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 Ameren objects to the rulemaking petition filed by the Agency pursuant to the fast-track procedures under Section 28.5. ObjMot2 at 1. Specifically, Ameren “request[s] that the Board decline to accept the Proposed Rule for a Section 28.5 proceeding.” ObjMot2 at 5.

 Ameren argues that the Board has authority to consider its objection and to decline to consider the proposed rule under Section 28.5. ObjMot2 at 5. Noting the Board’s statutory role in defining environmental control standards, Ameren argues that “the Board has the ultimate responsibility to ensure that its rulemaking procedures meet the requirements of the Act and the IAPA [Illinois Administrative Procedure Act].” Id.; see 415 ILCS 5/5(b) (2004). Ameren further argues that the Board has already acknowledged this responsibility. ObjMot2 at 5. Ameren notes that, in a resolution first providing procedures with regard to fast-track rulemaking, the Board stated that it has “inherent authority to determine what documents to ‘accept.’” Id., citing Clean Air Act Rulemaking Procedures Pursuant to Section 28.5 of the Environmental Protection Act, as Added by P.A. 87-1213, RES 92-2, slip op. at 2 (Dec. 3, 1992) (affirming Oct. 29, 1992 resolution). Ameren further notes that the Board later codified its authority to review fast-track rulemaking proposals submitted by the Agency. Id., citing 35 Ill. Adm. Code 102.302(b). Stressing that those rules require the Board to file the proposed rule for first notice within 14 days (35 Ill. Adm. Code 102.304(a)), Ameren requests that the Board decline to accept the proposed rule for consideration under Section 28.5. ³ ObjMot2 at 5.

Agency Response To Objection

In its response to Ameren’s objection, the Agency notes that Ameren cites Board Resolution 92-2 in support of its claim that the Board may reject a rulemaking proposal filed by the Agency under Section 28.5. Resp2 at 2, citing Clean Air Act Rulemaking Procedures Pursuant to Section 28.5 of the Environmental Protection Act, as Added by P.A. 87-1213, RES 92-2 (Oct. 29, 1992). According to the Agency, however, “a reading of Board Resolution 92-2 shows the Board stated no such thing.” Resp2 at 2.

 The Agency notes that the resolution followed a question-and-answer format. Resp2 at 2. The Board stated that it did so in order to resolve questions regarding interpretation of specific provisions of Section 28.5 and to provide guidance to participants in proceedings under that section. Clean Air Act Rulemaking Procedures Pursuant to Section 28.5 of the Environmental Protection Act, as Added by P.A. 87-1213, RES 92-2, slip op. at 1 (Oct. 29, 1992). The Board in that resolution first addressed the content of Agency proposals. Id.; see 415 ILCS 5/28.5(e) (2004). In response to a question asking whether the Board would conduct any type of review for compliance with those content requirements before stamping the proposal as received, the Board replied it “will conduct a review of the Agency proposal for minimal compliance with the requirements of subsection (e).” Resp2 at 2, citing Clean Air Act Rulemaking Procedures Pursuant to Section 28.5 of the Environmental Protection Act, as Added by P.A. 87-1213, RES 92-2, slip op. at 1 (Oct. 29, 1992). The Agency characterizes this review as one ensuring that the required elements of a rulemaking package are present when it is submitted. Resp2 at 3; Resp1 at 1; Resp3 at 1; see 35 Ill. Adm. Code 102.302(a). The Agency concludes that “[t]he Board did not raise the possibility that it could actually reject an Illinois EPA request for fast-track rulemaking for any reason other than for failure to comply with the content requirements set forth in Section 28.5(e).” Resp2 at 2-3.

