ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
November 7, 1985
NATIONAL MARINE SERVICE,
 INC.,
 )
Petitioner,
v.
 )
 PCB 85—108
ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL
 )
PROTECTION AGENCY,
Respondent.
 )
MARTIN,
 CRAIG, CHESTER
 & SONNENSCHEIN
 (MR. JOSEPH
 S.
 WRIGHT,
JR., OF COUNSEL) APPEARED ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER.
MR.
WILLIAM
 D.
 INGERSOLL, ATTORNEY AT LAW, APPEARED ON
BEHALF
OF THE RESPONDENT.
OPINION AND ORDER OF THE BOARD
 (by W.
 J.
 Nega):
This matter comes before
 the Board
 on the July 23, 1985
Petition
 for Permit Review filed by National Marine Service,
 Inc.
(National Marine).
 The Petitioner has asked
 the Board
 to review
the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency’s denial
 on June
 18,
1985 of
 an air operating permit for National Marine’s six—hundred
horsepower boiler
 (Boiler
 *1)
 that services
 its Hartford,
Illinois barge cleaning facility.
 Boiler
 #1
 is located
 on
 a
barge, approximately 40 feet x
 120 feet in size, which
 is
presently moored
 to
 the river bank and now floating on the
 Mississippi River.
 (R1
 19—20).
On October
 1,
 1985,
 a hearing was held at which
 testimony
was heard and exhibits were received.
 No members of
 the public
or press attended this hearing.
 (R.
 10;
 R.
 68).
On October
 3, 1985,
 the Agency filed a Motion
 to Dismiss
this case as not ripe for decision because the relief
 for which
the Petitioner
 asks is,
 allegedly,
 in essence,
 an “advisory
opinion”.
 In
 its motion
 to dismiss, the Agency states that
National Marine does not challenge the Agency’s denial of the
permit application or the sufficiency or reasonableness of
 the
Agency’s reasons for denial,
 but instead only asks for
 a
determination that no permit
 is necessary.
 However,
 the Board
believes that National Marine
 is
 challenging the Agency’s denial
of the permit application,
 for
 if the Agency had issued
the
requested permit,
 it
 is likely that National Marine would
 not
have filed
 its Petition for Review of the Agency’s decision.
 The
Board hereby denies
 the Agency’s motion to dismiss,
 as we believe
that an actual case
 or controversy exists.
On October
 9,
 1985,
 the Petitioner
 filed
 its Post—Hearing
Argument and
 the Respondent
 filed
 its Post—Hearing Brief.
88-293
—2—
On October
 18, 1985,
 the Agency filed
 a Motion
 to Strike
which requested that the Board overturn the Hearing Officer’s
decision to admit National Marine’s Exhibits
 “A” and “B”
 into
evidence and
 to strike these exhibits from the record
 in this
matter.
 Petitioner’s Exhibit A is a letter,
 dated February 15,
1985,
 from National Marine’s engineering manager,
 Mr. David J,
Miller,
 to attorney William D.
 Ingersoll of
 the Agency.
Petitioner’s Exhibit B is
 a letter dated February 22, 1985
 from
Mr.
 Ingersoll to Mr. Miller.
 At the hearing, National Marine’s
Exhibits A and B were admitted into evidence over
 the Agency~s
objection.
 (R. 8—9).
 The Agency has contended that the
letters
in question merely contain arguments and viewpoints of each
 of
the
 respective parties pertaining
 to the applicability of
 35 ili~
Mm.
 Code 201,146(c)
 to Boiler
 #1,
 and that these exhibits
 played
no part
 in the actual permit review process, since
 the Agency
reviewer ana~.yzedNational Marine’s permit application and
 the
applicable
 facts
 in the Agency record and had never seen
Petitioner’s Exhibits A and B before the October
 1,
 1985
hearing.
 (R.
 44—45).
On October
 25, 1985, National Marine filed
 a Memorandum
 in
Response to the Agency’s Motion to Strike which strenuously
argued that the Agency’s Motion
 to Strike should
 be denied
 and
urged
 the Board
 to find that the exemptions
 apply and that no
permit
 is required.
