ILLINOIS
POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
December
17,
1987
ILLINOIS
ENVIRONMENTAL
)
PROTECTION
AGENCY,
)
Complainant,
v.
)
AC 87—6
JAMES PRESSNALL,
)
Respondent.
WILLIAM SELTZER APPEARED ON BEHALF OF THE COMPLAINANT.
JAMES
H. PRESSNALL APPEARED PRO SE.
SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION AND ORDER OF THE BOARD
(by J. Marlin):
This matter comes before the Board on a Motion
for
Reconsideration and Memorandum filed by the Illinois
Environmental Protection Agency (Agency) on October
21,
1987.
By
that motion,
the Agency has requested that the Board reconsider
its September
17, 1987 Opinion in accordance with the Agency’s
Memorandum (herein cited
as
“Ag.
Memo”).
The Board’s September
17, 1987 Opinion and Order
found that the Agency improperly
issued
an administrative citation to James Pressnall.
Accordingly, the Board struck the citation and dismissed the
matter.
Specifically,
the Agency contests
the Board’s conclusion
that administrative citations issued pursuant to Section 31.1 of
the Illinois Environmental Protection Act
(Act), may only be
issued against facilities that are permitted as sanitary
landfills.
Section 31.1
is one mechanism by which the
prohibitions of Section
21(p) may be enforced.
On November
19,
1987,
the Board issued
an Order
stating that
it would “reconsider” its September
17th Opinion
arid
Order.
However, the Board did not address the substantive arguments
of
the Agency Memorandum.
Pressnall was given until December
1,
1987 to file a response to the Agency’s motion.
Pressnall never
filed such
a response.
Today’s Opinion and Order will dispose of
the Agency’s motion on its merits.
In
its Memorandum,
the Agency presents numerous arguments in
an attempt
to support its position.
First,
the Agency states that the language
of Section 21(p)
of the Act is clear and unambiguous and that as
a result,
the
Board
is “prohibited
from employing statutory construction
analyses.”
(Ag. Memo.,
p.
2).
The Agency goes on to state:
84—683
2
The
only
reason
stated
by
the
Majority
for
broaching the issue of statutory construction
is
that
this
was
the
first
contested
~ministrative
citation case that went before
the Board, and
is, therefore,
a case of first
impression.
This
is
not
legally
sufficient
reason
for
embarking
upon
statutory
construction analysis.
The Agency
urges
the
Board
to
reexamine
the
language
of
Section
21(p), which does not display characteristics
of
ambiguity
or
lack
of
clarity.
(emphasis
added).
(Ag. Memo,
p.
3)
The Board agrees with the Agency that the language of
Section 21(p)
is unambiguous and clear.
However,
the Board does
not agree that
it embarked on “statutory construction analysis”
in its September 17th Opinion and Order.
The Board merely came
to its conclusion after considering Section 21(p)
in light of
Sections 21(d)
and 3.41.
Section 21(p)
reads as
follows:
No person shall:...
p)
Conduct
a
sanitary
landfill
operation
which
is required to have
a permit under
subsection
(d)
of
this
Section,
in
a
manner
which
results
in
any
of
the
following
conditions:
The
subsection
then lists twelve specific conditions
Ill.
Rev.
Stat.
1986 Supp.,
ch.
111 ~/2
,
par. 1021(p).
Because this was
a case of the first impression,
the Board
believed that
it was necessary to determine the elements of
Section 21(p)
violation.
To that end, the Board looked closely
at the language of Section 21(p).
In the September
17th Opinion,
the Board
found:
A plain reading of
the language of subsection
(p)
suggests
that
only
sanitary
landfill
operations
which
are
also
subject
to
subsection
(d)
may
be
subject
to subsection
(p).
(emphasis added).
AC 87—6,
slip.
op.
at
5.
After reviewing the language of Section
21(p)
again, the Board
finds no reason
to deviate from its earlier conclusion.
84—684
3
In the previous opinion, the Board
also concluded that the
term “‘sanitary landfill operation’
is plainly read
to be
equivalent to the phrase
‘operation
of
a sanitary landfill’.”
(emphasis added).
The Board concluded that this plain
reading of
those words was appropriate, since
the Act provided
a statutory
definition
for “sanitary landfill” but not
a definition
for
“sanitary landfill operation.”
