ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
August 30,1971
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
v.
)
PCB #71—32
OSCAR
E.
DENNY,
d/b/a/
)
D.
&
S. LANDFILL
Robert F.
Kaucher for Environmental Protection Agency
Ted Harvey
for Oscar
E. Denny
Opinion and Order of the Board
(by Samuel
R. Aldrich):
On February
25,
1971,
the Environmental Protection Agency
(“Agency’t)
filed
a complaint against Oscar E.
Denny
(“Denny”).
Respondent
operates
a landfill
for solid waste disposal near Belleville,
Illinois.
The complaint alleges numerous violations
of the Envir-
onmental Protection Act
(“Act”)
and of
the Rules and Regulations
for Refuse Disposal
Sites and Facilities
(“Land Rules”).
At
a
prehearing conference held April
21,
1971,
the wording of the com-
plaint was amended to indicate
that the alleged violations occurred
before,
on and since August 11,
1970.
As
in similar cases involving landfills
(EPA v.
Sauget,
#71-29,
and EPA
v.
Clay Products Co.,
#71-41)
the evidence establishes
certain charges and fails
to establish others.
We order that
violations cease and
a money penalty be paid.
The complaint
first alleges open dumping
in violation of Section 21
(a)
of the Act and of Rule
3.04 of the Land Rules.
As in the Clay
Products
case we note
that open dumping is
a general term embracing
a number of more specific infractions with which the respondent
is
also charged.
In view of our findings on the more specific infrac-
tions
it is unnecessary for us
to decide whether open dumping has
also occurred.
Respondent
is alleged to have had open burning at his landfill
site.
A witness
for the Agency testified that he observed a large pile of
brush being burned on August
11,
1970
(R.
92,153).
A photograph
taken on August
12,
1970,
and introduced by the Agency
(EPA Ex.
4)
shows material that has been burned.
Oscar Denny admitted that tree
limbs had been burned in August but stated that no such burning had
occurred for over
six months
(R.
238,239).
A witness
for Denny
indicated that burning refuse is occasionally brought to the site
but that it is dumped
in a separate area and extinguished with dirt
(R.
283).
Nevertheless,
the evidence indicates that material was
burned on August
11,
1970, and we find that Denny has caused or
allowed open burning.
2-331
Denny
is
alleged to have
violated
Rule
4
•
02
of
the
Land
Rules
and
Section
12(a)
and
(d)
of
the
Act
by
operating
his
landfill
so
as not
to
prevent
leachate
from
contaminating
the
ground
waters
or
streams
in
the
area.
There
is
ample
evidence
that
leachate
was
coming
to
the
surface
and
running
off
into
water
impounded
on
the
site
(R.
87,103,114).
However,
Rule 4.02 does not apply to
contamination
of
water
by
leachate
at
an
existing
landfill
site.
This
rule
relates
only
to
siting,
not
to
operation
of
a
landfill.
The
question
remains
as
to
whether
a
violation
of
Section
12
of
the
Act
has
occurred.
The
first
issue
for
the
Board
to
decide
is
whether
the
water
impounded
on
the
Denny
site
constitutes
“waters
of
the
State”
under
the
Act
and
is
to
be
protected
from
pollution.
The
record is
simply
inadequate.
In
future
cases
we will
expect
the Agency
to
describe
the
receiving
waters
such
that
we
can
make
a
determination.
A
second
issue
is
the
extent
to
which
the
leachate
would
be
expected
to
alter
the
properties
of
the
receiving
water
so
as
to
interfere
with
“legitimate,
uses”
under
Section
3(n)
of
the
Act.
In
order
to
decide
this
issue
we
must
be
provided
with
a
description
of
the
amount of
leachate
relative
to
the
volume
of
receiving
water
and
of
the
nature
of
the
leachate
•
In
the
present
case
there
is
no
evidence
that
the
leachate
created
or
was
likely
to
create
a
nuisance
or
render
the
impounded
water
unfit
for
any
legitimate
use.
We
do
not
feel
that
the
simple
fact
of
water
coming
to
the
ground
surface
at
a
landfill
site
is
prima-facie
evidence
of
water
pollution
under
Section
12.