In analyzing
 the respective positions
 of
 the parties vis—a—
vis this issue,
 the Board believes that the Agency has made
 a
strong argument that the exhibits
 in question, which were not
considered
 in the permit review process, should not have been
admitted
 in evidence.
 However, even
 if the Board were
 to
consider these two letters,
 it would not change
 the outcome
 of
this case, because the letters merely set forth the respective
legal
 (and other)
 arguments of the parties,
 which the Board
has
already evaluated
 in depth.
 It
 is well—established that the
Agency must only consider matters
 in the record before
 it,
 and
 if
a party wishes
 the Agency to consider new facts, evidence,
scientific reports,
 etc.,
 it
 is possible to file
 a new or amended
permit application with the Agency
 if
 a company believes that
such measures are warranted
 to establish a stronger record or
position for Agency review.
Accordingly, the Board hereby grants the Agency’s Motion
 to
Strike
 and hereby overturns the Hearing Officer’s decision
 to
admit
 the Petitioner’s Exhibits A and B into evidence and will
hereby strike
 these exhibits from the record in this matter.
On October
 25, 1985, National Marine filed
 a letter from
 its
engineering manager, Mr. David J. Miller,
 which contains various
typographical corrections relating to Mr. Miller’s testimony at
the hearing.
 The Agency has filed no motion or other
 legal
documents
 in opposition
 to the suggested stenographic
corrections,
 and therefore the Board will construe the
Petitioner’s filing as a Motion to Correct Typographical Errors
86-294
—3—
in the Hearing Transcript.
 Thus,
 the Board hereby grants
National Marine’s Motion to Correct Typographical Errors
 in the
Hearing Transcript.
The Petitioner
 ia a corporation which
 is
 in the business
 of
rendering various repairing and cleaning services
 to owners of
barges and tugboats
 operating on the Mississippi
 River.
 In
addition
 to cleaning, repairing and servicing barges and
tugboats, National Marine occasionally,
 in the past,
 sold some
diesel engine parts and deck fittings.
 (R. 21).
 Although
National Marine often employs over 400 people in its operations
during busy times,
 the company’s present employment is about
 120
people.
 (R. 36).
 The Petitioner’s Hartford Shipyard
 is located
on the Mississippi River near Hartford, Illinois
 in an industrial
area with
 the nearest residential areas over one mile away
 in
 the
City
 of Hartford and separated from the National Marine facility
by dikes.
 (R.
 35).
Boiler #1
 is utilized to generate steam and hot water
 for
cleaning the insides of river—going barges in order
 to facilitate
a change of cargo
 or
 to expedite necessary barge repairs and
maintenance.
 Boiler
 *1 has a maximum firing rate capacity of
about
 20 million Btu per hour and
 is fitted with an appropriate
burner designed
 to burn the *6 fuel oil and other hydrocarbons
and miscellaneous substances which are recovered from the barge
 cleaning operations.
As previously indicated, National Marine’s barge cleaning
operations are primarily conducted from a mobile barge which
floats
 in the Mississippi River and is moored to the
 river
bank.
 Boiler
 #1
 is installed on this barge and the barge itself
can be moved from place
 to place
 if necessary.
On April
 27, 1985,
 the Petitioner applied
 to the Agency
 for
an
 air operating permit for Boiler *1.
 A report dated April
 23,
1985 on emission tests of Boiler *1 was included as part of
National Marine’s permit application.
 These emission tests,
which were conducted on April
 10, 1985 by Environmental Science
and Engineering,
 Inc.
 (ESE),
 indicated that the average
“particulate concentration” in
 the tests was 0.506
 lb/mmBtu,
while
 the average
 “sulfur dioxide concentration”
 in the
 tests was
1.25 lb/mmBtu.
 (See:
 ESE report,
 p.
 2).
 On June 18, 1985, the
Agency denied
 the Petitioner’s application for an operating
permit for Boiler *1 citing
 the exceedance of the requisite
particulate
 and sulfur dioxide emission limitation standards
 as
reasons for denial.
