BEFORE THE ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,
)
1
Complainant,
)
)
-
vs
-
)
PCB No. 06- 177
)
(Enforcement
-
Used Tires)
SHERlDAN SAND
&
GRAVEL CO.,
1
an Illinois corporation,
Respondent.
NOTICE .OF
FILING
TO: Kenneth Anspach
Eight South Michigan Avenue
Suite 3400
Chicago, Illinois 60603
I
(VIA ELECTRONIC FILING)
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that today I have filed with the Office of the Clerk of the
Illinois Pollution Control Board by electronic filing COMPLAINANT'S RESPONSE TO
RESPONDENT
SHERlDAN SAND
&
GRAVEL
CO.'S MOTION TO DISMISS
COMPLAINT, a copy of which is attached and hereby served upon you.
Respectfully submitted,
I
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
LISA
MADIGAN
Attorney General of the
Environmental Bureau
188 W. Randolph St.,
20th
Floor
Chicago, Illinois
6060
1
312-814-5361
ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, JULY 28, 2006
BEFORE THE ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,
)
)
Complainant,
)
)
v.
)
PCB No. 06-177
)
(Enforcement
-
Used Tires)
SHERIDAN SAND
&
GRAVEL CO.,
1
an Illinois corporation,
)
)
Respondent.
1
COMPLAINANT'S RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT
SHERIDAN SAND
&
GRAVEL
CO.'S
MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT
NOW COMES Complainant, PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, by LISA
MADIGAN, Attorney General of the State of Illinois, and responds to Respondent
SHERIDAN
SAND
&
GRAVEL
CO.'S Motion to Dismiss Complaint brought pursuant to Section 2-615 of
the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure ("Code"), 735 ILCS
512-615(a).
I.
INTRODUCTION
On May 22,2006, the Complainant filed its five-count Complaint in this matter. The
Complaint is an environmental enforcement action against a single corporation alleging
violations and seeking penalties pursuant to the Illinois Environmental Protection Act ("Act")
and the Illinois Pollution Control Board's ("Board") regulations.
Respondent seeks dismissal on the grounds of defective pleading, challenging the
sufficiency of each count. A claim should not be dismissed on the pleadings unless there is no
set of facts in favor of the allegations that would entitle the pleader to relief.
See,
e.g.
Northrup
Corp.
v. Crouch-Walker. Inc., 175
Ill.App.3d 203,212
(1" Dist. 1988).
In considering whether a cause of action should be stricken, pleadings are to be liberally
construed and should not be stricken if the facts alleged constitute a good cause of action.
See
e.g.
First Nat. Bank v.
City of Aurora, 71
111.2d 1, 15
111.Dec. 642, 373
N.E.2d 1326 (1978) and
ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, JULY 28, 2006
Great Atlantic
&
Pac.
Tea Co., Inc. v.
LaSalle Nat. Bank, 77
Ill.App.3d 478, 32
111.Dec. 812, 395
N.E.2d 1 193
(lS'
Dist. 1979). Section 1
-
106
of the Code explicitly mandates liberal construction:
"This Act shall be liberally construed, to the end that controversies may be speedily and finally
determined according to the substantive rights of the parties." Indeed, liberal construction of the
Illinois Environmental Protection Act is mandated by similar language in Section
2(c), 415 ILCS
5/2(c) (2004).
In light of case law, the Code and the Act, Complainant has more than adequately alleged
violations against Respondent in all five counts of the Complaint.
ARGUMENT
11.
THE PEOPLE HAVE PLED SUFFICIENT FACTS TO STATE A CLAIM IN
COUNTS I AND
I1
Respondent contends that Counts I and
I1 of the Complaint, alleging improper storage of
tires, are insufficient in law. The question presented by a Section 2-61 5 motion to dismiss is
whether the allegations of the complaint, when viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff,
are sufficient to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted.
See
e.g.
Urbaitis v.
Commonwealth Edison, 143
111.2d 458,475 (1991). The facts that the Board must, in ruling on
this motion to dismiss, accept as true are well pleaded in the Complaint. Contrary to
Respondent's contentions, these factual allegations are "plain and concise"
as required by
Section
2-603(a) of the Code, and satisfy the substantive requirements of Section
103.204(c) of
the Board's Procedural Rules.