The Agency emphasizes that the Board granted an Agency motion to reconsider a number of the provisions of Resolution 92-2. Resp2 at 3. Specifically, the Agency objected to the Board’s decision to review Agency proposals for compliance with content requirements. Id.; Resp1 at 2; Resp3 at 2. The Agency notes that the Board, having reconsidered the issue, stated that it would conduct “a short review of an Agency proposal for minimal compliance with the requirements of Section 28.5(e).” Clean Air Act Rulemaking Procedures Pursuant to Section 28.5 of the Environmental Protection Act, as Added by P.A. 87-1213, RES 92-2, slip op. at 2 (Dec. 3, 1992). The Agency further notes that the Board characterized this as a “technical review . . . intended to promote, not hinder, efficiency.” Resp2 at 3; Resp1 at 2; Resp3 at 2, citing Clean Air Act Rulemaking Procedures Pursuant to Section 28.5 of the Environmental Protection Act, as Added by P.A. 87-1213, RES 92-2, slip op. at 3 (Dec. 3, 1992). Stressing the Board’s statement that it “will not delay a proposal because of minor problems” and the Board’s concern in the original resolution with filing a proposed rule for first notice within 14 days, the Agency suggests that the Board cannot undertake a substantive review of a proposal filed under Section 28.5. Resp2 at 2-3.

 The Agency proceeds to argue that, when the Board codified its resolution, it did not change its view of its authority to review a rulemaking proposal submitted under Section 28.5. Resp2 at 4; Resp1 at 3; Resp3 at 3, citing Revision of the Board’s Procedural Rules: 35 Ill. Adm. Code 101-130, R 00-20. The Agency claims that only one provision of the Board’s revised procedural rules addresses the Board’s authority to reject a Section 28.5 proposal. Resp2 at 4; Resp1 at 3; Resp3 at 3, citing 35 Ill. Adm. Code 102.302(a). Characterizing that provision as a “checklist of items to be included in a fast-track proposal” (Resp2 at 4), the Agency suggests that the Board’s authority is limited to rejecting a proposal for filing only if it lacks one or more items from that checklist. Resp1 at 1; Resp3 at 1. The Board’s procedural rules “do not claim the ability to decide the merits of a submission under Section 28.5.” Resp2 at 4; Resp1 at 3; Resp3 at 3. Consequently, the Agency claims “the Board cannot refuse to accept the rulemaking under either Section 28.5 of the Act or Section 102.302(b) of the Board’s rules.” Resp1 at 4; Resp3 at 4.

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Replies To Agency Response To Objections

 On April 5, 2006, the Board received a reply from Ameren (Reply2), a joint reply from Dynegy, Midwest Generation, and SIPC (Reply1), and a reply from Kincaid Generation (Reply3). The Board separately addresses the arguments in those replies below.

Ameren Reply. Ameren argues that it has “clearly documented the Board’s authority to reject the Proposal.” Reply2 at 1. Ameren argues that, in adopting Resolution 92-2, the Board stated that “it had the ‘inherent authority’ to review the Agency’s submission for compliance with the Act.” Reply2 at 1-2, citing Clean Air Act Rulemaking Procedures Pursuant to Section 28.5 of the Environmental Protection Act, as Added by P.A. 87-1213, RES 92-2, slip op. at 2 (Dec. 3, 1992). Ameren further argues that, while the Board noted the short amount of time in which it could conduct that review, “it never strayed from its position that it had the authority to conduct this review and codified its position in its procedural rules.” Reply2 at 2, citing 35 Ill. Adm. Code 102.302(b).

 Ameren characterizes as “ridiculous” the Agency’s claim that the Board can review a rulemaking proposal for technical compliance with the Act but cannot determine whether the rulemaking procedure would be lawful. Reply2 at 2. Ameren notes that procedures under Section 28.5 are a “significant departure from the Board’s normal rulemaking process” and that they limit the Board’s evaluation of the proposed language. Id. If the Board could not determine whether the procedures were even lawful, claims Ameren, then the Board would be frustrated in exercising its statutory authority. Id., citing 415 ILCS 5/5(b), (c) (2004).