*Webster’g Seventh
 New
 Collegiate Dictionary defines
 a barge
as a
 “roomy, usually flat—bottomed boat used chiefly for the
transport of goods on inland waterways” and defines
 a tugboat
(also called “towboat”) as a “strongly built, powerful boat used
for
 towing and pushing”.
66-295
—4—
In its July 23,
 1985 Petition
 for Permit Review, National
Marine claimed that “because National
 is a commercial
establishment and because Boiler #1 uses gas and fuel oil
exclusively with total capacity of less than 14.6 MW,
 it
 is
exempt
 from permit
 requirements pursuant to
 35
 Ill.
 Adin.
 Code
201.146(c).”
 (Pet.,
 at 2).
 National Marine’s petition for
review requested that the Board enter an order “reversing
 the
Agency’s denial
 for
 the reason that no permit is required”.
(Pet.,
 at
 2).
In its pre—trial memorandum of September
 25,
 1985,
 the
Petitioner
 also contended that Boiler *1 was exempt from Agency
operating permit requirements because
 it
 is a “marine
installation” within the purview of 35
 Ill. Adm. Code
201.146(e).
 The Respondent, however, has asserted that the
Petitioner’s Boiler
 #1
 is not exempted as
 a “marine installation”
 as that term is used
 in
 35
 Ill. Adm. Code 201.146(e).
The threshold issue involved in this permit appeal
 is
whether
 or not an air operating permit
 is required
 for Boiler
#1.
 The Petitioner claims that the boiler
 falls within either
 or
both of
 two exceptions from permit requirements
 i.e.,
 35
 Ill.
Mm.
 Code 201.146(c) and 201.146(e),
 while the Respondent argues
that the boiler does not fall within either
 of
 the two
exceptions.
 Accordingly, National Marine asserts that its Boiler
#1
 is not required
 to have
 an air operating permit because
 it
 is
exempted from such
 a requirement because its barge cleaning
facility
 is a “commercial establishment” and its boiler uses
 “gas
and/or
 fuel oil exclusively”; thereby placing Boiler #1 within
the exception delineated
 in 35
 Ill. Mm.
 Code 201.146(c).
Additionally, National Marine claims that its Boiler #1
 is a
“marine installation” within
 the exception set forth
 in
 35
 Ill.
Adm.
 Code 201.146(e)
 because the boiler
 is installed on a vessel
floating
 in
 a navigable water and
 is currently moored on the
Illinois side of the Mississippi River.
The pertinent portions of the Board’s Air Pollution
 Regulations as codified
 in 35
 Ill. Adm. Code 201.146 are
 as
follows:
“Section 201.146 Exemptions From Permit Requirement
No permit
 is required for
 the following classeS of equipment:
...c)
 Fuel burning emission sources
 for
 indirect systems and
for heating and reheating furnace systems used exclusively
for residential
 or commercial establishments using gas and/or
fuel oil exclusively with
 a total
 capacity of less than 14.6
MW
 (50 mmbtu/hr)
 input;...
e)
 Mobile~interna1combustion and jet engines, marine
installation,
 and locomotives;...”
66-296
—5—
The parties both agree that Boiler #1
 is
 a fuel burning
emission source
 for
 an indirect system with
 a total capacity of
less than 14.6 MW (50 mm Btu./hr)
 input, but strongly disagree
 as
to whether
 the Petitioner’s facility is “commercial”
 and whether
it burns
 “fuel
 oil exclusively.”
In
 its Opinion adopting the air pollution regulations,
 the
Board
 noted that certain classes of sources are exempted from the
permit requirements
 and
 that the exempted classes are basically
numerous small sources.
 The Agency has indicated
 that
 it
believes that the exemption of
 35
 Ill. Adm,
 Code 201.146(c) was
designed
 to “relieve the multitude of small’stores, whose heating
systems are probably environmentally insignificant, from
 the
burden of permit requirements.”
 (R.
 66; see: Respondent’s pre-
trial memorandum, page
 3).
 The Agency has suggested that
 the
term “commercial establishment” should be strictly construed
 to
eliminate facilities like the Petitioner’s which are “more
 in the
nature of
 an industrial service establishment”.