Such
water
may
make
little
or
no
contact
with
refuse
or
may
contact
only inert materials.
There
is
insufficient
proof
that
the
Denny
operation
was
creating
a
water
pollution
hazard
pursuant
to
Section
12.
We
note
further
the
statement
of
an
Agency witness
that
leachate
tends
to
come
to
the
ground
surface
when
refuse
is
not
properly
compacted
and
covered
(R.87).
In
that
event
the
leaching
problem
will
likely
be
corrected
in
the
Denny
case
once
proper
compaction
and
covering
is
provided.
The
Agency
alleges
that
Denny
permitted
access
to
the
site
“during
all hours of the day”, in violation of Rule 5.02 of the Land Rules.
However, as we noted in the Clay Products case, that rule does not
limit
the
hours
of
operation
but
rather
prohibits
access
when
no
employee
is
present.
We
find
the
allegation
to
be
deficient.
Rule
5.03
requires
the
dumping
of
refuse
on
the
site to be confined
to the smallest practical area.
The
evidence
on
this
point
is
inadequate.
The record contains
estimates
of
the
size of
the
entire landfill area but no clear indication of the area being
actively used.
An
inspector
for
the Agency testified that in
his
opinion the
fill
face
was
too large for the refuse
to
be
compacted
immediately with the equipment on
hand
(R. 94,95).
Nevertheless,
in the absence of more objective evidence we find no violation
has been proved.
2—
Respondent
is alleged to have permitted unsupervised unloading, and
to have provided no portable fences ;or policing of the area.
An
Agency witness testified that on November
19,
1970,
no operational
personnel were present at the site despite the fact that trucks
were dumping refuse at the
time
(R.
97,98).
Furthermore,
the same
witness testified that no portable fencing was provided
(R.
98).
Rule 5.04 requires
the use of portable fences “when necessary to
prevent blowing litter from the unloading site”.
Oscar Denny denied
that blowing litter was
a problem but admitted that litter could
be blown into
the impounded water
CR.
242).
The regulation specifi-
cally requires fencing to avoid material blowing from the unloading
site.
There
is evidence that litter was blowing from the unloading
site during one visit by an Agency inspector and that no effort was
being made
to collect scattered material
(R.
98,99).
We
find
Respondent
to be
in violation of Rule
5.04.
The Agency further alleges th~tDenny has failed to spread and com-
pact refuse as required by Rule
5.06.
The record indicates that
on November
19,
1970,
refuse was dumped without being spread or
compacted
(R.
98).
Indeed,
no one was even operating equipment at
the site.
The rule requires re&use
to be spread and compacted as
rapidly
as it
is
admitted to the
site.
A violation of the rule
was
therefore shown.
Respondent
is charged with operating his refuse disposal site with-
out covering the refuse at the end of the working day, contrary
to Rule
5,07(a).
There
is ample proof of such violations.
The
Agency introduced photographs showing that certain recognizable
objects remained uncovered for two consecutive days
(EPA Ex.
2,
3,
7,
8).
In
fact,
the record indicates that some refuse present in
August of
1970, was still uncovered on February
2,
1971
CR.
168).
We note, however,
that the amount of refuse left uncovered has
decreased somewhat in recent months.
A witness for
the Agency
testified that by March
26,
1971, much old refuse had been covered
adequately
CR.
172),
By April
19,
almost all refuse had been
covered
CR.
192),
Denny is also alleged to have permitted improper salvage operations
and scavenging,
in violation of Rules
5,10 and 5.12(a).
As we
noted in the Clay Products
case,
the difference between salvaging
and scavenging is not altogether clear,
There
is evidence of manual
sorting of refuse
(scavenging)
by truck drivers
CR,
100).
Oscar
Denny testified that salvage operations were carried out
at the site,
salvaged materials being placed in
a pile
(R.
237).
However, photo-
graphs introduced by the Agency show several junked automobiles and
other
items presumably meant
for salvage lying scattered
among other
refuse
(EPA Ex.