 Ameren characterizes the Agency’s argument as a claim that the Agency alone has authority to determine whether the Board is authorized to proceed under Section 28.5. Reply2 at 2. Ameren argues that, in light of the history of Section 28.5, this argument is “untenable.” Reply2 at 2-3. Ameren states that the Agency had originally proposed that it would adopt certain federally-required regulations, but the General Assembly rejected that proposal. Reply2 at 3. Instead, claims Ameren, the General Assembly adopted Section 28.5, which follows the general rulemaking procedures in the Act on an accelerated schedule. Id. Ameren suggests that this history shows intent to give the Board an independent role in procedures under Section 28.5. See id. “Nothing in this history, or in the statute itself, suggests that the Board could embark on a legally unauthorized procedure, simply because the IEPA told it to.” Id. Accordingly, Ameren submits that the Board has the authority based on its procedural rules to reject the Agency’s proposal. Id.

Dynegy Reply. Dynegy argues that “the Agency overlooks settled law that provides that a governmental agency always has the authority to determine whether it has jurisdiction over an issue.” Reply1 at 2, citing Metropolitan Distributors, Inc. v. Illinois Dept. of Labor, 449 N.E.2d 1000, 1002 (1st Dist. 1983); Shapiro v. Regional Bd. of School Trustees, 451 N.E.2d 1282, 1288 (5th Dist. 1983). However, Dynegy argues, agencies are limited to the authorities specifically prescribed in a statue. Reply1 at 2 (citation omitted).

 Dynegy claims the language of Section 28.5 provides that only the Agency and not the Board or regulated entities can propose rules. Reply1 at 3. Dynegy further claims that Section 28.5 does not give the Board jurisdiction to consider a rule that is not “required to be adopted” by the state under the CAA. Id, citing 415 ILCS 5/28.5(a) (2004). Dynegy argues that neither the Agency nor the Board “has jurisdiction under Section 28.5 unless the rule proposed is ‘required to be adopted.’” Reply1 at 3 (emphasis in original).

 Dynegy further claims that application of Section 28.5 is limited to federally-required rules for which the United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) is empowered to impose sanctions upon the state. Reply1 at 3-4, citing 415 ILCS 5/28.5(c) (2004). Dynegy further claims that the plain meaning of “empower” requires that “there must be a specific grant of authority to USEPA to impose sanctions.” Reply1 at 4. Dynegy therefore concludes that, unless USEPA is explicitly empowered to sanction the state for failure to adopt a mercury rule, then the Agency lacks jurisdiction to propose and the Board lacks jurisdiction to consider that rule under Section 28.5. Id.

 Dynegy notes the Agency’s claim that the Board, in adopting Resolution 92-2, acknowledged limited authority to determine whether it had jurisdiction over a rulemaking filed under Section 28.5. Reply1 at 5, citing Clean Air Act Rulemaking Procedures Pursuant to Section 28.5 of the Environmental Protection Act, as Added by P.A. 87-1213, RES 92-2

(Oct. 29, 1992). Dynegy argues that “Board Resolution 92-2 does not suggest that the Board has somehow limited its responsibility to determine jurisdiction over a rulemaking proposed pursuant to Section 28.5.” Reply1 at 5. In fact, argues Dynegy, the Board lacks authority to limit its own jurisdiction, as jurisdiction is conferred statutorily. Id.

 Dynegy further argues that “Section 28.5 jurisdiction has not been seriously disputed in prior rulemakings.” Reply1 at 5. Dynegy suggests that the Board, in the absence of such a dispute, has assumed that the Agency has properly invoked Section 28.5. Id. Accordingly, argues Dynegy, the Board has not “examined the issue of jurisdiction and the relationship of that jurisdiction to the sanctions that USEPA is empowered to impose.” Reply 1 at 6. Dynegy claims that, if the Board accepts the Agency’s argument that the Board can conduct only a technical review of a rule proposed under Section 28.5, then the Agency would be free to propose under Section 28.5 rules that are “totally unrelated to the Clean Air Act” and presumed to be facially invalid. Id. Dynegy describes this result as “ridiculous” and an illustration that the Board must have authority to consider whether it has jurisdiction over proposed rules filed with it. Id.