 The Agency has
interpreted
 the term “commercial establishment”,
 which
 is not
specifically defined by the Board’s Air Pollution Regulations,
 to
mean
 “a place where commodities
 are exchanged, bought,
 or
 sold”.
On the other hand, National Marine has argued that the
actual intent of
 the Board’s exemptions is
 to relieve the permit
“burden” from “small
 sources” such as its Boiler #1,
 since
 its
Boiler
 #1
 is
 rated at
 20 mmBtu/hr and would need
 to be two and
one—half times larger before exceeding the
 50 mmBtu/hr numerical
standard set by 35
 Iii. Adm. Code 201.146(c).
 Moreover, National
Marine contends that the definition of
 “commercial establishment”
 as
 interpreted by the Agency
 is
 far
 too restrictive in that
 it
would eliminate most service establishments from the exemption
and would defeat
 the alleged purpose of
 the exemption.
 National
Marine argues that
 its Hartford facility
 is
 a “commercial
establishment” because
 it provides
 for the needs
 of river
commerce both by providing needed
 repair and cleaning services
for
 barges and tugboats and by occasionally selling goods
 (i.e.,
parts and fittings for vessels) which are utilized
 in the course
of daily commercial activities.
 National Marine asserts
 that the
definition of “commercial” as interpreted by the Agency would
place
 a “burden” on various small businesses
 to obtain permits
and place an undue burden on the Agency to administer the permit
program for small
 sources.
*As pointed out
 in the Petitioner’s post—hearing argument,
the two aforementioned exceptions have remained unchanged since
their adoption on April 13,
 1972 and
 a comma following the phrase
“marine
 installation” was contained
 in the regulation originally
adopted by the Board
 and apparently inadvertently omitted as
 a
typographical error
 in the current printed edition of Title
 35,
Subtitle
 B.
 However, the Board finds that
 the deletion or
insertion of
 the comma does not significantly change
 the
 context.
or
 the inherent meaning
 of the term “marine installation1’
 itself,
66-297
—6—
The Board believes
 that
 the record clearly indicates that
National Marine’s facility is more
 in the nature of an industrial
service establishment than a “commercial establishment” within
the commonly accepted meaning of the term.
 Although National
Marine’s engineering manager, Mr.
 David
 3. Miller,
 testified at
the hearing that the Petitioner occasionally,
 in the past,
 sold
some few things like deck fittings and diesel engine parts
 (Ri.
21)
 as an adjunct
 to its primary business,
 it is crystal
 clear
that such minor sales
 are
 a minuscule portion of the Petitioner’s
business and are completely
 incidental
 to
 its main business of
cleaning and repairing barges,
 tugboats, and other tiver~going
vessels.
 Thus, the company
 is actually selling industrial
services, and there
 is nothing in the Board’s Air Pollution
Regulations which is intended or designed
 to give
 a “free pass”
or exemption
 to such large industrial service establishments as
 the Petitioner’s.
 National Marine’s facility,
 as an industrial
service establishment involved in
 a substantial business and
having between 120 and 400 employees at various times,
 simply
does
 not fall within the accepted definition
 of
 a “commercial
establishment” and
 is clearly not in the same category as
 a small
store
 or other
 small source with an environmentally insignificant
heating system.
Accordingly,
 the Board believes that the Agency has
correctly interpreted
 the “commercial establishment” exemption
 in
the present case to exclude the Petitioner’s facilities,
 While
National Marine’s arguments on the potential
 effects of
 the
Agency’s interpretation of this exemption
 to other sources are
interesting,
 they are not germane~for, in the present case, we
are only consideri~ng the Petitioner’s facility and whether
 or not
the exception is applicable
 to that specific industrial service
operation.
 Other
 cases involving different facilities and
perhaps other factual considerations will
 be decided on a case-~
by—case basis
 in the general framework of
 a strict construction
of the exemption language.
Thus,
 in ascertaining whether the Petitioner’s facility
 is
indeed a “commercial establishment” within the purview of the
exception in
 35
 Ill.
 Adin.
