ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
    April
    17,
    1973
    ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
    Complainant,
    v.
    )
    PCB 72—158
    ROYAL PACKING COMPANY,
    INC.,
    Respondent.
    John W. Leskera, Assistant Attorney General, on behalf of the
    Environmental Protection Agency;
    Leo H.
    Konzen,
    on behalf of Royal Packing Company,
    Inc.
    OPINION AND ORDER OF THE BOARD
    (by Mr. Seaman):
    By complaint filed on April 14,
    1972,
    the Environmental
    Protection Agency
    (“Agency11)
    charged the Royal Packing Company,
    Inc., owner and operator of certain facilities including but
    not limited to an inedible rendering plant located at
    St. Clair
    Avenue and Ice Plant Road, National Stockyards, Illinois.
    The
    Agency further charged that on or before September 20,
    1971,
    that the Respondent discharged obnoxious odors and other
    contaminants into the atmosphere so as to cause or tend to cause
    air pollution,
    either alone or in combination with contaminants
    from other sources, in violation of Section 9(a)
    of the Environ-
    mental Protection Act
    (“Act”) (Ill.
    Rev.
    Stat.,
    1971,
    Ch. 111
    1/2,
    §1009(a)) and in violation of Rule 3-3.280 of the Rules and
    Regulations Governing the Control of Air Pollution
    (hereinafter
    “Air Rules”), continued effective pursuant to Section 49(c)
    of the
    Act.
    Further,
    on or about December, 1967,
    Respondent caused or
    allowed the installation and/or operation of a blood dryer system
    without first obtaining an installation permit from the
    Complainant in violation of Section
    9(b)
    of the Act and Rule
    3-2.100 of the Air Rules.
    The record further indicates that on
    January
    4,
    1973,
    the Complainant,
    the Agency, filed an amendment
    to the complaint and substituted the following language:
    that
    in the years 1969 and 1970, Respondent caused or allowed the
    installation and/or operation of a blood dryer system without
    first obtaining an installation permit from the Complainant in
    violation of Section 9(b)
    of the Act and Rule 3-2.100 of the
    Air Rules.
    7
    583

    —2—
    The Respondent,
    in answer to the amended complaint, denies
    all of the allegations with the exception of ownership and the
    type of operation that is described in the Agency ‘s complaint as
    stated above.
    In addition, the Respondent’s answer to the
    amended complaint urges four affirmative defenses.
    The first
    is that the definition of
    “Air Pollution”
    in Section 9(a)
    of
    the Act is
    “so vague, uncertain,
    and indefinite that men of
    common intelligence must guess at its meaning, and citizens are
    not adequately apprised of the conduct proscribed therein, and
    the person charged with violations of the Act is not fairly
    informed of the nature and cause of the charges against him”.
    The definition of
    “Air Pollution” is not contained in Section
    9(a)
    of the Act but in Section
    3(b) and is defined as follows:
    “SECTION
    3
    (b)
    ‘AIR POLLUTION’
    is the presence in the atmosphere of one
    or more contaminants in sufficient quantities and of such
    characteristics and duration as to be injurious to human, plant,
    or animal life,
    to health,
    or to property,
    or to unreasonably
    interfere with the enjoyment of life or property.”
    It is the finding of the Board that the
    definition of “Air
    Pollution”
    as defined in the Act is not vague, uncertain or
    indefinite and that men of common intelligence can certainly
    understand
    its meaning.
    Statutory authorization need not
    delineate with scientific precision,
    the characteristics of all
    types of pollution.
    To do so would be unrealistic.
    The second affirmative defense goes to Rule 3-3.280 of the
    Rules and Regulations Governing the Control of Air Pollution
    and alleges that attempts to permit deprivation of private
    property without due process of law by the use of improper and
    inadequate standards and methods to prove violations
    of law, all
    in violation of Article
    II, Section
    2, of the Illinois Constitu-
    tion and Article XIV, Section
    1,
    of the Constitution of the
    United States.
    The third affirmative defense goes to Rule 3-2.100 of the
    Rules and Regulations.
    The Respondent alleges that Rule 3-2.100
    of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Control of Air
    Pollution is illegal, void and invalid in that it unlawfully
    attempts to legislate by the adoption of rules of greater scope
    and breadth than authorized by the statutes of the State of
    Illinois, or the attempt by the General Assembly to delegate to
    the Air Pollution Control Board such authority is an unlawful
    delegation of legislative power.
    That said Rule amounts to the
    attempt to deprive the rights of persons to private property in
    violation of Article XIV of the Constitution of the United States
    and Section
    2 of the Constitution of the State of Illinois.
    7
    .—
    584

