ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
    August
    3,
    1995
    PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,
    )
    )
    Complainant,
    )
    v.
    )
    PCB 95—91
    (Enforcement—land)
    BELL SPORTS,
    INC. A CALIFORNIA
    )
    CORPORATION,
    AND
    WASTE HAULING
    )
    LANDFILL,
    INC., AN ILLINOIS
    )
    CORPORATION,
    AND
    WASTE HAULING,
    )
    INC., AN ILLINOIS CORPORATION,
    )
    Respondents.
    ORDER OF THE BOARD
    (by C.A. Manning):
    This matter is before the Board on a motion to dismiss an
    enforcement complaint filed on June 14,
    1995 by Waste Hauling
    Landfill,
    Inc.
    (WHLI)
    and Waste Hauling,
    Inc.
    (WHI).
    The
    underlying complaint was filed March
    14,
    1995 by the People of
    the State of Illinois by James E. Ryan, Attorney General, against
    Bell Sports
    (Bell), WHLI and WHI, and alleges violations of the
    RCRA provisions of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act
    (Act)
    and the corresponding Illinois regulations regarding
    proper treatment of hazardous waste including storage,
    disposal,
    marking,
    inspection, manifesting, transportation and proper
    closure of a RCRA facility.
    (See 415 ILCS 5/21(f),(d),
    (g),
    21.1(a)
    and
    35 Ill. Adm. Code Parts 703,
    722,
    723,
    724,
    807.)
    On
    June 23,
    1995, the People filed a response to the motion to
    dismiss and on July
    3,
    1995, WHLI and WHI filed a reply
    accompanied by a motion for leave to file instanter.
    Bell has
    neither filed a motion to dismiss,
    or an answer to the complaint
    pursuant to unopposed motions for extension of time in which to
    answer, which were granted by the Board.
    (See Board orders of
    April 20,
    1995, May 18,
    1995 and June 22,
    1995.)
    The motion to dismiss filed by WHLI and WHI argues that the
    complaint before the Board arises out of the same “occurrence or
    transaction” as another matter pending before the circuit court
    in Macon County,
    Illinois since 1992 and it is therefore
    duplicative under Section 2—619(a) (3) of the Illinois Code of
    Civil Procedure and should be dismissed.
    The motion to dismiss
    attaches a copy of the circuit court complaint which only names
    WHLI as a defendant and alleges violations of various provisions
    of the Act and the regulations concerning WHLI’s operation of its
    sanitary landfill,
    i.e.
    failing to provide adequate cover,
    control leachate and refuse, causing water pollution,
    improperly
    accepting special waste,
    and improperly disposal in unpermitted
    portions of the landfill, failed to submit an adequate closure
    plan and maintain prior conduct certification.
    (See
    415 ILCS
    5/12(a), 2l(d),(p)
    and
    35
    Iii.
    Adm. Code Parts
    745,
    807,
    809.)
    2
    WHLI and
    WHI
    argue that during the pendency of the litigation
    before the circuit court,
    a search warrant was obtained and paint
    waste was seized from the WHLI landfill and the Bell facility,
    and it is this paint waste which is allegedly hazardous and which
    is the basis of the complaint before the Board.
    WHLI and
    WHI
    argue that since the Attorney General has elected to proceed in
    the circuit court, the Board should decline jurisdiction and
    allow the case to be resolved in one forum, which could include
    the Attorney General amending the complaint before the circuit
    court.
    In response, the Attorney General argues that under either
    the Board’s frivolous and duplicitous procedural rule provision,
    Section 103.124
    (35 Ill. Adm. Code 103.124)
    or the Illinois Code
    of Civil Procedure, Section 2-619(a) (3), this matter is not
    duplicative of the litigation in circuit court,
    and the complaint
    is properly before the Board.
    The Attorney General argues that
    the actions are different because this case involves RCRA
    violations while the case before the circuit court involves
    sanitary landfill violations.
    Also,
    the Attorney General argues
    that the primary objective of the state’s case before the circuit
    court was to obtain injunctive relief enjoining WHLI from
    continuing to operate the sanitary waste landfill which the court
    did award in June of 1992,
    and which the Board cannot grant.
    The
    Attorney General asks that we deny the motion to dismiss on the
    basis that due to the technical expertise of the Board, we are
    the appropriate forum to determine the adequacy of a RCRA closure
    plan.
    We agree with the Attorney General that this case is not
    substantially similar to the matter pending in circuit court so
    as to grant the motion to dismiss and we believe that it is
    appropriate that this case proceed to hearing before the Board.
    The complaint before the circuit court involves only one of the
    parties,
    WHLI, while this case involves the two additional
    parties,
    Bell and Will.
    The case before the circuit court
    involves the operations of only the sanitary landfill, while the
    case before the Board involves whether hazardous waste was
    properly handled from its point of generation until
    it was
    allegedly unlawfully disposed.
    Importantly the complaint before
    the circuit court has not been amended to include any of the
    violations at issue before the Board.
    We also observe that the Board, as a statutorily—authorized
    forum to hear violations of the Environmental Protection Act and
    Illinois’ regulations,
    is comprised of technically qualified
    members designated to hold hearings on violations of the Act,
    determine issues of fact regarding the alleged violations and to
    consider any other ancillary issues to the complaint such as
    permitting and proper closure of a facility.
    (415 ILCS 5/5(a)
    and
    (d).)
    (See e.g.
    Employers Mutual Companies v. Skilling
    (1994)
    163 Ill.2d 284,
    644 N.E.2d 1163,
    206 Ill.Dec.
    110,
    113,
    3
    where the Illinois Supreme Court held,
    citing Kellerman v. MCI
    Telecommunications Corp.
    (1986),
    112 Ill.2d 428,
    493 N.E.2d
    1045,
    98
    Ill. Dec.
    24,
    25, that matters should be referred to an
    administrative agency when it has a specialized or technical
    expertise that would help resolve the controversy, or when there
    is a need for uniform administrative standards.)
    We hereby deny the motions to dismiss and direct that Bell,
    WHLI and
    Will,
    answer the complaint within 30 days of service of
    this order.
    As a hearing officer has been assigned to this case,
    this matter shall proceed to hearing.
    Board Member
    J. Theodore Meyer dissented.
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    I, Dorothy M.
    Gunn,
    Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control
    Board, hereby certify that the above order was adopted on the
    _________________
    day of
    __________________,
    1995, by a vote
    of
    ~/—/
    .
    a
    Dorothy M. c~4nn, Clerk
    Illinois Potlution Control Board

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