Respondent argues that Count I fails to describe how Respondent's actions meet the legal
definition of "storage." This argument is irrelevant and ignores what the Complaint does allege.
Complainant does not allege "storage", but rather that Respondent has been operating as an
unregulated "tire storage site," which is provided its own definition under the Act.
ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, JULY 28, 2006
Count I alleges that Respondent operated a tire storage site in violation of Section
55(d)(l) of the Act. Section
55(d)(l) provides:
".
.
.no person shall cause or allow the operation
of: (1) a tire storage site which contains more than 50 used tires, unless the owner or
operator..
.(i) registers the site with the Agency, (ii) certifies to the Agency that the site complies
with any applicable standards adopted by the Board pursuant to Section 55.2,
(iii) reports to the
Agency the number of tires accumulated, the status of the vector controls, and the actions taken
to handle and process the tires, and (iv) pays the fee required under subsection (b) of Section
55.6;
. .
."
Count I at
7
12. "Tire storage site means a site where used tires are stored or processed
other than (1) the site at which the tires were separated from the vehicle wheel rim, (2) the site
where the used tires were accepted in trade as part of a sale of new tires, or (3) a site at which
tires are sold at retail in the regular course of business, and at which not more than 250 used tires
are kept at any time or (4) a facility at which tires are sold at retail provided that the facility
maintains less than 1300 recyclable tires, 1300 tire carcasses, and 1300 used tires on site and
those tires are stored inside a building or so that they are prevented from accumulating water."
Count I at
7
15.
The facts alleged by Complainant are: "On April 19,2005, the Illinois EPA.. .inspectors
observed approximately 500 used and waste tires at the Site."
Count I at
7
4. "The tires were
stored inside seven (7) uncovered roll-off boxes and two (2) uncovered semi-trailers." Count I at
T[
5. "The tires that were off the rims were stored inside the roll-off boxes and semi-trailers and
contained water." Count I at
7
6. "During the inspection at the Site, the Illinois EPA observed
unmounted tires that were worn, damaged or defective and that, therefore, constituted used tires
as defined in Section 54.13 of the Act,
41 5
ILCS
5l54.13
(2004)." Count I at
7
14. "Respondent
failed to register the Site with the Illinois EPA, certify that the Site complies with applicable
ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, JULY 28, 2006
Board standards, report to the Agency the number of tires accumulated, the status of vector
controls, and the actions taken to handle and process the tires, and failed to pay the fee required
under subsection (b) of Section 55.6..
."
Count I at
7
17. "The Site constitutes a tire storage site
as that term is defined in Section 54.12 of the Act,
41 5
ILCS
5154.12
(2004), because used tires
were stored or processed at the Site." Count I at
7
16.
In light of what the Act provides, Complainant has alleged sufficient facts to inform
Respondent of the specific allegations
against which it must defend. The Complaint even further
alleges that
"[oln May 4,2005, Illinois EPA sent a Violation Notice ("VN) to
Sheridan S
&
G,
advising Respondent that the accumulation of tires at the Site constituted violations of the Act
and Board regulations."
Count I at
7
8. Thus, Respondent's objection that the Complaint does
not define "stored" or "processed" as those terms are incorporated under the definition of 'tire
storage site' is baseless. Through its argument, Respondent is, in effect, defending itself by
attempting to exclude its activities from the scope of the Act based on a separate and unrelated
definition.
Contrary to Respondent's assertions, it is not necessary at this stage, if applicable at any
stage, to extrapolate a term from the definition of "tire storage site" and require the Complainant
to further describe how a used tire is "deemed subject to 'storage' under the
Act." Motion at p.
2. In its motion to dismiss, Respondent essentially argues on the merits its defense. Respondent
has not demonstrated its inability to understand the capacity in which it is being sued in Count I.
Respondent's argument that Complainant has failed to define "storage" is hardly a defect in the
pleadings, much less capable of rendering the allegations "substantially insufficient in law."
Furthermore, Complainant is not required to prove its case in its complaint, but only must
allege sufficient facts to state all the elements of the asserted causes of action. Certainly the
ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, JULY 28, 2006
Complaint provides Respondent sufficient information to understand the nature of the allegations
and to prepare a response, especially since that is exactly what Respondent has already proceeded
to do in its motion to dismiss.