In other words, the Board
rejected
the possibility that “sanitary landfill operation” in
Section 21(p) meant something different than “an operation of
a
sanitary landfill”.
Here,
too,
the Board
finds no reason change
its position.
The Board
is at
a loss to determine how the Agency concludes
that the Board has not utilized a plain reading
of Section
21(p).
However, the Agency contends that the Board’s reading
of
Section 21(p) does indeed change “the entire meaning of the
clear, unambiguous language of
Section 21(p).”
(Ag. Memo,
p.
3).
Specifically,
the Agency asserts:
Under
a normal
understanding
of the language
of
21(p),
the Board
had
to consider only
the
factual
issue
of
whether
or
not
the
Respondent
was
conducting
a
waste
disposal
operation
as
alleged
by
the Agency.
If
the
Board had agreed with the Agency’s allegation
that Respondent was disposing
of
waste,
then
Respondent would have been required to have
a
permit pursuant
to Section
21(d)
of
the Act,
and
would
therefore
be
amenable
to
administrative citation enforcement.
Id.
It
is clear that the Agency’s “normal understanding” of
Section 21(p) substitutes
the words
“waste disposal operation”
for the words “sanitary landfill operation”.
Also, the Agency’s
“normal understanding” seems
to presume that if one
is shown to
be “disposing of waste”,
then one
is “required
to have a permit
pursuant to Section 21(d)
of the Act.”
However Section 21(d)(l)
of the Act plainly states:
No
personal
shall
d.
Conduct
any
waste—storage,
waste—
treatment,
or waste—disposal operation:
1.
Without
a
permit
granted
by
the
Agency
or
in
violation
of
any
conditions
imposed
by
such permit,
including periodic reports and full
access
to
adequate records and
the
inspection of facilities,
as may be
necessary to assure compliance with
this
Act
and
with
regulations
and
standards
adopted
thereunder;
84—685
4
provided,
however,
that
no
permit
shall
be
required
for
any
person
conducting
a
waste—storage,
waste—
treatment,
or
waste—disposal
operation
for
wastes
generated
by
such person’s
own activities
which
are
stored,
treated,
or
disposed
within
the
site
where
such
wastes
are generated or,
2.
In violation
of any regulations or
standards
adopted
by
the
Board
under
this Act.
This
subsection
(d)
shall
not
apply
to
hazardous waste.
(emphasis added).
Ill.
Rev.
Stat.
1986 Supp.,
ch.
111
1/2
,
par.
1021.
The Agency’s “normal understanding” certainly rejects a
plain reading
of Section 21(p)
and 21(d).
The Agency’s own
Memorandum provides:
No
rule
of
construction
authorizes
a
court
or
the
Agency
to
decide
that
the
Legislature
did
not
mean
what
the
plain
language
imports.
Hill
v.
Butler,
1982,
107
Ill.
App.
(3)
721,
437
N.E.
(2)
1307.
(emphasis added).
(Ag. Memo,
p.
2).
The factors
in 21(d)
other than “disposing of waste” render
the determination
of whether or not
a permit
is required
somewhat more complex than the Agency implies.
Consequently,
the
Board questions the basis of the Agency’s own interpretation of
Section 21(p).
In seeking
to determine exactly what type facility
is
subject
to the prohibitions of Section 21(p), the Board had
applied
the statutory definition of sanitary landfill as set
forth by Section 3.41.
Without Section 3.41, there are
no other
statutory criteria by which to judge whether
a facility is a
sanitary landfill operation.
Section 3.41 states:
“Sanitary
Landfill”
means
a
facilit
permitted
by
the Agency
for
the disposal
0
waste on land meeting the requirements of the
Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act,
P.L.
94—580,
and
regulations
thereunder,
and
without
creating
nuisances
or
hazards
to
public
health
or
safety,
by
confining
the
84—686
5
refuse
to
the
smallest
practical
volume
and
covering
it
with
a
layer
of
earth
at
the
conclusion
of
each
day’s
operation,
or
by
such other methods and intervals as the Board
may provide by regulation.
(emphasis added).
Section 3.41 of the Act,
Ill.
Rev.
Stat.
1986 Supp.,
ch.
1111/2, par.
1003.41.
The Agency concludes that the application of the statutory
definition of “sanitary landfill”
to Section 21(p) “would make
the Legislature’s language utterly redundant.”