 Code 201.146(c),
 the Board believes
that
 it
 is very clear
 that National Marine’s facility does not
come within the contemplated exemption.
In reference to the mixed factual and legal
 issue of whether
National Marine’s Boiler *1 uses fuel oil
 “exclusively” or
 not,
the Agency has pointed out that, because
 the fuel oil burned
 in
Boiler #1
 is
 recovered from the Petitioner’s barge cleaning
operations, many substances which
 are rinsed from the barges
ultimately find their way into the boiler
 fuel, and therefore
 the
fuel utilized by National Marine does not legally fit
 the fuel
oil “exclusively” requirement.
Mr. David
 3,
 Miller, Engineering Manager for
 the
Petitioner’s Shipyard Division, testified
 that:
66~298
-,
“,,,The products that are coming in on the barges,
 the
products’ residues are washed from the compartments and
sent
 to a lagoon.
 The floatin
 materials are reclaimed
and sent back to
 the cleaning facility w ere
 t ey are
burnt
 for fuel..,the rust and dirt that is carried
 in
the
 fuel cer~l
 has
 an
 im act on
 the
articulate level
 of the boiler,,,the boiler could be
fueled with
 a commerciall
 available
 6 oil,
 However,
or
 us
 to remain in business,
 it would not be
~
 to purchase fuel oil
 to
support this boiler,,, National Marine Service
 is
currently constructing
 a new cleaning facility which
will,
 as a sort of side
 result, will end up cleaning up
our
 fuel,
 A big part of this new cleaning plant will
be the immediate treatment and rust removal, filtering
of the water
 that is used to clean the barges~ In
cleaning it,
 it goes into a wastewater treatment
plant.
 The water gets cleaned
 up, and we will recycle
that water
 back into the cleaning process and run
 it
through the system again,
 The reason that our
partic~
have identified, one being
 the rust from the
 bar
 cc,
and the secondis
 the mud
 t at
 is
 in the water
 t at we
~shin
 ri~
 which comes out of
 t
 e
Mississippi River,,,With the new cleanin
 lant we will
be able to filter outtepart
 culates and not use the
water out of
 the river...makeup water
 from the City of
Hartford.,,will
 lend itself to reducing
 the particulate
levels
 in the boiler,,,we are under construction right
now,
 I would estimate within three weeks
 it will be
ready for startup,.,However, we have an amount of oil
Ott
 t:towe
~
 (Emphasis supplied).
(R,
 21—39),
In his testimony,
 Mr. Miller admitted
 that:
 (1) many
substances listed in Exhibit
 1 of the Agency’s record
 (i,e,, such
as gasoline, aviation gas, asphalt, lubrication oil, benzene,
xylene,
 styrene, and even soybean oil)
 are assorted hydrocarbons
which are cleaned from barges
 and recovered
 for use
 as fuel in
Boiler #1
 (R. 23—26);
 (2) National Marine’s operations add river
mud,
 rust particles,
 and dirt
 to the fuel and affect partriculate
emissions from boiler
 (R,
 28—29);
 (3)
 the purer #6 commercial
fuel oil
 is not used because
 it
 is too expensive,
 so the company
has unilaterally made
 a trade~offbetween environmental
protection
 and economics
 in which concern over its expenses
 took
the place of environmental concerns
 (R, 30);
 (4)
 the particulate
and sulfur dioxide standards were exceeded on the day that the
tests were taken
 CR. 30—31);
 (5)
 the new filtration unit of
 its
 new cleaning facility will eliminate the environmental problems
previously admitted by Mr. Miller
 CR. 31~36); (6)
 the company has
not applied
 to the Agency
 for any permits for
 the construction
 or
—8—
operation of any of its new facilities
 (R. 37—38); and
 (7
National Marine intends to burn residual oil from its pord
(thereby exceeding the requisite standards) even after
 its
 i’w
cleaning facility is in operation until it builds up its su~~
of cleaner oil
 (a.
 34).