Respondent's second argument, that Count I and
II
are contradictory, is without merit.
Under the Code, Complainant is allowed to "plead as many causes of action" as it may have. 735
ILCS
512-613(a). Nothing in the Code prohibits Complainant
from alleging liability under
multiple or alternative theories of recovery.
.In Count 11, Complainant alleges that Respondent violated Section
55(e) of the Act.
Section
55(e) provides: "No person shall cause or allow the storage, disposal, treatment or
processing of any used or waste tire in violation of any regulation or standard adopted by the
Board." Count
11
at
f
17. The facts alleged by Complainant are: "During the April 19,2005
inspection, the Illinois EPA observed waste tires at the Site that were placed in uncovered
receptacles on the land and were not part of a systematic reuse or conversion in the regular course
of business and, therefore, constituted disposal of waste tires as those terms are defined at
Sections 54.04 and 54.16 of the Act." Count
II
at
f
20. "Section 54.16 of the Act,
41 5 ILCS
5154.16
(2004), provides as, follows: 'Waste tire' means
a used tire that has been disposed of."
Count
II
at
7 18. "Section 54.04 of the Act, 415 ILCS 5154.04
(2004), provides as follows:
'Disposal' means the placement
of used tires into or on any land or water except as an integral
part of systematic reuse or conversion in the regular course of business." Count
II at
f
19.
"Respondent stored or disposed of used
andlor waste tires at the Site in violation of Section
55(e)
of the Act, 415 ILCS
5/55(e) (2004).
.
."
Count
II at 722.
Complainant does not make contradictory allegations, as Respondent claims, but rather, is
pleading.
an additional, complimentary, count. Motion at p.
3.
Count
II
alleges that waste tires, in
ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, JULY 28, 2006
addition to used tires, were present at the site. Complainant is not precluded from alleging an
additional count involving violations of tire regulations relating to waste tires, and as such, has
properly pled Count II.
Respondent next contends along a similar line of reasoning it applied to Count I, that the
allegation with respect to Section
848.202(b)(4) of the Board's regulations pleaded in Count
I1
"is a mere conclusion." Motion at p. 5. Respondent's objection as to factual specificity is
groundless. Complainant alleges in Count 11 that Respondent violated Section
55(e) of the Act
and Section
848.202(b)(4) of the Board's regulations. Section
55(e) of the Act provides as
follows: "No person shall cause or allow the storage, disposal, treatment or
processing of any
used or waste tire in violation of any regulation or standard adopted by the Board." Count 11 at
f
17. Section
848.202(b)(4) of the Board regulations provides: "At sites at which more than 50
used or waste tires are located the owner or operator shall comply with the following
requirements:
. .
.(4)
Used or waste tires shall be drained of water on the day of generation or
receipt." Count
II
at
f
21.
The facts alleged by Complainant in Count
II
are: "On April 19,2005..
.the Illinois EPA
inspectors observed approximately 500 used and waste tires at the
Site." Count I at
7
4. "The
tires were stored inside seven (7) uncovered roll-off boxes and two (2) uncovered semi-trailers."
Count I at
f
5. "The tires that were off the rims were stored inside the roll-off boxes and semi-
trailers and contained water." Count I at
7
6. "Tires located outdoors can fill with water
from
precipitation events and provide breeding habitat for mosquitoes." Count I at
f
7. "During the
April 19,2005 inspection, the Illinois EPA observed waste tires at the Site that were placed in
uncovered receptacles on the land and were not part of a systematic reuse or conversion in the
regular course of business and, therefore, constituted disposal of waste tires as those terms are
ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, JULY 28, 2006
defined at Sections 54.04 and 54.16 of the Act, 415
ILCS 5154.04 and 54.16
(2004)." Count 11 at
7 20.
To the extent that the facts are known to Complainant, these allegations apprise the
Respondent of the extent and nature of the improper water conditions at the site. This allegation
is not conclusory. It has factual support, and is sufficient as a matter of law.
In considering this motion to dismiss, the Board shall also construe all reasonable
inferences in favor of Complainant. For instance, the tires were uncovered and contained water
at the time of Illinois
EPAYs
inspection. In the context of the date of generation, the Board may
infer that the water was never drained since the date Respondent received the tires. Such
evidentiary facts supporting the allegation will be adduced at trial to address relevant issues such
as, on what date and in what condition Respondent received the tires. Evidence need not be pled
in the complaint. It is at trial, not in the pleadings, that Complainant must present all its evidence
of how and when water was accumulated in the tires.