Kincaid Reply. Kincaid states that the Board “has the statutory authority to reject a proposal as not required to be adopted under the language of Section 28.5.” Reply3 at 2. Kincaid argues that the Board’s interpretation of Section 28.5 must be based on the presumption that the General Assembly did not intend any absurd or unjust result. Id. (citation omitted). Kincaid further argues that it would be absurd to require the Board to act accept and act upon this proposal without considering jurisdictional prerequisites. Id. Kincaid further suggests that it would be absurd to require the Board to adopt regulations that will be challenged and invalidated because the Board lacked jurisdiction to consider them. Id.

 Kincaid argues that “the Board has the inherent authority to do all that is reasonably necessary to execute its specifically conferred statutory power.” Reply1 at 2, citing People v. Archer Daniels Midland Corp. 140 Ill. App. 3d 823, 825 (3rd Dist. 1986). Because Section 28.5 gives the Board authority to promulgate certain rules on a fast-track schedule, Kincaid argues that the Board inherently may determine whether proposed rules are eligible for consideration under that section. Reply3 at 2-3. Kincaid further argues that “Illinois courts have upheld the ability of an agency to decline taking an action due to lack of jurisdiction.” Reply3 at 3 (citations omitted).

 With regard to Board Resolution 92-2, Kincaid argues that its mere existence shows “the Board’s understanding that it has the power to interpret and apply Section 28.5.” Reply3 at 3. Kincaid stresses that the Board, in addressing the Agency’s motion to reconsider the resolution, stated that it “has inherent authority to determine what documents to ‘accept’.” Id., citing Clean Air Act Rulemaking Procedures Pursuant to Section 28.5 of the Environmental Protection Act, as Added by P.A. 87-1213, RES 92-2, slip op. at 2 (Dec. 3, 1992). Kincaid also disputes the Agency’s argument that Board Resolution 92-2 limits the Board to a technical review of rulemaking petitions filed under Section 28.5. Reply3 at 3-4. Kincaid notes that Board Resolution 92-2 by its own terms addresses only specific subsections of Section 28.5 and is not an exhaustive review of that provision. Reply3 at 3. Kincaid argues that the Agency refers to language in the resolution regarding compliance with technical requirements for submissions under Section 28.5(e) and not regarding compliance with sections 28.5(a) and (c). Id.

 Finally, Kincaid characterizes the Agency’s interpretation of the Board’s procedural rules as “strained.” Reply3 at 4, citing 35 Ill. Adm. Code 102.302(b). Specifically, the Agency argues that the Board may only reject a proposal filed under Section 28.5 if it fails to meet the filing requirements of section 102.302(a). Reply3 at 4, citing 35 Ill. Adm. Code 102.302(a). Kincaid stresses that this language provides only that the Board “may” reject a proposal that fails to satisfy the content requirements. Reply3 at 4, citing 35 Ill. Adm. Code 102.302(b). “This section does not limit the Board’s ability to reject a proposal for failure to meet the content requirements of subsection (a).” Reply3 at 4. Kincaid concludes that there is no basis in the Board’s procedural regulations to conclude that the Board cannot determine whether a valid Section 28.5 rulemaking proposal has been submitted to it. Id.

 The Board notes that its powers are limited to those vested in it by the Environmental Protection Act. See Chemetco, Inc. v. PCB, 140 Ill. App. 3d 283, 286 (5th Dist. 1986); 415 ILCS 5/5 (2004). The Board’s role is analogous to a court of limited jurisdiction. The Board can act only pursuant to the authority conferred on it by statute, and any action outside the authority granted to it is void. Pickering v. Illinois Human Rights Comm’n., 146 Ill. App. 3d 340, 352 (2nd Dist. 1986); see Landfill, Inc. v. PCB, 74 Ill. 2d 541, 560 (Ill. 1978) (concluding prior to statutory amendment that challenged rules “are unauthorized administrative extensions of the Board’s authority”). However, “[a]s an administrative agency, the Board has the inherent authority to do all that is reasonably necessary to execute its specifically conferred statutory power.” People v. Archer Daniels Midland Corp., 140 Ill. App. 3d 823, 825 (3rd Dist. 1986), citing A.E. Staley Manuf. Co. v. IEPA, 8 Ill. App. 3d 1018, 1024 (4th Dist. 1972).

