    1021(a).)
    The Act is malum prohibitum so
    that the owner’s lack of knowledge
    of the dumping
    is no defense.
    (Meadowlark Farms,
    Inc.
    v.
    PCB,
    17
    Ill.
    App.
    3d
    851,
    308 N.E.2d
    829,
    836
    (5th
    Dist.
    1974.)
    The
    owner
    of
    the
    source
    of
    the
    pollution “causes or allows” the pollution within the meaning
    of
    the statute and is responsible for that pollution unless the facts
    establish
    the owner either lacked the capability
    to control the
    source or had taken extensive precautions to prevent
    intervening
    causes.
    (Perkinson v.
    PCB,
    187 Ill. App.
    3d 689,
    543 N.E.2d 901,
    903
    (3d Dist.
    1989).)
    Lefton introduced two photographs showing the accumulation of
    110—20

    3
    a great deal of debris.
    (Response Ex.
    3,
    4.)
    Mr. Lefton testified
    that
    he
    took
    the
    photographs
    on
    April
    13,
    1989
    and
    that
    the
    photographs depicted trash
    on
    Brady and Converse Avenues.
    (Tr.
    7/24/89 at 12.)
    The evidence establishes that the debris had been
    at that location from the summer of 1988 until at
    least one week
    prior to the hearing in July of 1989.
    (Tr. 7/24/89 at 14; Ex.
    1,2.)
    In
    support
    of
    its assertion that the debris was
    located on
    the
    public
    streets,
    Lefton
    introduced
    two maps depicting
    Brady
    and
    Converse Avenues and the location of the refuse.
    While the City’s
    cross-examination of Mr. Lefton attempted to cast doubt on whether
    the debris was located on the public streets,
    the Board finds that
    Lefton
    established by
    a
    preponderance
    of
    the
    evidence that the
    refuse was indeed located on public streets owned by the City.
    The
    City failed to introduce any evidence to rebut Lefton’s assertion
    that the refuse was located on
    Brady and Converse Avenues.
    At
    best, the City introduced some evidence that, at one point in time,
    the City attempted a clean-up of the area.
    (Tr.
    7/24/89
    at 33-
    34.)
    The Board finds that the City had control of the land where
    the
    debris
    accumulated
    and
    allowed
    the
    dumping
    of
    waste
    in
    violation of section 21(a)
    of the Act.
    Lefton also contends that
    the City’s conduct constitutes
    a
    violation
    of
    section
    807.201
    of
    the
    Board’s
    waste
    disposal
    regulations.
    Section 807.201 provides that “no person shall cause
    or allow the development of any new solid waste management site
    without a Development Permit issued by the Agency.”
    (35 Ill.
    Adin.
    Code 807.201.)
    The Board does not believe that the City’s conduct
    in
    this
    cause
    constitutes
    the
    “development”
    of
    a
    solid
    waste
    management
    site which
    section
    807.201
    is
    designed to regulate.
    Therefore,
    the Board finds no violation of that section.
    Pursuant to section 42(a)
    of the Act, the Board is empowered
    to impose a maximum penalty of $10,000
    and an additional penalty
    of $1,000 for each day the violation continues.
    (Ill. Rev. Stat.
    1987,
    ch.
    111 1/2, par.
    1042(a).)1
    Lefton has taken the position
    that, because of the City’s poor financial situation,
    no monetary
    penalty should be
    imposed upon the
    City.
    Lefton requests that
    the Board enter a cease and desist order and require that the City
    submit
    a plan to bring
    itself
    into compliance with the
    Board’s
    cease and desist order.
    A consideration of the factors set forth in section 33(c)
    of
    the Act supports the relief requested by Lefton.
    (Ill. Rev.
    Stat.
    1987,
    ch.
    ill
    1/2, par.
    1033(c).)
    Pursuant to section 33(c)(l),
    the
    Board
    finds
    the
    interference with
    Lefton’s
    property
    to
    be
    substantial.
    The Board finds that there is no “social or economic
    value”
    to
    be
    accorded to
    the
    source
    of
    the
    pollution
    (section
    1
    The Board notes that P.A.
    86-1014 was recently enacted to
    increase the minimum penalty to $10,000 and the maximum penalty to
    $5”,OOO.
    P.A.
    86—1014 becoin~sef.~’ectiveJuly 1,
    1990.
    110—21

    4
    33(c)(2))
    and that section 33(c)(3)
    is inapplicable to this cause.
    Regarding section 33(c) (4), the Board finds that, even for East St.
    Louis,
    it
    is technically practicable and economically reasonable
    to eliminate the pollution source.
    The Board also finds that the
    City has accrued some economic benefit from its failure to remove
    the debris to the extent that the evidence shows that the trash has
    interfered with Lefton’s use of its property since the summer of
    1988.
    (See,
    Ill. Rev.
    Stat.
    1987,
    ch.
    111 1/2, par.
    1033(c) (5).)
    Although the City made an ineffective attempt to clean up the area,
    there has been no compliance to date.
    Therefore,
    the Board finds
    that section 33(c)(6)
    is not germane to this matter.
    The Board will not impose a penalty upon the City but directs
    the City to remove the debris located on Brady and Converse Avenues
    and to cease and desist from allowing the dumping of waste on those
    streets so that Lefton’s operation of its business and enjoyment
    of its property
    is not interfered with any longer.
    However, the
    Board
    does not believe that
    it
    is appropriate
    in this cause
    to
    require the
    City
    to
    submit
    a
    compliance
    plan;
    the
    City
    either
    cleans
    the
    area
    in
    question
    or
    it
    does
    not.
    The
    situation
    presented here does not necessitate that this Board put its stamp
    of approval on the method of ridding the area of debris.
    This Opinion constitutes
    the
    Board’s
    findings
    of
    fact
    and
    conclusions of law on this matter.
    ORDER
    Within 60 days of the date of this Order, respondent,
    City of
    East St.
    Louis,
    is hereby directed to take all steps necessary to
    rid Brady and Converse Avenues of all debris so that complainant’s
    enjoyment of its property is not interfered’ with and to cease and
    desist from allowing the open dumping of waste at the location in
    question.
    Section 41 of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act
    (Ill.
    Rev.
    Stat.
    1987,
    ch.
    111 1/2,
    par.
    1042)
    provides for appeal of
    final Orders of the Board within 35 days.
    The Rules of the Supreme
    Court of Illinois establish filing requirements.
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    I,
    Dorothy N.
    Gunn,
    Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control
    Board, hereby certj~fythat the above Order was adopted on the
    /~‘~
    day of
    j~e.2~_
    ,
    1990 by a vote of
    7-O
    /
    ~‘
    ~
    ~
    J~
    ~
    Dorothy M./Gunn, Clerk
    Illinois Pollution Control Board
    110—22

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