(Ag.
Memo,
p.
4).
Under
the Board’s
interpretation,
a sanitary landfill
operation by its very definition
is
a permitted facility.
The
Agency reasons that such an interpretation renders the phrase
“which
is required
to have
a permit under subsection
(d) of this
Section
21”
superfluous.
The Agency asserts that from its
experience
it can conclude that “only waste disposal facilities
required
to have Agency permits obtain permits.”
Therefore,
according
to the Agency,
the Board’s interpretation provides “a
distinction without
a difference.”
Id.
The Agency sums the
issue up by asserting:
The
question
must
be
asked
——
why
did
the
Legislature
pin
the applicability of Section
21(p)
to
sites that are
“required”
to have
a
permit?
The
answer,
of
course,
is
that
the
Legislature
used
clear,
unambiguous
arid
commonly—understood
language
to
set
forth
their
intent
and
expectations
that
Section
21(p)
apply
not
only
to
sites
that
have
a
Permit,
but
to
the
larger
universe
of
sites
that are required to have a permit.
(Ag. Memo,
p.
5)
To the Board,
it
is clear and unambiguous that only a person
conducting
a sanitary landfill operation may be subject
to this
enforcement of Section 21(p)
through the administrative citation
process.
The Agency claims that the phrase “which
is required
to
have
a permit under subsection
(d)” precludes the application of
the statutory definition of “sanitary landfill”.
The Board
believes the statutory definition clearly applies in the context
of Section 21(p).
If the Board does not utilize the definition
of “sanitary landfill” as provided by the Act, how is the Board
to determine what constitutes
a sanitary landfill operation?
The
Agency provides no alternative criteria
in order
to make such
a
determination.
The Agency seems
to suggest that the only
criterion necessary for a facility to be subject
to a Section
21(p)
enforcement action
is that the facility would
be required
to have
a permit under subsection
(d).
If that is
so, why did
the legislature choose notto use the introductory language of
84—687
6
subsection
(d)
in subsection
(p).
In other words,
rather than
drafting the phrase “conduct
a sanitary landfill operation which
is required to have
a permit under subsection
(d)
of this
Section,” the legislature could have merely stated “conduct any
waste—storage, waste—treatment,
or waste—disposal operation.”
The Board
is reluctant to ignore the plain reading of subsection
(p)
and interpret that language
as merely being equivalent to the
language found in subsection
(d).
The Agency claims that a facility which is not required to
have
a permit would
in actuality never obtain one.
However,
the
Agency does not state that such an occurrence
is a legal
impossibility.
Consequently,
the Board’s interpretation does not
necessarily create a redundancy.
Also, the phrase “which
is
required to have a permit under subsection
(d)” could be
interpreted as
a further explanation as
to why the facility must
be permitted.
Subsection
(d)
requires that certain facilities
must be permitted.
Use
of the words,
“sanitary landfill
operation”
insures that only facilities permitted pursuant to the
requirements of subsection
(d) may be the subject of
Section
21(p) enforcement action.
Next,
the Agency argues that the Board should have looked to
the intent and purpose of the Act and reject the use of the
statutory definition of “sanitary landfill”.
Essentially, the
Agency argues:
Considering
the objectives
of
the Act,
it
is
reasonable
to
assert
that
administrative
citations
apply
to
illegal
dump
sites
and
that
it
would
be contrary
to
the objectives
of
the
Act
to
exclude
illegal
unpermitted
sites from the 2l(p) process.
(Ag.
Memo,
p.
7).
The Agency buttresses this conclusion with the statement that
“the
same violation, whether committed by a permitted
or
unpermitted site, has the same environmental consequences.”
(Ag.
Memo,
p.
8).
The Board agrees with the Agency that actual environmental
harm is not necessarily premised upon permit status.
However,
simply because a certain interpretation of the Act
is consistent
with the intent and purpose of the Act, it does not necessarily
follow that the interpretation is proper
in all contexts.
Surely,
it would be consistent with the overall
intent and
purpose of the Act
to enforce all
types of violations,
for
example violations concerning
air
and water, through the
abbreviated enforcement process of an administrative citation;
but the Act clearly does not provide for such an application.
The Board notes that violations covered by the administrative
citation process are in general easily determined by visual
84—688
7
inspection.