    —3—
    We reject the Respondent’s first three affirmative defenses,
    the subject matter having been covered thoroughly in
    Environmental Protection Agency v. Granite City Steel Company,
    PCB72-34, and C. M. Ford v. Environmental Protection Agency, and
    Pollution Control Board of the State of Illinois, PCB71-307.
    As to the fourth affirmative defense, the Respondent alleges
    that a permit has been issued for the installation of pollution
    abatement equipment,
    and also,
    the Environmental Protection
    Agency has issued an operators permit for both the blood drying
    process and the meat rendering process.
    This last affirmative
    defense would appear to be more in mitigation than in defense
    since for the years charged in the amendment to the complaint,
    to wit:
    1969 and 1970,
    the Respondent presented no evidence to
    rebut the Agency’s allegations, but did in fact admit to operating
    without a permit in violation of Section
    9(b)
    of the Act and
    Rule 3-2.100 of the Air Rules.
    In the 350 pages of testimony,
    there were two offers of
    proof made by the Agency.
    The first had to do with testimony
    concerning violations predating the Act or any public health
    regulation.
    We think the Hearing Officer properly sustained the
    Respondent’s objection.
    The second offer of proof made by the
    Agency had to do with the submission of certain exhibits consist-
    ing of photographs and memorandums.
    We think the Hearing
    Officer properly overruled the Respondent’s objection in this
    case and ratify the Hearing Officer’s Rulings.
    There is no major disagreement
    on the facts of this case.
    Respondent’s operation consists of the rendering of meat scraps
    and bones in the manner characteristic of operations of this
    kind.
    The violations alleged under Section
    9(a)
    of the Act and
    of the Rules Governing the Control of Air Pollution we find have
    been proven.
    Testimony by the Agency’s witnesses after having
    taken numerous scentometer readings, together with photographs
    (Complainant’s Exhibits 1-5)
    to illustrate the visibility of the
    plume from Respondent’s
    stack and the direction of the wind upon
    which the scentometer readings were based, together with citizen
    testimony as to the obnoxious odors.
    Witnesses testified as
    follows:
    George Marshall
    (P.
    253) resides one—half block from Royal.
    “Q
    And, what about the smell? can you characterize
    it at all?
    A
    No way you can describe it.
    Q
    Well,
    can you describe whether it
    is pleasant or not?
    A
    It’s unpleasant.
    It sticks right in your throat.
    Make you sick at your stomach.
    Q
    All right.
    And, how long have you lived at your
    current address?
    A
    We have been there,
    I think,
    about three years.
    We
    lived further down the street for around eleven years.
    7
    585

    —4—
    Q
    For how long have you been subjected to these odors?
    A
    Ever since we have been out there.
    Q
    For the last
    --
    A
    Fifteen years.”
    James Murphy
    (P.
    258) resides one-half block from Royal.
    How long have you lived at your present location?
    A
    Be two years this March.
    Q
    And,
    have you detected this odor throughout that time?
    A
    Yes,
    I have.
    Q
    Are you able to have your dinner or your other meals
    while that odor
    is
    --
    A
    No sir,
    I cannot eat with that smell.”
    Agnes Counts
    (P.
    262)
    resides one-half block from Royal.
    What can you tell us about odor emissions from the
    Royal Packing Plant?
    A
    Well,
    some days it’s nearly all day but most in the
    evenings, oh say, from 5:00 on and it’s terrible.
    Q
    Can you describe it? Can you characterize it?
    A
    That’s hard to say.
    It’s the worse smell you have
    ever had,
    I can tell you that.
    Q
    Are you able to have your dinner?
    A
    No.”
    And even the Respondent’s witness admitted to the odors
    (P.
    341).
    The evidence indicates that the Respondent now has a proper
    permit and that
    lie is proceeding with his control equipment,
    the
    cost of purchase and installation thereof aggregating $40,000
    (P.
    338)
    ,
    either on or ahead of schedule.
    This we take as
    mitigating evidence.
    We
    direct that the Respondent cease and
    desist its odor emissions and make a progress report within the
    next 60 days to the Agency.
    Because of the long standing
    violations
    as evidenced herein, we impose a penalty in the
    amount of $3,000.
    This opinion constitutes the findings of fact and conclusions
    of law of the Board.
    IT IS THE ORDER of the Pollution Control Board:
    1.
    Penalty in the amount of $3,000 is assessed against Royal
    Packing Company for violation of Rule 3-3.280 of the Rules and
    Regulations Governing the Control
    of Air Pollution and Section 9(b)
    of the Environmental Protection Act in failing to obtain
    a permit
    for
    the
    installation of its equipment and for causing air pollu-
    tion in violation of Section
    9(a)
    of the Act.
    Penalty payment
    by
    certified check or money order payable to the State of Illinois
    shall be made to:
    Fiscal Services Division,
    Illinois ~Environmental
    Protection Agency,
    2200 Churchill Road,
    Sprinqfield,. Illinois
    62706.
    7
    586

    —5—
    2.
    Within 60 days from the date of this order, Respondent
    shall cease and desist the causing of odor emissions so as to
    cause air pollution as defined in the Environmental Protection
    Act and shall report its progress to the Environmental Protection
    Agency.
    I, Christan L. Moffett, Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control
    Board, certify that the above Opinion and Order was adopted by
    the Board on the
    IT~’
    day of
    ~
    ,
    1973,
    by a vote
    of~
    top.
    7— 587

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