9).
There was
testimony that
the automobiles were
not being compacted or covered, nor were they being remove~dfrom
the
site
CR.
113).
Such operations are clearly improper.
Not only
do they interfere with
the fill operation;
they also create
a
potential rat harborage and give
the landfill
an unsightly appearance.
2
—
333
The Agen~y’sfinal allegation is that Denny allowed refuse to be
deposited in water contrary to Rule 5.12(c).
There is considerable
evidence that refuse was seen in water
(R. 64,66,104,184).
However,
the rule requires proof that refuse was put into the water.
A
witness for the Agency did testify that refuse was being discharged
into standing water on two occasions
(R.
100,103)..
The record in-
dicates that on or prior to one of these occasions
(November 19)
some rainfall occurred in the area
(Denny Ex.
2).
Although we
recognize that rainfall may create additional problems for a land-
fill operator, it does not automatically justify viqiations of the
rules.
The regulation
does not provide for any exceptions
in this
regard.
Rule 4.03(b)
suggests but does not require that separate
operational areas be operated within the ~siteto allow for wet or
dry weather operation and access.
Respondent apparently has no
plans for a suitable alternate disposal site during wet weather.
Relative to the second date, November 30,
a date preceded by mini-
mal rainfall
(Denny Ex.
2),
the record is clear that refuse was
discharged into water
CR.
103).
We find,
therefore, that a violation
has been established.
There
is considerable testimony concerning the presence of
a septic
liquid at the
site.
Oscar Denny admitted that septic tank pumpings
had been deposited at the landfill
(R.
236).
He testified that as
of July
1,
1970, he had refused
to accept such wastes after being
informed he was violating
the
law.
Rule 5.08 clearly prohibits
the discharge of septic tank pumpings without written approval
of the Department of Public Health.
However, the complaint does
not allege violations of Rule 5.08,
failing even to mention the
deposition of liquids or hazardous materials.
The complaint is
clearly deficient.
Nevertheless,
as we noted in the Sauget case,
the disposal of septic tank wastes is
a most unsanitary practice
and future violations will not be tolerated.
In summary,
we find violations with regard to open burning, unsuper-
vised unloading, fencing, policing of the
area, spreading,
compacting,
and covering,
scavenging, improper salvaging,
and deposition of refuse
in standing water.
We note that conditions at the site have improved
considerably in recent months, although evidently only after the
complaint was
filed.
Letters
to Denny from the Agency enumerating
deficiencies
apparently evoked little or no action
CR.
127,156).
Recent photographs submitted by the respondent
indicate improved
operating methods
(Denny
Ex.
3-10).
Agency witnesses testified
that improvements had been made
CR.
l67.l72,l74,l89).
We
shall
order Denny to cease and desist any further infractions.
As
in
the Sauget case we shall assess
a penalty of $1000 to deter future
violations.
This opinion constitutes
the Board’s findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law.
2—334
ORDER
1. Oscar E.
Denny shall cease and desist from violations of the
Rules and Regulations
for Refuse Disposal Sites and Facilities
and of the Environmental Protection Act as follows:
(a)
Open burning
shall not be permitted.
(b)
No unloading shall be permitted without supervision.
Cc)
Portable fences shall be required when necessary to
prevent the scattering of litter,
and scattered litter
shall be collected.
(d)
Refuse shall be spread and compacted as rapidly as it
is admitted to the site.
Ce)
Refuse shall be covered daily as required by the Rules.
(f)
Scavenging shall not be permitted.
(g)
Salvaging must be carried out in a sanitary manner,
salvaged materials being removed from the
site daily or
properly stored as required by
the Rules.
(h)
The deposition of refuse in standing water shall not
be permitted.
2.
Oscar E.
Denny shall within
35 days
of the filing of this
order remit to the Environmental Protection Agency the sum,
in penalty,
of $1000.
/~
I concur
I dissent
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:
I, Regina E. Ryan,~Clerkof the Pollution Control Board, hereby
~‘~rtify that the Bãard adopted the above opinion and order this
3QtI~uiay of August,
1971.
2
—
335