The larger question of whether
a site requires
a
permit is more properly considered
in Section
21(d)
enforcement
proceeding.
sentence
deleted.
In order
to support
its conclusion that Section 2l(p) may be
used to enforce against unpermitted facilitites, the Agency
points to the language of Section 2l(p)(7) which reads:
“acceptance of waste without necessary permits”.
However, the
Agency also provides an example when
a permitted facility could
still be
in violation of Section 21(p)(7); acceptance of “special
waste”
requires
a supplemental “special waste permit”.
The
Agency claims that
if the “Legislature intended 21(p)(7)
to apply
to
‘special waste’,
it certainly would have
so stated.”
The Board
is not convinced by the Agency’s argument that the
legislature did not intend 2l(p)(7) to be enforced against an
operation which is accepting special waste but not permitted to
do so.
The language of 2l(p)(7) certainly does not preclude
that
option of enforcement.
An operation is required
to have
a
supplemental permit before it may legally accept special
wastes.
Also,
there are different types
of special waste
supplemental permits which apply to specific categories of
“special waste.”
That is, an operation may be permitted to
accept certain types of special waste but not others.
This could
be one rationale why the legislature refrained from using the
words “special waste”.
In any event, enforcement of
a 21(p)(7)
violation against a permitted facility is not a legal
impossibility.
The Board has plainly read the language of the Act and finds
that the administrative citation process only applies to
permitted facilities.
The Agency seems
to imply that
if the
Board adheres to its September
17th decision,
there will be no
available enforcement route to take against unpermitted
facilities.
This
is clearly wrong.
There are several avenues
open for enforcement against unpermitted sites.
Enforcement actions may be brought pursuant to Section 31.
Depending upon the situation, actions dealing with non—hazardous
waste could
be based on the following provisions of the Act.
Section 21
No person shall:
a.
Cause
or
allow
the
open
dumping
of
any waste.
The
Board notes that the
Act
provides
a
definition
of
open
dumping.
Section 3.24
84—689
8
“OPEN
DUMPING”
means
the
consolidation
of
refuse
from
one
or
more sources at
a disposal
site that
does not
fulfill
the requirements of
a
sanitary
landfill.
(emphasis
added).
b.
Abandon,
dump,
or
deposit
any
waste
upon
the
public
highways
or
other
public property, except
in
a sanitary
landfill
approved
by
the
Agency
pursuant
to
regulations
adopted
by
the Board.
(emphasis added).
c.
Abandon
any vehicle
in
violation
of
the
“Abandoned
Vehicles Amendment
to
the
Illinois
Vehicle
Code,”
as
enacted by the 76th General
Assembly.
d.
Conduct
any
waste—storage,
waste—
treatment,
or
waste—disposal
operation:
1.
Without
a permit granted
by the
Agency
or
in
violation
of
any
conditions
imposed
by
such
permit,
including
periodic
reports
and
full
access
to
adequate
records
and
the
inspection of facilities,
as may
be
necessary
to
assure
compliance with the Act and with
regulations
and
standards
adopted
thereunder;
provided,
however, that no permit shall be
required
for
any
person
conducting
a
waste—storage,
waste—treatment,
or
waste—
disposal
operation
for
wastes
generated
by
such
person’s
own
activities
which
are
stored,
treated,
or disposed within
the
site
where
such
wastes
are
generated;
or,
2.
In
violation of
any
regulations
or
standards
adopted
by
the
Board under this Act.
This
subsection
(d)
shall
not
apply
to hazardous waste.
84—690
9
e.
Dispose,
treat,
store
or
abandon
any
waste,
or
transport
any
waste
into
this
State
for
disposal,
treatment,
storage
or
abandonment,
except
at
a
site
or
facility
which
meets
the
requirements
of
this
Act
and
of
regulations
and
standards
thereunder.
(emphasis added).
Consequently, the Board
is not abandoning
in any way the
existing environmental enforcement process as provided by the
Act; the Board is merely adhering strictly to the Act as
it
is
written.
The Agency also attempts
to support its position by citing
Reynolds Metals Co.
v.
Illinois Pollution Control Board,
108 Ill.
App.
3d 156,
438 N.E.2d 1263
(1982).
Although Reynolds Metals
does concern statutory interpretation in the context of the
intent and purpose of the Act,
it does not appear
to be
controlling concerning
the outcome here.