In addition, Count 11 alleges that Respondent violated Section
848.202(b)(5) of the Board
regulations. Section
848.202(b)(5) provides: "At sites at which more than 50 used or waste tires
are located the owner or operator shall comply with the following requirements:
. .
.(5)
Used or
waste tires received at the site shall not be stored unless within 14 days after the receipt of any
used tire the used tire is altered, reprocessed, converted, covered or otherwise prevented from
accumulating water. All used and waste tires received at the site before June 1, 1989, shall be
altered, reprocessed, converted, covered or otherwise prevented from accumulating water by
January
1, 1992." Count 11 at 72
1.
Basing its pleading on the same set of facts, Complainant alleges violation of a different
regulation, but one with a similar purpose as Section
848.202(b)(4), to prevent the accumulation
ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, JULY 28, 2006
of water in "used or waste tires received at the site." Complainant is not prohibited
fiom alleging
liability under multiple theories. As such, Complainant properly alleges in Count
II
that
"Respondent stored or disposed of used
andlor waste tires at the Site in violation of Section
55(e)
of the Act, 415
ILCS
5/55(e)
(2004), and 35
Ill. Adm. Code
848.202(b)(4) and
(b)(5)." Count
II
at
7
22. While each cause of action in the Complaint referenced all of the factual allegations
contained in the first 16 paragraphs of the Complaint, Count
I1 clearly sets forth the elements of
the cause of action as well as a general statement as to the actions of the Respondent pertinent to
that count.
111.
COMPLAINANT PROPERLY ALLEGED RECORDKEEPING AND
REPORTING REQUIREMENTS IN COUNT
I11
Count
III
of the Complaint alleges that Respondent violated Sections
848.304(a) and (c),
and 848.305 of the Board's Regulations. Section
848.304(a) provides as follows: "The owner or
operator shall maintain an Annual Tire Summary at the site; such record shall include the Agency
designated site number, the site name and address and the calendar year for which the summary
applies." Count
111
at
7
21. Section
848.304(c) of the Board regulations provides as follows:
"The Annual Tire Summary shall be received by the Agency on or before January 3 1 of each year
and shall cover the preceding calendar year." Count
III
at
7
21. Section 848.305 of the Board
regulations provides as follows: "Copies of all records required to be kept under this Subpart
shall be retained by the owner and operator for three years and shall be made available at the site
during the normal business hours of the operator for inspection and photocopying by the
Agency." Count 111 at
7
22.
Simply stated, much in the same way the Board regulations are simply presented, the
facts alleged by the Complainant to support these violations are: "Respondent failed to maintain
ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, JULY 28, 2006
and submit an annual tire summary to the Illinois EPA at any time relevant to the Complaint..
."
and "Respondent failed to maintain records at the Site at all times relevant to this Complaint..
."
Count
III at
77
23 and 24. These factual allegations are plain and concise as required by Section
2-603(a) of the Code, and give notice to the Respondent of the claims being presented. Smith v.
Heissinner, 3
19
Ill.App.3d 150, 154, 253
111.Dec. 543, 745
N.E.2d 666 (2001). The Code also
provides that
"[nlo pleading is bad in substance which contains such information as reasonably
informs the opposite party of the nature of the claim or defense which he or she is called upon to
meet." 735
ILCS
512-612(b).
Respondent's argument is simply that because the exact language provided in the
regulation was not alleged, the cause of action fails entirely. This simplistic challenge by the
Respondent is itself "substantially insufficient in law." The Complaint alleges the presence of
"approximately 500 used and waste tires at the site." Count I at
7
4. Respondent argues that
because the recordkeeping and reporting requirements under the Board regulations apply to "sites
P
at which more than 500 used or waste tires are located," Respondent is precluded from having to
comply with such regulations. Motion at p. 6. In support of its tenuous argument, Respondent
narrowly defines "approximately" under Black's Law Dictionary, so as to limit its meaning and
effect, and exclude "more than."