 When the Agency argues that the Board’s review of this proposal is limited to technical or procedural issues, it disregards well-settled case law providing an agency has authority to determine whether it has jurisdiction over a proceeding. For example, in Metropolitan Distributors, Inc. v. Dept. of Labor, 114 Ill. App. 3d 1090 (1st Dist. 1983), the petitioners sought in circuit court to enjoin the department from investigating claims regarding severance pay. The circuit court entered a permanent injunction, finding that severance pay lay outside the department’s jurisdiction to investigate. Metropolitan Distributors, 114 Ill. App. 3d at 1092. The appellate court found that injunctive relief had been improperly granted and began its analysis by stating its agreement with the department “that the initial determination of whether an agency has jurisdiction over a particular matter should be made by the agency itself.” Id. (citations omitted).

Similarly, in Shapiro v. Regional Bd. of School Trustees, 116 Ill. App. 3d 397 (1st Dist. 1983), the court faced the question whether a school board could reconsider its findings after determining that it had jurisdiction over a petition for detachment. Stressing that action on a defective petition results in a void order, the court stated that the school board, “like any other agency, may inquire into its jurisdiction to act at any time, at the request of any party or upon its own motion, since it simply has no power to act in the absence of that jurisdiction.” Shapiro, 116 Ill. App. 3d at 405 (citations omitted).

 These precedents also appear to reflect the principle that, in interpreting statutes, it must be presumed that the legislative enactment did not intend an absurd or unjust result. See Adams v. Northern Illinois Gas Co., 211 Ill. 2d 32, 64 (Ill. 2002) (citations omitted). If, as the Agency argues, “the Board cannot refuse to accept the rulemaking under either Section 28.5 of the Act or Section 102.302(b) of the Board’s rules” (Reply3 at 4), then the Board simply cannot determine whether the proposed rules are required by the CAA or whether USEPA is empowered to impose a sanction if the state fails to adopt them. In effect, the Agency’s decision to proceed under Section 28.5 would be reviewed only by the courts after adoption of the proposed rule. Taking the Agency’s argument to its logical conclusion, even a proposal invoking Section 28.5 to adopt underground storage tanks rules would have to proceed toward adoption, consuming the resources of the Agency, the Board, regulated entities, and other participants. Such a proceeding would be virtually certain to be challenged and to be invalidated as outside the Board’s authority under Section 28.5. Reviewing its own jurisdiction helps the Board avoid the absurd result of requiring the consumption of resources in a proceeding in which its statutory authority has been questioned.

 The Board finds that the language of the Act and case law clearly authorize the Board to consider whether or not a proposal filed pursuant to Section 28.5 may proceed under that provision. Neither Board Resolution 92-2 nor the Board’s procedural rules restrict the Board to a technical review of the Agency’s proposal. By its own terms, Board Resolution 92-2 addresses specific provisions and “is not intended as an exhaustive review of the fast-track procedures. Clean Air Act Rulemaking Procedures Pursuant to Section 28.5 of the Environmental Protection Act, as Added by P.A. 87-1213, RES 92-2, slip op. at 1 (Oct. 29, 1992). While the resolution addresses the form of the rulemaking proposal under Section 28.5(e), it does not specifically address either sections 28.5(a) and (c) and does not prevent the Board from reviewing a proposal for compliance with those requirements. Id.; 415 ILCS 5/28.5 (2004). Upon reconsideration of the resolution, the Board emphasized that it “has inherent authority to determine what documents to ‘accept’” and that it “must have some method to determine whether the proposal is sufficient for the Board to take the action required by the statute.” RES 92-2, slip op. at 2-3 (Dec. 3, 1992).

Public Participation Under Section 28.5

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