Reynolds Metals dealt
with the Board’s determination of whether
a particular facility
was required to have
a permit under
Section 21(d)
of the Act.
Unlike Section 21(b),
Section 21(d) does not contain the words
“sanitary landfill operation”.
Therefore,
in Reynolds Metals,
the Board was not faced with the same question which
is at issue
here.
On appeal, the First District found that given the great
potential for serious environmental harm, the Board properly
found that Reynolds Metals could
not be exempt from the permit
requirement of Section 21(d).
438 N.E.2d at 1267.
The Agency further contends that the statutory definition of
“sanitary landfill” should not apply to Section 21(p), due to the
way the words “sanitary landfill” are used
in other parts of the
Act.
This
is an interesting position
to take.
On one hand,
the
Agency claims that the language of Section 21(p)
is clear and
unambiguous
and that the Board need not look further than the
words of Section 21(p).
On the other
hand,
the Agency is seeking
to convince the Board that
it should interpret Section 21(p)
based upon the way other
sections of the Act utilize the words
“sanitary landfill.”
Specifically,
the Agency points
to Section 22.15(b).
The
language at issue
is as
follows:
b.
On
and
after
January
1,
1987,
and
until
and
through
June
30,
1989,
the
Agency
shall
assess
and collect
a
fee
in
the
amount
set
forth
herein
from
the owner
or operator of each sanitary
landfill
permitted
or
required
to
be
permitted
by
the Agency
to dispose of
84—69 1
10
solid
waste
if
the
sanitary
landfill
is
located
off
the
site
where
such
waste
was
produced
and
if
such
sanitary
landfill
is
owned,
controlled,
and
operated
by
a
person
other
than
the
generator
of
such
waste...(emphasis added).
A plain reading of this Section clearly indicates two types of
sanitary landfills:
those permitted or those required
to be
permitted.
The Board agrees that in this context the strict
statutory definition of sanitary landfill would not make much
sense.
But
it is highly significant that this meaning is evident
from a plain reading
of the language of Section 22.15(b).
It
is
important to note the use of the word “or” which clearly
indicates two alternative types of facilities.
Such a clear
indication is lacking
in Section 21(p).
Consequently,
Section
21(p)
is plainly read
to mean something different.
The Board
is
constrained by existing language of Section 21(p).
Finally,
the Agency argues that the utilization of the
statutory definition of “sanitary landfill” would frustrate
enforcement actions.
In particular, the Agency asserts that
if
the definition provided by Section 3.41
is accepted
in a strict
way, many permitted facilities would not be subject
to
enforcement under Section 21(p)
or Board regulations.
The Agency
cites as an example a permitted landfill which
fails to apply
daily cover
to the site.
The Agency reasons that since Section
3.41 describes
a facility which applies daily cover,
if
a
facility fails to apply such cover,
it
is no longer
a “sanitary
landfill”.
The Agency states that the Board’s position would
require such
a
result.
In support of this conclusion, the Agency
quotes from
the Board’s September
17th Opinion.
In
short,
sanitary
landfill
operations
include
only
those
facilities
that
are
permitted
by
the
Agency
and
meet
the
other
requirements
of
Section
3.41.
Therefore,
sanitary landfill operations that are subject
to
administrative
citation
enforcement
of
Section
21(p) must
in the
least be permitted
by
the
Agency
and
fall
within
the
other
requirements
of
Section
3.41.
(emphasis
added).
AC 87—6,
slip.
op. at
6.
On reconsideration, the Board believes that the above
language could
be rephrased to better
reflect the intention of
the Board.
The above quotations should be replaced with the
following:
84—692
11
In
short,
as
strictly
defined,
sanitary
landfill
operations
include
only
those
facilities
that
are
permitted
by
the
Agency.
In order
to
be
initially permitted,
they
must
meet
the
other
requirements
of
Section
3.41.
Therefore,
sanitary landfill
operations that are subject to administrative
citation enforcement of Section 21(p) must in
the least be permitted by the Agency.
Section 39 of the Act provides that the Agency may not issue
a permit
to
a facility
if the facility’s operation will cause
violations of the Act or
Board regulation.