This argument is, at best, a stretch. A complaint is to be liberally construed with its
purpose being to reasonably inform the Respondent of the nature of the claim. Moreover,
Complainant is not required to prove its case in the complaint, but must only allege sufficient
facts to bring its claim within the scope of a legally recognized cause of action. Thus, when
combining Complainant's definition of "approximately"
found in Webster's Dictionary, that is,
ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, JULY 28, 2006
"nearly correct, or exact," with the Board regulation requiring "more than
500" tires, Respondent
has been adequately informed of its claimed acts or omissions to enable it to respond.
IV.
COMPLAINANT HAS PROPERLY PLED COUNT IV
With respect to payment of the annual fee, Respondent presents the same argument as it
did in Sections I and
II
of its motion to dismiss, that is, that the site is not a tire storage site as
Complainant properly alleges, and therefore, is not subject to the applicable regulations. For the
reasons already discussed in Sections I and
II
of this response, this argument is without merit.
Count
IV
alleges that by failing to pay an annual fee required for operation of tire storage
sites, Respondent violated Section
21(k) of the Act. Section
21(k) provides that "No person
shall: fail to pay any fee imposed under this Act." Count IV at
7
21. Section
55.6(b) of the Act
provides:
".
.
.the owner or operator of each site required to be registered under subsection (d) of
Section 55 shall pay to the Agency an annual fee of
$100." Count
IV
at
7
22. Section
55(d)(l)
provides: "...no person shall cause or allow the operation of: (1) a tire storage site which
contains more than 50 used tires, unless the owner or operator..
.(i) registers the site with the
Agency, (ii) certifies to the Agency that the site complies with any applicable standards adopted
by the Board pursuant to Section 55.2, (iii) reports to the Agency the number of tires
accumulated, the status of the vector controls, and the actions taken to handle and process the
tires, and (iv) pays the fee required under subsection (b) of Section 55.6;
.
.
."
Count I at
7
12.
Complainant alleges these facts: "At the time of the April 19,2005 inspection,
Respondent operated a tire storage site that contained more than 50 used tires and was required to
register with the Illinois EPA as a tire storage site, and therefore, required to pay an annual fee."
Count
IV
at
7
23. "Respondent failed to pay the annual fee in violation of Sections
55.6(b),
ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, JULY 28, 2006
55(d)(l)
and
21(k) of the Act." Count
IV
at
7
24. Thus, the Complaint sets forth the factual
allegations as to the activities of the corporate Respondent.
While the Count references all of the factual allegations contained in the first 20
paragraphs of the Complaint, Count IV clearly sets forth the elements of the cause of action as
well as a general statement as to the actions of the Respondent pertinent to that count. There is
no referencing between counts to render the Complaint incomprehensible. To reiterate, the
purpose of Section 2-603 is to give notice to the Respondent of the claims being asserted. Smith,
319
Ill.App.3d at 154. Thus, and for the same reasons already provided in Complainant's
response in Sections I and
11,
the Complaint more than sufficiently states facts supporting its
claim contained in Count
N.
V.
COMPLAINANT HAS PROPERLY PLED COUNT V
Respondent's argument that "nowhere in Count V does the State allege" facts as to why
Respondent is a tire transporter under the Act fails for several reasons. To defeat a motion for
failing to state a claim, you must first look at the Code. The Code mandates that
"[all1 pleadings
shall contain a plain and concise statement of the pleader's cause of action." 735 ILCS 512-
603(a).
Count V alleges that "Respondent transported used or waste tires at the Site" in violation
of Section
55(g) of the Act. Count V at
7
23. Section
55(g) of the Act provides: "No person shall
engage in any operation as a used or waste tire transporter except in compliance with Board
regulations."
Count V at
7
2 1. Section
54.12(b) of the Act,
41 5 ILCS
5/54.12(b) (2004) defines a
tire transporter as "a person who transports used or waste tires in a vehicle."
Count V at
7
22.
Complainant alleges that "Respondent transported used or waste tires to the Site, and is
therefore a tire transporter as defined in Section
54.12(b) of the Act,
41 5 ILCS
5/54.12(b)
ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, JULY 28, 2006
(2004)."
Count V at
7
23. Complainant
fbrther alleges: "Section 848.601 of the Board
regulations, 35
Ill. Adm. Code 848.601, provides, in pertinent part, as follows:.
. .
no person shall
transport more than 20 used or waste tires in a vehicle unless
. . .
