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**FUTURE ENERGY
LEGISLATION: FROM
A(Amortization) TO Z(Zero
Emission Credits)**

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Introduction

- **FEJA:** Massive energy/climate law, began as separate Clean Jobs & Exelon bills. Clean Jobs bill aimed to “fix” the Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) and increase energy efficiency (EE) targets. Exelon bill sought \$300 m for Byron, Quad Cities & Clinton nuclear power plants.
- Ultimately enacted: FEJB (SB 2814); combined “zero emission credits” (ZECs) for Quad Cities & Clinton plants with major pieces of the Clean Jobs bill.

Agenda

- Today's discussion will highlight FEJB's 3 core areas:
- **Zero Emission Credits** (Mark)
- **Renewable Portfolio Standard** (Jason)
- **Energy Efficiency** (Katie)
- **Note:** we will discuss cost recovery for each program. Please bear in mind that beyond program-specific rate caps, FEJA also imposes **general caps** on future-energy costs by customer class.

Zero Emission Credits

Mark Powell

ZEC Background

- Significance of ZECs to Board? Hard to discern any likely **direct** effects. But, as we will discuss, there are predictable **indirect** consequences:
 - ZEC program favors **nuclear generation** over generation from fossil fuel-fired plants and renewable sources.
 - **Greatest impact** of this is expected to be on coal-fired power plants – the subject of Board air, water & land pollution regulation.


ZEC Background: IPA procurement

- In Illinois, the **generation** of electricity is *deregulated*; the “wires” (T & D) side is *not*. ICC still approves the “**delivery service**” portion of electric bills.
- Currently, **IPA** procures energy to meet demand of certain customers of investor-owned utilities. The ZEC program significantly **expands** IPA’s role.
- Delivery yr for such customers begins **June 1**.

ZEC Background: FERC, RTOs & ISOs

- FERC has **exclusive** jurisdiction over wholesale elec. markets; auction-based markets used to set *wholesale* energy prices.
- FERC authorizes ISOs and RTOs to oversee interstate auctions. Most of Illinois is in **MISO** (incl. all/parts of 15 states & Manitoba); **PJM** covers the rest, incl. Chicago & N. Ill. (serves all/parts of 13 states & DC)
- **ComEd** => PJM; **Ameren utilities** => MISO.

PJM & MISO Map



ZEC Background: FERC, RTOs & ISOs

- PJM and MISO conduct 2 primary types of auctions:
 - Energy auctions ensure sufficient generation to meet actual load.
 - Capacity auctions trade **options** to require gen. to produce elec. at given time and location; ensures grid has *ability* to meet forecasted demand; MISO & PJM set **capacity** for LSEs to meet peak demand.
 - **Both** auctions begin with lowest bid and stop when demand satisfied; final accepted bid = “market clearing price” => **all successful** bidders.

ZEC Background: Quad Cities & Clinton

- **Quad Cities** (800 workers, 2 units), Cordova, mostly in PJM & licensed through 2032; **Clinton** (700 workers, 1 unit), in MISO, is licensed through most of 2026.



ZEC Background: Quad Cities & Clinton

- **QC** failed to “clear” PJM 2019-20 capacity auction; **Clinton** cleared MISO 2016 one-yr forward capacity auction but unable to avoid continued losses
- In June 2016, Exelon announced intent to **close QC and Clinton**; plants said to have lost **\$800 million** in 7 years.
- In Aug. 2016, **NYPSC** adopted **Clean Energy Standard** to provide \$500 m/yr for 12 yrs for 3 Exelon nuclear plants. FEJA’s ZEC program developed against backdrop of challenges to NY standard by many of the same generators.

Key ZEC Provisions of FEJA

- Starting 6/1/17, IPA must purchase— for utilities – ZECs from nuclear plants; winning bidders agree to sell ZECs to utilities during contract terms (which utilities then recover from *all delivery service* customers)
- For first 6 planning years, subsidy = \$16.50/mwh, increasing \$1 each subsequent yr; *but* reduced if year's “market price index” (proj. energy + proj. capacity prices) exceeds baseline of \$31.40/mwh.