Section 3.41 states
that
a “sanitary landfill”
is
“a facility permitted by the Agency
for the disposal of waste on land meeting the requirements
of....” The Agency could not properly issue the permit
if
a
facility did not meet the requirements of
RCRA
and the other
items listed
in the remainder of the definition, including daily
cover.
Once the Agency issues the permit,
the violation of any
of
the requirements as prescribed by the remainder
of Section
3.41 does not remove the facility from the category “sanitary
landfill”.
The permitted facility
is expected
to meet those
requirements.
Violations of any permit conditions or
prohibitions of Section 21(p)
would not nullify “sanitary
landfill” status nor prevent the enforcement
of Section 21(p)
requirements.
In addition, the Agency cites Illinois Environmental
Protection Agency v. City of Marion, PCB 81—19,
41 PCB 281,
284
(September
3,
1981)
as support
for
its contention that the
Board’s application
of the statutory definition of “sanitary
landfill” to Section 2l(p) will frustrate enforcement efforts.
In City of Marion, the Board
found the City of Marion and two
individual landowners
to h~veviolated certain provisions of the
Act and Board regulations.~ Among
the violated Board regulations
included those which applied
to sanitary landfills.
The landfill
1
In City of Marion,
the Respondents principally argued
that the
Agency unreasonably denied
to the City of Marion
a permit for the
Operation of
a landfill.
After
reviewing the evidence,
the Board
concluded:
Given that there is no competent testimony to
rebut Mr. Mann’s testimony and no meritorious
defense
has
been
presented,
the
Board
finds
that Respondents have violated
all Rules
and
Sections
of
the
Act
cited
in
the
complaint
during the times alleged.”
IEPA v. City of Marion, PCB 81—19,
43 PCB at 283.
84—693
12
in question had never been permitted.
The Agency reasons that
if
a strict Section 3.41 definition of sanitary landfill had been
applied
to Board regulations, the Board could not have found
liability concerning the sanitary landfill regulations.
The
Agency reasoning seems
to be correct
in that instance, however,
Section
3, which states that the statutory meanings of the terms
in the Act should be adhered
to unless the context clearly
requires otherwise, would presumably apply.
The same
is not true
in the instant matter.
The case presently before the Board concerns the Section
31.1 (administrative citation) enforcement of Section 2l(p)
of
the Act.
At the time of City of Marion neither of those Sections
were contained
in the Act.
As
a result,
issues
in the City of
Marion were different than the one considered
in this matter.
The two cases are quite distinguishable.
The Board’s holding
of September
17th only addresses a plain
reading
of Section 21(p).
The Board recognizes that the
legislature, Agency, and Board, itself, may have
in the past used
the words “sanitary landfill”
in
a context that
is not consistent
with the definition of Section 3.41.
However,
this fact does not
weaken the Board’s finding
that Section 3.41 applies
to Section
21(p).
The Board emphasizes
its belief that the administrative
citation process applies
to permitted facilities,
sanitary
landfills.
The Agency attempt to use Section 31.1 at unpermitted
sites “required to have
a permit” will lead
to major
difficulties.
The determination as to whether or not
a site
requires
a permit
is far more legally complex than whether the
12
conditions listed
in Section 21(p)
have been violated.
If the
Agency believes that
a small pile of litter,
trash dumped along
a
rural
roadside,
a salvage operation,
or any other potentially
illegal dumping should have a permit under Section 21(d),
it
Should file an appropriate enforcement action.
In summary, the Agency has not convinced the Board that the
Board’s Order
of September 17th
in this matter was improper.
To
the extent consistent with this Opinion,
the Board readopts the
rationale set forth
in the September
17th Opinion.
This Opinion and
the Opinion
of September
17,
1987,
constitute
the Board’s findings of fact and conclusions
of law in
this matter.
ORDER
After reconsideration of this matter,
the Board hereby
affirms its Order of September
17,
1987.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
84—694
13
Section 41
of the Environmental Protection Act,
Ill. Rev.
Stat.
1985 ch. 1lll,~ par.
1041, provides for appeal
of final
Orders of the Board within 35 days.
The Rules of the Supreme
Court of Illinois establish filing requirements.
B.
Forcade dissented.
I, Dorothy M. Gunn,
Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control
Board, hereby certif
that the above Opinion and Order was
adopted on the
/
day of
~
1987, by a vote
of
_____________________
Dorot y
M. Gum,
C er
Illinois Pollution Control Board
84—695