1) The owner or operator has
registered the vehicle with the Agency in accordance with this Subpart, received approval of such
registration from the Agency, and such registration is current, valid and in effect."
Count V at
7
24. "Respondent failed to register vehicles that were used for transporting used or waste tires
with the Illinois EPA, in violation of Section
55(g) of the Act, 415
ILCS
5/55(g)
(2004), and 35
Ill.
Adm. Code
848.601(a)(l)." Count V at
7
25. Thus, in light of what the statute and
regulations provide, Complainant has alleged sufficient facts to apprise the Respondent of the
extent and nature of the transporter violations.
The Respondent's objections as to factual specificity are simply unfounded. Respondent
argues that Complainant does not allege "when such tires were transported, who transported
them, how many such tires were transported, or how such tires were transported."
Motion at p. 8.
Respondent fails to recognize the distinction between pleading and proof. As repeatedly pointed
out in Complainant's response to this motion to dismiss, the pleader is not required to set out its
evidence in its complaint. The pleading is only required to allege ultimate facts, and not
evidentiary facts tending to prove such ultimate facts. Zeitz v.
Village of Glenview, 227
Ill.App.3d 891, 592
N.E.2d 384, 169 Ill.Dec.897
(lSt
Dist. 1992). Therefore, it is not necessary to
plead evidence, especially when more information may be expected at trial regarding the method
of transportation.
Respondent's second argument,
that "the regulation is inherently unenforceable" because
the regulation does not provide an exception, is irrelevant. Motion at p. 9. Count V alleges that
Respondent failed to display a placard on vehicles used for transporting used or waste tires in
ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, JULY 28, 2006
violation of Section 848.60 1
(a)(2) of the Board regulations. Section 848.60
1
(a)(2) provides that
"no person shall
transport more than 20 used or waste tires in a vehicle unless the following
requirements are met. 2)
[tlhe owner or operator displays a placard on the vehicle, issued by the
Agency following registration, in accordance with the requirements of this Subpart." Count V at
7
24. Complainant alleges that "Respondent failed to display a placard on vehicles used for
transporting used or waste tires, in violation of Section
55(g) of the Act, 415
ILCS
5/55(g)
(2004)' and 35
Ill.
Adm. Code
848.601(a)(2)." Count V at
7
26.
This pleading is sufficient to inform the violator of the specific allegations against which
it must defend. Complainant specifically alleges that Respondent violated Section
848.601(a)(2).
The regulation's language is clear. Complainant will present its evidence on this issue at hearing.
The Complaint is legally sufficient.
VI.
CONCLUSION
In summary, Complainant states a claim in each of the five counts of the Complaint.
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss must be denied because it does not meet the standard required
by Section 2-61 5 of the Code. The Respondent should be directed to file an answer addressing
the allegations of the Complaint.
WHEREFORE, Complainant, PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,
respe~thlly
requests that the Board deny Respondent's Motion to Dismiss.
Respectfully submitted,
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,
LISA
MADIGAN,
Attorney General of the State of Illinois
MATTHEW J.
DUNN, Chief
ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, JULY 28, 2006
Environmental Enforcement Division
A
Illinois Attorney General's Office
Environmental Bureau
188 W. Randolph Street,
2oth
Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60601
312 814-5361
312 814-2347
(fax)
Dated: July 28,2006
ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, JULY 28, 2006
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, VANESSA A.
VAE, an Assistant Attorney General, certify that on the 28th day of July
2006, I caused to be served by First Class Mail the foregoing NOTICE OF FILING and
COMPLAINANT'S RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT SHEFUDAN SAND
&
GRAVEL
CO.'S
MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT, by depositing same in postage prepaid envelopes with
the United States Postal Service located at 100 West Randolph Street, Chicago, Illinois 60601:
To: Kenneth Anspach
Eight South Michigan Avenue
Suite 3400
Chicago, Illinois 60603
A copy was also sent by First Class Mail with postage thereon
fblly prepaid to:
Bradley P.
Halloran
Hearing Officer
Illinois Pollution Control Board
James R. Thompson Center, Suite 11-500
100 W. Randolph Street
Chicago, Illinois 60601
ELECTRONIC FILING, RECEIVED, CLERK'S OFFICE, JULY 28, 2006