Key ZEC Provisions of FEJA

- ZECs effectively **limited** to **Clinton & QC** (alleged): **nuclear** plants in PJM & MISO = ZEFs, i.e., nuclear plants interconnected with PJM or MISO;
 - “preservation of [ZEFs] is key “public interest” factor in IPA’s ZEC procurement; and
 - specified output very close to **QC & Clinton’s** combined output.
 - but...FEJA does not **on its face bar** procurement of ZECs from other Exelon nuclear plants **in PJM** (whether in Ill. or elsewhere) in danger of closing.

Key ZEC Provisions of FEJA

- 10-yr program – *i.e.*, 2017-18 through 2026-27 planning yrs (unless suspended or terminated early) by generators
- Annual procurement of ZECs is **capped** by formula; max. auth. spending under cap estimated to be *at least* \$235 m/yr

Federal Suits Challenging ZECs

- *EPSA, et al. v. Star, et al*, No. 17-cv-1164 (non-nuclear generators e.g., Dynegy, Calpine), & *Village of Old Mill Creek v. Star*, No. 17-cv-1163 (ComEd customers) (both filed 2/14/17)
- Allege subsidies distort wholesale electricity markets, artificially depressing prices and ultimately driving up consumer costs.

Federal Suits Challenging ZECs

- Claim federal *preemption* and discr. against, & burdening of, interstate commerce.
 - In March, PJM Market Monitor moved to intervene on plaintiffs' side in *EPISA*. And in late March, pls. moved for a **preliminary injunction**.
- Both suits rely on *Hughes v. Talen Energy (2016)*: Sp. Ct. struck down MD new-generator subsidies because they were tied to generator's wholesale market (PJM) participation.
- Oct. 2016 suit pending in NY fed. ct. raises similar claims.

Potential Implications? Precedent?

- Drop in wholesale energy prices, **reducing revenues for non-nuclear generators** and drive closure of fossil fuel-fired plants (**esp. coal**).
- Critics (*see, e.g.,* lawsuits) contend subsidies will distort wholesale markets and ratchet **up consumer prices**.
- Exelon – the largest operator of U.S. nuclear plants – may seek subsidies for its **nuclear fleets** in PA, NJ, OH, and CT.

Renewable Energy Standard

Jason James

Renewable Energy Provisions

- Illinois' Renewable Portfolio Standard, enacted in 2007, requires 25% of Illinois' energy to come from clean sources by 2025
- Subsequent legislation and rulemakings—particularly municipal aggregation—subverted the RPS goals
- Future Energy Jobs Bill hopes to “fix” the RPS and create more clean energy in Illinois
- What was the problem and what's the attempted fix?

2007/08: RPS Legislation

- Illinois Power Agency created to procure wholesale power for Ameren and ComEd customers
- 25% of Illinois' power required to come from clean sources by 2025
- Both power providers contracting with IPA and alternative retail electric supplies (ARES) covered by RPS

Aside: What's a REC?

- Compliance with an RPS is often reached through purchase of Renewable Energy Certificates, commonly referred to as RECs
- Renewable producer gets 1 REC for every MWh generated and fed into the grid and sells it to those who need to comply with an RPS
- RECs can come in different flavors, *e.g.*, solar RECs
- When it comes time to prove compliance with RPS, it is generally shown through purchase of RECs

2007/08: RPS Legislation

- Three paths to compliance:
 - IPA-contracted power producers send compliance money to IPA-administered fund
 - ARES can buy RECs with up to half of their compliance money
 - ARES send other half of compliance money to a separate IPA-administered fund via “alternate compliance payments”
- Early success: in 2009, \$1.3 billion invested in wind power and 632 MW wind installed in-state

2010: Municipal Aggregation

- 2010 Energy Legislation
 - IPA power became expensive, so most large commercial and industrial customers procured power from alternative retail electric suppliers (ARES)
 - In 2010, municipalities began to aggregate customers and also procured from ARES instead of utilities (via IPA)

2010: Municipal Aggregation

- Complications for the RPS
 - As customers moved toward ARES and away from utilities, less funds were put into IPA-administered fund
 - Other IPA-administered fund frequently swept by other parts of state government
 - Only remaining funds went to RECs, usually to out-of-state and already-existing projects
 - Uncertainty caused by mobile customer base and fund sweeping undermined efforts to create long-term power purchase agreements with renewable developers

The RPS “Fix” in the Future Energy Jobs Bill

- New bill kept the same target: 25% clean energy by 2025
- Funding mechanisms altered to ensure that money intended for clean energy is spent on clean energy
- Specific mandates for in-state facilities, new facilities, and solar facilities