 Accordingly, the testimony of Nationa
Marine’s own witness seems to indicate that the company’s oo
 y
is to burn whatever
 is recoverable from whatever cargo
 a
contained in the barges, regardless of what impurities o
subsatances become mixed
 in, or contaminate, the fuel o 1
The Board believes that the Agency was entirely coct~c
its interpretati~nthat the operations of National Mazine’
Boiler #1 did not
 corae within the purview of the burning
oil exclusively’ er mption of 35 Ill. Mm. Code 201.146(e)
 r
while it appears that the Petitioner’s new cleaning faciF’y ~
 &
hopefully eliminate future environmental problems in refere c3
 o
exceeding the part~e”late
and
sulfur dioxide standards, Natio~.
 Marine would be wets advised to consult with the Agency zid r
for any and all nec
 sary permits before installing and opt
 as..
new equipment to &void costly delays and retrofitting at a 1at~
date.
National Marinc. has also argued that its Boiler $1 should
*
exempted as a ‘marine installation’ as that term is used ii
 •
Ill. Adm. Code 201.146(e) since its boiler is installed on a
vessel floating in a navigable water and is currently moo c
the Illinois side of the Mississippi River.
The Agency states that the Petitioner did not raise this
issue in its initial Petition for Review and indicates that
 e
Respondent was only advised of this claim approximately ac
 r
ten days before the hearing of October
 1, 1985.
 In response to
the Petitioner’s argument that it qualifies under the ‘marine
installation’ exemption,
 the Agency correctly notes that National
Marine is attempting to read the phrase ‘marine installation’
 uu:
of context
and
twist its interpretation to cover the Petitiorer’s
facilities.
 Section 201.146(e) exempts ‘mobile internal
combustion
and
jet engines, marine installation, and locomotives’
from the necessity of obtaining an Operating Permit from the
Agency.
 The comma after marine installation, which the Company
itself has insisted is appropriate, merely indicates that van. us
 items in a series are being exempted.
 Accepted grammatical usage
provides that a comma may
 (or may not) be placed before the
conjunction ‘and’ joining the last item in a sequence or
 series,
it does not change the fundamental meaning of the series
itself.
 In the present case, the parties are arquing over
 tie
intent and purpose of the exemption, rather that the correct
placement of the comma.
As the Agency has correctly noted, Section 20l.146(e
 is
designed to exempt several types of mobile energy sour~.es
 ‘.
those energy sources which provide the motive force ft
 t
mobile source are exempted.
 For example, the jet engire ~
 b
the jet plane
and
 the internal combustion engine
power&
—9*
locomotives.
 In
 the Petitioner’s case, Boiler
 #1 does absolutely
nothing
 to provide any power
 to make National Marine’s barge
mobile;
 that
 is not
 its
 function.
 Mobility of the Petitioner’s
barge,
 if desired, would be provided by separate tugboats and
absolutely
 no mobility would be provided by the boiler itself.
As the Agency has concisely stated,
 it is possible that
 a boiler
on
 a riverboat which provides steam to drive
 the riverboat would
fall within
 the scope of the Section 201.146(e)
 exemption;
 but
that
 is not
 the case here.
The Board believes that the term “marine installation”
should properly be read in the context of
 the related grouping
 of
mobile energy sources which provide the motive power
 such as jet
engines and railroad engines, rather than being taken out—of—
context as the Petitioner
 has attempted
 to do.
 Moreover,
 as
previously stated,
 the Board believes that a more strict
construction of exemptions
 is generally applicable
 in this
case.
 Additionally, although both parties failed to bring up
this point,
 it
 is worth noting that the
 term “marine” commonly
relates
 to “the navigation of
 the sea”
 (see: Webster’s Seventh
New Collegiate Dictionary) and therefore operations on
 a river
might,
 under
 a strict construction of the rules,
 not be exempted
under
 the “marine” installation exception of Section
201.146(e).
 For the previously mentioned reasons,
 the Board
hereby finds
 that the Petitioner’s facilities
 are not exempt
under
 the
 “marine installation” exemption delineated
 in 35
 Ill,
Adm. Code
 201.146(e).
