ILLINOIS
POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
April
1, 1987
ILLINOIS PO~ER COMPANY
(Hennepin Power Plant),
Petitioner,
V.
)
PCB 86—154
ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL
PROThCTION AGENCY,
Respondent.
CONCURRiNG O1~It~ION(by
3. Anderson):
S~hile I joined
in the Board’s decision to allow
the Agency
to consider
imposing conditions pursuant to Section 122.4~(h), I
believe the more appropriate action would have been to airect
that the permit
be issued without further Agency review.
As the Board Opinion makes eloquently clear,
this case
is
a
distressing example
of tne permit process gone out
of control.
see
no
legal or environmental reason that compels us to wait for
a “Hennepin IV”.
The only remaining
issue
is the Agency’s assertion
tflat
it
has
a right
to
a remand
so
it can consider, pursuant
to the
provisions
of
40 CFR 122.45(h), whether
to demonstrate that
“exceptional circumstances” exist,
and thus allowing
the Agency
to impose turther permit conditions on what it now concedes are
internal waste streams.
Of course, by remanding for further
Agency review,
the board
has set the stage
for
a “Hennepin
IV”
appeal
of permit conditions.
Under
the circumstances of this i~PDLSpermii
appeal wherein
the Board holds
a Oe novo hearing not limited
to
the Agency’s
record,
I think we could properly hold that the Agency has
already effectively waived any demonstration of exceptional
circumstances because
of its failure
to carry
its burden of going
forward
on this issue
in the Board proceeding.
Once
the t~gencyconceded at Board hearing
that these were
indeed internal waste streams,
I believe the Agency had an
affirmative responsibility to at
the very least articulate
to the
Board any disagreement with IPC’s testimony that no exceptional
circumstances exist.
I might even have settled for
an
explanation by the Agency as to what its concerns were that
~revented
it from arguiny
this issue.
77-47
—~—
Instead,
the Agency said nothing
(except for
a hypothetical
on—line statement in its brief),
choosing instead to
rely on a
legalistic assertion that
its admission of error following its
permit determination did not preclude
it from now looking at the
“exceptional circumstances” issue.
Even
if this were to be
true,
by its decision not
to tackle this issue before the Board, the
Agency effectively rejected
a perfectly appropriate Board
forum.
Why? The Agency cannot claim surprise
—
it
is the party
that switched position,
it did not claim that there was vital
information it needed.
Moreover, the federal regulations do not
mandate
the Agency to utilize Section 122.45(h); on
the contrary,
the Agency has
a “demonstration” burden
if
it intends
to use that
Section.
The Board’s concern that its ruling
in hennepin
II might
have contributed
to the Agency’s failure to present evidence at
hearing
is understandable
(Board Opinion at
p.
8);
however,
I do
not find it so persuasive as to offset the consequences of
deferring
to this concern.
while arguably not evidence per
Se,
the Agency did not hold back at hearing when articulating
its new
thinking on other substantive aspects
of
the permit.
As
it
is,
we have a situation where we are prolonging what
is already an
abuse of process,
an inappropriate use
of the Board’s hearing
process,
and a waste of legal and budgetary resources.
The Board should not nave allowed the
stage to
be set
for
a
“Hennepin IV”.
ç~I7I~4~
)~/
~
Joan G. Anderson
I,
Dorothy M.
Gunn,
Clerk of
the Illinois Pollution Control
Board, hereby certify that the ab~veConcurring Opinion was
fiieo
on the
_______________
day of
~2~L~
,
1987.
~
Dorothy M. ~n,
Clerk
Illinois Pollution Control Board
77-48