The RPS “Fix” in the Future Energy Jobs Bill

- Problem:
 - Funding avenues dried up due to municipal aggregation and fund sweeps
- Fix:
 - Multiple types of funding replaced by a single fund
 - Charge added to distribution of energy and directed into a single fund administered by IPA for purchase of RECs
 - Funds held by utilities until spent by IPA, thus less likely to be swept
 - Begins at \$180 million per year and grows to \$220 million per year to build in Illinois

The RPS “Fix” in the Future Energy Jobs Bill

- Problem:
 - RPS funds were spent on out-of-state RECs, usually toward already existing facilities
- Fix:
 - IPA directed to procure 8 million RECs from new facilities, equating to 1,300 MW of wind and 3 GW of solar
 - 50% of solar RECs must come from distributed and community solar
 - 40% for utility-scale solar, 2% brownfield solar, and 8% discretionary

Other RE features of Future Energy Jobs Bill

- Requires IPA to make a long-term plan for renewable energy development in Illinois
- “Solar for All” directs funds to increase access to solar for low-income customers and nonprofits while funding job training programs
- Net metering—compensating distributed solar generators for energy produced “behind the meter”—continues in Illinois
- Demand charge—assessing fees based on peak energy use—not included

Open questions

- Will funds created by the fixed RPS be sufficient to meet stated goals?
- Renewable energy prices ultimately determined by market, not legislature

Energy Efficiency

Katie Papadimitriou

New Energy Efficiency Standard

- FEJB amended §8-103 (220 ILCS 5/8-103) will now apply to small investor own utilities (IOUs) only
- Large IOUs (ComEd & Ameren) will now be governed by new §8-103B

New EE Plans' Timeline

- EE Plans will now run Jan 1-December 31
 - 2014-2017 plan will remain in force through December 31, 2017
- FEJB prescribes provisions for up to 2030, new plans will be:
 - 2018-2021
 - 2022-2025
 - 2026-2030

New EE Goals 2018-2030

- Separate goals for ComEd/Ameren:
 - 7.8% in 2018 to 21.5% in 2030 - ComEd
 - 7.4% in 2018 to 16% in 2030 – Ameren
- Set as “cumulative persisting annual savings” (vs “incremental annual savings”)
- EE goal is a % of a set number (deemed baseline)
 - Deemed baseline = average sales of electric power during 2014-2016 minus average annual sales from exempt customers
 - 88,000,000 MWhs for ComEd
 - 36,900,000 MWhs for Ameren

New EE Goals, ComEd Example

	2018	2019	2020	2021
Com Ed Target	7.8%	9.1%	10.4%	11.8%
Savings Persisting from 2012-2017 Programs	5.8%	5.2%	4.5%	4.0%
Savings persisting from 2018 program	2.0%	1.7%	1.6%	1.5%
Savings persisting from 2019 program		2.2%	1.9%	1.8%
Savings persisting from 2020 program			2.4%	2.0%
Savings persisting from 2021 program				2.5%
Total Savings that Count Towards Target	7.8%	9.1%	10.4%	11.8%

Source: EFG

10 MW+ Customers Exempt from EE Programs

- Large commercial & industrial electric consumers with demand greater than 10MW
- These customers no longer pay into EE programs and are not eligible to participate starting in 2018
 - Estimated about 10% for ComEd and 25% for Ameren

Additional Provisions

- Utilities will take over DCEO programs
- Public sector: min. 10% ComEd and 7% Ameren of annual portfolio budgets
 - Including Public Housing Authorities, local gov. unit, municipalities, school district, community college
- Low-income: min. \$25m ComEd and \$8.5m Ameren / year
- Gas/other fuel: not more than 10% of the annual goals
 - Converted on eBtu basis with low-income residential priority

Cost Recovery

- EE Cost cap % of \$/KWh paid by eligible customers in 2015 and varies by plan:
 - 3.50% for each year of 2018-2021 plan
 - 3.75% for each year of 2022-2025 plan
 - 4.00% for each year starting in 2026

Amortization

- IOUs may defer EE spending as a regulatory asset and amortize over project lifetime
 - Voltage Optimization has 15yrs agreed lifetime and agreed increasing savings (0.17% in 2018 to 1% in 2025)

Thank you!