In summary,
 since the Petitioner’s barge cleaning facility
 and Boiler #1 are not exempt from permit requirements under
 the
“commercial establishment”, burning “fuel
 oil exclusively”,
 or
“marine installation” exceptions to 35
 Ill. Adm. Code 201.144,
the Board believes
 that
 the Agency quite properly reviewed
National Marine’s application as
 a request for
 an air operating
permit
 for Boiler #1 and correctly denied
 the Petitioner’s
request.
 The Board believes that the emission test results which
were submitted by National Marine
 as part
 of
 its permit
application clearly show that Boiler #1 exceeded both the
particulate emission limits
 of
 35
 Ill. Adm. Code 212.206
 and the
sulfur dioxide emission limits of
 35 Ill. Mm. Code 214.161.
Therefore,
 the Agency could not legally or properly grant an
operating permit for Boiler #1.
 Testimony by
 the Agency’s permit
reviewer,
 Mr. James D. Cobb,
 P..E.,
 clearly indicated that he
considered whether
 or not National Marine was exempted from the
requisite permit requirements and reached
 a proper determination
that
 the Petitioner was not eligible for exemptions under
Sections 201.146(c)
 and/or 201.146(e).
 (R.
 45—46).
After carefully considering
 the
 respective positions
 of both
parties
 in this case,
 the Board believes that
 the Agency was
correct
 in requiring an air operating permit for Boiler
 #1 and we
believe that the Agency was correct in denying the Petitioner’s
permit application,
 Although the Petitioner has pointed out
alleged flaws
 in the operation of
 the Agency’s permit review
66-301
—10—
system, testimony at the hearing revealed that the experienced
professional engineer who reviewed National Marine’s permit
application considered whether or not the Petitioner’s facility
came within any recognised exceptions to the permit requirements
and decided that it did not.
 Zn reviewing
 all
 the facts and
circumstances of this case, the Board is
 compelled
 to reach the
same conclusion as the Agency’s reviewer.The Board finds that
National Marine’s Boiler Il is required to have an air operating
permit from the Agency
 and
 finds that it is not exempted from
such requirement by either 35 Ill. Mm. Code 201.146(c)
 (since it
is not a “comeercial establishment” which uses “fuel oil
exclusively”)
 or 35 Ill. Mm. Code 201.146(e)
 (since it is not a
“marine installation” as those words are used in the Section
201.146(e) exemption).
 The Agency’s June 18, 1985 denial of an
 air operating permit for Boiler #1 citing the exceedance of the
requisite particulate and sulfur dioxide emission limitation
standards is hereby affirmed.
This Opinion constitutes the Board’s findings of fact and
conclusions of law in this matter.
ORDER
It is the Order of the Illinois Pollution Control Board
that:
1.
 The Agency’s June 18, 1985 denial of an air operating
permit for the Petitioner’s Boiler 41 that services National
Marine Service, Inc.’s Hartford, Illinois barge cleaning facility
is hereby affirmed.
2.
 The Board hereby finds that Boiler 41 is not exempted
from permitting requirements pursuant to 35 Ill. Adm. Code
201.146(c)
 and/or 35 Ill. Mm. Code 201.146(e).
3.
 The Agency’s October 3, 1985 Motion to Dismiss this case
is hereby denied.
4.
 The Agency’s October
 18, 1985 Motion to Strike. which
requested that the Board overturn the Hearing Officer’s decision
to admit the Petitioner’s Exhibits A and B into evidence is
hereby granted.
 Petitioner’s Exhibits A and B are hereby
stricken from the record.
5.
 National Marine Service, Inc.’s October 25,
 1985 Motion
to Correct Typographical Errors in the Hearing Transcript is
hereby granted.
 The hearing transcript shall be modified
accordingly to take into account the typographical cotrections as
indicated by the Petitioner.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
—11—
Board Members J. Anderson and J. Marlin concurred.
I, Dorothy M,
 Gunn, Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control
Board, hereby certify that the above Opinion and Order was
adopted on the
______________
 day of
 t.~*~&~’
 ,
 1985 by vote
of
 7-a’
Dorot y
 M. Gunn,
 C er
 —
Illinois Pollution Control Board
66-303